


The presence of areas not currently under the control of the Government of Ukraine (non-government-controlled areas or NGCAs) and security risks arising from active ground conflict and shelling continue to drive high access constraints for oblasts in the south and east of Ukraine. In rural areas and communities along the frontlines, access remains highly dependent on local NGOs and volunteers who face funding and other challenges. Nationwide, an escalation of air strikes has damaged critical civilian infrastructure, affecting the delivery of services, especially electricity.

As winter approaches, these constraints suggest a need to closely monitor the eastern, southern, and central oblasts hosting increasing numbers of IDPs. Where the nationwide escalation in missile and air strikes is increasingly straining service delivery, intensifying humanitarian needs could create new tensions within host communities even far from the frontlines. The sustainability of the local response capacity also remains a concern given that local NGOs and volunteers continue to fill gaps in the response while access constraints more acutely hamper international humanitarians – for example, given their lack of access to more remote or frontline areas. Based on lessons learnt from responders in newly accessible areas, information and coordination gaps between donors, public authorities, local responders, and communities could worsen financial, material, and psychological burnout.

As the dynamics of the conflict continue to evolve, significant access developments emerge accordingly. In September–October, these included:

- **Newly accessible areas in Kharkiv:** a large portion of Kharkiv oblast became newly accessible following a counteroffensive by Ukrainian forces. Regardless, access constraints in the oblast remained high because of severe damage to civilian infrastructure and the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).
- Movement between the government-controlled areas (GCAs) and NGCAs of **Zaporizhzhia oblast significantly decreased.** For travel towards GCAs, movement slowed down following the claimed annexation of the oblast by the Russian Federation. For travel into NGCAs, Ukrainian authorities temporarily halted movement after a missile strike hit a civilian convoy on 30 September.
- **The evacuation of Kherson city** and surrounding areas towards the eastern bank of Dnipro River by Russian authorities raised concerns about forced displacement and disruptions to basic service delivery due to destruction of critical civilian infrastructure.

Humanitarian access severity in Ukraine



Sources: ACAPS using data from ISW (21/10/2022); ACLED (accessed 26/10/2022)
See the full map on page 11.

About this report


This report aims to provide a comprehensive comparison of access challenges across different oblasts in Ukraine to inform humanitarian responders and support decision-making. This analysis is based on a severity model that ACAPS developed using data collection from secondary sources publicly available as at **31 October 2022**, complemented by 17 key informant interviews.

The access constraints analysed in this report involve the access of people to humanitarian aid, the access of humanitarian responders to the affected population, and security and physical constraints.

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OBLASTS WITH THE HIGHEST ACCESS CONSTRAINTS



Access constraints remain high across all oblasts along the frontline. The presence of NGCAs, which hampers the free movement of civilians and humanitarians, continues to drive these constraints. Shelling and air strikes also cause safety and security concerns and impede the provision of water and electricity.

The biggest shift in access constraints since early September occurred in Kharkiv, where a counteroffensive by Ukrainian forces between 10–13 September removed the presence of Russian forces from most of the oblast’s territory (The Guardian 13/09/2022 and 11/09/2022). In Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, the frontline has remained largely unchanged except for some small Ukrainian advances. On the Kherson and Mykolaiv front, Ukrainian forces have regained some territory in Beryslav raion (ISW 01/09/2022 and 01/11/2022).

Sources: ACAPS using data from ISW (21/10/2022); ACLED (accessed 26/10/2022)

Humanitarian access severity scores for oblasts with the highest access constraints **with** the 'Multiple authorities controlling the territory' access event (all scores range from 0–5):

	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIANS	SECURITY AND PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS	SEVERITY SCORE
Donetsk	5.00	4.50	3.22	4.2
Kharkiv	5.00	4.33	3.48	4.3
Kherson	5.00	4.08	2.92	4.0
Luhansk	5.00	4.50	2.92	4.1
Mykolaiv	5.00	3.25	3.03	3.8
Zaporizhzhia	5.00	4.60	3.33	4.3

Humanitarian access severity scores for oblasts with the highest access constraints **without** the 'Multiple authorities controlling the territory' access event (all scores range from 0–5):

	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIANS	SECURITY AND PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS	SEVERITY SCORE
Donetsk	3.50	3.72	3.22	3.5
Kharkiv	3.20	3.33	3.48	3.3
Kherson	2.50	3.40	2.95	2.9
Luhansk	3.50	3.50	2.92	3.3
Mykolaiv	3.50	2.25	3.03	2.9
Zaporizhzhia	2.50	3.92	3.33	3.3

As access severity scores are relatively similar among oblasts with the highest access constraints, the order of the oblasts in the following section does not strictly follow these scores. It is based on an analytical interpretation of the access situation using the severity score, secondary data, and observations from key informants.

Luhansk

Access constraints remain very high in Luhansk as most of the oblast, except for a small area in the east, is currently not under the control of the Government of Ukraine. Constraints on civilians' ability to access assistance and on humanitarians' capacity to reach the population in need are severe, although detailed information on the specific constraints for both is not available. A relatively low level of ground conflict also characterises the situation in Luhansk compared to other oblasts along the frontline.

Level of conflict: the lower level of conflict in Luhansk oblast explains its lower severity score in the third pillar (security and physical constraints) compared to other oblasts along the frontline. In fact, Luhansk only accounted for less than 4% of reported ACLED conflict incidents among the six oblasts between September–October (ACLED accessed 08/11/2022).

Access of humanitarians: despite the lower level of conflict, Luhansk oblast has the second-lowest number of responders operating as part of the international humanitarian response after Kherson (Humanitarianresponse accessed 08/11/2022).

Zaporizhzhia

Humanitarian access in Zaporizhzhia has further deteriorated since September because of continued heavy shelling, subsequent damage to infrastructure (including the power grid), and constricted access to areas near the frontline due to restrictions by the Ukrainian military (KII 28/10/2022 a; KII 28/10/2022 b). As at 28 October, 27,600 people in the oblast remained without electricity (Dixi Group 28/10/2022). Increased restrictions on movement from the NGCA to the GCA at the Vasylivka checkpoint also drive access constraints in Zaporizhzhia.

Movement of civilians: the Vasylivka checkpoint is the only regulated crossing point along the frontline for people wishing to travel between Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia GCAs and NGCAs (Ukrainska Pravda 04/10/2022). In Zaporizhzhia, travel from the NGCA towards the GCA significantly slowed down in late September and October because of administrative constraints related to Russia's claimed annexation of the oblast.

On 30 September, a missile strike hit a civilian convoy on the outskirts of Zaporizhzhia city, where people were queuing to enter the NGCA to pick up relatives and deliver aid. The incident killed more than 30 people and injured over 100 (Ukrainska Pravda 30/09/2022). Ukrainian authorities temporarily suspended crossings towards the Zaporizhzhia NGCA immediately after the missile strike (Slovo i Dilo 02/10/2022). Ukrainian authorities generally suspend crossings into NGCAs whenever they consider the safety and security risks too high (ND 13/10/2022).

Since the claimed annexation of the oblast by Russia on 30 September, Russian forces have turned the Vasylivka checkpoint into a “state border” (BBC 04/10/2022; Ukrinform 04/10/2022). Since 1 October, exiting the NGCA has only been possible with a permit acquired via a written application to the de-facto authorities (Visit Ukraine 23/09/2022). On 8 October, 6,000 cars were waiting to exit at Vasylivka, with some waiting for more than ten days (Ukrainska Pravda 08/10/2022). In late October, daily reported evacuations from Zaporizhzhia oblast varied between 100–200 people (compared to up to 1,500 per day prior to the introduction of permits) (Suspline News 22/10/2022).

Shelling and missile strikes: Russian forces have increasingly been targeting Zaporizhzhia towards the end of September, causing increased damage to civilian infrastructure and driving displacement. Between July–September, the number of shelling incidents and air and missile strikes on the oblast increased from 224 to 437 (ACLEd accessed 08/11/2022). The resulting security constraints are a major impediment to civilians’ ability to reach assistance (KII 28/10/2022 a; KII 28/10/2022 b).

Communities near the frontline: most of the assistance to the oblast is concentrated in Zaporizhzhia city, with little distribution towards rural areas and communities near the frontlines. Local volunteer groups are the only ones providing assistance to these communities, although access is not always guaranteed because of restrictions by the Ukrainian military (KII 28/10/2022 a).

Kherson

Access to Kherson oblast remains constrained as Russian forces control most of the oblast, although the counteroffensive by Ukrainian forces in September has made some areas newly accessible in its northern region (Beryslav raion).

Access of humanitarians: humanitarian access is possible, including by international responders, to Kherson GCAs. These territories are slowly expanding as a result of the military offensive, which gained control of 90 settlements between 12–26 October (OCHA 26/10/2022). Kherson is the oblast with the lowest number of humanitarian responders within the international cluster system (Humanitarianresponse accessed 08/11/2022).

Kherson city: on 19 October, Russian authorities announced the evacuation of the west bank of Dnipro River, including Kherson city (PBS 22/10/2022). By 26 October, 70,000 people had evacuated from the west bank to the east bank (Meduza 26/10/2022). On 31 October, the evacuation order was extended to a 15km area from Dnipro River (RFE/RL 31/10/2022). The way the evacuation is being carried out has added to the constraints civilians face in accessing services, including:

- **Forcible displacement:** the evacuation of civilians by Russian forces from Kherson city further into NGCAs is increasing concerns over forcible population displacement (CNN 07/11/2022).
- **Disruption of health services:** as part of the evacuation, Russian forces have shut down municipal hospitals, taken away equipment, and forced doctors to move to Russia (Ukrainska Pravda 28/10/2022; USA Today 29/10/2022).

Movement of civilians: reports indicate that Russian officials are using checkpoint controls to slow the movement of civilians trying to leave the Kherson NGCA. These controls include lengthy vehicle inspections, property seizures, long document reviews, requirements for multiple documents, and the turning away of certain civilians (ISW 03/10/2022).

Donetsk

Access constraints in Donetsk oblast are still high because of the presence of NGCAs and active ground conflict. There were no new major access trends or events during September–October.

Mines and UXO: the presence of mines and UXO adds significant risks to the movement of civilians. Donetsk is the oblast with the second-highest number of reported mine incidents among oblasts along the frontline. During September–October, mines and UXO caused over 18 civilian casualties, including one fatality, in Donetsk, mainly in Kirovskiyi district (Donetsk city) and Mariupol (ACLEd accessed 08/11/2022).

Damages to civilian infrastructure: Donetsk was the oblast with the highest number (37%) of newly recorded damage to civilian infrastructure between September–October throughout Ukraine.

Mykolaiv

Mykolaiv oblast has lower access constraints than the other oblasts along the frontlines as only a small part remains under the control of Russian forces. That said, shelling and air strikes continue to hamper the free movement of civilians and humanitarians, drive additional displacement, and impede the delivery of services, particularly water.

Damage to civilian infrastructure: Mykolaiv is the oblast with the second-highest number of recorded damage (24%) to civilian infrastructure since the start of the full-scale invasion because of constant shelling. Newly reported damage in September–October included schools, gas pipelines, health facilities, and electricity infrastructure.

Water: a lack of running water continued to be a concern in Mykolaiv city in September–October. Water is only accessible via more than 70 locations in the city, which residents have to reach themselves. The situation raises concerns over access for those with limited mobility or strength, which places them in heightened danger in case of shelling. The damaged water pipes to the city are in NGCAs and are impossible to repair for municipal workers. Non-drinking water is being piped to residents from an industrial pipeline, but it has a strong smell, and its high salt content damages pumps and appliances (NPR 11/10/2022; Reuters 23/10/2022).

Access outside of humanitarian responders: international organisations and government workers centre their operations in Mykolaiv city, while local volunteers are the ones who travel to remote areas and locations more exposed to conflict and shelling. Military checkpoints restrict mobility, especially nearer communities along the frontlines (KII 26/10/2022 a).

Kharkiv

Humanitarian access in Kharkiv has improved since the Government of Ukraine regained control of most of the oblast between 10–13 September (KII 24/10/2022 a; KII 25/10/2022 a; KII 27/10/2022 b; The Guardian 13/09/2022 and 11/09/2022). That said, access constraints in the oblast remain very high because of shelling, the presence of mines and UXO, and a lack of detailed information on access to remote areas.

Recent repair and demining activities have allowed unrestricted truck access in the Izium and Balakliia areas (KII 25/10/2022 a; KII 30/10/2022 a). That said, there are still constraints on civilian movements further south and east from Izium, primarily because of the presence of mines, the risk of shelling, and unrepaired damage to roads and bridges (KII 25/10/2022 a).

Mines and UXO: Kharkiv is the oblast with the highest number of access events involving mines and UXO in the country, affecting civilian movement, humanitarian operations in newly accessible areas, and the pace of reconstruction. 28 incidents involving mines and UXO affecting civilians were reported between September–October, leading to 13 fatalities. 44% of recorded incidents affected civilians (ACLEDA accessed 08/11/2022).

Damage to civilian infrastructure: recorded damage to civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv oblast since the start of the full-scale invasion is the third highest nationwide. Recorded damage to transport infrastructure has been highest in Kharkiv across all oblasts in the same period. This trend will continue to hamper humanitarian response and the delivery of services in the short term despite most of the oblast becoming accessible. More detailed


information on damage to transport infrastructure in Kharkiv oblast as at early October is available in ACAPS' Humanitarian Situation in Newly Accessible Areas of Kharkiv Oblast report.

Access to remote areas: when access was initially restored in Kharkiv oblast, it was only possible in localities along main tarmac roads. Villages and smaller settlements in northeast areas remained very difficult to access in late September (ACAPS 06/10/2022). More recent detailed information on access to remote areas is not available.

Active ground conflict prevents the repair of infrastructure and restoration of services in areas closer to the frontlines, where the population continue to live in basements or other shelters given the risk of shelling. People exit their shelters to access aid from distribution points, but to do so, they expose themselves to harm from shelling (The Kyiv Independent 27/09/2022). Ukrainian forces have continued gaining ground, and only a small area in the northeast of the oblast, along the border with Russia and Donetsk oblast, remains under the control of Russian forces (ISW 01/11/2022).

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS IN NEWLY ACCESSIBLE AREAS

Situation as at 31 October



Sources: ACAPS using data from ISW (21/10/2022); ACLED (accessed 26/10/2022)

Current humanitarian access severity scores in newly accessible areas (all scores out of 5) – please refer to the methodology for a description on scoring:

OBLAST	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIANS	SAFETY AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Chernihiv	2.20	1.65	2.22	2.0
Kharkiv*	3.20	3.33	3.48	3.3
Kyiv	1.50	1.69	1.73	1.6
Kyiv City	1.50	0.69	0.30	0.8
Sumy	1.50	1.90	3.38	2.3

*Excluding territory not under the control of the Government of Ukraine

The presence of mines and UXO, damage to infrastructure, and the recent escalation in missile and air strikes all over the country mainly drive the access constraints in oblasts that at one point were newly accessible (Chernihiv, Kyiv, Sumy).

The presence of mines and UXO continues to pose safety and security concerns for civilians and responders, especially in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts. Victims of landmines continue to be reported in Sumy oblast, with Okhtyr raion being one of the most heavily mined areas of the oblast (Dmytro Zhyvytskyi Telegram 02/10/2022; KII 31/10/2022 b).

Shelling and air strikes have continued to damage civilian infrastructure, including schools, electrical infrastructure, health facilities, and rail infrastructure, affecting service delivery and aid transport and slowing down reconstruction efforts. The latest escalation in missile and air strikes has especially targeted electrical infrastructure in Kyiv, affecting the provision of services to civilians (KII 29/10/2022 a). Border areas of Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts are particularly exposed to shelling from the Russian side of the border. 873 shelling and missile and air strike events were reported between September–October in Kharkiv, 314 in Sumy, and 118 in Chernihiv (ACLEDA accessed 08/11/2022).

Border areas: as part of the martial law, the movement of civilians within 1km of the border with Russia and Belarus is forbidden, except in settlements immediately adjacent to the borders (DPSU 23/06/2022; Rivne RMA Facebook 23/05/2022).

Initial response

The following analysis provides an overview of how the humanitarian access situation evolved in the early response to newly accessible areas of Kharkiv. It is difficult to provide a general picture of the initial situation as access constraints, including the granting of access to humanitarians, and the availability of information on accessible areas vary between locations and over time.

Role of government authorities: public authorities, particularly through the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, are primarily in charge of restoring access via demining and repair activities. Damaged roads and the presence of mines and UXO have been the main initial access constraints in newly accessible areas (KII 24/10/2022 a; KII 25/10/2022 b). Some local responders reported getting a portion of their humanitarian supplies from public authorities (KII 23/10/2022). During the initial response, international organisations operated out of Kharkiv city and distributed aid through oblast authorities, local administrations, and some local counterparts (KII 27/09/2022 c).

Sparse and/or contradictory information: initial responders faced issues with contradictory information, for example, being denied access to certain localities by the National Guard because of security measures despite having secured an agreement for a response with local hromadas. Local authorities sometimes did not allow access to certain areas without explanation (KII 23/10/2022). Local responders also reported sometimes receiving inaccurate information on needs. An example is when a group of responders received information that the affected population had access to electricity to cook meals. In contrast, one of the main needs the group observed when visiting the location was the need for hot meals given a lack of electricity (KII 30/10/2022 a).

Coordination between local responders and local authorities: certain responders perceive the uncertainty and delays over the granting of access to certain areas as a significant impediment. Others decide to act as quickly as possible despite lacking complete information. These responders opt to not fulfil all bureaucratic obligations to secure access, choosing instead to secure access with authorities that are present locally (KII 23/10/2022; KII 30/10/2022 a).

Coordination with international responders: despite concerns over lacking and/or contradictory information, some responders found that there was good coordination between government, local, and international responders in aid delivery towards newly accessible areas of Kharkiv (KII 25/10/2022 a). For example, the local administration and international responders were able to organise convoys to Izium in only one week (KII 30/10/2022 a). There have not been any reports of large organised convoys being stopped because of differing local indications on access.

Safety and security: the large number of landmines and UXO present in newly accessible areas causes large safety and security concerns for civilians and humanitarian responders, with some areas remaining inaccessible until the conduction of demining activities. These areas may also still be within striking distance of shelling by Russian forces (KII 23/10/2022; KII 25/10/2022 a). As a result, remote areas away from main roads may remain inaccessible for a longer period while demining work is taking place.

Damaged road infrastructure: damage to road infrastructure created a constantly changing access situation during the initial response. Certain small pockets, such as Vovchansk, where authorities were slower in restoring transport infrastructure remained inaccessible

for longer (KII 23/10/2022). In other localities, such as Shevchenkove, road repairs were relatively quicker (KII 24/10/2022 a).

Access to information: in some areas, authorities were initially unable to share information on aid distribution points with community members, partly because of fear of becoming targets of shelling by Russian forces. In at least one case, community members started looking for humanitarian convoys, adding to the overall confusion as those convoys were headed towards depots for sorting rather than immediate distribution (KII 24/10/2022 a).

Sharing of previous experiences: some organisations operating in newly accessible areas of Kharkiv benefitted from receiving information from other organisations and government authorities that provided the initial response in other newly accessible areas, allowing them to better tailor their response to the needs of the population (KII 24/10/2022 a).

Frontline settlements: providing assistance to frontline settlements under heavy artillery fire, such as Kupiansk or Dvorichna (Kharkiv oblast), remains particularly difficult (KII 26/09/2022 b; KII 27/09/2022 a).

Administrative impediments: access to certain cities, such as Iziium (Kharkiv oblast), remains restricted. Only organisations with a certificate from the coordination centre of the oblast can carry out their activities. Oblast authorities provide these permits, but there have been reports of city-level authorities requiring their own additional permits (RFE/RL 13/09/2022; KII 28/09/2022 a).

CHANGES IN NATIONWIDE ACCESS CONSTRAINTS

The recent increase in missile and air strikes from Russia has led to additional access constraints even far away from the frontlines. These missile and air strikes have led to damage to civilian infrastructure and cuts to electricity and telecommunication services. Compared to ACAPS' previous access reports analysing the nationwide occurrence of non-conflict access events (ACAPS' Ukraine access events dataset), fuel scarcity is no longer a major access concern.

Funding: a lack of money was among the reported factors limiting the operation of Ukrainian NGOs and volunteer groups (KII 23/10/2022; KII 24/10/2022 b; KII 25/10/2022 b; KII 25/10/2022 c; KII 26/10/2022 a; KII 26/10/2022 b; KII 27/10/2022 b; KII 28/10/2022 b). Private donations to local NGOs continue decreasing as people's capacity to donate diminishes over time, with a substantial decrease since late August (KII 23/10/2022; KII 26/10/2022 b). The situation is especially problematic for volunteer organisations relying on their own purchases for humanitarian aid (KII 26/10/2022 b). Local organisations have also reported that access to funding from the Government and international organisations requires long and cumbersome administrative procedures. Some institutions have also shown reluctance to accept additional responders to their funding pools (KII 23/10/2022). Some volunteer activities have shut down given a lack of funding (KII 24/10/2022 b).

Local response capacity continues to be strained as volunteers and local staff increasingly become physically and mentally exhausted. Several local responders have reported staffing shortages (KII 23/10/2022; KII 31/10/2022 a; KII 25/10/2022 c; KII 26/10/2022 a; KII 28/10/2022 b; KII 28/10/2022 c). Repeated travels to Europe and Western Ukraine to gather aid are also costly, and their equipment is starting to wear down. For example, transportation trucks require multiple repairs, and funds for newer, more reliable models are unavailable (KII 25/10/2022 b).

Population in remote areas: access to services for the population in remote areas continues to be a concern, even in oblasts not experiencing active ground conflict. IDPs in remote areas need to reach urban centres to address administrative problems, sometimes related to accessing financial aid. The distance can be challenging for single-headed households with many children, the elderly, and people with impaired mobility (KII 23/10/2022). People in more remote areas are also more likely to experience gaps in service delivery (KII 25/10/2022 b).

Access to information: there continues to be a lack of a centralised information source for people in need of assistance (KII 24/10/2022 b; KII 25/10/2022 c; KII 27/10/2022 a; 31/10/2022 a). For example, information may be displayed at public administration buildings, while at other times, it is disseminated through humanitarian responders' online platforms (KII 24/10/2022 b). Outages to telecommunication systems resulting from the increase in missile and air strikes also temporarily disrupt the transmission of information to the affected population (KII 28/10/2022 b).

Fuel availability: fuel is now more accessible than during the period covered by ACAPS' previous access reports, although prices remain high (KII 23/10/2022). That said, local responders in Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhia continue to list a lack of fuel as a factor constraining their response (KII 26/10/2022 a; KII 27/10/2022 b; KII 28/10/2022 a; KII 28/10/2022 b). For local responders, the lack of fuel mainly results from high costs, as well as occasional shortages in Mykolaiv oblast and the newly accessible areas of Kharkiv oblast.

Security protocols: the escalation in air strikes across the country has led to some local responders integrating additional security protocols in their decision-making. These measures keep their staff and supplies safer but add a layer of non-response activities detracting from the overall response capacity (KII 24/10/2022 b).

International movement of male Ukrainian humanitarians aged 18–60: some Ukrainian NGOs have reported increased scrutiny at the border for their male staff aged 18–60 travelling abroad to pick up humanitarian aid, even when all required documentation is in order (KII 24/10/2022 b). As a general rule, the martial law continues to forbid men aged 18–60 from leaving the country.

Lack of coordination between regions: there has been a lack of coordination between regions, meaning an overabundance of certain relief items (such as food and cash) in some locations, such as Sumy oblast, while these needs remain unaddressed in other areas (KII 31/10/2022 b).

METHODOLOGY

The data used for this report was extracted from publicly available sources and unpublished sources circulated within the response. The narrative presented is based on data analysis, secondary data review, and key informant interviews. Access severity scores were calculated using the oblast-level data collection of events related to access constraints. The collected events are available in the [humanitarian access events dashboard and dataset](#). ACAPS predefined 75 types of events and grouped them into 35 sub-indicators, nine indicators (Is), and three pillars. The indicators received a score between 0–3, while the pillars received a score between 0–5. The final access severity score is an average of the three pillar scores.

Pillar 1: Access of people in need to humanitarian aid

11. Denial of existence of humanitarian needs or entitlement to assistance
12. Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance

Pillar 2: Access of humanitarian actors to affected population

13. Impediments to entering the country (bureaucratic and administrative)
14. Restriction of movement within the country (impediments to freedom of movement and/or administrative restrictions)
15. Interference in the implementation of humanitarian activities
16. Violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets

Pillar 3: Security and physical constraints

17. Ongoing insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance
18. Presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices, explosive remnants of war, and UXO
19. Physical constraints in the environment (obstacles related to terrain, climate, lack of infrastructure, etc.)

More information on ACAPS' humanitarian access scoring system is available in the [Humanitarian Access Methodology Note](#). For oblast-level scoring in Ukraine, the calculations were done on a continuous numerical scale rather than using thresholds, allowing for decimals and giving a more nuanced result.

The resulting scores are classified into the following groups:

- 0–1 Low access constraints
- 1–2 Moderate access constraints
- 2–3 High access constraints
- 3–4 Very high access constraints
- 4–5 Extreme access constraints

Sub-indicators of a temporary nature, such as active hostilities, statements denying humanitarian needs, and time-sensitive events (checkpoints, aid diversion, weather, fuel scarcity) are taken into account for 45 days from the day they were reported. For the other sub-indicators, a final data validation process is conducted to ensure they are still relevant.

Changes for this report


Damages and conflict events: damage recorded in ACAPS' civilian infrastructure damages dataset feeds into the scores of I7 and I9 without appearing as events in the access dataset. Conflict events from ACLED's dataset feed into I7 without appearing in the access dataset.

Separate scores for GCAs and NGCAs: for oblasts with the presence of Russian forces, the event 'Multiple authorities controlling the territory' is active, automatically giving the highest score to indicators I1, I3, and I4. To provide more nuance between GCAs and NGCAs, we recalculated the score for the former without taking into account the effects of 'Multiple authorities controlling the territory'. **This method is not a complete disaggregation of scores based on GCA/NGCA status** as access events are still collected at the oblast level. These changes only influence I1, I3, and I4.

LIMITATIONS

- The analysis relies on publicly available data, which is unlikely to be comprehensive in a dynamic conflict situation such as in Ukraine. Reported data may come with some delay, so some published data may no longer be applicable at the time of analysis.
- The collection of data used a review process to check that selected sub-indicators for a given oblast are still relevant, but the evolving situation and the amount of data collected make it likely that some inaccuracies remain.
- Key informant interviews are a valuable source of additional information, but they only offer a snapshot of the situation based on the respondents' experiences.
- Detailed information on the humanitarian response and the access constraints faced in NGCAs is lacking.
- Crimea and Sevastopol were not given access scores; gathering enough information and producing a reliable score were not feasible as information was not available. These regions have been under the control of Russia since 2014, and entering from Ukraine has been impossible since then.

MAP: HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SEVERITY IN UKRAINE



Sources: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 21/10/2022); ACLED (accessed 26/10/2022)

Access severity table as at 31 October 2022 (indicator scores out of 3, pillar and overall scores out of 5)

OBLAST	I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	I6	I7	I8	I9	P1	P2	P3	ACCESS
Cherkasy	0	1.8	0.9	0.75	0	0	0.06	1.2	0	1.5	0.69	0.7	1.0
Chernihiv	0.84	1.8	0.9	0.75	0.9	1.4	0.87	3	0	2.2	1.65	2.15	2
Chernivtsi	0	1.8	0.9	0.75	0	0	0.03	0	0	1.5	0.69	0.02	0.7
Dnipropetrovsk	0	1.8	0.9	0.75	0	0	2.4	3	0.03	1.5	0.69	3.02	1.7
Donetsk	3	3	3	3	1.8	3	1.98	3	0.81	5	4.5	3.22	4.2
Donetsk*	1.2	3	2.1	2.03	1.8	3	1.98	3	0.81	3.5	3.72	3.22	3.5
Ivano-Frankivsk	0	1.8	0.9	0.75	0	0	0.06	0	0	1.5	0.69	0.03	0.7
Kharkiv	3	3	3	3	1.8	2.6	1.77	3	1.5	5	4.33	3.48	4.3
Kharkiv*	0.84	3	2.1	1.5	1.8	2.6	1.77	3	1.5	3.2	3.33	3.48	3.3
Kherson	3	3	3	3	1.8	2	1.56	3	0.75	5	4.08	2.95	4
Kherson*	0	3	2.1	2.25	1.8	2	1.56	3	0.75	2.5	3.4	2.95	2.9
Khmelnyskyi	0	1.8	0.9	0.75	0	0	0.06	0	0	1.5	0.69	0.03	0.7
Kirovohrad	0	1.8	0.9	0.75	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	0.69	0	0.7
Kyiv	0	1.8	0.9	0.75	0.9	1.5	0.12	3	0	1.5	1.69	1.73	1.6
Kyiv City	0	1.8	0.9	0.75	0	0	0.24	0.3	0	1.5	0.69	0.3	0.8
Luhansk	3	3	3	3	1.8	3	1.5	3	0.75	5	4.5	2.92	4.1
Luhansk*	1.2	3	2.1	1.5	1.8	3	1.5	3	0.75	3.5	3.5	2.92	3.3
Lviv	0	1.8	0.9	1.5	0	0	0.06	0	0.75	1.5	1	0.45	1.0
Mykolaiv	3	3	3	3	1.8	0	1.68	3	0.78	5	3.25	3.03	3.8
Mykolaiv*	1.2	3	2.1	1.5	1.8	0	1.68	3	0.78	3.5	2.25	3.03	2.9
Poltava	0	1.8	0.9	0.75	0	0.35	0.03	0.3	0.75	1.5	0.83	0.6	1.0
Rivne	0	1.8	0.9	0.75	0	0	0.03	0	0	1.5	0.69	0.02	0.7
Sumy	0	1.8	0.9	0.75	1.8	0.35	1.56	3	1.53	1.5	1.58	3.38	2.2
Ternopil	0	1.8	0.9	0.75	0	0	0.03	0	0.75	1.5	0.69	0.43	0.9
Vinnitsia	0	1.8	0.9	0.75	0	2	0.09	0	0	1.5	1.52	0.05	1.0
Volyn	0	1.8	0.9	0.75	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	0.69	0	0.7
Zakarpattia	0	1.8	0.9	0.75	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	0.69	0	0.7
Zaporizhzhia	3	3	3	3	3	2.05	2.25	3	0.75	5	4.6	3.33	4.3
Zaporizhzhia*	0	3	2.1	2.25	3	2.05	2.25	3	0.75	2.5	3.92	3.33	3.3
Zhytomyr	0	1.8	0.9	0.75	0	0	0.09	3	0	1.5	0.69	1.72	1.3

*Scores not taking into account the 'Multiple authorities controlling the territory access' event