This six-day training is intended for case managers/community health volunteers/field supervisors who help households affected by HIV in India.
Le présent guide a donc pour objet de servir d’orientation de base et de point de référence pour l’élaboration d’un projet pilote de marché-santé. Si les principes énumérés dans ce guide s’appliquent de fait à tous les marchés, certains d’entre eux devront sans doute faire preuv...e de souplesse pour atteindre leurs buts. Les projets pilotes couronnés de succès sont ceux dans lesquels la communauté collabore à l’élaboration d’une vision commune d’un marché respectueux des conditions d’hygiène et de sécurité.
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Policy Research Working Paper 6100 | Impact Evaluation Series No. 60 | This study examines the effect of performance incentives for health care providers to provide more and higher quality care in Rwanda on child health outcomes. The authors find that the incentives had a large and significant effec...t on the weight-for-age of children 0–11 months and on the height-for-age of children 24–49 months. They attribute this improvement to increases in the use and quality of prenatal and postnatal care. Consistent with theory, They find larger effects of incentives on services where monetary rewards and the marginal return to effort are higher. The also find that incentives reduced the gap between provider knowledge and practice of appropriate clinical procedures by 20 percent, implying a large gain in efficiency. Finally, they find evidence of a strong complementarity between performance incentives and provider skill .
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Paying for performance (P4P) provides financial incentives for providers to increase the use and quality of care. P4P can affect health care by providing incentives for providers to put more effort into specific activities, and by increasing the amount of resources available to finance the delivery ...of services. This paper evaluates the impact of P4P on the use and quality of prenatal, institutional delivery, and child preventive care using data produced from a prospective quasi-experimental evaluation nested into the national rollout of P4P in Rwanda. Treatment facilities were enrolled in the P4P scheme in 2006 and comparison facilities were enrolled two years later. The incentive effect is isolated from the resource effect by increasing comparison facilities’ input-based budgets by the average P4P payments to the treatment facilities. The data were collected from 166 facilities and a random sample of 2158 households. P4P had a large and significant positive impact on institutional deliveries and preventive care visits by young children, and improved quality of prenatal care. The authors find no effect on the number of prenatal care visits or on immunization rates. P4P had the greatest effect on those services that had the highest payment rates and needed the lowest provider effort. P4P financial performance incentives can improve both the use of and the quality of health services. Because the analysis isolates the incentive effect from the resource effect in P4P, the results indicate that an equal amount of financial resources without the incentives would not have achieved the same gain in outcomes.
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Harmonising proven strategies beyond the emergency phase. Zero Hunger Phase 2