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WFP World Food Programme

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Implications of the Conflict in Ukraine on Food Access and Availability in the East Africa Region

Update #2

March 2022

Key Messages

- The disruptions in imports, production and the related surge in food prices induced by the current conflict in Ukraine have the potential to worsen the food security situation in the Eastern Africa Region, which is already been impacted by the effect of three consecutive below-normal rainfall seasons.
- Considering reliance on direct imports from Russia and Ukraine, rising global prices since the start of the war and significant internal challenges; **Sudan**, **Kenya**, **Ethiopia**, **Somalia** and **South Sudan** are likely to be the hardest hit by the fall-out of the ongoing conflict.
- Driven, in part, by the ongoing conflict the cost of WFP's local food basket has increased by 23 percent in one year (Feb 2021/2022). This is only the average increase across the entire Eastern Africa region as **Sudan**, **Ethiopia** and **Somalia** have seen the cost of the food basket increasing by 92, 66 and 36 percent between Feb 2021/2022.
- **Djibouti** and **Sudan** are expected to be more susceptible to rising wheat prices, considering the size of the demand and the heavy reliance on imports to meet it. Domestic production and in-country stocks alone are estimated not to be enough to meet wheat demand in the medium to long-run.
- Although direct imports from Russia and Ukraine are negligible, 95 percent of sunflower-seed oil re-exported to **Burundi** and **Rwanda** comes from Egypt, which directly imports 100 percent of its sunflower-seed oil from Russia and Ukraine. If the conflict continues, higher costs of sunflower oil will affect Egypt, which in turn will be reflected in the domestic markets of **Burundi** and **Rwanda**. In addition, **Sudan**, which imports oil from both Russia and Ukraine will be directly impacted.
- Eastern African countries are fully dependent on fertilizer imports and the rising fertilizer costs are expected to have severe implications of food availability and prices. As the long rains planting season approaches, prospects of higher-than-average fertilizer prices could reduce fertilizer demand, which, coupled with anticipated below-average rains is likely to impact crop production, availably of staple crops on markets and, eventually, push cereal prices up. Countries of concern are **Kenya** and **Uganda** (importing 15 and 16 percent of the total value of fertilizers from Russia and Ukraine).
- Increased global oil prices will be reflected in higher in-country costs of petrol and diesel, which has already impacted **Somalia** – where pump prices have increased by 37 percent (the highest increase in the region); **Uganda** – where prices went by 32 percent following a fuel crisis in late January – and Burundi – where petrol prices went up by 24 percent year-on-year. Shortages of oil and oil products and related high fuel prices are likely to persist against the backdrop of international oil prices that continue to soar, which will eventually have an impact on transport costs and push local food prices up.
- The forecasted average to below-average rains from March-May will be the fourth consecutive drought in a row, further complicating the food supply situation in **Kenya**, **Somalia**, and **Ethiopia**. Prices of cooking oil, bread, and wheat flour are already reaching new records in local markets, while fuel prices and cost of living are on the rise, increasing concerns of a crisis similar to 2007/2008.

Overview Global Food Prices[1]

Global food prices have increased since 2021 mainly due to the fallout of COVID-19. Against the backdrop of an already progressively worsening situation, the impacts of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine will likely contribute to a further increase in food prices. Compared to 2019, food prices have increased by 31 percent in 2021 and since then prices went up by another 8 percent in the first two months of 2022. As of February 2022, commodities recording the y-o-y increase are vegetable oils (up 36.7 percent compared to February 2021), dairy products (up 24.8 percent), and cereals (up 14.8 percent).

Figure 1: Food Commodity Price Index, 2018-2022



Source: FAO

The increase in global vegetable oil is driven by rising palm, soybean, and sunflower-seed oil prices. Price spikes of the first two types of vegetable oils are due to increased global demand and reduced exports availability of the largest producers (Indonesia and South America). Ukraine's war-related concerns over surging crude oil prices and potential reductions in exports (following disruptions in the Black Sea region), had affected the prices of sunflower-seed oil as Ukraine is a key exporter of this product.

Similarly, potential disruptions in wheat production and exports from the two countries in conflict – which are also major wheat exporters – have affected global cereal prices in February 2022. Not only did the conflict lead to an increase in global wheat prices (up 2 percent compared to January 2022), but it also pushed global maize and sorghum prices up (by 5 and 6 percent, respectively) following the increase in the price of wheat and uncertainties around exports from Ukraine.

Potential Ukraine's war-induced disruptions in imports and the related surge in food prices might worsen the food security situation in the Eastern Africa Region, especially in the Horn of Africa, which is already recording a reduction in domestic crop production following three consecutive below-normal rainfall seasons. The fallout of the conflict in Europe combined with projected below-average April - May rainfall; and keeping in mind other ongoing drivers such as the socio-economic fallout from COVID, and local conflicts etc - all point to a worsening food security situation for the Eastern Africa region.
Considering the multifaceted fallouts of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the following analysis examines the impact of possible trade disruptions and prices spikes of food and non-food commodities on the availability and affordability of food in the Eastern Africa Region.

[1] The section is based on FAO Food Price Index. More details on the methodology at this link.

I. Availability

I.I. Wheat and wheat flour[2]

On average, wheat and wheat flour-based products account for 25 percent of total cereals consumed in the Eastern Africa Region (corresponding to 1,186 thousand tonnes). A large portion of domestic wheat demand across countries in East Africa is met through imports (84 percent), with **Sudan**, **Djibouti**, and **Burundi** relying exclusively on imports to meet the domestic wheat demand. Should trade disruptions be widespread, and global wheat prices continue to be on the rise in the upcoming months, the above-mentioned countries are likely to record an increase in retail prices of wheat-based products.

Figure 2: Wheat demand (tonnes and share on total cereal demand) for the 2021 marketing year (January-December)



Source: FAO

Trade disruptions are expected from this month as key global trade routes for grain through Ukraine's ports on the Black Sea are blocked by Russia in the first week of March 2022 the Ukrainian government banned the export of wheat, oats, millet, buckwheat and some other food products to forestall a food crisis and stabilize the market[3]. Russia has also announced a partial ban on wheat and grains effective March 15th through June 30th[4]. These policies will further squeeze global wheat supplies. While shortfalls in grain exports by the two key exporting counties might be partially compensated by alternative sources, this will drive up international wheat prices through increased global demand in the near term to the detriment of Eastern African countries, which are highly vulnerable to international wheat supply chain fluctuations.

Based on WFP calculations, access and availability of wheat-based products in **Sudan** is worrisome as almost 50 percent of wheat-based products are supplied by Russia and Ukraine while wheat domestically produced and current stocks alone are estimated to cover the domestic wheat demand for 3 months only. Despite a large consumption of wheat-based products, the situation is less concerning in **Djibouti**, as it is less dependent on imports from the two countries in

[2] WFP calculations based on [FAO – Cereal supply and demand balances for sub-Saharan African countries, February 2022] and data from [ITC-TradeMap]
[3] [Time – Ukraine Bans Exports of Wheat, Oats and Other Food Staples, March 2022]
[4] [FAO - Russian Federation bans exports of wheat, maize and other cereals to Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan until 30 June 2022, March 2022]

conflict (only one-third of wheat demand is met through imports from Russia and Ukraine). However, the high reliance on imports makes the country extremely vulnerable to any shocks in international trade.

Notwithstanding the large dependence on imports from Ukraine and Russia, disruptions in availability and reduced affordability of wheat-based products to consumers in **Somalia**, **Burundi**, **Uganda**, **Rwanda,** and **Kenya** is less concerning in the immediate term as the size of wheat-based products is lower than one-third of total cereal demand). However if the conflict persists, it can be expected that this set of countries will be directly affected as the price of substitute cereals is also projected to rise.

With only four percent of wheat demand met through imports from Russia and Ukraine and stocks available for the next year, the availability of wheat and wheat-based products in **Ethiopia** as well as consumers' access to them is expected to be less affected by the fallout of conflict in Europe.

Further statistical analysis based on wheat imports quantities and prices for the region (excluding Sudan due to lack of available data), reports a reduction of 0.71 percent (that is 178,324 tonnes) in imports of wheat for every percentage increase in the price of wheat flour.

I.II. Sunflower-seed Oil[5]

Palm oil is widely consumed across Eastern Africa (accounting for 48 percent of vegetable oils used for human consumption), followed by sunflower seed oil (15 percent). A greater portion of vegetable oils consumed in Eastern Africa is imported, with palm oil constituting almost 70 percent of vegetable oil imports, followed by sunflower-seed oil (29 percent). Countries importing significant quantities of sunflower-seed oil are **Sudan**, **Ethiopia**, **Djibouti**, and **Rwanda**.

Figure 3: Share of imported vegetable oils in Eastern Africa Region, 2020



Source: ITC TradeMap

With over 70 percent of total global production of sunflower oil originating from Russia and Ukraine, destabilized export trade, delays, and higher shipping costs will directly impact the global supply of sunflower-seed oil and consequently prices, further deepening vegetable oil supply chain woes experienced in the previous year. Despite the main destinations for sunflower-seed oils produced in

[5] WFP calculations based on data from FAO, Crop and Livestock Products, Supply Utilization Accounts and ITC-TradeMap. No data for Somalia and South Sudan.

Russia and Ukraine being India and China, notable portions of Eastern Africa's net imports of the commodity originate from the two countries in conflict. **Kenya** and **Sudan** heavily rely on Russia and Ukraine, supplying 78 and 95 percent of imported sunflower-seed oil, respectively. Considering the size of sunflower-seed oils imports and the heavy reliance on supplies from Russia and Ukraine, **Sudan** is likely to be more vulnerable to anticipated conflict-induced trade disruptions once existing stocks are depleted. Russia and Ukraine supply less than 6 percent of sunflower-seed oil in **Djibouti** and **Ethiopia**, downsizing vulnerability to trade disruptions for these two countries.

Some countries might be indirectly affected by the fallout of the conflict. Although direct imports from Russia and Ukraine are negligible, **Burundi** and **Rwanda** fully rely on imports (over 95 percent) from Egypt, which, directly imports 100 percent of its sunflower seed oil from Russia and Ukraine.
Trade disruptions and related higher import costs affecting Egypt will, in turn, be reflected in Egypt's exports and countries heavily dependent on imports from Egypt through increased local prices of imported commodities – as is the case of **Burundi** and **Rwanda** for sunflower seed oil.

As the Russian and Ukraine sunflower oil supply dwindles, countries like China and India (which consume the most share of sunflower oil) may be forced to turn to other alternative vegetable oils such as palm and soybean oils. Such market shifts amidst a crunch in the supply of other widely consumed vegetable oils witnessed since the early last year 2021, would create shortages, driving prices of all vegetable oils up across the Eastern Africa region.

In the short term, the cost of importing vegetable oils may not be sustainable for countries in the region that import either directly or indirectly from the two countries in conflict.

Figure 4: Sunflower-seed oil imports (tonnes and share), 2020



Source: ITC TradeMap

I.III. Fertilizers

Figure 5: Share of imported fertilizer from Russia and Ukraine, 2020



Source: ITC TradeMap

Over the past decade, there has been significant growth in the global use of fertilizers. In 2020/2021, approximately 198.2 million metric tonnages of fertilizers were consumed globally, with the highest consumption rates recorded in the United States, India, Brazil, and China.[6] In the Eastern Africa region, over USD 1 billion worth of fertilizer was imported in 2020, with **Kenya**, **Ethiopia,** and **Djibouti** taking the largest share of imports[7]. Russia and Ukraine play a key role in the global fertilizer markets, contributing to a significant share of fertilizer and natural gas (a major ingredient in the manufacture of nitrogenous fertilizers) exports. According to IFDC, Russia is the world's top exporter of fertilizers, accounting for at least 23 percent of ammonia and 21 percent of potash global supply. The ongoing conflict is causing major trade disruptions in terms of natural gas production and logistics, and this would consequently affect fertilizer availability and prices in the short and long term.Although Russia's fertilizers are mainly exported to the United States, Brazil, and China, a good share of fertilizer net imports in the Eastern African region originates from the two countries in conflict. Out of the total value of fertilizers imported in 2020, Russia and Ukraine accounted for 16 percent of imports in **Kenya** and 15 percent in **Uganda**. Tanzania, which supplies **Rwanda** (73 percent) and **Burundi** (60 percent), imported approximately 24 percent of its fertilizer directly from Russia and Ukraine[8].

Ukraine's war can affect the supply and prices of fertilizers in different ways. The price of natural gas has skyrocketed since the breakout of the conflict, directly inflating costs of production of fertilizers, which, in turn, are passed to consumers through increased retail prices of fertilizers and eventually food. As Western countries continue to impose sanctions on Russia, shifts in demand by major importers of Russian fertilizers are likely to happen. This can exacerbate existing supply shocks, by affecting the availability of the commodity and by putting pressure on international fertilizer prices – which have remained high since late last year. Even under the assumption of sustained production of fertilizer in Russia, shipment rates around the Black Sea region have become more expensive in the short run, as shipping companies charge extra high additional security charges.

Considering Eastern African countries are fully dependent on fertilizers imports, shocks affecting global availability and prices of fertilizers would be directly felt in local markets. As the long rains planting season has started in the Region, prospects of increased fertilizer prices could reduce demand because of non-affordability. This coupled with anticipated below-average rains can impact yields by reducing domestic crop production, availably of food crops on markets, and, eventually, lead to higher food prices. The forward risk of increased staple prices might persist during and beyond the next harvests starting in June 2022.

[6] Source: IFA Medium-Term Fertilizer Outlook 2021-2025 Public Summary, 2021
[7] Source: ITC trade map
[8] Only Burundi, Kenya and Uganda directly import fertilizers from Russia and Ukraine

II. Access

II.I. Food Basket and its components[9]

In February 2022, the per capita monthly average cost of a local food basket reached USD 16 across Eastern African countries – from USD 12.8 in February 2021. **South Sudan** recorded the most expensive basket (USD 24), followed by **Djibouti** (USD 21.6), **Somalia** (USD 19.8), and **Sudan** (USD 17.2). Compared with January 2022, the cost of the food basket has increased in **Ethiopia** (up 7 percent), **Somalia** (up 4 percent), and **South Sudan** (up 3 percent). Commodities pushing the cost of the food basket up are cereals and vegetable oils. It is worth noting that milk prices in **Sudan** increased by 11.3 percent between January and February 2022, making access to a source of protein extremely important for children's growth less affordable. **Burundi** is the only country where the cost of food baskets decreased (down 15 percent) compared to last month, mainly due to a decrease in the price of maize (down 21.8 percent) following increased supplies from 2022A seasonal harvests from December.

In terms of y-o-y variations, the food basket has become more expensive across the entire region (on average it increased by 24 percent), with peaks in **Sudan** (up 92 percent), **Ethiopia** (up 66 percent), and **Somalia** (up 36 percent). The surge in prices of imported items such as vegetable oil and reduced domestic

Table 1 and 2: Cost of food basket and of selected components, with month-on-month and year-on-year variations

Country	Food Basket (per capita/month)			
	USD	LCU	Variations (LCU)	
			m-o-m	y-o-y
	Feb-22		Jan-22	Feb-21
Burundi	7.4	23,465	-15.2%	8.5%
Djibouti	21.6	3,846	4.2%	14.8%
Ethiopia		909	7.2%	66.5%
Kenya	13.0	1,479	-1.2%	-6.8%
Rwanda	10.4	10,728	-1.5%	-1.6%
Somalia	19.8	487,362	4.4%	36.2%
South Sudan	24.0	10,464	3.5%	6.8%
Sudan	17.2	8,753	0.6%	92.4%
Uganda	15.3	53,892	-1.2%	-4.0%
RBN	**16.1**		**0.1%**	**23.7%**

Country	Variations in selected components of the food basket (LCU)							
	m-o-m				y-o-y			
	Cereals	Beans	Vegetable oil	Milk	Cereals	Beans	Vegetable oil	Milk
Burundi	-21.8%	-4.2%	-5.3%		8.9%	-20.4%	42.3%	
Djibouti	13.3%	-2.0%	12.5%		23.6%	0.7%	24.1%	
Ethiopia	7.3%		14.8%		70.9%		78.9%	
Kenya	12.1%	1.0%	2.2%	-8.0%		-9.1%	23.5%	-18.5%
Rwanda	-5.1%	11.4%	3.8%		-1.4%	-32.6%	28.9%	
Somalia	4.5%		13.7%	2.0%	36.5%		73.0%	27.5%
South Sudan	4.3%	2.1%	0.2%		4.1%	6.3%	27.7%	
Sudan	2.6%		-8.0%	11.3%	62.4%		14.9%	110.1%
Uganda	5.1%	3.6%	3.5%	3.8%	9.0%	-15.9%	34.4%	-2.9%
RBN	**2.5%**	**2.0%**	**4.2%**	**2.3%**	**26.8%**	**-11.8%**	**38.6%**	**29.0%**

Source: WFP Field Monitor, FXTop

[9] No data available for Ethiopia (parallel exchange rate)

availability of domestic produce (following four consecutive below-average rainfall seasons) are making the food basket less affordable to households across the region. Indeed, the conflict in Ukraine is exerting additional increased pressure on imported food in the countries in the region (**Ethiopia**, **South Sudan,** and **Sudan**) that were already facing mounting macro-economic challenges (dollar shortages, high fuel prices, currency depreciation, depleted foreign exchange reserve, among others) even before the onset of the ongoing conflict.

II.II. Note on food baskets

The below table includes components and quantities of the food basket for each Eastern African country (sourced by WFP field monitor).

Food item	Monthly Quantity (Kg per capita)								
	Burundi	Djibouti	Ethiopia	Kenya	Rwanda	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Uganda
Beans	3.6	1.6	1.5	7.5	3.6		1.5		5.4
Cassava									0.6
Cowpeas						1.0			
Fish (dry)									0.6
Leafy vegetables									3.0
Maize flour	10.8			32.3	12.3				8.7
Meat (cow)						0.7		0.2	
Meat (goat)								0.2	0.3
Milk						2.5		0.8	
Millet		0.3		22.5					
Oil (vegetable)	0.8	2.5	0.5	5.3	0.9	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.8
Onion								1.5	
Pasta	0.2	3.0							
Rice		5.5		22.5		11.9			
Sorghum						15.8	15.0	13.5	1.5
Salt				0.8	0.2	2.5	0.2		0.2
Sugar		3.1		0.8		0.8		1.2	
Tomatoes (dry)								0.8	
Wheat flour		4.7	15.0			0.6			

Crude oil and fuel

Crude oil prices increased sharply in February 2022 (up 11 percent compared to January 2022 and up 53 percent compared to February 2021), mainly driven by concerns around significant supply disruptions amid escalated geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe. Prices were still on the rise in March and expected to show an upward trend in the coming months due to fading hopes of a quick end to the conflict, and Russia's decision to reduce the supply capacity of a major oil pipeline in addition to biting economic and trade sanctions.

Figure 6: Crude oil prices



Source: EIA. OPEC

Despite it might still be premature to estimate the impacts of the conflict in Eastern Europe on pump prices in the Eastern Africa region, the cost of fuel is likely to increase in the coming months being that all east African countries are net importers of crude oil and its products. As of February 2022, pump prices of petrol have already significantly increased compared to the same month last year, reaching an average price of USD/L 1.4 – corresponding to an average regional y-o-y increase of 20 percent.

Following the global trend, pump prices in **Somalia** have increased by 37 percent compared to February 2022 – the highest increase recorded in the region. Due to a fuel crisis that hit the country in late January, fuel prices in **Uganda** went up by 32 percent. Shortages of oil and oil products and related high fuel prices are likely to persist on the back of international oil prices that continue to soar. Following the government's decision to increase fuel prices by 13 percent in January 2022, the pump price of petrol in **Burundi** increased by 24 percent in February 2022 compared to the same month in 2021.

The sky-rocketing global fuel prices are likely to have a multiplier effect on end consumers' purchasing power. Increased global prices will be reflected in higher in-country costs of petrol and diesel, reducing economic access to fuel and resulting in increased transport and production costs. Moreover, increased production and transport costs will be reflected in higher food prices in local markets, which will further constrain consumers' purchasing power and access to food. Removal of fuel subsidies in **Sudan**, ineffective fuel price control, and high taxation on fuel in East Africa adds to the risks of increased petroleum products at the pump.

Table 2: Petrol Prices, February 2022

Country	Petrol price			
	USD	LCU	Variations	
			m-o-m	y-o-y
	Feb-22		Jan-22	Feb-21
Burundi	1.1	3,601	15%	24%
Djibouti	1.1	200	0%	3%
Ethiopia				
Kenya	1.1	131	0%	13%
Rwanda				
Somalia	0.9	22,513	2%	37%
South Sudan	2.4	1,029	0%	11%
Sudan				
Uganda	1.4	5,028	3%	32%
RBN			**3%**	**20%**

Source: National CPIs, WFP field monitor, FX Top

Policy Implications – Ethiopia, Kenya Sudan, Somalia, and South Sudan[10]


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Local government policies aiming to ensure the internal demand for cereal is met also imply stability and overall food security status of the population, especially in countries affected by major financial crises and related political turmoil.

In **Sudan**, the severe depreciation of the local currency since February 2021, the related high inflation rates coupled with the full removal of fuel subsidies in June 2021, have increased production costs for farmers. In addition, many bakeries went out of business as costs of production for non-subsidized items (e.g., water, yeast, cooking gas, labor, and oil) have exceeded earnings from the sale of bread. The potential disruption in wheat and inputs supply due to the conflict in Eastern Europe and the related increase in global cereal and oil prices are likely to put further pressure on domestic prices of wheat-based products.

The financial and political crises affecting **Sudan** have already translated into economic hardships for its people, with triple-digit headline inflation standing at 258 percent in February. Considering the high macro-economic vulnerability and substantial reliance on imports from Russia and Ukraine (e.g., wheat, sunflower seed oil, and fertilizers), any price increase or removal of state subsidies on essential goods, will be translated into reduced households' capability to meet essential needs, posing an additional threat to the food security of the population.

Being land-locked, **South Sudan** will be particularly susceptible to the impact of increased petroleum prices, which will, in turn, push up prices of other imported commodities, including cereals. In February 2022, sorghum export prices – a key staple in South Sudan rural areas – have already increased by 5.9 percent compared to January 2022, following the increase in global wheat prices (up 2.1 percent). In addition, global maize prices – widely consumed in urban areas of the country – have increased by 5.1 in the same time frame. There are still uncertainties on how the global increase in coarse grains prices will affect **South Sudan** and how possible disruptions in wheat supply from Russia and Ukraine will affect trade relations in the region. However, if **Sudan** will substitute wheat imports with less expensive cereals – such as sorghum or maize – the supply of these two coarse grains to **South Sudan** might be affected, which, in turn, can impact the local prices of cereals.

Despite increased oil prices should improve the exchange rate outlook and eventually the fiscal position of **South Sudan**, the upcoming elections and related increased governmental expenditure might offset potential gains by potentially generating inflationary pressure, which, in turn, will constrain households'

[10] Section based on WFP FSNMS and macroeconomic data from National Bureaux of Statistics

purchasing power and, consumers' economic access to food.


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Ethiopia, **Somalia,** and **Kenya** which are heavily reliant on wheat and sunflower oil imports from both Ukraine and Russia and are also facing mounting internal challenges are likely to be equally hardest hit by shocks to the global wheat trade.

Ethiopia is struggling with macro-economic challenges such as currency depreciation, inflation, and ballooning public debt, worsened by the ongoing conflict in the Northern regions and drought in the south. **Kenya** has one of the highest taxation regimes on fuel in eastern Africa and is also facing biting drought in most of its arid and semiarid (ASAL) counties, unprecedented currency depreciation, and high government debt. The forthcoming general elections in August 2022 will put more pressure on public expenditure while leaving little fiscal space for price subsidies.

The forecasted average to below-average rains from March-May will be the fourth consecutive drought in a row, further complicating the food supply situation in **Kenya**, **Somalia,** and **Ethiopia**. Prices of cooking oil, bread, and wheat flour are already reaching new records in local markets, while fuel prices and cost of living are on the rise, increasing concerns of a crisis similar to 2007/2008. Potential increased inflation and poverty risks will disproportionately affect low-income earners as the price of food accounts for more than 60 percent of the consumer price index across the region and the poorest households spend the lion-share of their monthly income on food.

Strengthening foreign exchange reserves to cushion local currencies and prevent imported inflation, prudential public expenditure management and expansion of domestic fiscal space should be considered. Measures to revamp strategic grain reserves in the short-term while accelerated sourcing and support to food importers for alternative and diversified export sources for crude oil, sunflower oil, fertilizer, and wheat products should be prioritized.

Ongoing humanitarian support to the most food insecure segments of the populations in rural areas will need to be sustained and or scaled up through June/July 2022. Expansion in coverage of the national social safety nets should also be envisioned to counter the detrimental effects of rising food prices on the poorest and vulnerable households, especially in urban areas. Farmers, urgently need the support of subsidized fertilizers to enable them to plant in time for the ongoing March-May cropping season.

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food security analysis

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