

A young child with light hair, wearing a dark blue beanie and a dark jacket, is looking out of a window. The child's face is in profile, looking towards the right. The window glass shows a reflection of the child's face, creating a double image. The background outside the window is blurred, showing some greenery and a building. The overall lighting is soft and natural, suggesting an indoor setting near a window.

# Forced displacement from and within Ukraine:

Profiles, experiences, and aspirations of  
affected populations





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**Date of release:** 28 October 2022



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Cover Photo: Boy looking through train window [Photographer: Johner Images, Getty Images]

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This publication was issued without formal editing by the IOM.

Manuscript completed in October 2022.

Date of Release: 28 October 2022

ISBN: 978-92-9400-638-7

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# Executive Summary

Earlier this year, following the Russian large-scale war against Ukraine, an unprecedented number of people were forced to flee their homes in search of a safe haven. This report brings together the results of desk research and survey projects implemented by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to detail forced displacement from and within Ukraine, with the aim of providing practitioners and policy makers with a clear picture captured from the perspective of the affected populations themselves.

## State of play

Between late February and early September 2022, the UNHCR reported 12.3 million exits from Ukraine, of which three quarters were into the four neighbouring EU Member States. At the same time, there were 5.6 million border crossings into Ukraine from neighbouring countries. In addition to displacement to the EU, the IOM reports that, by the end of August, an additional 7 million persons have been displaced internally within Ukraine, often more than once and over distances that sometimes exceed external displacements, which is more challenging for humanitarian access.

On 4 March 2022, as a result of the unprecedented outflow from Ukraine, the European Council voted to activate the Temporary Protection Directive designed to rapidly provide displaced persons with urgent services such as accommodation, access to healthcare, employment, and education. During the first three months following the Russian invasion, there were more than 3.4 million registrations for temporary protection, according to data reported by national authorities to the EUAA. Since that time, registrations have slowed to, at the time of writing, around 55 000 per week, amounting to more than 4.1 million in total. It should be noted that some persons may have registered more than once.

Amongst the displaced persons from Ukraine there are also several hundred of thousand third country nationals (TCNs) mainly students and migrant workers who fled Ukraine due to the invasion. Most were nationals of Türkiye, the Russian Federation, India and Azerbaijan. These TCNs arrived mainly in Poland, Romania and Moldova.

To manage this volume of displacement, EU Member States and the European Commission activated their crisis management and emergency measures in a coordinated manner to effectively deploy resources, including the rapid distribution of staff to assist with reception and entry procedures at the borders, and the use of emergency funding for the most urgent support measures.

## Displaced in Europe

Results from the EUAA and OECD's Survey of Arriving Migrants from Ukraine (SAM-UKR) indicate that most respondents, who originated from all areas in Ukraine, left in March to escape military attacks, but also due to fear of being personally targeted, fear of sexual violence, and deprivation of basic needs. The data, analysed for this report (see [Chapters 2-4](#)), show that most displaced people were Ukrainians (96 %), women in their thirties, travelling with family members, including children. The most common adverse experiences reported during their journey were severe hardship, shooting and bombing. One fifth of all respondents reported having had to pay

someone to be transported out of the country. Results of this survey also confirm that many displaced Ukrainians are highly educated with previous work experience in sectors such as sales, management, education, and healthcare, and can speak, beside Ukrainian and Russian, English, and to a lesser extent several other languages.

Most respondents were already at their preferred destination, having considered both work opportunities and the location of friends and family. Two thirds of participants had already registered for temporary protection and the vast majority had only registered in one Member State. Just one in six displaced persons were accommodated by national authorities in reception centres, whereas two thirds were either with a host family, with their own family or were renting their own accommodation.

The OECD analysed Google search volume to assess topics of urgent concern to the population displaced from and within Ukraine. Results suggest that in Ukraine, even on the day of the invasion numerous Google searches for topics such as border, refugee and migration were conducted. Internet search volumes increased significantly on potential destination countries, as well as employment, education, money and accommodation.

A large number of open text narratives of Ukrainian refugees were collected. They give an insight in the refugees' most pressing issues like the behaviour of or care for other persons, accommodation, and assistance. Unsurprisingly for displaced persons, the statements showed a much more negative tone when describing financial challenges and experiences in securing long-term accommodation, while the statements also contained positive references of loved ones, host families, allocations of school places and kindness shown by volunteers. Some participants expressed frustration with overly bureaucratic procedures in applying for accommodation, possibly exacerbated by suboptimal information provision and language support. In the digital realm, misinformation was common, as were fraudulent offers of support. Many refugees reported having experienced difficulties and trauma escaping the war with children.

## Internally displaced in Ukraine

Data from IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) baseline assessments and interviews with IDPs in Ukraine (see [Chapters 5-6](#)) suggest that, by the end of August, the East macro-region of Ukraine was most affected by internal displacement in two aspects: most IDPs (3.8 million) originated from the East macro-region, while at the same time, most IDPs (1.9 million) were also hosted in the East. The IOM estimated that by the end of August, nearly 16 % of the population of Ukraine (7 million persons) had fled their places of residence in Ukraine due to the deterioration in security. These IDPs may not have the financial or physical means for further travel, or they may feel safer or more able to survive in another part of their own country. IDPs face similar challenges to those displaced internationally, that is they are in a new and unfamiliar environment and have been forced to abandon their homes and livelihoods.

Initially IDPs were equally male and female, but by August the majority were female. A third of IDP households included someone who was chronically ill, and a quarter included persons with disabilities. Some IDPs have been displaced more than once; indeed, by late July, nearly a third of all IDPs reported at least one secondary displacement, especially those in Kyiv city. Overall, three quarters of all IDPs hope to return home in the immediate future, and almost two thirds claimed that their need for cash assistance was their most pressing concern. Results of the IOM survey suggest that more than half of all IDP households with children under the age of five faced food insecurity, while importantly for the onset of winter, one in four IDPs experienced a lack of accommodation, and one in three IDPs experienced a lack of non-food items such as clothes and shoes.

By the end of August 2022, IOM estimated the return of 6 million people to their homes which includes IDPs, those returning from abroad, and back-and-forth movements.<sup>1</sup> The demographic composition of respondents who returned closely resembles the composition of IDPs. Compared to IDPs, returnees' households were less likely to include infants, yet they were more likely to have children between the ages one and five. The North macro-region and Kyiv city saw a higher volume of returnees. Some 15 % of externally displaced persons who responded to SAM-UKR had returned to Ukraine at least once.

## Displacements from and within Ukraine

This report offers a close to comprehensive overview on forced displacement from and to Ukraine, ensuing from the Russian war. To this end the EUAA, the IOM, and the OECD have combined their expertise and analysed a variety of qualitative and quantitative sources. In the following chapters, we describe the profiles of persons who have been displaced from Ukraine with protection needs, and show determinants of their movements and their intentions. We then focus on internally displaced persons in Ukraine and on returns to and within the country.

Concerning the crucial question of future developments, further refugee flows to Europe, and the evolution of returns (about 6 million estimated as of 23 August 2022, including IDPs), many questions still remain. Refugee flows from Ukraine stabilised over the summer of 2022, yet Europe anticipates further inflows over the winter. The magnitude and directions of these possible flows strongly depend on how the war evolves, in combination with other factors, mentioned below.

Possible drivers of further flows are identified in this report by exploring the decision-making processes of Ukrainians who have already fled the country, following internet searches in Ukrainian, and by depicting individual voices as expressed in the surveys studied. The main contributing factors identified are the stability of the security situation in specific parts of the country, work opportunities, the access to basic services and goods, reconstruction of houses, and the access to education. Moreover, this report illustrates the importance of family separation: when family reunification becomes possible, wives and families will either relocate back to their homes, or husbands will join them in their new places of residence.

The aforementioned elements will certainly shape future internal and cross-border movements. Whereas most displaced persons are waiting for acceptable conditions for a return to Ukraine, a considerable proportion, because of the war, see an outlook on a better future in Europe, the United States of America or Canada, and do not plan to return home for the time being.



# 1

## State of play: Displacement and protection

### Asylum applications and temporary protection in the EU+

#### Some 4.1 million registrations for temporary protection in the EU+

Between 24 February, when the Russian Federation started a large-scale invasion of Ukraine, and 11 September 2022, there were almost 4.1 million registrations for temporary protection in the EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland (EU+). Moreover, between 21 February and 11 September 2022, Ukrainian nationals also lodged 25 400 applications for international protection in the EU+.


On 4 March 2022, the Council of the EU adopted an implementing decision activating the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD or 2001/55/EC).<sup>2</sup> Since then, EU+ countries have adopted the necessary national legislation to ensure adequate implementation, configuring electronic systems and gradually reporting data to the EUAA. In terms of eligibility, the Council Decision envisages temporary protection for Ukrainian nationals who were residing in Ukraine and were displaced on or after 24 February 2022, as well as for third country nationals and stateless persons, and their families, who benefitted from international protection or a similar status in Ukraine, on or after 24 February 2022.

According to the UNHCR, there were around 12.3 million exits from Ukraine between 24 February and 6 September 2022, of which at least 9.2 million were into the four neighbouring EU Member States. At the same time, there were also around 5.6 million entries into Ukraine from abroad (both from EU Member States plus Belarus, the Russian Federation and Moldova). These also include back-and-forth movements. Within Ukraine, a further 7 million persons have been internally displaced (see [Chapter 5](#)), according to IOM estimates as of 23 August, up from 6.6 million a month earlier and indicating the second monthly increase in a row.

#### Gradual increase in registrations over the last months

The EUAA estimates that, by the end of May, there were already more than 3.4 million registrations for temporary protection. During the next three months, between 113 000 and 164 000 (+3-5%) registrations took place every two weeks (Fig. 1), such that by the end of June, the total reached 3.7 million, by the end of July approached 4 million, and by the end of August exceeded 4.2 million.

EUAA data suggest that the overwhelming majority (96%) of all persons registered for temporary protection are Ukrainians – although the citizenship was not reported for 2% of the total. Among other nationalities, the most numerous were Russians and Nigerians (0.2% each), as well as Moroccans (0.1%).



**Figure 1.** Total number of bi-weekly registrations for temporary protection, May – August 2022 (Source: EUAA EPS)

## Responses of EU+ countries to displacements from Ukraine: From crisis measures to temporary protection

EU+ countries rapidly implemented initial response measures to manage the sudden inflows of people fleeing Ukraine during the first days of the invasion by the Russian Federation.<sup>3</sup> Inevitably, neighbouring countries and nearby countries were significantly impacted at this stage. To manage the volatile situation, EU+ countries immediately activated their existing crisis management and emergency measures to allocate resources in a flexible manner, including the rapid deployment of staff to assist with reception and entry procedures at the borders, the use of emergency funding for urgent support measures, and coordinated between stakeholders to ensure the availability of housing.

New reception and emergency structures were created as temporary shelters and rest areas for people newly arrived in the host countries. One-stop service points further facilitated the short stay of arriving people before being referred to accommodation. Private hosts and households across Europe provided housing for new arrivals, increasing the general reception capacity in host countries and giving authorities time to adapt.

Following the immediate crisis response measures, the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive<sup>4</sup> offered a well-defined legal framework for protection and encouraged harmonised operational responses and relevant procedures across Member States. Following the Council Decision of 4 March 2022, the majority of Member States enacted temporary protection for displaced persons from Ukraine through various legal acts, and several countries also extended temporary protection to additional categories of persons.<sup>5</sup>

Digital and social communication played important roles in information provision on procedural aspects, accommodation and relevant rights. For example, social media platforms and YouTube were consulted frequently for the latest information by the target audience (see [Chapter 3](#)).<sup>6</sup>

New arrivals had certain immediate needs which stabilised over time into more permanent needs, such as long-term accommodation, employment, financial support, language learning support, health support, education for children, among other needs for stable social integration. To ensure access to rights, EU+ countries boosted the provision of services to displaced persons

from Ukraine by facilitating access to the labour market, medical care including psychological support, social welfare services and means of subsistence, education and transportation. Some procedures for this group were simplified, such as importing pets, recognition of driving licences, education and work qualifications.<sup>7</sup>

The deterioration of the security situation in Ukraine and the activation of temporary protection have had a direct impact on asylum procedures in EU+ countries. In some countries, the processing of asylum applications by Ukrainian nationals was suspended, Ukraine was removed from national lists of safe countries of origin, and Dublin transfers were suspended to border countries affected by the wave of displaced persons from Ukraine. In addition, the use of an accelerated procedure protected the integrity of national asylum systems to ensure they were not saturated, and the processing of asylum applications could continue.

# 2

## Displaced persons from Ukraine

The EUAA in partnership with the OECD launched the Survey of Arriving Migrants from Ukraine (SAM-UKR) on 11 April 2022. The aim of the survey was to collect standardised data directly from the people fleeing the Russian war against Ukraine, who have sought shelter in Europe. The survey was self-administered using a mobile phone and was available in Ukrainian, Russian and English (see [Annexes: Methodological Note](#)).

### Profile and origin

#### Demographics

Between its launch on 11 April 2022 and 15 August 2022, 3 932 adult respondents participated in the SAM-UKR survey. Of these, 82 % were female with a mean age of 38 years (median age of 37). The majority (79 %) were aged between 18 to 44 years, followed by a fifth who were aged 45 to 64 (18 %) or older (2 %). The sample is almost exclusively Ukrainian citizens (96 %) with just 4 % (161) being non-Ukrainian residents of Ukraine prior to 24 February 2022 (Fig. 2).

Typically, most asylum applicants arriving in the EU+ are young males.<sup>8</sup> This is not the case for persons fleeing Ukraine after the Russian invasion who are mostly women and children because most adult men, between 18 to 60, were prohibited from leaving Ukraine due to Martial Law in effect since 24 February 2022. According to other surveys conducted, the percentage of elderly people leaving has also been relatively low, indicating that older people tend to be less willing or able to leave their country.<sup>9</sup>

Importantly, 9 in 10 respondents were travelling with family members (86 %), including 38 % who travelled with children only. In total, the 4 000 or so adult respondents reported travelling with at least 3 400 children, of whom 29 % were very young (0-5 years), a third (32 %) were primary school age (6-10 years) and 39 % were secondary school age (11-17 years) (Fig. 2). Of those with children, more than a third fled with one child (38 %), whereas a quarter fled with at least two children, and 9 % with even more. Moreover, a non-trivial 5 % claimed to still have children left in Ukraine and around 30 % stated they have dependent adults with them (Fig. 2 and Fig. 3).





Figure 2. Citizenship, sex, age, journey company (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)



**Figure 3.** Ages of displaced children in the EU+ (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

From the qualitative testimonies collected in the SAM-UKR survey (analysed in detail in Chapter 4), some respondents shared information about their nationalities, their journey, who they travelled with and their concerns regarding their integration and future lives in host countries. Some expressed concerns about family members that stayed in Ukraine while others expressed fear about the martial law and the restrictions in place prohibiting men from leaving the country. A few explained they are third country nationals and conveyed concerns about their current legal status.

### Testimonies

*Testimonies are extracts of qualitative text collected in the context of the SAM-UKR survey which are case-specific and do not represent the population, focusing on individual experiences and stories.*

“ It is very difficult to live in another country. I have a son and two elderly people to support. But we are Ukrainians! We are hardworking! We will overcome everything. ”


“ I left with three children; my husband stayed in Ukraine. I am looking for a safer place to wait out the war in Ukraine so we can go back ”

## Oblasts of origin

Ukraine comprises 24 oblasts (first level administrative division), one autonomous republic (Crimea), plus the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol. The SAM-UKR survey included respondents from all over Ukraine, illustrating the widespread effect of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the coverage of the survey results in general.

For the ease of analysis, different areas were grouped into macro-regions (see [Annexes: Methodological Note](#)), half of all respondents came from the East (28%) and South (19%) macro-regions of Ukraine and one-fifth came from Kyiv city (19%). Fewer respondents came from the North (13%), West (9%) and Centre (4%) macro-regions or were in another country when the invasion started (4%). Most respondents came from, in decreasing order, Kyiv city, Kharkiv Oblast and Donetsk Oblast (East macro-region), Odesa Oblast (South macro-region). The number of SAM-UKR respondents per macro-region was correlated ( $r=0.8$ ,  $n = 6$ ) with the number of explosions, remote violence and battle events (ACLED)<sup>10</sup> in the same macro-region (Fig. 4).

One fifth of respondents (22%) stated they had been internally displaced in Ukraine before they entered the EU. Internally displaced people (IDP) are highly vulnerable people who were displaced from their homes and have not crossed an international border, commonly women and children, who remain at high-risk of violence, persecution, deprivation of food, water, shelter, and health services as they tend to stay relatively close to conflict zones (see [Chapter 5](#)).




**Figure 4.** Number of respondents per region (upper left), number of explosions, remote violence and battle events according to ACLED data (upper right), comparison between number of respondents per region and number of explosions, remote violence and battle events (bottom) (Sources: SAM-UKR Survey, ACLED)

## Previous employment, qualifications, and languages

It is not known how long displaced Ukrainians will remain in the host countries, but many working-age adults will seek work during this time which is expected to impact local labour markets in Europe. The OECD<sup>11</sup> estimates that for all European countries together, the labour force is expected to increase by about 0.5% by the end of 2022. For individual countries, the largest increase is found in Czechia (2.2%), Poland (2.1%), and Estonia (1.9%). The overall estimated impact on labour force is about twice as large as that of the 2014-17 inflow of refugees to the European Union. Understanding the labour force profile of arrivals helps to shed light on the segments and sectors that might be disproportionately impacted by the influx.

The SAM-UKR survey corroborates findings from other sources that a higher share of Ukrainian refugees are tertiary educated compared to other refugee groups as well as the general Ukrainian population.<sup>12</sup> For example, about 71% of SAM-UKR participants reported having completed tertiary education with 41% holding a Master’s degree or higher (Fig. 5). A further 11% of the respondents stated having completed professional (vocational) education. It is important to note that the SAM-UKR findings suggest even higher educational levels than some other similar sources, for instance, about 49% of participants had a university degree in a recent regional monitoring exercise conducted by the UNHCR.<sup>13</sup>


There are some differences in the qualification levels of respondents by their region of origin. Notably, about 85% of Ukrainians fleeing from Kyiv city indicated that they have a tertiary degree with 56% holding a Master’s degree or higher (Fig. 5). The place of origin may thus shape the labour market characteristics and outcomes of Ukrainians in Europe.



**Figure 5.** Highest qualification levels of respondents by region of origin (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

Regardless of their educational levels, refugees are some of the most vulnerable groups on the labour market and assistance with labour market integration is likely needed, especially to find gainful employment commensurate with prior experience<sup>14</sup>. This is particularly important considering the demographic profile as refugee women often face a higher risk of long-term unemployment, involuntary inactivity and underemployment compared to native-born as well as other immigrant groups.<sup>15</sup>

The SAM-UKR survey also collected information on the main job categories of Ukrainian refugees before leaving Ukraine (Fig. 6 and Table 1). The share of different professionals in host countries can inform the need for different labour market entry measures in host countries. For instance, refugees with a background in 'education, teaching' or 'healthcare, life science' may face additional entry barriers in host countries compared to those in less regulated occupations, prompting a need for specific support measures to speed up the assessment and recognition of foreign qualifications.<sup>16</sup>




**Figure 6.** Top 5 job categories of respondents, who were employed on 23 February 2022 (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

Poland	Czechia	Lithuania	Romania	Sweden
Other professionals, occupations (18 %)	Other professionals, occupations (19 %)	Other professionals, occupations (19 %)	Other professionals, occupations (20 %)	Other professionals, occupations (14 %)
Sales, communication (9 %)	Sales, communication (10 %)	Sales, communication (15 %)	Management, administration (10 %)	Sales, communication (11 %)
Management, administration (9 %)	Management, administration (9 %)	Management, administration (7 %)	Sales, communication (6 %)	Education, teaching (10 %)
Healthcare, life science (6 %)	Healthcare, life science (6 %)	Education, teaching (5 %)	Healthcare, life science (6 %)	Management, administration (9 %)
Education, teaching (5 %)	Education, teaching (6 %)	Healthcare, life science (4 %)	Education, teaching (6 %)	Healthcare, life science (3 %)

**Table 1.** Main previous job categories of respondents in relation to current country (for top 5 countries with highest participation in the survey, excluding ‘other’) (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

Language skills are also important for facilitating entry to the labour market. Main languages spoken by the respondents of the survey are Ukrainian (94%), Russian (80%) and English (50%) (Fig. 7). Many respondents speak both Russian and Ukrainian (76%). Other languages are less commonly spoken. This suggests that only a small share of refugees speak the language of the EU+ host country in which they reside.



**Figure 7.** Main languages spoken by the respondents (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

**Note:** Multiple answers possible.

## Displaced third country nationals

As of 14 September 2022, the Russian Federation’s war against Ukraine had forced third country nationals residing in Ukraine to flee from the military invasion. The top three countries of arrival<sup>17</sup> were: Poland, Romania and Moldova. During border checks nationals of Türkiye, the Russian Federation, India, Azerbaijan, Romania, Israel, Germany and Georgia were mainly recorded.

Surveys conducted by IOM Belgium<sup>18</sup> and IOM Germany<sup>19</sup> on TCNs<sup>20</sup> indicate that TCNs fleeing the war tended to be young single men who were enrolled in education in Ukraine. In Belgium,



90 % of TCNs were men aged 28 years old on average, a third were married and more than half were studying in Ukraine. In Germany 71% were male with an average age of 26 years, only a few were married (11%) more than two-thirds were studying in Ukraine. In Belgium many of the interviewed TCNs were from the Middle East and North Africa (44 %), especially Morocco, while 69 % of TCNs interviewed in Germany originated from West Africa (mostly Nigeria).

Interviews suggest that TCNs in Belgium had often lived longer in Ukraine and more frequently reported that they were likely to return to Ukraine. More than half of the respondents in Germany and Belgium indicated discrimination and xenophobia among the protection issues encountered while fleeing Ukraine. Abductions, torture and gender-based violence were further threats faced by a share of respondents.

*“ I am an Indian citizen, and I was on a work visa in Kyiv. I am not hoping to apply for asylum and staying in the EU, neither am I asking for money, but I would have appreciated to be eligible for temporary protection until everything is fine in Kyiv. ”*

*“ It was like a nightmare! At the borders, Ukrainian people could easily pass and could also get a free bus, but not me. I am a foreigner, I was on the line many days, sometimes without food, drink or hygiene. I was assaulted by border guards, and was pushed back many times, for others that were behind me to pass. Moreover, my bag was stolen, and I was left without anything.”*


## Current situation in the EU+

### Current location

Some SAM-UKR survey respondents have reached what they believe is their preferred destination in the EU+, while others are on the move towards their intended destination (inside or outside the EU+). Forced displacements tend to be unexpected rapid movements to flee specific adverse and harmful situations, such as violent conflicts. This often results in movements and decisions that are not fully planned and may change over time, depending on several factors which will be explored later in this chapter.

The SAM-UKR survey was completed by respondents that were located in Poland (14 %), Czechia (12 %), Lithuania (11%), Romania (7 %), Sweden (6 %), Belgium and Germany (5 % each), followed by lower numbers in other EU+ countries including Iceland (Fig. 8). Of these, despite the high levels of uncertainty over future developments, 7 out of 10 respondents reported that they believed they reached their preferred destination country, whereas 14 % of the respondents were as yet undecided whether to remain where they were, move to another country or return to Ukraine and about 13 % reported they were not in their intended destination (Fig. 8). The percentage of those who believe they have reached their intended destination is slightly lower in neighbouring countries to Ukraine, compared to those in other EU+ countries, which would be expected as many Ukrainian refugees are transiting through frontline Member States towards their destination.

Regarding final destinations other than respondents' current country, if return to Ukraine is not possible in the short term, the preferred destination countries were Czechia, Germany, and the United Kingdom (15 % each), Canada (12 %) and the United States of America (10 %). Other mentioned countries included Belgium (7 %), Poland (6 %), Ireland (6 %), Spain (5 %), France (5 %), Sweden (5 %), Lithuania (5 %) (Fig. 8).




**Figure 8.** The map (left) presents the current location of respondents of the SAM-UKR survey (where they were when they participated in the survey). The pie chart (top right) presents whether respondents of SAM-UKR are at their preferred destination country, or are undecided, with the bar chart (right) presenting the top 20 intended destinations for those who are not yet at their preferred destination (Source: SAM-UKR Survey) **Note:** 68 respondents chose a country outside the top 20 intended destinations.

## Protection status

Most respondents to the survey had already registered for temporary protection (68%), while some registered for a national residence permit in their host country (11%) and a few applied for asylum (international protection) (2%). Moreover, some respondents had not yet registered (14%), while others were waiting to register in a different country (3%), which is consistent with a quarter of respondents not yet in their intended destination when they participated in the survey (Fig. 9).

The status of requested protection changed over time based on the date respondents left Ukraine, considering the criteria in place for the TPD (see [Chapter 1](#)), as well as the flexibility Member States may extend in this regard.

Many respondents provided testimonies to explain that they anticipated the Russian invasion and left Ukraine before the war started. Some of these respondents expressed frustration that they were not eligible for temporary protection because of the date they crossed into the EU. Moreover, considering that the Council Decision was implemented on 4 March 2022, by which time more than 2 million persons had already fled Ukraine into



**Figure 9.** Protection status (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

neighbouring countries, many had applied for international protection upon arrival.<sup>21</sup> Among the SAM-UKR respondents who applied for international protection the vast majority did so before the TPD was implemented.

The vast majority of respondents (93%) had not registered in a different EU country prior to completing the survey. SAM-UKR results indicate that 7% of the respondents had registered in another country, which ended up not being their final destination, indicating duplicated registrations for TPD. The main countries of first registration for SAM-UKR respondents were Poland, Germany, and Czechia, followed by Lithuania and Bulgaria.

“The waiting period for submitting documents is very long, and for me it is difficult to understand what documents are needed, where to submit them, and what is needed for this or for that... All information is taken from social networks...”


“I don't want to be an asylum seeker - I left Ukraine on the 18 February because I was able to foresee that the war was going to start. However, the migration authority doesn't want to change our status for the EU directive on temporary protection because I left a few days before.”

## Reception conditions

The scale and speed of displacement, combined with the needs of those who fled, generated significant challenges for EU+ reception authorities. EU+ countries responded with an immediate and unprecedented rise in humanitarian assistance, from governmental authorities and civil society, institutions and organisations, all providing support to displaced persons in any way they could, such as offering food, clothes, accommodation, health assistance, information and guidance, communication, goods, transport, among other needs (see [Chapter 1](#)). Over a quarter of all respondents were hosted by a private household (27%). One fifth were hosted by family members (19%) and another fifth (18%) were in their own private rented housing. Just 14% were housed in a reception centre.

Half of all respondents met their living expenses with their personal savings (54%), followed by a third who received direct support from authorities, and another third who received support from families. A quarter (24%) received income from employment (local or teleworking), while others were supported by NGOs (15%) or borrowed money (13%) (multiple responses were possible).

Figure 10 illustrates satisfaction levels with the host country reception conditions in terms of general living conditions and access to services. Considering the Likert scale used (from 1 to 5), satisfaction levels are close to the neutral level or slightly positive, with satisfaction with living conditions (mean=3.6), and satisfaction with education for children (mean=3.5) being higher, followed by access to medical care (mean=3.2) and access to legal advice (mean=3.2), which are slightly lower.



**Figure 10.** Average satisfaction with the current situation (in a scale 1-5) (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

Many respondents approached this topic in their testimonies, explaining their experiences in the host country regarding accommodation, living conditions, financial support, language learning process, legal advice, medical care and education for children. Although respondents tended to speak about their difficulties and current needs, many also stated their gratefulness for all the support they received within the host country.

“ The problems we encountered when we arrived in Europe were the lack of warm clothes, shoes, and money for minimal needs. ”

“ I am very grateful to caring people of different nationalities and volunteers for the fact that I have a roof over my head and my children are not hungry... ”

“ It is not easy, employment is not possible, there is no funding or money to this day, there is no way to buy food for the child, it is very hard morally. ”

### Satisfaction with health and education of children

Many respondents of the SAM-UKR survey fled with children. The satisfaction with health and educational provision for their children directly influences their general experiences in host countries. The average satisfaction with children’s education among respondents is 3.53. Although the overall satisfaction remains relatively similar across countries, responses in the neighbouring EU countries to Ukraine are slightly more concentrated to the middle of the scale. In other countries extreme attitudes seem to be slightly more prevalent, suggesting more diverse experiences (Fig. 11).

Regarding the satisfaction with medical care, the average satisfaction is higher for those with children (3.21) compared to those without (3.14). Yet the picture reverses when we look at just the neighbouring EU countries to Ukraine, where the satisfaction with medical care is lower among those with children (3.02) compared to those fleeing without children (3.25). While all EU countries provide access to health care to some degree, especially as far as children are concerned, the level of support provided may vary between countries, influencing diverse groups of arrivals differently.




Figure 11. Satisfaction with children’s education by current country (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

## Understanding needs

Since March, IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix has deployed assessments on the profiles, intentions, and needs of the Ukrainians and TCNs in 14 countries surrounding Ukraine and other EU countries. Around 30 000 responses have been collected as of mid-September. The data were collected through in-person interviews at collective shelters, registration sites, transit points, and major border crossing points.

Between 5 May and 17 June 2022, IOM interviewed 1 320 displaced people crossing the border from Ukraine to Poland. The results indicate that overall, the most common needs among displaced people were financial support (58 %), long-term shelter/accommodation (55 %) and employment (54 %). Further, respondents reported a significant need for language training (43 %), informational support (40 %) and access to medicine and health care services (37 %) in Poland.

Between 25 March and 28 June 2022, some 6 029 interviews were also conducted in Romania, providing evidence that needs vary per country, as the needs in Poland differed from those in Romania. Moreover, needs change over the period of displacement and according to future movement intentions. Among those residing in Romania with the intention to stay, financial support (59 %), transportation support (50 %) and general information (55 %) were the needs most often indicated. On the other hand, displaced people in Romania intending to travel onward experienced a more significant need for food products (52 %) than financial services (25 %).

# 3


## Displacement flows, determinants and intentions

### Reasons to leave

The vast majority of respondents of the SAM-UKR Survey left Ukraine in March 2022, which aligns with the reported border crossings from Ukraine.<sup>22</sup>

Unsurprisingly, respondents stated that the main reason to flee Ukraine was to escape possible (but not yet materialised) military actions (53 %) or because of actual military attacks (49 %), followed at a distance by the deprivation of basic needs (food, water, housing) (33 %), the fear of being personally targeted (32 %) and the fear of sexual and/or gender-based violence (30 %). Fear of torture or punishment (21 %) and unemployment and poverty (20 %) were also highly mentioned (Fig. 12). This question allowed multiple answers and on average respondents gave two answers.

More than two thirds of those who left and mentioned that their home was destroyed were from the East macro-region. Fleeing direct military attacks was most often reported by respondents from the East, followed by Kyiv city and the South macro-region, lower values were reported from those who lived in the North and in the West macro-regions. Respondents who lived in the West are more likely to indicate that they left to escape possible future military actions and due to fears in general, namely the fear of being personally targeted. Escaping in evacuations organised by the authorities



was more common in the East macro-region and in Kyiv city. Both deprivation of basic needs and unemployment reasons were more commonly reported among those from the East and South macro-regions.

Respondents often used their testimonies to describe in more detail their reasons for leaving Ukraine, focusing on concerns about the safety of their families, psychological aspects of living in a country under attack (constant fear, anxiety, deprivation of sleep, panic attacks), their life in Ukraine before they left (living in basements and shelters, deprivation of basic needs) and whether they were previously internally displaced.

**Figure 12.** Reasons to leave Ukraine (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)  
**Note:** Multiple answers possible.

“ Our village has been under occupation by Russian troops since March 2. There was no electricity, water, or communication. The invaders robbed shops and people. Shelling and aerial bombardment began. It was very scary, the children were crying, the food was running out. ”


“ I believe that I left the country on time, I understood that my relatives could not stand it there. Constant transition to the basement from the 10th floor. The elevators were not working. It was very difficult for the children. We had to leave. ”

“ I am from Donetsk region, and this is my second war. In 2014, I fled with three children. In 2022, I fled with my daughter (two sons are already adults) (...) I am in shock, I feel there is no help. ”

“ It's very hard to leave your home, but also to look at the eyes of children full of fear from explosions, it's terrible, this is something you never wish to anyone. ”

## Determining exit routes

The decision to leave Ukraine is followed by a need to determine a suitable route for fleeing the country. These decisions are unlikely to be made on a whim, but are instead underpinned by available information. Google searches performed in Ukraine for immediate border countries such as Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Moldova in Ukraine (Fig. 13) increased since the start of the invasion in February, suggesting that Ukrainians are collecting more information on possible destination countries and exit routes. This is particularly prominent with regards to Poland, which is the main entry point in the EU for Ukrainians, including the respondents of this survey. The relative frequency in Google searches for Poland, in Ukrainian, in Ukraine also aligns with the daily border crossings from Ukraine (Fig. 13). Moreover, exit routes were also determined by proximity, unhindered access to roads, and available transport.



**Figure 13.** Evolution of the relative frequency in the Google searches for neighbouring EU countries (Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) in Ukrainian in Ukraine and the daily border crossings from Ukraine, 01/01/22-01/07/22 (Sources: Google Trends Analytics, UNHCR)

**Note:** The right axis is shifted upwards.

## The journey to the EU


During the journey from Ukraine to the EU, most respondents travelled with their family members, including those of any age (48 %) or children (38 %). About one fifth travelled with their pets (22 %), while a few travelled alone (12 %) or with people they met during the journey (12 %). The main modes of transportation were buses (46 %), trains (40 %) and own car (36 %) (multiple answers were possible).

Information about the journey, i.e. which routes to take or where to go, was mainly consulted from other people abroad (48 %) or from social media websites (44 %), followed at a distance by traditional media (20 %) and NGOs, grassroots organisations (10 %). Government authorities appear in fifth place, with only 4 in 100 having consulted government authorities to get information about their journey (multiple answers were possible).

Along the journey, the smartphone is by far the most used media device (86 %). Other phones, laptops and tablets were much less used (respectively, 15 %, 11%, and 5 %, multiple answers were possible). Moreover, regarding online practices during their journey and forced displacement, most respondents communicate with each other and with family members back home by using

the Viber mobile application (71%), followed by Telegram (62 %). Other relevant channels have been phone calls and SMS (43%), WhatsApp (35%), Facebook (33 %) and Instagram (25 %). Other less used channels were Signal, Skype and e-mail (multiple answers were possible).

A fifth of all respondents (22 %) had paid someone to help them escape Ukraine. On average, they paid EUR363.<sup>23</sup> Respondents reported severe hardship (63%), shooting, bombing or threats (48 %) en route. Less frequent but still traumatic events were emotional abuse, threat of physical assault (17%), racism or xenophobia (11%), financial fraud or exploitation (11%) (Fig. 14, multiple answers were possible).



**Figure 14.** Adverse events during the journey (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

“ There are problems with water and food in trains. 24 hours with children without water and food. Earlier, the organisation of assistance was better, now there are even complaints about the tickets and there is no water or food and that is it, continue with small children as you wish. ”

“ We lived in the car for 6 days, the children slept at night, and we took turns to drive and take care of the baby. The car was perceived as something extremely important, which should always be nearby. It seems that you can die without it. ”

“ My children and I spent two days at the train station in Poznań due to a Russian hacker attack on the servers of the Polish Railways. ”

“ In Ukraine during evacuation (5 days), we heard sirens and many explosions, I did not sleep for 3 days. ”



## Reasons for choosing a destination country

The SAM-UKR survey respondents' main reasons for choosing a destination country were work opportunities (50 %) and the location of friends and family members (47 %). Other reasons included reception conditions in terms of benefits and support (23 %) and the language spoken in that country (20 %) (Fig. 15). Biggest differences emerge when looking at displaced persons from Ukraine who have reached their destination and those who are still hoping to travel onward. Among those who have reached their destination country, family and friends have been the main reason for choosing their current location, followed by work opportunities. Among those who are still en route or intending to move to another country, the main reported reasons are work opportunities, followed at significantly lower share by the presence of family and friends. These findings suggest that reduced work opportunities may trigger onward movements of displaced people, especially if they do not have family ties in the present country.

Some respondents also used testimonies to describe in detail how they decided which country to flee to, many explaining their intentions to join family abroad, others describing their rationale based on previous personal experiences, professional skills, and languages that they already speak or ones that they believed they could learn relatively fast which would support their integration in the host country. Some spoke about their concerns about integration, while expressing intent to return home as soon as it is safe to do so.




Figure 15. Most relevant reasons to choose a destination country (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

“ At first, I thought about going to the Netherlands, but at the last minute I decided to try my luck in Denmark. This is an agrarian country, and by education and work experience I am an economist of agricultural production, we lived in a village, had our own farm, my hands are used to work and my head is not stupid. If I have a piece of land and a house during my stay (until my country is free and safe for children), I will feed my children and be able to work and pay taxes for the development of the country that will shelter us. ”


“ My daughter and I had to evacuate from Kharkov for 2 years due to shelling of the city. Now we are in Poland waiting for a visa to Great Britain, we dream of returning home when it becomes safe. We are very grateful to the Europeans for their support. ”

## Country of entrance and secondary movements

More than half of respondents of the SAM-UKR survey entered the EU via Poland (55%), followed at a large distance by Romania (17%), Slovakia (8%), and Hungary (8%), confirming the findings of other sources.<sup>24</sup> As of 17 August 2022, more than 5 million people crossed Ukraine international borders into Poland, corresponding to 65% of the displaced people that entered EU from Ukraine.<sup>25</sup> In SAM-UKR survey, some 12% of respondents stated they entered the EU via other country, out of whom around a fifth travelled by air, and a third travelled in their own car, arriving often via Moldova, Belarus and the Russian Federation.

Not everyone arriving through the neighbouring EU countries with Ukraine stayed there. For instance, in Poland, more than six million border crossings from Ukraine were registered between 24 February and 20 September 2022, while around four million border crossings were registered into Ukraine and slightly less than 1 400 000 registrations for TPD were received.<sup>26</sup> These data indicate that large numbers of people carry on their journey into other EU+ countries or even towards non-EU countries.

Among the respondents of the SAM-UKR survey, about 4 in 10 of those that arrived in Poland remained there, while the rest travelled further - a quarter going to Lithuania and around a fifth to Czechia (22%). Of those respondents, who arrived in Romania, around two thirds stayed there (62%), 18% went to Bulgaria, 11% to Czechia and 9% to Greece. From Hungary, about one third of respondents moved to Czechia and another third to Italy, while only 17% remained in Hungary. Finally, of those who arrived in Slovakia, more than half continued to Czechia (52%), only 15% stayed in Slovakia with others travelling to Sweden (10%), Austria, Germany or Poland (7% each) (Fig. 16). These findings should be interpreted with care, as they reflect data from SAM-UKR respondents and do not always follow administrative data.




**Figure 16.** Country of entrance to the EU (left) in relation to current location (right) (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

Around 14% of SAM-UKR respondents explained they are still on the move, not having reached their final destination, while some 13% explained they are not sure if they will move further. Additionally, some 14% have not registered for temporary protection or applied for any other form of protection because they are still deciding whether they will stay in their current destination. Moreover, among the respondents of this survey, 7% said that they had registered for temporary protection or another status in another country before arriving in their current location (see [Chapter 2](#)), indicating that movements may still continue even after the registration.

It is difficult to know the exact numbers of Ukrainians in the EU and where they are currently located. For instance, Ukrainians can travel to the Schengen area without a visa and even reside


there for some time without having registered.<sup>27</sup> This makes it also challenging to estimate potential secondary flows.

However, it is possible to monitor possible triggers for onward movements. Secondary movements of forcibly displaced persons often relate to an inability to access durable solutions in a host country, such as housing, access to employment or education.<sup>28</sup> The evolution of Google searches in Ukrainian language in Poland (Fig. 17) reveals that finding suitable work and education opportunities are a concern for Ukrainian refugees in the country and they are actively seeking out information on these topics. Moreover, despite some variation in relative frequency over time, these searches have remained important over an extended period of time since the start of the refugee crisis.



**Figure 17.** Evolution of the relative frequency in the Google searches for “apartment”, “job”, “school” and “money” in Ukrainian in Poland 01/01-01/07 (Source: Google Trends Analytics)

The results from SAM-UKR survey suggest that satisfaction with living conditions may be shaping the migration intentions of some groups. When looking at respondents’ general satisfaction with living conditions, the average rate is much lower among the respondents who have not reached their destination (Fig. 18) (for more information on satisfaction see [Chapter 2](#)).



**Figure 18.** Satisfaction with living conditions among different groups of respondents (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

## Possible further outflows from Ukraine

Refugee flows from Ukraine stabilised over the summer of 2022,<sup>29</sup> yet many European countries are anticipating further inflows over the winter. The magnitude and directions of these possible flows, however, remains unclear and depends on how the war evolves. Despite the uncertainty, we can identify possible drivers of further flows by exploring the decision-making processes of those Ukrainians who have already fled the country.

Refugee movements often result from a sudden overwhelming push, be it war, political crisis or some other disastrous event that places the emphasis on immediate escape. This can trigger a mass flight, where many flee because of the general atmosphere of panic and fear, leaving their homes on a moment's notice and giving little thought to the consequences. This was also the case in Ukraine. The evolution of Google searches in Ukraine for different migration-related words like 'border', as well as for information on bordering countries (Fig. 13 and Fig. 17), shows that searches peaked already on 24 February, highlighting a sense of urgency and people seeking out information to decide their next steps or plan their escape. Shortly after the start of the Russian Federation's war against Ukraine, people began fleeing the country for safety and by the evening of 24 February, more than 79 000 Ukrainians had already left the country. According to the UNHCR, within the first four days, the number had risen to almost half a million and, in a week, to about 1.2 million.

Not everyone leaves their home country immediately. Moreover, many become and remain internally displaced first (see [Chapter 5](#)). So while cross-border refugee movements are triggered by sudden developments, then alongside such flows, there are also those movements that are motivated by a wider variety of reasons and where refugees may have had more time to weigh their options. The SAM-UKR survey confirms that the widespread destruction of infrastructure and Ukraine's economy is also pushing many to leave Ukraine. As the war drags on, material and livelihood reasons for leaving Ukraine are becoming increasingly important among respondents and we can expect this trend to continue as the economic situation in Ukraine worsens.


Further flows from Ukraine can also be expected for the purpose of family reunification. While most adults fled with their minor children (see [Chapter 2](#)), many family units are not intact. Most adult men stayed in Ukraine due to general mobilisation, but they may join their partners and families at some point. Moreover, other family members, who were unable or unwilling to flee previously, may choose to join their family members abroad. About 31% of the SAM-UKR survey respondents expect other family members (on average, 2 persons) to join later.

# 4

## Voices of displacement

Some 500 SAM-UKR survey respondents chose to share further information about their experiences of displacement in the form of a typed, free-text testimony. The text was processed and translated, and then a qualitative analysis was performed to identify reoccurring themes. The top 10 most frequent themes were: people (95 references), accommodation (75 references), assistance (57 references), Ukraine/Ukrainian (40 references), protection (36 references), language (29 references), transport (23 references), services (23 references), work (22 references) and migration (21 references). This section presents a detailed analysis of some of these themes.

A sentiment analysis was performed on the testimonies and identified a tendency for more negative (573 references) than positive views (293 references) (Fig. 19), as would be expected for displaced persons, separated from their families and having their homes and country under attack. The degree of negativity varied among topics but was rather common in relation to financial situations, long-term housing support in host countries, difficulties and experiences during the journey, and the situation in Ukraine before escaping the war. More positive sentiment was used when expressing appreciation for the support and help of volunteers and NGOs, immediate reception conditions in host countries and education for children in host countries.



**Figure 19.** Sentiment analysis of all 500 testimonies (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

### Theme 1. People: persons, children and family

The most common theme identified in the testimonies was people, including both individual persons, children and family members. Respondents expressed a great deal of concern for their loved ones, including children and family members. At the same time, they shared generally positive experiences and interactions with the people they met during their journey and in the host country, and they expressed concern about more vulnerable Ukrainians, such as young children and elderly people (for more details see [Annex: Themes in Testimonies](#)).

## People

Respondents referred to “friendly”, “good” and “kind” people, in terms of volunteers, NGOs, people they met during their journey or in host countries that helped them. They expressed gratitude to all those that supported them with housing, food, water, clothes, guidance, advice, etc. Another dimension in this category refers to local people, Ukrainian people and the solidarity bonds between them. Concerns were also expressed regarding how to care for displaced elderly people and people with disabilities.

“  
Big thanks to volunteers and ordinary people in Romania, Italy and Slovenia!  
”

“  
I have a son and two elderly people to support, and we have nothing.  
”

“  
When we arrived in Lviv, we received water and food from the Red Cross, and caring people gave us advice on how to cross the border as quickly as possible.  
”

“  
I am indescribably grateful to people, ordinary people, for their participation, sympathy and help.  
”

“  
Many local people helped with medicines, basic necessities and simply provided moral support  
”

“  
Thank you very much to common people of EU and governments of some countries who support Ukraine in this horrible war and genocide of Ukrainians.  
”

## Children

Respondents expressed difficulties escaping the invasion with children. Most explained how terrified children were during aggressive attacks, bombing and shelling resulting in persistent mental health issues such as fear of sirens/sudden sounds, constant crying, panic attacks, anxiety related mutism, sleep deprivation, nightmares, sickness, among others. As if to compound the effects of the war, these affected children were then expected to live and essentially to recover from the experience in a new and unfamiliar country away from their friends and other members of the family.

“  
At this time, I am most concerned about the fact that I cannot rebury my husband, and I cannot legally prove that I am now the sole guardian of two minor children.  
”

“  
The trip was divided into several stages with long stops — adjusted to the pace of a small child.  
”

“  
There was not enough food, the little child was forever afraid and terrified, and we prayed.  
”

“ Since we are practically deprived of all possible payments, except for the minimum food assistance from the migration service, it is very difficult to survive with small children.”

“ Water was given, but with such war and disgust and shouting “get in your seat urgently and don’t walk here” as if giving water to Ukrainian children is something incredible!”

“ A few days later, shelling and aerial bombardment began. It was very scary, the children were crying, the food was running out. I left the occupied village with children through mined areas, and then using evacuation buses, and while shelling.”

“ Life is very hard because there are no social benefits, and I am here alone with two small twin children, so I am not able to work, because there is no one to leave the children with and they often get sick.”

## Family

This word was used generally to refer to family members that travelled with the respondents, plus those that stayed in Ukraine and also host families in EU+ countries.

“ At the moment, we have been living with a Polish family for the third month, which sheltered us, but we have to move out of their place.”

“ I am living now in a host family with my daughter.”

“ We are a large family and we need help with food.”

“ I feel like I am a burden for my hosting family.”

A sentiment analysis (Fig. 20) shows that testimonies about people tended to be most positive, largely because of kindness shown by people met en route and in host countries. On the other hand, mentions of children tended to be in a negative context because of the compounded effects of war, displacement and then settling in an unfamiliar environment. Narratives about family were more complex resulting in both positive and negative signals and reflecting a dichotomy between family that stayed in Ukraine, family that were able to escape the war, and host families combined with a feeling of separation, burden and dependency on host families.




Figure 20. Sentiment analysis of ‘people’ category (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

## Theme 2. Accommodation: housing, and residence permits

The testimonies described in this section highlight the challenges those fleeing the war in Ukraine are experiencing in finding long-term accommodation in host countries. This thematic category includes both housing and residence permit topics (see [Annex: Themes in Testimonies](#)).

### Housing

Host countries tended to offer short-term accommodation, but respondents expressed strong desires for longer-term options. Indeed, many respondents had a looming deadline to leave their short-term accommodation, which for the most part they found to be expensive. Moreover, they explained they have dependent family members with them, mainly children and elderly people, or disabled people, meaning they need a housing option with enough suitable space and they will need to support the expenses of a family. Some respondents complained about social shared housing options and others spoke about living with local families that hosted them.

“ We stayed with a host family. At first everything was fine, then something did not suit the owner and we were given a deadline to leave. Finding housing here is expensive and difficult. No organizations that I contacted helped us. There is no housing support. There is no financial support. ”

“ I have no income now. The money is running out. The period of stay at the hotel ends at the end of May, I have no opportunity to work or at least learn the language. There is no one to leave the children with. ”

“ Living conditions in social housing are terrible. In the first month, I was robbed in my room. The police did not come when called, the administration could not solve the issue. ”

“ When we arrived, we were given free housing, but only for 3 months. I have been looking for work and housing, but housing prices are completely prohibitive. ”

“ The housing situation is difficult. For example, I will be sheltered until July only. Then I will have to look for other options. ”

“ The housing situation become unbearable. I live with a host family, but I feel like I am a burden for them. ”

Respondents often found applications for accommodation to be overly bureaucratic and had difficulties accessing support in this regard. Some asked for support and information on how to request accommodation, hoping to overcome language barriers and complete forms, and a few explained they were experiencing misinformation and did not know how to proceed, where to go, who to contact. A few participants even encountered fraudulent situations, leaving them even more vulnerable, and highlighting the need for more effective support from national authorities.



“ The most demanding thing is to find housing and to register. Where I am now, regulation does not require the registration of a large number of residents in one apartment. The absence of a residence permit blocks other opportunities, such as filing applications, receiving assistance, etc. Finding accommodation for six or more people is next to impossible. It is impossible to receive compensation before concluding a residence contract, and it is also impossible to conclude a contract without money and a national bank account. ”

“ There is a problem of official housing rental with a contract and the possibility of registration because national citizens are afraid to rent housing to foreigners who do not have a national work contract and/or monthly income in a national account. Even with enough money in an Ukrainian account, it is almost impossible to prove one's decency and solvency. ”

“ The government should take an urgent action to provide longer-term housing to Ukrainians. Right now, there is only a possibility to get one night in a hotel, or sleep in centers packed with 200+ people in one room. ”

“ Private sector agencies refuse to rent to Ukrainians. Even if I would have the capacity to pay for housing, I cannot get it, so this is also humiliating. ”

## Residence permits

Respondents faced difficulties in submitting a request and being approved for residence permits, which are required under specific circumstances, for example if they: i) were not Ukrainian citizens, ii) left Ukraine before 24 February, iii) were already living abroad, or iv) were on holiday abroad. Some explained they have had contact with illegal situations online associated with requests for residence permits, calling for more support from national authorities.

“ I have been here for three months but I need to get a residence permit to be able to have access to other benefits. ”

“ My letters and requests have been ignored, however, through intermediaries, with payment in cash it seems the process can be speeded up, apparently this is corruption, which is very strange in Europe, but I saw it and there are a lot of intermediary services on the Internet for obtaining a residence card, and they say that with them everything happens much faster. ”

A sentiment analysis found that these topics were mostly spoken about in a negative way (Fig. 21). Only a few (14%) comments were positive when mentioning volunteer work and hosting families, to whom respondents continuously expressed their gratitude. Regarding the housing situation, respondents' discourse was largely focused on their negative experiences and their constant worries (87%). Regarding residence and residence permit, which is more related to bureaucratic processes, the discourse was exclusively negative.




Figure 21. Sentiment analysis of ‘accommodation’ category (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

### Theme 3. Assistance: assistance, aid, support and help

This category includes assistance in host countries in the EU+, from financial, to food, psychological or medical and housing assistance (for more details see [Annex: Themes in Testimonies](#)).

#### Assistance

Respondents frequently mentioned financial problems and monetary assistance, explaining they were hoping to receive enough to cover their expenses in the host countries, but they either received less than required or had not yet received anything at all. However, respondents also expressed difficulties with the application process and admitted to having poor understanding of eligibility criteria.

“ In my case, my family did not receive payments, we have not received any financial assistance, we are now in trouble because our savings are running out. The country we are in, promised us 80 euros for 2 adults and a child (1.5 months stay, which is not enough for our needs). ”

“ Unfortunately, the financial assistance provided by [EU country] is too small, moreover, it is a one-time allowance. ”

“ Failure to provide financial assistance in [EU country] due to the fact that I live with my children in a private housing and not in settlements designated by the migration service. ”

“ We still haven’t received any financial assistance. ”

“ There is no financial assistance, you can only rely on your own funds. ”

## Aid

Insufficient monetary and humanitarian aid was commonly mentioned based on short-to-longer-term experiences in the host country. Respondents often expressed satisfaction with immediate reception but dissatisfaction with medium and long-stay experiences, referring to inadequate financial, food, goods, and clothes during the months following their arrival.

“ *Very limited in their own finances, lack of work, inaccessibility of basic medical care, no opportunity to purchase the necessary things and food, humanitarian aid is scanty.* ”

“ *Walking in the park helped a lot, there was support from local people, but in fact you won't live long without money and humanitarian aid.* ”

“ *Financial aid for children was refused because I have as much as 200 euros (!!!).* ”

“ *Thank you for the humanitarian aid.* ”

## Support

This sub-category included legal, social, state and psychological support from volunteers, NGOs, host families and host country support initiatives for newly arrived refugees and during their journey. In general, respondents were happy and extremely thankful for all the work and support they received at this level.

“ *I am sincerely grateful to everyone I met on my way in Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland - it was unexpected and incredible support.* ”

“ *Incredible support was felt from everyone around, food and water (essentials) on every path!* ”

## Help

Respondents described insufficient medical and psychological help in Ukraine in occupied and liberated cities, as well as challenges in obtaining medical help in host countries. Some expressed dire need for medical and psychological help to overcome traumas experienced in Ukraine.

“ *I am satisfied with everything, but I am sick. I need psychological help. My brother was buried in Ukraine because of the war... He was killed in the Armed Forces.* ”

“ *At first, we lived in the corridor (...) I thought we would not survive, there was constant shelling and no help, no one was putting out fires, there was not any type of medical help. After this, we lived in the basement for a week with no food or water. One morning we left the city under shelling, I covered my child with a blanket and just prayed* ”

A sentiment analysis indicated both positive and negative testimonies in this category, with moderately more negative aspects being shared, such as the lack or insufficient financial support (Fig. 22). Positive comments were mainly related to support from NGOs, volunteers, and national families along the journey and in reception places upon arrival.

For more information on other themes identified in the qualitative analysis, please consult the Testimonies Annex.




Figure 22. Sentiment analysis of ‘assistance’ category (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

# 5

## Internally displaced persons in Ukraine


This chapter presents an overview of internal displacement trends within Ukraine over time, looking at the demographic composition of the population sub-group and their pattern of past and intended future movement. It refers to the findings of IOM’s General Population Survey conducted between 16 March and 23 August 2022 (see [Annex: Methodological Note](#)).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has triggered an unprecedented humanitarian crisis across all the country’s sub-regional divisions (oblasts), forcing people to leave their homes and habitual residences as they fled the war. As of 23 August 2022, IOM estimates that 6 975 000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) have fled their places of residence due to the deteriorated security situation without crossing the Ukrainian external border.<sup>30</sup>

IDPs can have various reasons for staying in Ukraine. They may not have the physical or financial means to cross the international borders, or they may feel safer in another part of the country (in August, 68 % of IDPs stated feeling completely or somewhat safe compared to 49 % of non-IDPs). By remaining in Ukraine, IDPs face specific challenges, as they are still forced to abandon their homes and livelihoods.

### Trend analysis

The impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine will have unprecedented and long-term effects on human mobility and human suffering of the people displaced by the war in the region and beyond. In March, IOM estimated that 6.5 million people became internally displaced during the first weeks after the start of the invasion (Fig. 23). A month later, a further 1 million people had become internally displaced, reaching 7.7 million. The internal displacement peaked at the




**Figure 23.** Estimated number of IDPs Mar. – Aug. 2022 (Source: IOM General Population Survey)

**Notes:** \*All population estimate figures are rounded to the nearest thousand. \*\*Starting in Round 3, IOM made a slight adjustment to the estimation method for IDPs in Ukraine to increase the precision of the sampling frame and improve accuracy, while remaining within the original margin of error.

beginning of May 2022 at 8 million. Thereinafter, the number of IDPs started to decrease, and the assessments revealed a total of 6.3 million IDPs on 23 June. As of 23 August 2022, 16 % of the general population of Ukraine, equivalent to 7 million individuals (Fig. 23), were internally displaced within the country.

National level figures paint a broad overview, but increasingly, the mobility dynamics differed dramatically between macro-regions of Ukraine (Fig. 24), especially between the East (+73 % IDPs between March and August) and the West (- 33 % IDPs between March and August). The East macro-region has been the main region of origin of IDPs (3.8 million displaced coming from the East) whilst also hosting the largest share of current IDPs (1.9 million currently displaced in the East).




**Figure 24.** Estimated number of IDPs per Ukrainian macro-region in Aug. 2022, Round 8 (Source: IOM General Population Survey)  
**Note:** Surveys were not conducted in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

## Demographics


The share of males in the population of IDPs has steadily decreased over time. For example, in March the recorded IDPs were 46 % male and 54 % female, while in August 2022, women made up 70 % of the IDP population. Increasing war deployments or forced displacement outside of the country may have led to the declining proportion of male respondents over time.

Some 50 % of IDPs interviewed were between 25-45 years of age, only 6 % of adult respondents indicated being younger than 25 years, while 43 % were older than 45 years at the time of the interview (23 August 2022) (Fig. 25).<sup>31</sup>



**Figure 25.** IDPs age distribution as of 23 Aug. 2022

Of all IDP respondents surveyed, half (49%) were part of a 2-3-person household, with 50% confirming having at least one child (48% of households with children had one child, 37% had two children, while 16% of families indicated having three or more children). Among the internally displaced, many households included one or more vulnerable household members<sup>32</sup>. IOM has identified nine vulnerability groups within the Ukrainian population (Fig. 26). Age-based vulnerability encompasses an extensive age range (anyone younger than 18 years and older than 60) and is the most prominent vulnerability within households interviewed (Fig. 26).



**Figure 26.** Share of IDP households with vulnerable members (Source: IOM General Population Survey)


**Note:** Share of IDPs who reported one or more of their current household members fall within one of the following vulnerability categories.

## Origin and destination

The East has been identified as the leading macro-region of origin (67% of IDPs originated from there) as well as the main macro-region of destination (29% of all IDPs lived there in August). Over the course of the eight General Population Survey rounds, the number of IDPs originating from the East macro-region increased by 77% between March and August 2022, while internal displacement of people from the North, Kyiv city and Centre macro-regions steadily decreased.

The number of IDPs living within the East macro-region also increased significantly from March until August (+73%), while displacement within or to the West macro-region decreased (-33%). The Centre macro-region saw a comparatively stable incoming flow of IDPs with the regional movement following the national pattern. Apart from a significant drop in June, movements towards the North macro-region have remained relatively stable while movements towards Kyiv city increased over time (Fig. 27).<sup>33</sup>

Most IDPs remain displaced within their macro-region. For instance, in the East, about 40% of IDPs originated from the same macro-region, 65% in the North, and 38% in the South. Those who left their macro-region often chose to go to the West (25% of IDPs from the East, 13% from the North and 14% from the South). Limited movement was observed from the East to the South (2%) and Kyiv city (7%). People from Kyiv city primarily found their temporary place of living in the North macro-region (59%), while almost a third (31%) moved to the West. The picture is different for the limited number of IDPs in the West (less than 2% of total IDPs): three in four moved, instead, to the East, while the minority remained within their macro-region.



**Figure 27.** Estimated IDP presence per macro-region from March to August 2022 (Rounds 1 to 8) (Source: IOM General Population Survey)

## Decision-making and intentions (internal patterns)

As the war continues, external circumstances may force IDPs to repeatedly relocate to find a safe location. As of 23 July, further displacement was experienced by 30 % of IDPs, of which 9 % endured displacement three or more times.<sup>34</sup> More than half of the IDPs (59 %) in Kyiv city at that time had gone through secondary displacement; other macro-regions hosted significantly lower shares of secondarily displaced persons. The three most common reasons for further displacement were: the inability of IDPs to find a job in their new location to earn an income (60 %), followed by a lack of accommodation (53 %) and the security situation (40 %).

June and July marked a decrease in overall readiness for further mobility among IDPs. The share of IDPs with intentions for relocation was significantly smaller in August (29 %) than at the beginning of the invasion (45 %). The number of Ukrainians who have not left their habitual places of residence, but are considering doing so, remains low (4 %).


The East is the macro-region of habitual residence for the largest share of IDPs, whilst also having been the primary location of displacement for the greatest share of secondary displaced people (Fig. 27). However, the secondary movement from the East may decrease in the following month as merely 23 % of IDPs in the East macro-region now indicate an intention of further movement (any direction, including return), as opposed to 37 % in the West, as well as 29 % in the South, 38 % in the North, and 20 % in the Centre macro-region (as of 23 August).

Most IDPs (77 % in August, a 9 % increase since July) planned to return to their places of habitual residence in their immediate future, only 10 % of IDPs did not intend to return and hoped to locally integrate into their place of displacement. Others remained undecided about their future place of residency (9 %) or planned to settle in a third area (3 %), which is neither their habitual residence nor their current location.

Regional variations were observed regarding IDPs' intention of local integration. IDPs in Kyiv city were more likely to wish to integrate locally in the long term (30 %), than IDPs residing in one of the other macro-regions of the country (Fig. 28). In the medium and long term, this unequal distribution of regional integration patterns could impact the job and housing market, potentially leading to a significant rise in the cost of rental housing in Kyiv city and challenges accessing the job market. The intention of local integration has been observed to be primarily a response to the security situation in IDPs' habitual place of residence. Damaged housing, low income and livelihood prospects are additional deterrence.



Among all macro-regions a significant increase in the desire to return was observed from July to August (Kyiv city: +28 %, East: +13 %, South: +15 %, West: +4 %, North: +6 %, Centre +6 %).



**Figure 28.** IDPs long-term movement and integration intentions by macro-region (Source: IOM General Population Survey)

## Sectoral analysis

### Financial needs

The need for cash assistance steadily increased over time. For example, in March, about half (49 %) of the internally displaced population indicated a need for financial support, but within six months, the share has increased to 78 %. Cash assistance continued to be the most pressing need for the largest number of IDPs (60 %) in August. Regional differences have been decreasing, with the need for financial aid being indicated by more than 70 % of IDPs in all macro-regions. The highest need was recorded in the South, where 87 % of IDPs showed a lack or partial lack of financial resources (the share of unemployed IDPs looking for a job was also the highest in this macro-region – 36 %).

### Food and non-food items

In addition to the limited financial resources, the harvest, production and import of food and other goods slowed down across the country, 27 % of IDPs experienced a lack of food (an 8 % increase since March). Some 54 % of IDP households with infants and children under the age of five reported problems getting enough food for their children. Food shortages were also most pressing for households with no income or income below UAH 5 000 (approximately EUR 135), and those who reside in the southern or northern macro-regions of the country.

One in three persons (34 %) experienced a lack of non-food items such as clothes and shoes. Preparing for winter, bedding kits (56 %), warm clothing (76 %) and footwear were named as the most needed non-food items (in July). A lack of sales of the items was mainly reported by those living in the eastern macro-region, southern and northern parts of the country. In other macro-regions cash-based winterisation schemes could be viable.

## Shelter

Of the internally displaced respondents, nearly half (49 %) were renting their housing, placing an additional burden on their budgets. Some 23 % of IDPs experienced a lack of accommodation in August. The greatest need was observed among the IDPs in the West macro-region (28 %); while only 5 % of IDPs in Kyiv city lacked housing. For the upcoming winter, one in four currently internally displaced respondents dread to be forced to leave their current housing situation due to insufficient heating. The lack of heating appliances is endured by an even greater share of IDPs (43 % of IDPs residing in rented apartments in July).

A third of IDPs reported that attacks had damaged their homes. Whilst this could be an overestimation considering many have not had access to their homes since their displacement, it may still be a deterrent of return. The need for building and reconstruction materials was seemingly higher amongst the non-displaced population (32 %), yet the share of IDPs lacking repair material for their current shelter remained high (22 %). As return rates increase despite the ongoing war, the need for building materials can be expected to grow further.

## Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and health

More than a quarter (28 %) of displaced people experienced a lack of hygiene items as of 23 August (+12 % since March). Notably, almost half (45 %) of the respondents faced a lack of menstrual items, indicating a need for a more gender-inclusive humanitarian aid response. Access to drinking water continued to be an issue for the population residing in the South and East macro-regions, where 12 % and 10 % of the people continued to lack drinking water in August. Very few respondents reported a lack of safe toilet access (3 % of displaced persons).

A shortage of medicine and health care services was experienced by 30 % of IDPs, with 32 % not taking their medication due to the war. Rural residents were more likely than others to endure a lack of medical services and medicines. A third of all respondents requested IOM's free psychological support hotline number for support in August. Women were twice as likely to enquire about psychological support than men.

# 6


## Returns<sup>35</sup> to and within Ukraine

This chapter presents an overview of returns to and within Ukraine since the start of the Russian invasion, looking at the demographic composition of returnees, their movement patterns, and their needs after their return. It refers to the findings from IOM's General Population Survey (see [Annex: Methodological Note](#)).

IOM identifies as returnees those respondents who indicated having left their place of habitual residence since 24 February, due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, for a period of at least 2 weeks (14 days), but who have, since then, returned. As of 23 August 2022, IOM estimated the return of 6 013 000 people to their homes. This figure includes people who were internally displaced persons (IDPs) and who have since returned from another city, oblast or macro-region, as well as people who returned from forced displacement outside of the country.

### Trend analysis

In May, the IOM General Population Survey started recording the number of returnees. This figure increased from 2.7 million, in early May 2022, to 6 million, at the end of August (+117%). The returnee trend has been closely negatively correlated with internal displacement; as internal displacement decreased, the number of people returning increased (Fig. 29).



**Figure 29.** Estimated number of returnees and IDPs from Mar. - Aug. 2022 (Source: IOM General Population Survey)

Analyses indicate that as general returns increased, so did the proportion of self-reported returns from abroad, up from 7%, in May 2022, to 15% of all returns, in August. This increase of returnees from abroad was accompanied by a relevant rise in men returning to Ukraine. In May, returnees from abroad were exclusively female (12% of female returns were from abroad), all interviewed male returnees reported having been internally displaced (none coming back from abroad). In August, 6% of male and 20% of female returnees were recorded returning from another country.

## Returnees: Socio-demographic profile

The demographic composition of the General Population Survey respondents who returned to their place of habitual residence within Ukraine closely resembles the composition of IDPs, as women were overrepresented (68%) and more than half of the respondents were between the ages of 25-45 years (Fig. 30). A more differentiated analysis of respondents' age groups revealed that, in August 2022, returnees continued to be slightly younger than IDPs, with 63% of returnees under the age of 45, compared to 56% of IDPs. Just 12% of the returnees were part of a single-person household, 41% belonging to 2-3 person households, and 47% to a household with four or more members.




Figure 30. Returnees age distribution (Source: IOM General Population Survey)

Compared to IDPs, returnee households less often included infants (Fig. 26 and Fig. 31), but they were more likely to have children between the age of one and five. Returnees were also more likely to have one or more children between the age of five and 17. Households with children may be more inclined to return to their place of habitual residence when schools are open to allow their children to return to school and restore a sense of normality. Meanwhile, younger people may also return to help with reconstruction work or ongoing war efforts.





Figure 31. Share of returnee households with vulnerable members

Note: Share of returnees who reported one or more of their current household members fall within one of the following vulnerability categories.

## Origin and destination

As of 23 August, of all respondents in their place of habitual residence, 20 % indicated they returned following more than two weeks in displacement due to the war, equivalent to an estimated 6 013 000 returnees. As a result of the war, some 15 % of returnees had previously fled to another country while many more had been locally displaced and some 36 % had stayed within their oblast but moved to another city. About half (49 %) of the returnees had moved temporarily to a different oblast within Ukraine. Considering both internal displacement and forced displacement outside of the country, after 180 days of war (23 August 2022), people who returned to their habitual place of residence did so after an average of 63 days.

A high volume of returnees was observed both in the North macro-region (34 %) and Kyiv city (20 %). Compared to July, all macro-regions, apart from Kyiv city, experienced increases in August (Fig. 32). The East macro-region had previously experienced a significant decrease in estimated returnee numbers (presumed secondary departures), in line with the deteriorating perception of safety reported by respondents in the area (57 % in the East felt somewhat or entirely unsafe in August, compared to 61 % in July and 45 % in June). It is hard to determine the definite nature of these returns and whether they are permanent or temporary. However, in August, amongst returnees, 78 % indicated they were planning to remain in their homes.



**Figure 32.** Estimated returns per macro-region in Aug. 2022 and changes since July (Source: IOM General Population Survey)

**Note:** Surveys were not conducted in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

## Decision-making and intentions

Most returnees reported no intention to leave their places of habitual residence again in the future; in August, out of 6 million returnees, just 661000 considered leaving their homes again (11%). The share of returnees who planned to leave their homes again due to the war was the highest in the South (22 %), followed by the Centre (14 %) and East macro-regions (12 %). In Kyiv city, 86 % of returnees were set on staying home.

Among IDPs, 11% indicated that they planned to return to their places of habitual residence within two weeks, marking yet a further decrease in anticipated IDP returns (15% in June decreased to 13% in July), translating into an estimated 780 000 forthcoming returns. A relatively large proportion of IDPs (7%) stated that their return would depend on further situation development. IDPs originally from Kyiv city were most likely to be planning to return at the present time (27%), followed by IDPs from the North (17%). Among the top motivations for return were family reunification, property ownership and free accommodation in place of habitual residence, and the perception of safety in the primary residence location.

## **Sectoral analysis (cash, food, non-food items, shelter, etc.)**

Living conditions and the level of destruction at the habitual residence ultimately affect people's needs. Following periods of displacement, returnees continued to have difficulties finding paid work. Many businesses remained closed (80% in the East, 78% in Kyiv city and 67% in the North, as of 23 July), and both farming and industrial activities have been reduced (65% in the North and 63% in Kyiv city, as of 23 July) due to the war, leading to job scarcity. Some 28% of returnees were not earning any money in August, and 42% earned less than before the war started.

In July, 93% of respondents in the East macro-region found it challenging to earn a living. A month later, data indicate that respondents from the East macro-region had the highest share of unemployed returnees. In turn, 67% of returnees (63% among male and 69% of female returnees) mentioned the need for cash in the form of financial assistance, indicating it to be their most pressing need. Such financial pressures made it difficult to obtain food (for 21% of returnees), clothes and other non-food items (13% of returnees indicated a need).

A significant share of residential houses have been destroyed during the war (in July, 80% of respondents in Kyiv city reported the destruction of houses in their area, 76% in the North macro-region, and 71% in the East macro-region). Some 12% indicated attacks had damaged their own houses (in August). For people to safely return and restart a "normal" life within their homes, the damaged buildings require repairs. However, some 23% of returnees lacked the necessary building materials. Regionally, the highest need for building materials shifted from the South (38%) and East (36%) macro-regions, in July, to the West (44%) and North (26%), in August.

## Frequency of returns to Ukraine – SAM-UKR

Data collected at EU borders with Ukraine suggest daily back and forth crossing movements. Some 14% of respondents from SAM-UKR survey confirmed they returned to Ukraine at least once, while half stated they have never returned to Ukraine, but that they intend to do so when it is safe. On the other hand, some 36% answered they have not returned, nor do they intend to do so in the future.

Return intentions differ per macro-region. For example, in Eastern oblasts, the war has continued for much longer and some oblasts have been occupied by the Russian Federation for more than 8 years, which might explain why more respondents do not intend to return at all (37%) compared to, for instance, Western oblasts (24%) (Fig. 33). The percentages of those who reported having been back to Ukraine vary between 10% for the South and East macro-regions and 25% for the West macro-region.




Figure 33. Returning intentions (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

“ The evacuation was risky, but we overcame everything. Now I am safe, I am waiting for the end of hostilities on the part of the Russian Federation on the territory of Belarus, so that I can return to the city without fear. ”

“ I cannot complain, the men had to stay and fight. I should have stayed and joined the fight; I may go back to fight. I guess this is female privilege. I will definitely go back to rebuild my country. ”

# Conclusion

The report brings together three organisations to deliver increased situational awareness of displacement from and within Ukraine. Projects combined innovative desk research, interviews and surveys, resulting in complementary findings.

Ukrainians have a long and varied history of migration in the EU. This year, as the Russian Federation launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU naturally emerged as the safest haven for Ukrainian families displaced by the ensuing war. The speed and scale of the crisis makes it the biggest and fastest displacement of people in Europe since World War II, with a third of the entire Ukrainian population finding themselves displaced internally or externally.

The successful offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in September, plus the Russian referenda in the non-government controlled areas and President Putin's declaration of the people of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson being "Russian citizens forever," indicate that it will take a long time until a stable and sustainable peace in Ukraine is visible. Caring for the vulnerable, such as children, the chronically ill and the disabled, in addition to access to financial support, food, employment and accommodation, especially in the onset of winter, have emerged as the most pressing needs for IDPs. The swift activation and implementation of the TPD has allowed the EU to provide safety to millions of displaced people from Ukraine. Forced displacements to the EU, most commonly women and families from all over Ukraine, have slowed since the initial surge. Displaced people speak kindly of their treatment especially by volunteers, but are frustrated by complex eligibility criteria and procedures, and facing difficulties in finding longer-term solutions for their families. Internally and externally, Ukrainians are concerned about their financial situation, and they want to work.

The analyses are retrospective: looking back at how the situation has evolved to determine the priorities for the months ahead. Practitioners and policy makers, however, want to know about the immediate forthcoming developments. In the case of Ukraine, this is very complex endeavour and the past is unlikely to deliver much predictive power but monitoring tipping points can help countries to prepare.

Countless families are currently separated by displacement. So when family reunification becomes possible, wives and families will either relocate back home, or husbands will join them in the EU or elsewhere. Which of these two processes will be prevalent remains to be seen but will shape future movements. Moreover, other contributing factors to future migration flows to and from Ukraine are the stability of the security situation in specific parts of the country, work opportunities, the access to basic services and goods, reconstruction of houses and the access to education.



Migration intentions, measured by Gallup polls in a pre-invasion context, have been high in Ukraine for some time, contributing perhaps to a lower motivation to return home. At the same time obviously, the situation has changed drastically, and nationalist sentiment has grown in Ukraine.

This report has demonstrated the value of collecting testimonies directly from hard-to-reach affected communities, and the benefits of deploying different methodologies (face to face, phone and online surveys) and then combining the results *post hoc*. Collecting testimonies in different countries, using a common questionnaire, and disseminated with complementary techniques, including social media and operational personnel, translated in the languages most understood by the displaced populations enables deeper understanding of the affected population. It has also shown that analysis of internet searches can provide near to real time understanding of the topics of utmost concern in Ukraine.

Inevitably, national reception systems are facing immense challenges due to the speed and scale of the crisis. The EUAA is committed to providing operational support to Member States whose asylum and/or reception systems are under disproportionate pressure. There will be subsequent challenges with the integration of displaced persons if they decide to settle in the EU, to start a new life abroad. The international community should support the reconstruction and recovery of Ukraine to ensure that returns are viable.

# Annexes

## 1. Methodological notes

### Introduction

This chapter includes methodological notes regarding the main sources of data used in this report: the EUAA and OECD's Survey of Arriving Migrants from Ukraine (SAM-UKR), the IOM General Population Survey Ukraine, the IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Needs and Intention Surveys, and Google Trends.

### *General notes*

Many subcategories were tested to gain deeper insights into different topics. These included geographical categories (concerning oblasts of origins, current location, desired destination, and the Ukrainian border crossing points), educational categories (those with vocational and higher education, and those with secondary education and below), family circumstances (with or without children as well as with or without other dependent persons), migratory stage (categories of those who have reached their destination, those who have not as well as those who are not sure) among others.

The categories referred to in this report are the following:

- EU+ is used when referring to the EU, plus Switzerland and Norway. The SAM-UKR survey also included responses from participants in Iceland.
- The category of “neighbouring (EU) countries” refers to ‘Poland’, ‘Slovakia’, ‘Hungary’ or ‘Romania’. “Other countries” encompasses all other responses in the EU+.
- The category “with minors” includes all respondents, who entered the value of ‘1’ or higher for the question: ‘How many minor children below 18 are with you and currently under your responsibility?’. “Without minors” included all respondents, who entered 0.
- The category “with dependents” includes all respondents, who have entered the value of ‘1’ or higher for either of the following questions: ‘How many minor children below 18 are with you and currently under your responsibility?’ or ‘How many dependent adults, elderly or handicapped are currently with you?’. “Without dependents” includes only those who have entered 0 for both questions.
- The categories “reached destination”, “not reached destination” and “not sure if reached destination” were determined based on the answers given to the question

'Have you reached your preferred destination outside Ukraine?' (respective answers being 'Yes', 'No' and 'I don't know').

- Macro-regions are compiled as shown in Table 2:

Macro-regions	Oblasts, autonomous regions, cities
West	Chernivtsi Oblast, Lviv Oblast, Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, Khmelnytskyi Oblast, Rivne Oblast, Ternopil Oblast, Volyn Oblast, Zakarpattia Oblast
Centre	Cherkasy Oblast, Kirovohrad Oblast, Poltava Oblast, Vinnytsia Oblast
North	Zhytomyr Oblast, Kyiv Oblast, Chernihiv Oblast, Sumy Oblast
South	Crimea, Sevastopol City, Odesa Oblast, Kherson Oblast, Mykolaiv Oblast
East	Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Donetsk Oblast, Kharkiv Oblast, Luhansk Oblast, Zaporizhzhia Oblast
Kyiv city	Kyiv city

Table 2. Macro-regions in Ukraine

## SAM-UKR methodological note

[Surveys of Arriving Migrants from Ukraine](#) (SAM-UKR) aims to survey adults displaced from Ukraine into the EU following Russia's invasion in February 2022. The survey was designed to be conducted online and fully self-administered using a smartphone or any device with internet access. The survey was voluntary and anonymous, and could be taken in English, Ukrainian or Russian, allowing each respondent to choose their preferred language to participate. The survey collects comparable and reliable information and provides valuable information to national authorities in the EU for better situational awareness leading to more focused policy and operational responses.

The survey questionnaire comprised of 40 questions, organised in 3 sections. In the first section, the survey collected respondents' informed consent and includes eligibility questions based on age, nationality, and residence. The second section captured information on citizenship/residence, oblast of origin, date they left Ukraine, preferred destination in the EU, pull factors, push factors, people they travelled with, namely children and other dependent persons, education, qualifications, employment, languages spoken, current location, accommodation conditions, protection status. The third section included information on internal displacement, returns, reasons to leave, journey, communication practices, satisfaction with living conditions in host country, experiences, and an open-text question that intended to collect further information in the form of written testimonies. A privacy policy and data protection notice (approved by the EUAA' Data Protection Officer) were available on the survey platform. Moreover, an ethics self-assessment process was conducted to ensure compliance with fundamental ethical principles of surveying vulnerable populations.

The dissemination strategy included EUAA's technical networks (national authorities and international organisations), OECD's networks, the EUAA and OECD websites, social media (both social media pages, social media groups and sponsoring campaigns), virtual information sessions, posters and flyers in asylum reception centres and countries with EUAA operational

personnel. Considering the survey was voluntary and dependent on a wide range of dissemination strategies, the sampling process generated a non-probabilistic sample, limited to respondents with smartphone (or other smart device), Internet access, and adequate reading and digital literacy skills, which may not be fully representative of the displaced population. The project delivers regular outputs via established channels, such as real-time dashboards, factsheets and reports.

The survey was launched on 11 April 2022 and, for the purpose of this report, the cut-off date was 15 August 2022. Data quality was established based on eligibility criteria for analysis inclusion, data consistency and duplicate control.

## **IOM General Population Survey Ukraine methodological note**

The data presented in this report was commissioned by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and collected by Multicultural Insights through a rapid phone-based survey. Eight rounds of data collection among a set of approximately 2 000 changing adults (18 years and above) was completed between 16 March and 23 August 2022 (Round 1: 16 March, Round 2: 1 April, Round 3: 17 April, Round 4: 3 May, Round 5: 23 May, Round 6: 23 June, Round 7: 23 July, Round 8: 23 August). This probabilistic sample, representative of over 30 million Ukrainian adults (18 years or older), was stratified to achieve representativeness at the level of 6 macro-regions of Ukraine. The sample frame was constructed by developing a list of 100 000 ten-digit phone numbers created by combining the three-digit prefix used by mobile phone operators with a randomly generated seven-digit phone number. The generated sample frame was proportional to the national market share of the six phone networks covered in the study. Using the random-digit-dial (RDD) approach, phone numbers were randomly generated, producing a new number every milli-second interval. Interviews were anonymous, and respondents were asked for consent prior to starting an interview. Interviewers used a structured questionnaire and the computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) technique to directly enter the results into a data entry program.

The estimates rely on the UNFPA population data for Ukraine, agreed upon as the common population baseline by the humanitarian community addition to this General Population Survey, data on recorded IDP presence at Hromadka level in Ukraine are available from IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix – Baseline Assessment (Round 10, 2022, HDX).

Using this methodology, between 17 and 23 August Round 8 was conducted and interview teams were able to successfully complete the surveys with 2 001 unique eligible and consenting adult respondents. While the response rate using the RDD approach in Ukraine has typically yielded a response rate of ca 7-8%, in Round 8 of this survey, a response rate of 13.1% was achieved. Results are presented and representative at the region level (West, Center, North, South, East and for Kyiv city) and desegregated by population (internally displaced, returnees, non-displaced).

Limitations: The exact proportion of the excluded populations is unknown, and certain considerations are to be made when interpreting results. Those currently residing outside the territory of Ukraine were not interviewed, following active exclusion. Population estimates assume that minors (those under 18 years old) are accompanied by their adult parents or guardians. The sample frame is limited to adults that use mobile phones. It is unknown if all phone networks were fully functional across the entire territory of Ukraine for the entire period of the survey; therefore, some numbers may have had a higher probability of receiving calls than others. Residents of areas with a high level of civilian infrastructure damage may have a lower representation among the sample – one may assume the needs in the report are skewed towards under-reporting. Among the people surveyed are not those residing in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC)

or the NGCA Donetsk and Luhansk.

Caveat: The survey collected information on the people's characteristics, their current locations and/or locations after the displacement (geographical information), intentions to move and planned destinations, needs, and issues faced by the people during the crisis. The analysis relies on two approaches when assessing the population profiles, their issues and needs. The analysis of geographical profiles utilizes the data, excluding the missing values identified at the macro-region level (n=2 001). The needs assessment and all other analysis is done using the available sample (considering the question refusal rate).

## Google Trends methodological note

The data extracted from the Google analytical tool [Google Trends](#) provide timely information on the relative variation in the frequency of the Google search for a term in a specific location over a defined period. In order to make comparisons between terms and locations, Google divided each data point by the total number of searches of the geography and time range it represents. The relative variation in the search frequency is then represented on a scale of 0 to 100, 100 referring to the day when the number of searches for a specific term was the highest over the defined period. Google Trends also allows comparing the frequency of different word searches between them over time. Google Trends does not provide the absolute number of searches because places with higher density and therefore higher search volume would always be ranked highest.

In order to complement the analysis of migration intentions among displaced persons from Ukraine, we analysed the relative search frequency of various key terms in Ukraine and Poland from 1 January 2022 to 1 July 2022. The relative frequency of different words was tested both in Ukrainian and Russian languages. However, only the Ukrainian language was selected in order to target as much as possible the Ukrainian population and to reduce the existence of noise and biases in the data. Regarding the nature of the Google searches, a number of words related to the intentions and the situation of Ukrainian refugees were tested such as asylum, migration, border, protection, visa, refugee, housing, job, school, support, money etc. The words included in the figures are those that stood out for their relatively high popularity. These Google searches were also tested in other destination countries such as Germany or Czechia. Although these findings were also relevant, results remain more robust for Poland, where most Ukrainian refugees were located. The frequency of a given word is expressed relatively to the frequency of other words present in the figure, thereby highlighting hierarchy between Ukrainians' interests over a period. It is worth noting that no misspelling, synonyms or spelling variations of the searched term are included in the results.

## 2. Themes in testimonies

This annex contains more information about the topics that were explored in each of the main themes during the qualitative analysis of the open-text testimonies, as well as additional themes that were identified (see [Chapter 4](#)).

### Theme 1. Persons: people, children and family




Figure 34. Thematic category: People (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

## Theme 2. Accommodation: housing, and residence permits




Figure 35. Thematic category: Accommodation (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

## Theme 3. Assistance: assistance, aid, support and help




Figure 36. Thematic category: Assistance (Source: SAM-UKR Survey)

## Other themes identified in the testimonies

### *Ukraine/Ukrainians*

Respondents spoke about Ukrainian people, citizens, refugees, children, and language, revealing a strong sense of community and identity. Some respondents shared their intentions to return to Ukraine. Moreover, respondents talked about Ukrainian authorities, associations, schools, companies and the Ukrainian diaspora.

*“ I experienced severe hardship but also the generosity of the Ukrainian people in these tough times. ”*

### *Protection*

Most respondents had already registered or intended to register for temporary protection, but some described challenges with regard to eligibility. Indeed, some did not have passports with them or other documents confirming their identities and residency, while others left a few days before the war started and so are ineligible for TPD, instead being advised to apply for international protection.

*“ I wanted to apply for temporary protection like everybody else (...) but I am currently under the regular asylum procedure, which limits my rights and takes a lot of my time. This has been problematic for having access to psychological help and to apply to university. ”*

*“ In the first days, we did not know what to do, so we applied for international protection in Poland so as not to break the law. ”*

*“ I don't want to be an asylum seeker. I left Ukraine on the 18 because I was able to foresee that the war is going to start. ”*

### *Language*

Respondents expressed concern about learning the language of their host country, with some complaining that they had not found any free language courses for adults and how this negatively affects their chances of applying for a job and integrating in the host country.

*“ The biggest problem is that migration service doesn't help me with language courses. ”*

*“ Access to quality language courses is limited (...) and it is impossible to get a job without knowing the language. ”*

*“ There are no language courses from level A1. ”*



## Endnotes

- 1 For the purpose of this survey, IOM defined a returnee as a person who had undergone a migratory movement and arrived back to their original place of habitual residence. For purposes of the present analysis, IOM identified as returnees those respondents who indicated having left the place of their habitual residence since 24 February due to the current war for a period of a minimum of two weeks (14 days), but who have indicated that they had since returned.
- 2 The [Council Implementing Decision \(EU\) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022](#) established the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine as a consequence of an armed conflict within the meaning of the Temporary Protection Directive ([Directive 2001/55/EC](#)). The directive applies to all EU Member States except Denmark. [Iceland](#), [Norway](#) and [Switzerland](#) have introduced similar national provisions.
- 3 EUAA, [Analysis of Measures to Provide Protection to Displaced Persons from Ukraine: Situational Report](#), 6 July 2022.
- 4 The [Council Implementing Decision \(EU\) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022](#) established the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine as a consequence of an armed conflict within the meaning of the Temporary Protection Directive ([Directive 2001/55/EC](#)). The directive applies to all EU Member States except Denmark. [Iceland](#), [Norway](#) and [Switzerland](#) have introduced similar national provisions.
- 5 EUAA, [Analysis of Measures to Provide Protection to Displaced Persons from Ukraine: Situational Report](#), 6 July 2022.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 OECD, [Rights and Support for Ukrainian Refugees in Receiving Countries](#), OECD Publishing, 2022. For a full coverage of the implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive in each EU+ country, consult the [EUAA's Who is Who: Temporary Protection online database](#).
- 8 EUAA, [Asylum Report 2022: Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union](#), 2022.
- 9 IOM, [Ukraine Response 2022 - Displacement Surveys - Ukrainian refugees and TCNs in Poland](#), 2022.
- 10 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), [acleddata.com](#).
- 11 OECD, [The potential contribution of Ukrainian refugees to the labour force in European host countries](#), OECD Policy Responses on the Impacts of the War in Ukraine, 27 July 2022.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 UNHCR, [Ukraine situation: Regional protection profiling and monitoring factsheet](#), 19 August 2022.
- 14 OECD, [Making Integration Work: Refugees and others in need of protection](#), 2016.
- 15 Liebig, T. and K. Tronstad, [Triple Disadvantage?: A first overview of the integration of refugee women](#), OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 216, 2018.
- 16 OECD, [Making Integration Work: Assessment and Recognition of Foreign Qualifications](#), 2017.
- 17 IOM tracks direct arrivals of TCNs from Ukraine to the neighbouring countries and does not include onward movements.
- 18 IOM BELGIUM, [Third Country Nationals arrived from Ukraine in Belgium ROUND 2](#), 30 April 2022.
- 19 IOM GERMANY, [Third Country Nationals arriving from Ukraine in Germany](#), June 2022.
- 20 The interviews were conducted between March and April 2022, in Belgium, with a total of 72 participants, and in Germany between May and June 2022, with a total of 114 participants.
- 21 UNHCR, [Ukraine situation – Flash update #1](#), Operational Data Portal, 8 March 2022.
- 22 UNHCR, [Operational Data Portal: Ukraine Refugee situation](#), last accessed 15 August 2022.
- 23 Minimum value declared was EUR 9.30, maximum EUR 9 300. Standard deviation was 775.
- 24 UNHCR, [Operational Data Portal: Ukraine Refugee situation](#), last accessed 15 August 2022.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 UNHCR, [Operational Data Portal: Ukraine Refugee situation](#), last updated 20 September 2022.
- 27 Data Europa, [Refugee flows from Ukraine](#), 31 May 2022.
- 28 Radjenovic, A., [Briefing on Secondary movements of asylum-seekers in the EU asylum system](#), European Parliamentary Research Service, October 2017.
- 29 Frontex, [Ukraine: Flows across external borders stabilise over summer](#), News Release, 8 August 2022.
- 30 IOM, [Glossary on Migration](#), International Migration Law, pp. 109, 2019.
- 31 Note that the General Population Survey did not interview individuals under 18 years old.
- 32 IOM uses the definition of vulnerable migrants set out in the Principles and Guidelines on the human rights protection of migrants in vulnerable situations: vulnerable migrants are migrants who are unable effectively to enjoy their human rights, are at increased risk of violations and abuse and who, accordingly, are entitled to call on a duty bearer's heightened duty of care."
- 33 DP figures in the Kyiv city and North macro-region have been prone to frequent fluctuations, several factors may have contributed to the variations between survey rounds. Short-term displacement and swift returns to their place of habitual residence as well as, secondary displacement to another macro-region due to for safety

- concerns or personal reasons are among other things contributing to the complex patterns of internal displacement.
- 34 The questions of the General Population Survey change regularly to cover various areas of interest and broaden the scope of understanding, therefore respondents were not asked about their secondary displacement in August (Round 8).
- 35 Due to the volatility of the current situation, it is impossible to determine what proportion of the returns observed at present are permanent or temporary. Existing data shows, however, that the returnee population in Ukraine is characterized by a unique set of needs and vulnerabilities which set it apart from those who had never been displaced and from the population of IDPs.



