

# THE FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN SURGE

LEARNING FROM THE TRANSFORMING SURGE CAPACITY PROJECT  
2015-2018

**act:onaid**

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PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMME

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## Acronyms and abbreviations

<b>CCP</b>	Community contingency plans
<b>CERT</b>	Community Emergency Response Team
<b>C4C</b>	Charter for Change
<b>CHCF</b>	Core Humanitarian Competencies Framework
<b>CHS</b>	Core Humanitarian Standard
<b>CRS</b>	Catholic Relief Service
<b>CSO</b>	Civil society organisation
<b>CSR</b>	Corporate social responsibility
<b>DEPP</b>	Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme
<b>DFID</b>	UK Department for International Development
<b>DRR</b>	Disaster risk reduction
<b>GiE</b>	Gender in emergencies
<b>HQ</b>	Headquarters
<b>HLA</b>	Humanitarian Leadership Academy
<b>HR</b>	Human resources
<b>ICVA</b>	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
<b>IMC</b>	International Medical Corps
<b>INGO</b>	International non-governmental organisation
<b>ISC</b>	International Steering Committee (for the TSC Project)
<b>LNGO</b>	Local non-governmental organisation
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and evaluation
<b>MBSR</b>	Mindfulness-based stress reduction
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organisation
<b>NNGO</b>	National non-governmental organisation
<b>OCHA</b>	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>PNG</b>	Papua New Guinea
<b>PPERR</b>	Philippines Partnership for Emergency Response and Resilience
<b>RCRC</b>	International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
<b>SHADO</b>	START Humanitarian Action Deployment Opportunities
<b>ToT</b>	Training of trainers
<b>TSC</b>	Transforming Surge Capacity (project)
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDAC</b>	UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination
<b>VfM</b>	Value for money
<b>WASH</b>	Water, sanitation and hygiene
<b>WHS</b>	World Humanitarian Summit

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Finally, the team would like to thank the CHS Alliance for their ongoing support throughout the research timeframe.

## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

This research has been undertaken by Lois Austin and Glenn O'Neil who have both worked in the humanitarian sector for more than twenty years. The team has significant research experience as well as experience of managing surge responses and being deployed as part of surge teams.

**Lois Austin:** Lois has worked for 20 years in the humanitarian field and has served in a broad range of field-based and headquarters positions. Lois has managed and provided technical inputs into wide-ranging assistance, protection and recovery programmes for vulnerable populations in a number of complex and often fluctuating environments in: the Balkans; the north and south Caucasus; the Middle East; Afghanistan; Asia and throughout Africa. Lois's field and headquarters experience has formed the basis for a solid understanding of humanitarian issues, including approaches to surge response, from both policy and operational perspectives. She has worked in conflict, transition and natural disaster environments. Lois holds a Bachelor's degree in law from the University of London.

**Glenn O'Neil:** Glenn is an evaluation and research consultant with a broad range of experience covering some 100 evaluations, research and communication projects for international organisations and NGOs, in over 50 countries. His specialisation is in communications, advocacy and media for the humanitarian and development sectors. Glenn holds a PhD in evaluation methodology from the London School of Economics and a Master's in communication management from the University of Lugano, Switzerland.

**About the CHS Alliance:** The CHS Alliance is the result of a merger between People In Aid and HAP International. The new organisation brings together more than two decades of experience in quality, accountability and people management, and forms one of the largest and most influential networks of organisations committed to improving humanitarian and development work through the application of standards

For more information visit [www.chsalliance.org](http://www.chsalliance.org)

## Executive Summary


In 2015 the Start Network launched a three-year Transforming Surge Capacity (TSC) project financed with UK aid from the UK government as part of the Department for International Development's (DFID) Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme (DEPP). The project has seen engagement by eleven UK-based aid agencies with a collective focus on finding ways to ensure effective civil society surge capacity in order to deliver more efficient, collaborative and localised emergency responses.

Since 2015, crises have continued with many conflict-affected countries also hosting refugees and experiencing disasters associated with natural hazards. Asia remains the most disaster-prone region in the world. Facing these challenges, there has been a new momentum for change with the commitments made in the Grand Bargain which put localisation at the forefront of addressing humanitarian crises.

In response, this pilot project has brought together agencies to undertake concrete collaborative activities on surge which has transformed how those involved – both at individual and organisational levels – think about and act regarding surge.

With a geographic focus on Asia, the agencies involved in the project – ActionAid (project lead), Action Against Hunger, CAFOD, CARE, Christian Aid, International Medical Corps, Islamic Relief, Muslim Aid, Plan International, Save the Children and Tearfund – have each taken the lead on and contributed to specific areas in which they have specialised skills and knowledge.

In order to implement the project, collaborative platforms were established at national, regional and international levels. Platforms were created in the Philippines and Pakistan (national platforms hosted by Christian Aid and ActionAid respectively) and Bangkok (a regional platform hosted by Plan International). With collaboration at its heart, the project has focused around eight themes:



This report has gathered data from project agencies and platforms with the aim of highlighting learning emanating from the project in order to support the humanitarian sector towards more effective surge practices. The learning identified will feed into the Future for Humanitarian Surge event, organised by the TSC Project, to be held in London in November 2017<sup>1</sup>.

Following a baseline of project agencies' surge capacity in the first year of the project, further research to understand the state of surge across the humanitarian sector was undertaken the following year<sup>2</sup>. This provided the largest snapshot of surge in over a decade and informed the project's efforts on understanding and piloting approaches to:

- Localised surge systems.
- Collaborative approaches to surge.
- Good practice in surge activities.

The national and regional level platforms have spearheaded a number of initiatives which have involved project agencies as well as other stakeholders. One of the key initiatives which brought together two of the project's central focus areas of **localisation and collaboration** has been the development and piloting of multi-agency surge rosters. Development of the rosters has enabled humanitarian agencies to draw on a pool of some 600 surge staff from different international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), partner organisations, national NGOs and other stakeholders, ready to deploy in response to emergencies across the Asia region and beyond.

Being involved in the project has highlighted to agencies the importance of **localised approaches** to surge and has encouraged thinking and action to promote this. The project has fostered significant levels of collaboration across all project areas, in a way which would not have been possible without the TSC Project's existence. Rather than focusing on individual agency surge, the project has ensured collaborative engagement in many surge practices. In addition, the humanitarian sector's current focus on localisation has meant that major international surge actors – such as the UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and INGOs – have started to review their approaches in this regard, highlighting the timeliness of the project.

All TSC Project agencies highlight how valuable the project has been institutionally in terms of progressing organisational and **collaborative** surge practices. This is most visible through the development and piloting of the above-mentioned rosters but has also been a central feature of all other project areas. Agencies have come together to develop surge-related training packages including the development of innovative mindfulness and wellbeing modules; piloting of private sector partnerships for disaster preparedness; undertaking research to identify and promote the role of women in surge; and the sharing of human resources good practices. Whilst the project has acknowledged the benefits of collaborative action, it is important to note that this approach takes time and has required significant levels of shared individual and organisational commitment and vision from the earliest stages.

One of the essential and underlying components of the project has been to understand surge-related **capacity building** needs and gaps. Contributions here have required collaborative approaches to developing training modules with individual agencies leading on different modules where they could provide specific inputs related to their areas of expertise. As a result a surge capacity training course, with eight separate modules, has been developed and tested during the project. The course includes a module on mindfulness and wellbeing as well as a module on behavioural competencies – an important yet frequently absent element of surge – focused training.

The **role of women** in surge was identified at the start of the project as an area that required further attention. In spite of the recognition that women play a crucial role in surge responses, particularly in reaching some of the most vulnerable populations, few agencies have specific surge gender policies. The proportion of women involved in surge responses has been found to be context-specific although at least three project agencies have started to implement proactive women-led response approaches. Research undertaken during the project highlighted some worrying barriers to promoting the role of

<sup>1</sup> An update from the event will be included as an annex to this report for future reference.

<sup>2</sup> All research reports of the project can be accessed here: <https://disasterpreparedness.ngo/project/transforming-surge-capacity>

women in surge. These include concerns about personal safety and security, and issues such as the lack of confidence amongst women in relation to being involved in surge activities, particularly at leadership level.

One of the project's cross-cutting themes – and an area identified as critical to ensuring appropriate surge responses – has focused on the sharing of good **human resources** (HR) practice and the promotion of learning in this area. A series of guidelines have been developed in relation to staff care, ethical recruitment and HR coordination, and an HR platform created to exchange learning in this area. In addition, two HR conferences have been held to bring together HR professionals to share learning and make recommendations on surge-related HR gaps that need to be addressed in the future.

Learning from the project has shown that localised and collaborative surge are not only realistic but that they are effective. In order to further the efforts started through this unique project, a willingness of actors across the humanitarian sector is required to encourage a change of approach to surge, both in terms of mind-set and in the implementation of practical activities. In this way, the future of surge responses to crises will continue to increase the involvement of those directly affected by, and those closest to, disaster, thus ensuring swifter and more effective humanitarian surge responses in a collaborative and accountable way. To support this process, the project supports future surge models based on more collaborative and localised approaches, aimed at transforming how the humanitarian system and communities surge.

## Key learning and recommendations on surge

These learnings and recommendations are supported by examples and evidence found in this report, drawn from the experience of the TSC Project in Asia and global research and practices.

### Learning: Localised surge

- Localised surge contributes to a better ability to identify needs, enhanced contextual understanding, provides a quicker response and is significantly more cost-effective than alternatives.
- A move towards surge being locally led through collaboration and partnership, maximises the social value of local and national actors, based on a shared vision with the disaster affected people.
- In order to ensure its effectiveness, localised surge benefits from a collective approach with tools such as joint rosters, shared services, coordinating and preparedness mechanisms.
- Localised surge requires all actors to redefine their current roles, with INGOs playing a more facilitative role while local and national non-governmental organisations(L/NNGOs) step up to lead and sustain links with the authorities.
- A residual barrier to increasing and sustaining localised surge models is the lack of available direct financing for L/NNGOs.

### Recommendations to humanitarian actors:

- Build the capacity of L/NNGOs to lead in surge responses through funding and supporting preparedness activities, shared services such as joint rosters and national/local coordination mechanisms for crises.
- Consider how global and regional surge policies and resources can be reoriented to support further locally-led surge such as through providing technical and sectorial expertise to L/NNGOs (e.g. resource mobilisation, women-led surge, monitoring and evaluation, reporting).
- Invest further in national staff and their capacity to be mobilised for surge response in-country, and in neighbouring countries.
- Donors should provide access to direct funding to L/NNGOs both to build their surge capacity, preparedness activities, shared services and coordination mechanism in crisis-prone countries.
- Ensure that surge funding to INGOs and UN agencies is conditional on collaboration with local responders.
- Support L/NNGOs in their own initiatives for funding mobilisation through exchanges of best practice and other learning possibilities.
- L/NNGOs should build collaboration with other L/NNGOs, INGOs and authorities to coordinate surge response and increase preparedness.
- L/NNGOs should place priority on developing sound financial and accountability systems.

### Learning: Collaboration

- Collaboration takes time and must be built with a shared commitment and vision from the earliest stages.
- Establishing trust, an open working atmosphere and a willingness of partners to play complementary roles is key to successful collaborative surge.
- Collaboration can lead to greater cost effectiveness and efficiency through the sharing of resources and increased access to a larger pool of surge expertise for agencies.
- Collaboration can support greater learning and knowledge exchange between agencies and increase their influence on surge policies and approaches of the humanitarian sector.
- Different organisational policies and operational approaches do not necessarily prohibit effective collaboration as can be seen through the establishment of shared surge rosters.
- Collaborative surge can lead to more effective humanitarian responses as seen with the response to Nock Ten.

### Recommendations to humanitarian actors:

- Give greater priority to collaborative actions in key aspects of surge, for instance coordination mechanisms, joint assessments and shared services and initiatives such as joint rosters, research, training and advocacy.
- Focus collaborative efforts where they are primarily occurring – at the national/local level and shift resources to these levels.
- Donors should support collaboration by considering the funding needs of specific collaborative mechanisms such as coordination mechanisms, shared rosters and other shared services.
- Donors should give priority to collaborative proposals in surge funding over ad-hoc consortiums and alliances.



**Learning: Engagement with the wider sector**

- Engagement with the wider sector increases the reach and breadth of emergency response.
- Engagement takes time and responding in crises is supported by pre-existing relationships with governments, UN agencies, the private sector and academia.
- Engagement often occurs locally and with other humanitarian actors rather than globally and with the private sector or academia.

**Recommendations to humanitarian actors:**

- At the country level, fostering strong and lasting relationships with wider stakeholders (such as government, UN, private sector and academia) outside of crises is recommended to facilitate surge response.
- At the global level, recognise that most collaboration will occur at the national/local level and re-orientate support and resources accordingly.
- Donors should prioritise and support engagement both within the humanitarian sector and with other stakeholders such as the private sector and academia.

**The following approaches to increasing engagement between INGOs and key stakeholders were also identified by the TSC Project:**

- UN agencies: Advocate for UN surge mechanisms to be more open to L/NNGOs for example at the sub-national cluster level. Proactively position and facilitate L/NNGOs as the link between UN-led responses and the community level; advocate for a review of the role of I/L/NNGOs in the UN-led Humanitarian Country Teams.
- Governments: Explore what complementary role I/NNGOs can play in government-led response such as support for local/national coordination mechanisms, joint assessments and responses.
- Academia: Engage with academia on teaching, policy and practice research, both to increase awareness amongst students and academics and to develop further research in the field.
- Private sector: Secure the support of private sector for disaster risk reduction and resilience building through a dialogue outside crisis situations. Advocate with private sector organisations to collaborate using their technical expertise and staff skills rather than just funding; encourage private sector to link their surge responses to their Corporate Social Responsibility goals respecting the Core Humanitarian Standard.

**Learning: Capacity building**

- Those on surge rosters will always need specific technical as well as behavioural skills to ensure they can function in high-pressure environments.
- Appropriate behaviour is essential for surge staff; training on these skills as well as on stress management is critical.
- Sustainability of training efforts in surge remains a key gap to be met with possible solutions such as online learning, mentoring, app technology, and shadowing.
- Capacity building in the form of training, simulation exercises, one-to-one-coaching and training of trainers can be a strategy to build collaboration and improve the ability of individuals and organisations to work together.
- There remain capacity building gaps in terms of supporting localisation, including key issues such as inclusion of localised elements into needs assessment training.
- Collaboration between agencies on surge training led to rich content and the uptake of materials within agencies own training programmes.
- Having mixed groups of trainees ensures a higher impact across sectors and across organisations.

**Recommendations to humanitarian actors:**

- As well as technical training, agencies should ensure that adequate behavioural skills training is provided to surge staff, such as the surge training modules developed by this project.
- Humanitarian organisations should explore more options to pool their efforts and resources to collaborate on training materials and courses which should prove to be cost-effective and facilitate relationship-building between surge professionals, while also focusing on organisations and not only individuals.
- Mentoring and buddy systems at different stages of capacity building should be put in place for those involved in surge responses.
- A more holistic approach to training should be pursued, moving away from classroom settings.
- Sustainability and follow-up of training needs to be a focus to ensure its continuing benefits.
- There is the need for the development of a training curriculum on women's leadership including gender based violence/protection from sexual exploitation and abuse, confidence building and skills development.

**Learning: Sustainability**

- Considerable progress has been made towards the sustainability of surge at the HQ level although it requires more funding for preparedness at the local level.
- Sustainability of surge at the national and local level implies involving partners, networks and authorities to support activities and finding alternative financial mechanisms.
- Establishing local funding and coordination mechanisms are possible solutions to sustainability of local surge and help to reduce individual agency costs through collaborative cost-sharing approaches.
- Some roles, such as fundraising and proposal writing positions, can support sustainable localised surge from the global and regional levels given their access to networks and donors.

**Recommendations to humanitarian actors:**

- Further support should be provided to regional and national INGO offices and L/NNGOs to develop their surge capacities in resource mobilisation.
- Funding should be reoriented to provide increased support to regional and national surge mechanisms, such as maintaining rosters and capacity building for national staff.
- The support of localised and collaborative surge to sustainability should be further recognised and resources reallocated accordingly.
- Donors should orientate financial support to sustainability of surge activities, and particularly at the regional, local and national levels.

**Learning: Women in surge**

- Involving women in an active role in emergency response is crucial to ensure that the communities' needs are addressed.
- Building the capacity of local female surge responders helps to improve disaster preparedness for future emergencies.
- Building on existing good practices can encourage more women to take up surge roles and ensure gender equality in international surge.
- Exchanging good practice and harnessing peer support in gender-sensitive surge policies and practices can ensure gender-responsive deployments in which both women and men can be deployed. This is beneficial to ensure that gender in emergencies (GiE) is mainstreamed across the sector.
- Although all major humanitarian organisations have gender policies in place, few have specific surge gender policies.
- Women's networks and other peer support mechanisms can be a cost-effective and pragmatic way to support female staff in humanitarian organisations.

**Recommendations to humanitarian actors:**

- For deployments: leadership roles for women in surge need to be promoted; gender balance of deploying teams need to be ensured; where possible, more than one woman from similar cultures/contexts be deployed.
- For surge briefings/training: include female trainers and more specific reference to gender-related safety and security; gender training needs to be delivered to all surge responders.
- Effort needs to be made to work in partnership with other sectors e.g. engineering to encourage women to join the humanitarian sector.
- Mentoring and secondments should be encouraged, combined with clear HR policies and inclusion on gender-related issues in staff development and learning activities.
- Donors should proactively support women-led surge responses and programming.

**Learning: Wellbeing**

- The mental health of aid workers, affected by stress, anxiety and trauma in the humanitarian sector is at chronic levels.
- The lack of dedicated wellbeing policies within agencies, related to mental wellbeing, combined with a lack of funding, means that the mental wellbeing of aid workers is often inadvertently neglected.
- A shift of emphasis from treatment to prevention could support preparedness to build resilience and mental wellbeing.
- Wellbeing for surge responders requires well defined proactive training and care responses from agencies, pre, post, and during deployment.
- Some agencies conflate duty of care responsibilities (legal duties) with ensuring the wellbeing of surge staff (moral duties).
- Measuring surge staff wellbeing is hindered due to the lack of dedicated monitoring and evaluation systems to gauge this.
- There is often a lack of leadership and prioritisation of wellbeing issues within agencies.

### Recommendations to humanitarian actors:

- Led by senior management, organisations should develop a dedicated wellbeing policy, focused on mental wellbeing, contextualised for their local situation (similar to security guidelines and protocols) linked to a dedicated monitoring and evaluation framework with set targets.
- A clear distinction and coherence needs to be made between duty of care (i.e. legal requirements and compliance) and wellbeing, so that wellbeing is not mislabelled and lost in organisational priorities.
- Concrete steps need to be put in place for surge staff (pre, post, and during deployment): managers and their staff should receive specific training; dedicated wellbeing staff team or a peer support system should be considered; optional counselling should be provided post-deployment; surge staff should be aware of their entitlements; smaller organisations should consider shared services and support.
- Early indications suggest that mindfulness may provide an effective evidenced-based approach to building the resilience and mental wellbeing of surge staff. It is recommended that the efficacy of mindfulness be further explored and piloted within the sector.
- As self-awareness is an important attribute linked to the Core Humanitarian Competencies Framework (CHCF), mindfulness training can support humanitarian workers to nurture and develop self-awareness to support management and leadership skills, as well as wellbeing.

### Learning: Human Resources good practices

- There remains a need for improved integration of HR teams and programme teams to ensure more effective surge responses.
- If not done ethically, recruiting national staff into INGOs for surge responses risks undermining NNGO capacity and their ability to scale up for humanitarian response.
- Difficulty exists in finding appropriate surge staff for slow-onset crises. Agencies face similar challenges in this area and in other areas related to HR approaches for surge staff.

### Recommendations to humanitarian actors:

- Preparedness actions should include having pre-surge HR capacities and systems in place and time needs to be invested in ensuring this.
- New or unprecedented types or scale of response (as seen during the Ebola crisis) require pre-surge thinking on how to work with non-traditional partners and hiring surge staff with different technical skills. This needs to be factored into organisational surge planning.
- Conditions and support available to local staff should include psychosocial support, acceptable terms and conditions of employment (in line with market scales); and support as contracts come to an end.
- INGOs need to put in place ethical national staff recruitment practices to ensure they don't undermine national surge capacity.
- INGOs and UN agencies should start to shift from investing in their own surge capacity to supporting that of their partners' in advance of crises and linked to other early warning networks.
- Continued use of a shared HR space, such as the project's HR platform, is encouraged, in order to avoid duplication and replicate good practice.

**Graphs:** Data of graphs found in this report are based on surveys of the 11 TSC Project agencies at international, regional and national levels (Pakistan and Philippines). In addition, surveys were also carried out of TSC Project agencies that responded to slow onset crises globally and disasters in Bangladesh, Haiti and Nepal. As the unit of analysis was the individual agency, responses ranged from 6 to 11 agencies per graph and this should be taken into account when reviewing them.

## Foreword

The world is facing unprecedented complex humanitarian crises. Armed conflict, in combination with severe drought, floods and food shortages have left an estimated 164.2 million people in 47 countries in need of humanitarian assistance in 2016. At present our agencies are responding to simultaneous emergencies across the globe, including the Rohingya refugee crisis, drought across the Horn of Africa, conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, floods across South Asia, the ongoing protracted crisis in the Middle East region, and the dramatic hurricane season across Latin America. With conflicts showing no sign of ending, and the impacts of climate change worsening, humanitarian needs are set to further dramatically increase over the coming years.

This report from the Transforming Surge Capacity (TSC) project highlights that significant improvements have been made in recent years to surge practices across international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) to respond to these increasing needs – and that change was necessary. However, it also recognises that more must be done to ensure that we have adequate surge capacity in place at all levels of a response so that we are able to scale up (and down) resources smoothly and quickly to support crisis affected communities.

Both of our agencies are incredibly proud to have been part of this project, ActionAid as lead agency, and Save the Children as a consortium member and Chair of the International Steering Committee. The project has enabled us to innovate, and given the space to different agencies to lead, collaborate, pilot and build evidence on new approaches to surge capacity with a focus on localisation and increased collaboration. We believe that the learning from the project, outlined in this report, will enable the sector to make more informed decisions on the mechanisms and approaches to improve humanitarian surge in the future.

In ActionAid, we focus on women's leadership in our humanitarian work and this project has given us the opportunity to explore how to encourage more women leaders in surge responses, so that we are more effectively meeting the needs of crisis affected women. We also focus on shifting power and supporting locally led responses, and this project has enabled us to look at different models of filling capacity gaps at the local level. We are particularly excited about the training programme for surge professionals that has informed our own training curricula. We in ActionAid believe that transforming the sector's approaches to humanitarian surge and working more collaboratively is critical to making a difference to people affected by disasters.

For Save the Children, the project's findings and learnings will contribute a long way to informing and designing future actions needed to meet the commitments, 50 in total, made by Save the Children at the World Humanitarian Summit. Of these, our commitments to; i) establish effective regional coordination mechanisms to ensure that our response is one of improved quality, ii) to play a lead role in identifying and responding to capacity-building needs among humanitarian practitioners and, iii) to provide financial, technical and human resources to initiatives aimed at building the capacity of local actors, are the most obvious ones to directly benefit from the project's achievements.

The work supported by this project is important to our agencies as we believe that investment in more localised, collaborative, and effective surge capacity, enables our organisations not only to better meet our commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit but also our most fundamental commitment to meet the needs of crisis affected communities.

We wish to express our thanks to the Department for International Development (DFID) for funding this initiative which is a project within the Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme (DEPP). Our thanks also go to the Start Network, and its members for their support of the project, and to the project team for their dedication in leading the project over the last three years.

**Alex Brans**, International Programmes Director, Save the Children & Chair of the International Steering Committee (ISC) for the TSC Project

**Sonya Ruparel**, Deputy Humanitarian Director, ActionAid International, Vice-chair of the ISC for the TSC Project

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# 1. INTRODUCTION

The Start Network's three year TSC Project aimed to improve the capacity of humanitarian agencies to scale up resources for emergency response. The project's objective was to ensure: "More effective civil society surge capacity capable of delivering more efficient, collaborative and localised emergency response".

Led by ActionAid, the project brought together eleven agencies: Action Against Hunger, CAFOD, CARE, Christian Aid, International Medical Corps (IMC), Islamic Relief, Muslim Aid, Plan International, Save the Children and Tearfund. The CHS Alliance (formerly People in Aid) is a technical partner for the three-year project and is responsible for the Surge Capacity Research element. The Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities Network (CDAC) is also a technical partner. The project was financed with UK aid from the UK government as part of DFID's DEPP.

Prior to the project, the 11 agencies involved were individually struggling with a number of similar surge-related challenges. As a result, they decided to combine their efforts into this three-year project, piloting and building evidence on collaborative and locally-focused approaches to surge.

An initial baseline was completed in the first year of the project in order to get an understanding of the surge capacity of the agencies involved. This was followed in 2015 by a research report – The State of Surge in the Humanitarian Sector – which included data from over 50 representatives of humanitarian agencies as well as the private and public sector. The report provided the largest snapshot of surge in over a decade. In response, the project then looked at how to implement the recommendations proposed in the two reports which focused on:

- Gaining a better understanding of how agencies could practically adapt their surge systems to be more localised.
- Improving understanding of what the advantages of collaborative surge could be and the level of agency willingness to share surge resources.
- Developing a space to test and pilot new models for surge and to share good practice.

Over the last two years, the project has piloted and built evidence which responds to these focus points. This has been delivered through collaborative platforms at national level – in the Philippines<sup>3</sup> and Pakistan<sup>4</sup> – and at regional level in Asia<sup>5</sup> as well as at global/international level<sup>6</sup>. The platforms were made up of a selection of different INGOs who met on a regular basis to oversee the delivery of activities. Other stakeholders were also involved in a number of initiatives that were developed by the platforms, such as the development of shared surge rosters.

Piloting of collaborative rosters was a key focus of the platforms' work. During the course of the project, this initiative attracted more than 600 roster members from different organisations to deploy to emergencies within the Asia region. The collaborative and localised rosters enable humanitarian agencies to draw on a pool of trained and skilled staff from a selection of different INGOs, partner organisations and other stakeholders in order to respond to humanitarian emergencies. Different shared roster models have been piloted including the sharing of staff across agencies whereby responding agencies look for additional surge capacity from agencies who are not responding. Through the platforms, the project also aimed to explore new ways for agencies to work together collaboratively with external stakeholders such as the private sector and the United Nations (UN).

The project held learning events and delivered training aimed at improving the capacity of surge personnel, including wellbeing support. Good practice in human resources (HR) has been another focus of the project. This area has seen the development of an online interactive HR surge portal, which is intended to help HR and other humanitarian staff to access and share good practice and resources on surge. The portal has 203 members, based in 38 countries and from 63 different organisations. Another central element of the project has been the design of eight surge-focused training modules which has included a specific pilot on using mindfulness techniques to better support surge staff.

<sup>3</sup> Hosted by Christian Aid

<sup>4</sup> Hosted by ActionAid

<sup>5</sup> Hosted by Plan International

<sup>6</sup> Hosted by ActionAid

The combined approach of targeting individuals involved in surge as well as focusing on organisational approaches has been an important element of the project's approach to collaborative working and localisation, focusing on skills, systems and processes at different levels.

Alongside project activities, significant surge-related research has been undertaken to highlight surge practice from within and outside the project and to feed into project activities. This final learning report is one element of the project's research. It has taken learning from the project, gathering information from the agencies and individuals who participated in it and drawing from some of the research that has been undertaken throughout the project's lifetime. This report will be used at the project's Future of Humanitarian Surge event which will pull together evidence from across the project, and will provide the opportunity to present propositions to the sector on how surge capacity can be transformed now and in the future.

## 2. PURPOSE, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH

The purpose of this research is to highlight key learning from the TSC Project as identified at different project platform levels. The learning emanates primarily from the 11 TSC Project agencies, although learning from non-project agencies is also covered where there is a link to the project. The report summarises learning from the three-year project with the aim of supporting the progress of humanitarian agencies towards more effective surge practice.

The report does not intend to serve as an endline and therefore it does not report against individual activities; rather it is designed to highlight key learning from the project's focus areas:




Figure 1: Project focus areas for learning

The report provides an overview of any key changes in surge practices by project agencies since the beginning of the project in 2015 and provides recommendations for future surge practice for the whole humanitarian sector. The report research methodology is described in annex 1.

### 3. DEFINITION OF SURGE CAPACITY

The following definition of surge capacity, taken from the foundational research on surge carried out in 2007, was used as a starting point for this research<sup>7</sup>: “In the humanitarian context, surge capacity can be defined as the “ability of an organisation to rapidly and effectively increase [the sum of] its available resources in a specific geographic location”, in order to meet increased demand to stabilise or alleviate suffering in any given population.”

By year three of the project (2017) TSC Project agencies felt that the definition of surge capacity should be adapted to be less organisation-centric and to incorporate localisation and collaboration as key enablers for surge, as follows:

**“Surge capacity is the ability of organisations, communities and individuals in crisis to rapidly and effectively respond to the needs of affected populations through improved local preparedness, collaborative effort and the scaling up and down of responses.”**

### 4. THE HUMANITARIAN ENVIRONMENT AND SURGE RESPONSE

Since the start of this project in 2015, crises have continued in mainly the same high-risk zones, and have led to ongoing calls for increased humanitarian assistance. Today, five crises receive some half of all international humanitarian assistance: Syria, Yemen, Iraq, South Sudan and Ethiopia. This shows a polarisation of contexts compared to 2012 where the top five accounted for only one third of funding<sup>8</sup>.

Most affected countries have faced multiple crisis types with many conflict-affected countries also hosting refugees and experiencing disasters associated with natural hazards, such as the El Niño and La Niña weather phenomena that have caused havoc across the globe. By the end of 2016, the number of forcibly displaced people had reached 65.6 million. This is the highest recorded total to date<sup>9</sup>.

Despite this situation, there has been a new momentum for change. The World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in 2016, the commitments made in the Grand Bargain and its focus on localisation, has pushed for new ways to address humanitarian crises. This includes a commitment to deliver at least 25% of humanitarian funding to local and national responders – who currently receive less than 1%. Another aspect of the Grand Bargain entails massively scaling up cash-based humanitarian assistance. As a result of technological advances and the growth of social media, new avenues for fundraising have also been seen. For example, raising money directly from individuals through “crowdfunding” saw a 210% increase in Asia in 2015<sup>10</sup>.

The changing humanitarian environment and new momentum for change have both stressed and highlighted the importance of effective humanitarian surge. The focus on localisation has meant major international surge actors, such as the UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC) and INGOs have started to review their approaches in this regard, highlighting the timeliness of this project.

At the same time, since 2015, some of the same poor surge practices persist. These can be seen in uncoordinated and inappropriate responses such as the 2015 Nepal earthquake and, more recently, in response to Hurricane Matthew, Haiti, in 2016. However, this project has also seen positive developments in the responses to smaller scale disasters including floods in Bangladesh and the Nock Ten typhoon in the Philippines. These were both largely locally-led responses and exhibited better preparation and reinforced response networks and systems.

<sup>7</sup> Houghton, R. and Emmens, B. People In Aid “Surge capacity in the humanitarian relief and development sector. A review of surge capacity and surge capacity mechanisms within international NGOs” 2007

<sup>8</sup> Data from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS).

<sup>9</sup> Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2017

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.



The actors that respond to humanitarian crises continue to grow both in size and variety and those involved have had to develop new ways to implement surge responses. The migration crisis in southern Europe saw the emergence of home-grown volunteer responders at the forefront competing with the traditional surge responders. At the same time, some conflict-affected countries, such as Central African Republic and Yemen, attracted far fewer responders. Challenges in responding continue to be seen both in terms of being able to access those affected by crisis as well as ensuring that humanitarian organisations have appropriate surge skills. For example, in order to reach those affected by the ongoing Syria conflict humanitarian actors have had to move towards remote programming in some areas. With regard to skillsets, the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa some three years ago caught the world unaware, requiring a new surge health skillset and prompting a reform of health emergency response.

The recent focus on accountability to affected populations took more prominence through the development of the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS). Yet the risks to humanitarian workers in the field only continue<sup>11</sup>. These highlight the stress faced by responders and the importance of ensuring their wellbeing.

The situation on the ground saw national and regional authorities growing in strength and further building their disaster response capacities, as was seen with regional organisations such as the African Union and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Associated with the new momentum for change there was a renewed push to more strongly link the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, with possible implications for surge response, preparedness, resilience and recovery.



ActionAid

<sup>11</sup> <https://aidworkersecurity.org/>

## 5. PROJECT PARTNERS' EVOLUTION OF SURGE 2007-2017

The eleven agencies involved in the project joined for a variety of reasons. These include the following:




Figure 2: Reasons for agencies' involvement in the project

All TSC Project agencies spoken to highlighted how valuable the project has been institutionally in terms of progressing organisational and collaborative surge practices.

Whilst agencies report their surge practices have evolved in different ways in the last two–three years (since contributing to the project's 2015 State of Surge report), at the global level there has been a continued institutionalisation of approaches to surge. This includes more formalised HR processes, much of which has been brought about through learning from involvement in the project. Being involved in the project has highlighted to agencies the importance of localised approaches to surge and has encouraged thinking (and action) to promote this. This can be seen in the development of more regional surge positions and signing up to the Charter for Change (C4C) for example. The project has fostered significant levels of collaboration across all project areas in a way which would not have been possible without the TSC Project existing. Rather than focusing on individual agency surge, the project has ensured collaborative engagement in many surge practices (see chapter 6.2.).

All seven organisations that are part of the regional platform in Asia have undergone changes over the past two years that have affected their surge response mechanisms. These organisations have, at different paces and through different approaches, all started a move towards the regionalisation and localisation of their approach to surge.

In the Philippines, agencies involved in the project have reported a shift towards more nationally-oriented approaches to surge, characterised by an emphasis on building national staff and partner capacity. Capacity is being built at national level through existing emergency programme teams, internal rosters and working with national and local partners with a presence on the ground. Whilst global and regional surge can be called upon, this has more frequently been activated to fill in gaps and provide expertise that does not exist at the national level. Over the course of the project, the Philippines has seen a more demand-driven approach rather than a supply-driven "no regrets" approach to surge. TSC Project agencies have developed strategies, procedures and internal processes to enable greater organisational coordination for surge in the last three years as well as increasingly working with national and local partners (see highlight box below on the Nock Ten response in chapter 6.1).

In Pakistan, as at other platform levels, agencies contributed to the shared surge roster developed by the project. Increased efforts to collaborate have been made through the project, including collaboration with government. For example, together with the Punjab province emergency service, Rescue 1122<sup>12</sup> and local NGOs (LNGOs), the project saw the successful piloting and development of Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) (see highlight box below) – an important collaborative and localised surge initiative.

Table 1 below highlights some of the areas that individual TSC Project agencies have benefited from through their involvement in the project.

Project thematic area	Action taken	Project members
Capacity building	Training modules for surge deployment have been adapted, specifically wellbeing and diversity sections.	ActionAid Islamic Relief
	Adaptation of surge training materials.	Save the Children
Localised surge	Thinking around ways to increase national surge capacity is being considered by more country offices.	ActionAid Muslim Aid
	Establishment of regional positions at HQ and in the regions.	
Women in surge	Changes to rules/policy concerning deploying women e.g. covering the cost of childcare.	ActionAid Muslim Aid
	Actively trying to surge more women.	
Wellbeing	Establishment of a cross-organisation working group on well-being in the UK, and the creation of a pilot 'Wellbeing Cluster' in the Philippines.	Action Against Hunger CAFOD Christian Aid
	Increased awareness of wellbeing issues in relation to surge.	
	Enhancement of soft skills such as staff care, wellbeing and security.	
HR good practice	Increased formalisation of policies.	CAFOD
	Formalisation of HR processes.	Islamic Relief
Roster development	The SHADO project has allowed CARE to develop their Asia-based gender advisors' skills in Gender in Emergencies, so that they could potentially be added to CARE's roster and made available to other agencies.	CARE Plan International Islamic Relief
	Learning from the shared roster for internal organisational roster development.	
Institutionalisation	Increased mainstreaming of surge and creation of a surge funding pool.	Christian Aid

Table 1: Examples of how the project is being used by TSC Project agencies

<sup>12</sup> Rescue 1122 is the Pakistan Punjab province government emergency service.

The project set-up, seen through the establishment of global, regional and national level platforms and a number of different working groups, committees and a technical advisory group, has provided an avenue for exchange and learning that has helped influence agency approaches to surge. Learning events, research reports and conferences undertaken during the course of the project have allowed for the sharing of good practice and enabled not only those organisations directly involved in the project but the humanitarian sector as a whole to learn from experiences and consequently adapt surge practices to ensure greater effectiveness in response.

## 6. KEY LEARNING FROM THE TRANSFORMING SURGE CAPACITY PROJECT

The sections below provide a summary of key learning from the different elements of the TSC Project. As stated above, this is not a measurement of what activities have been undertaken or what has been achieved – these should be covered in the project's final evaluation which will take place at the end of 2017. The emphasis is upon what has been learned by agencies and individuals involved in the project in the areas as described in Figure 1 above.



Cat Cowley/CAFOD

## 6.1 Localised surge

### Key learning:

- Localised surge contributes to a better ability to identify needs, enhances contextual understanding, provides a quicker response and is significantly more cost-effective than alternatives.
- A move towards surge being locally led through collaboration and partnership, maximises the social value of local and national actors, based on a shared vision with the disaster affected people.
- In order to ensure its effectiveness, localised surge benefits from a collective approach with tools such as joint rosters, shared services, coordinating and preparedness mechanisms.
- Localised surge requires all actors to redefine their current roles, with INGOs playing a more facilitative role while LNGOs and national NGOs (NNGOs) step up to lead and sustain links with the authorities.
- A residual barrier to increasing and sustaining localised surge models is the lack of available direct financing for LNGOS and NNGOs.

The TSC Project placed localisation as a central pillar of its work. It has served as a platform to link international to national and local actors for an exchange of knowledge and the establishment of concrete initiatives on localisation. The Start Network has identified seven dimensions on localisation as shown in diagram below<sup>13</sup>.

## SEVEN DIMENSIONS OF LOCALISATION



<sup>13</sup> <https://startnetwork.org/resource/start-fund-start-network-and-localisation>

CAFOD and Trocaire sum this up as follows:

**“Localisation is a collective process by the different stakeholders of the humanitarian system (donors, United Nations agencies, NGOs) which aims to return local actors (local authorities or civil society) to the centre of the humanitarian system with a greater, more central role”.**<sup>14</sup>

Within the TSC Project there were differing opinions as to what constituted localisation reflecting the Start Network’s own research that **“not only is localisation a vague concept, it is also an ongoing and difficult debate”**<sup>15</sup>. This report presents a range of interpretations and how these were operationalised through the TSC Project into localised surge.

This project considered localised surge as a transformative move towards surge being locally led through collaboration and partnership. The aim was to maximise the social value of local and national actors, based on a shared vision with disaster affected people. However, it is recognised that despite this key role in humanitarian response, local and national actors have less influence and access to funding than international actors<sup>16</sup>. International responses to emergencies can undermine the capacity of local and national actors, notably as their experienced staff move to international agencies, or their priorities and resources shift to those set by international actors<sup>17</sup>.

During the project, all TSC Project agencies were involved with local surge to some extent, with more activities seen at the national and regional level, as illustrated in Figure 3 below. Regional and global levels tended to be more involved in facilitating locally led-surge, such as seconding staff to work at the local level or involved in its funding. Further, the global level emphasised their support to local partners and setting up national structures, the main points highlighted by agencies that responded “Other” in the survey.


<sup>14</sup> <https://www.trocaire.org/sites/default/files/resources/policy/more-than-the-money-localisation-in-practice.pdf>

<sup>15</sup> The Start Fund, Start Network and Localisation: current situation and future directions, Smruti Patel & Koenraad Van Brabant, Global Mentoring Initiative, April 2017.

<sup>16</sup> DEPP Learning report, 2016.

<sup>17</sup> Smruti Patel & Koenraad Van Brabant, Op. Cit.; CAFOD, Christian Aid, Tearfund and Islamic Relief Worldwide (2017). Time to Move On: National perspectives on transforming surge capacity

Figure 3: Involvement by TSC Project agencies in types of local surge



Some of the highest involvement of TSC Project agencies in the area of localised surge was participating in shared rosters directly created as part of this project, i.e. at the Asia regional level and national level – Pakistan and the Philippines. Locally led and designed national and regional rosters were found to be important for supporting locally led responses. These provide access to the shared resource of a wider pool of trained staff (see Nock Ten case below).

The project’s Philippines platform placed an additional emphasis on the need to support the localisation of humanitarian coordination mechanisms for surge. A pilot was carried out in two regions to develop coordination mechanisms led by local organisations at the sub-national (regional) level. The pilots highlighted that local coordination needs to go beyond the sharing of information. While this can be the first step in coordination at local level, the real test is in actual operationalisation of the local coordination mechanism. This was experienced in the Philippines with the responses to Nock Ten (2016) and the Marawi conflict (2017). To date, experience has shown the benefits of local coordination in being able to establish more substantial relationships with local authorities and community-based organisations.

The following table illustrates some of the models or approaches used by TSC agencies and the project that had strong surge localisation elements. These models/approaches were not mutually exclusive; often agencies used several of them in a parallel and complementary manner:

	Joint national / regional rosters or teams	National-led approaches with global support	Developing national INGO chapters	Developing local development actors	Tripartite collaboration
<b>Description</b>	Rosters of national, neighbouring or regional-based staff than can be deployed to support responses.	National offices of INGOs lead the response with specific support from their regional or global offices/partners, e.g. fundraising, technical expertise.	INGOs have long-term commitment to support national chapters, often active in both humanitarian and development fields.	INGOs and NNGOs work with grassroots organisations (normally development focused) to build their capacity in crises to lead and respond.	INGOs, L/ NNGOs and local authorities collaborate on specific surge sectors / skills.
<b>Localisation focus</b>	Reliance on regional or national competencies rather than global.	National level led response with complementary support from global/regional level.	National capacity developed but can call on global network for support in crisis.	Grassroots organisations increase their capacity to respond immediately.	L/NNGOs involved in response with INGO support and expertise.
<b>Examples</b>	Regional roster National rosters: Pakistan and the Philippines. Agencies own rosters/teams, e.g. CARE, Christian Aid, Islamic Relief, Muslim Aid. INGO response to Nepal earthquake (2015).	INGO response in Bangladesh floods (2016) and Nock Ten (2016), the Philippines.	Caritas network; Save the Children network.	The Philippines Partnership for Emergency Response and Resilience	Rescue 1122 Pakistan; The Philippines Partnership.

Table 2: Types of local surge models/approaches

**“This project has inspired new thinking and new collaboration between NGOs in the Philippines, Pakistan and around the region. Projects like this are the key to turning the concept of localisation into tangible action and improving disaster response for all NGOs.”**

**External stakeholder**



As highlighted by the above models/approaches, the different forms of localised surge considered in the project did not exclude international actors. Rather, it involved readdressing the imbalances that exist in funding, designing and leading surge response. These models/approaches illustrate the following roles for global and regional offices of INGOs in a surge response emphasising localisation:

- **Global:** support and expertise in surge and related services, such as resource mobilisation, project direction (such as women-led approaches), monitoring, evaluation and reporting, sectorial technical expertise; global leadership and coordination/mobilisation of internal networks (e.g. chapters); providing surge materials; capacity building in disaster risk reduction (DRR), emergency response.
- **Regional:** providing surge resources, such as surge materials and managerial/sectorial expertise; coordination of regional response; linking to global networks for media, reporting and other support; capacity building in DRR, emergency response (see highlight box below for an example of the regional role).

### Islamic Relief's regionalisation process

After Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, Islamic Relief reflected on its response and concluded that relying on international staff from its UK HQ had not been the most effective way to support the organisation's response to the crisis in the Philippines. During Typhoon Haiyan, staff deploying from Asia arrived more quickly, showed better contextual sensitivity and highlighted that deploying within ASEAN countries allowed visa-free travel. Following the response, Islamic Relief carried out a mapping in the Asia region and set up a regional roster of country-level staff, managed by the Regional Humanitarian Team in Islamabad, Pakistan. Roster members participated in a training simulation just prior to the Nepal earthquake. When the earthquake struck, roster members were able to deploy within 24 hours, first from neighbouring India and then Pakistan and Bangladesh. 90% of the response team came from the region and a team spirit quickly developed due to them knowing each other from the training simulation.

The regional approach has been expanded through supporting local partners in their response capacity (STRIDE project) and mentoring/staff exchanges between country offices. With the creation of the TSC Project regional roster, Go Team Asia, Islamic Relief has integrated the roster with its internal surge mechanisms. TSC Project training modules have also been adapted and integrated into Islamic Relief's own roster training. Being involved in creating the Go Team Asia roster was also a learning experience for Islamic Relief with the organisation able to apply direct learning to the management of their own roster, for example in human resources practices for deployment.

The key learning from Islamic Relief's regionalisation process was:

- Neighbouring and regional staff were an effective support for the Nepal response.
- The regional office could play a facilitating role linking country-offices to surge response.
- Complementary approaches including deployments, mentoring and staff exchanges supported development of local surge capacity.

Source: TSC Project regionalisation of humanitarian action case study.


Despite an increased effort to ensure localised responses, the more traditional INGO model for surge response (i.e. dispatching global teams as soon as a crisis hits) is not yet obsolete. The crises tracked by the project since 2015 have shown that the level of localised response varied. The surge responses to the Bangladesh floods (2016), Nock Ten typhoon in the Philippines (2016) and slow onset crises (drought) in Zimbabwe (2015) and India (2013) were led locally using different approaches/models as described above. The Nepal earthquake (2015), Hurricane Mathew response in Haiti (2016) and drought response in Papua New Guinea (PNG) (2016) were less locally led, with global surge teams significantly involved. In these contexts the contributing factors to deploying global surge teams were that the disasters were overwhelming for existing local response systems and networks (e.g. Nepal and Haiti) and/or the systems and networks were under-developed (e.g. PNG and Haiti)<sup>18</sup>. Further, none of these crises were conflict-related, where limitations of localised surge have been identified, as discussed below.

<sup>18</sup> See tracking reports: <http://www.chsalliance.org/surge>.

### Benefits and challenges of local surge

The project confirmed previous research that localisation was key to an effective humanitarian response<sup>19</sup>. A surge response with a strong localisation focus contributed to an increased ability to identify the needs of the affected populations, enhanced contextual understanding and a quicker response. It has also been established through the project that localised surge is considerably cheaper than other alternatives (e.g. global). The financial sustainability study commissioned by the project concluded that deploying national staff cost one third less than deploying regional staff and two-thirds less than deploying global level staff<sup>20</sup>. The Value for Money (VfM) research conducted by the project concluded that the primary opportunity for VfM gains for collaboration were at national levels<sup>21</sup>. At the same time, significant challenges were identified for localised surge, as seen in Figure 4 below.

Figure 4: Challenges of TSC Project agencies for local surge



The first challenge to localised responses identified at all levels (global, regional and national) was the lack of funding for localised surge. Aside from any locally raised funds, humanitarian funding for L/NNGOs was almost exclusively channelled through INGOs who act as “brokers” sub-contracting their services. This impacts on the ability of L/NNGOs to design and lead surge responses<sup>22</sup>. Furthermore, a study of Philippine Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) found that only 10% had funds earmarked for emergency response<sup>23</sup>. In 2016, it was estimated that L/NNGOs received direct funding of only 0.3% (US\$66 million) of all documented humanitarian funding<sup>24</sup>

<sup>19</sup> See IFRC, World Disasters Report 2015; ICVA & HPG, Localisation in Humanitarian Practice. Briefing Paper 2016; TSC, State of Surge, 2016.  
<sup>20</sup> Average daily costs for one staff: £195 – global deployment; £121 regional deployment; £70 national deployment. The report comments “there is no direct link assumed between the cost and the effectiveness of the individual who responds”. Financial Sustainability of Surge Study, p. 11, 12.  
<sup>21</sup> TSC. Measuring the value for money of increased collaboration between UK International Non-Government Organisations in response to mega-disasters, 2016.  
<sup>22</sup> See for example: Philippines TSCP platform, Building on the Strengths of Philippine Civil Society Organizations in Responding to Emergencies, 2016.  
<sup>23</sup> Philippines TSC platform, Scoping Study on the Surge Capacities of Philippine CSOs, 2015.  
<sup>24</sup> Using data of OCHA’s FTS database, as quoted in Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2017, Development Initiatives, p. 74.

Throughout the project, some progress was seen with the Start Fund allocating its first ever grant directly to a NNGO, Caritas Bangladesh, for US\$ 124,000<sup>25</sup> for the 2016 floods (even though this NNGO is part of a global NGO network)<sup>26</sup>. Further, the alliance of four NGO networks – the Philippine Partnership for Emergency Response and Resilience (PPERR) – is piloting a local humanitarian mobilisation fund as part of the TSC Project (see Chapter 6.5 on sustainability). Another example of contribution to increased localised approaches by five of TSC Project agencies (CAFOD, CARE, Christian Aid, Islamic Relief, Tearfund) can be seen through their signing up to the C4C which committed them to pass at least 20% of their humanitarian funding to southern-based NGOs by May 2018<sup>27</sup>. Many TSC Project agencies also made commitments in relation to the WHS that support locally-led surge<sup>28</sup>, as highlighted by Save the Children in the foreword to this report.

The second challenge, identified at the national and regional levels, was an unsupportive external working environment. Particularly in Pakistan, the space for humanitarian work was limited, especially for INGOs. At the same time, a coping mechanism was to focus more on localised solutions, such as deploying more local staff and creating tripartite collaborations as described above. The challenge of local actors working in conflict zones was also raised, a limitation already identified<sup>29</sup>, even though successful deployments of local actors to respond to the Marawi conflict in August 2017 was reported by the Philippines platform.

The challenge of learning not being fed into decision-making processes was identified at all levels, most notably at the regional level. This was also linked by TSC Project agencies to the low priority given to preparedness for L/NNGOs and consequent learnings gained. The need to build the capacity of L/NNGOs to scale up humanitarian response was a key challenge identified by the Philippines platform<sup>30</sup>. The platform also emphasised the importance of supporting and developing the NGO networks through the PPERR, given their role in facilitating partnerships, capacity building and coordination between NGOs.

A challenge identified by both the Philippines and Pakistan national platforms, a combination of both supervision and monitoring of L/NNGOs as found in the above figure, was the need for sound financial systems of L/NNGOs in order to facilitate their access to funding from the large western donors who demand such standards. For example, this was recognised in a key joint agreement by the four major NGO networks in the Philippines<sup>31</sup>.

Other challenges identified included; the difficulty of NGO development staff “switching” to humanitarian action without proper support or training; the anti-terrorist and corruption measures in place that closely scrutinised financial transactions between international, national and local actors; the varying commitment to localisation of leadership and management of organisations, their branches and networks; the fear of INGOs that localisation will lead to their relevance being put into question; the potential bias of LNGOs in the selection of groups to assist in crises (due to local pressures and existing alliances); and the approach of other actors, such as UN agencies, whose surge systems and mechanisms were largely closed or difficult to access for local actors.

**“The local, collaborative roster developed by the project is going to allow people to contribute their talents and skills to a response in their own country. It’s going to give them a channel to be able to make sure that they are known to those organisations that need to hire people quickly.”**

### **External Stakeholder – the Philippines**

<sup>25</sup> This was in line with the Start Network’s commitments in relation the World Humanitarian Summit

<sup>26</sup> TSC, Bangladesh Floods Review of surge practices, April 2017

<sup>27</sup> <https://charter4change.org/>

<sup>28</sup> For a summary of CHS commitments see: <https://www.icvanetwork.org/key-ngo-whs-commitments-and-calls>

<sup>29</sup> See: ICVA, HPG (2016) Op. Cit.; Schenkenberg, Ed. The challenges of localised humanitarian aid in armed conflicts. MSF, Emergency Gap Series 03. November 2016.

<sup>30</sup> Philippines TSC platform, National NGO Networks Meeting, Coordinating Mechanism, 30-31 August 2016.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

## Recommendations for local surge

### Humanitarian actors:

- Build the capacity of L/NNGOs to lead in surge responses through funding and supporting preparedness activities, shared services such as joint rosters and national/local coordination mechanisms for crises.
- Consider how global and regional surge policies and resources can be reoriented to support further locally-led surge such as through providing technical and sectorial expertise to L/NNGOs (e.g. resource mobilisation, women-led surge, monitoring and evaluation, reporting).
- Invest further in national staff and their capacity to be mobilised for surge response in-country, and in neighbouring countries.
- Donors should provide access to direct funding to L/NNGOs both to build their surge capacity, preparedness activities, shared services and coordination mechanism in crisis-prone countries.
- Ensure that surge funding to INGOs and UN agencies is conditional on collaboration with local responders.
- Support L/NNGOs in their own initiatives for funding mobilisation through exchanges of best practice and other learning possibilities.
- L/NNGOs should build collaboration with other L/NNGOs, INGOs and authorities to coordinate surge response and increase preparedness.
- L/NNGOs should place priority on developing sound financial and accountability systems.

### Surge response to Nock Ten

Typhoon Nock Ten (known locally as Nina) entered the Philippines on 23 December 2016 and made its first landfall in the Catanduanes province on 25 December 2016. Maximum sustained winds of 255 km/h it left a trail of destruction with 2 million people affected.

11 agencies from the project's Philippines platform responded to Nock Ten in different ways ranging from water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) activities, provision of shelter, coordination and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The Start Fund provided a grant of GBP 250,000 to members, a coalition headed by Action Against Hunger and to Catholic Relief Service (CRS).

Local organisations were either partners with INGOs or led certain aspects of the response. For example, a gap identified was the lack of formal coordination mechanism at the local level, amongst provincial and municipal government, NGO and INGOs. As part of the Humanitarian Resource Consortium, one local organisation, the People's Disaster Risk Reduction Network (PDRRN), stepped in to provide de-facto coordination support, initiating coordination meetings, which made collaboration and information sharing with other groups possible. Another local organisation, Simon of Cyrene was instrumental in supporting social mobilisation and identifying vulnerable groups in partnership with Action Against Hunger. In another partnership, CRS worked closely with the local church network to identify and prioritise the distribution of supplies to the most affected households.

All platform members reported that their response was 100% carried out in collaboration with others. The response was led by local staff, with only one global staff member known to have been mobilised. From the project's Philippines roster, On Call, three people were mobilised (one WASH and two M&E specialists) to support the response.

Local organisations felt that their involvement was positive in gaining experience in working in an emergency response and provided them with a "voice" in the response. But, given their lack of access to funding, organisations found that the response still maintained LNGOs largely as "service providers".

**The key learning was:**

- The response was led within the country although it was headed by INGOs.
- The involvement of local organisations supported a more targeted, coordinated and community-led response.
- The TSC Project's On Call Roster increased the capacity of organisations to respond with the deployment of staff.
- Further changes are needed to readdress the imbalance between INGOs and L/NNGOs in funding, decision making and access to staff.

Source: Christian Aid, Start Network Mechanisms in Practice in the Philippines: Assessing and learning from the Typhoon Nock-Ten Alert Activation and Response, 2017.

On Call Roster member assisting community member in the aftermath of the Nock Ten Typhoon in the Philippines



Action Against Hunger

## 6.2 Collaborative surge

### Key learning:

- Collaboration takes time and must be built with a shared commitment and vision from the earliest stages.
- Establishing trust, an open working atmosphere and a willingness of partners to play complementary roles is key to successful collaborative surge.
- Collaboration can lead to greater cost effectiveness and efficiency through the sharing of resources and increased access to a larger pool of surge expertise for agencies.
- Collaboration can support greater learning and knowledge exchange between agencies and increase their influence on surge policies and approaches of the humanitarian sector.
- Different organisational policies and operational approaches do not necessarily prohibit effective collaboration as can be seen through the establishment of shared surge rosters.
- Collaborative surge can lead to more effective humanitarian responses as seen with the response to Nock Ten.

Go Team Asia roster members training in Bangkok




Transforming Surge Capacity Project

Collaboration was a cornerstone of the TSC Project and proved essential to the project's achievements. The design of the project itself was collaborative – a set of platforms bringing together INGOs (and NNGOs in the Philippines) that advanced its objectives through working together with an extended network. Collaboration was seen as a necessity for agencies given limited resources and the challenges faced. Collaboration was seen as being distinct from coordination and consortium arrangements; it was working together to develop and implement joint initiatives based on a shared vision.

TSC Project agencies at all levels of the project collaborated together as seen in Figure 5 below. Aside from participation in the platforms and networks, collaboration was mostly seen in the shared rosters developed by the project and in capacity building initiatives (mainly training as described below). According to the TSC Project agencies, collaboration on surge between the agencies since 2015 has predominantly been due to, or inspired by, participation in the project.

Figure 5: Types of collaboration of TSC Project agencies within the project



As identified in the 2015 TSC Project baseline<sup>32</sup>, collaboration occurs more at the national level than at the global level. However the project did find collaborative areas of work at the global level, such as joint research and advocacy. This also reflected the different roles of the platforms, i.e. the international platform took on more of an advocacy role at the global level, whereas national platforms were closer to operations, and, as such, collaboration focused on rosters and training. The regional platform was strong on building capacity and facilitating the sharing of resources between countries for preparedness and response. The level of collaboration was tracked by the project both at the platform level and in response to selected crises since 2015. As illustrated in the figure below, working in a mainly collaborative way in crises varied between 50%-100%. This indicated that collaboration is a way of working for the majority of agencies. Of note, those crises where the surge response was strongly local (e.g. Bangladesh floods 2016 and Nock Ten 2016), a more collaborative way of working was reported.




Figure 6: Percentage of TSC Project agencies responding "We work mainly in collaboration with others for surge response" - by baseline, selected crises and final learning report survey

### Enablers for successful collaboration

To mitigate the challenges of collaboration, research carried out by the project identified the following enablers for successful collaboration:

- **A shared and transformative vision:** The project was able to develop a vision that was accepted across the project and operationalised through concrete pilots.
- **Governance and ways of working:** The project established a clear approach to collaboration. For example, by assigning agencies to take the lead for a given pilot, reinforced in a "Principles of Collaboration agreement" in addition to a governance structure with clear management lines and responsibilities.
- **Individuals' contribution:** having qualified and committed persons in key roles proved important and building communications between them within and across platforms.

Source: Case study: The nuts and bolts of collaboration in the DEPP TSC Project, 2017

### Benefits and challenges of collaboration

Although collaboration was a key component of the project, it was not without its challenges. A main challenge identified across the project was that collaboration takes time in order to establish ways of working and relationships before activities can start. This was evident within the platforms themselves in the time needed to develop collaboration (at least six months) and the consequent time needed to develop pilots together (some one year from project start). Any collaboration also had to take into account existing power dynamics in a given location, and actively put in place measures to put all partners on an equal footing and resolve conflicts if needed.

<sup>32</sup> [http://www.chsalliance.org/files/files/Resources/Articles-and-Research/Transforming-Surge-Capacity-Project\\_Baseline-Report-2015.pdf](http://www.chsalliance.org/files/files/Resources/Articles-and-Research/Transforming-Surge-Capacity-Project_Baseline-Report-2015.pdf)



A second challenge was the scepticism amongst agencies that collaboration was possible. For example, the difference in human resources policies and hiring conditions was often stated as a reason why joint rosters would not work. However, ultimately these differences were resolved with joint rosters being created at regional and national levels, showing that such obstacles were not insurmountable. TSC Project agencies at all levels were surprised at their own ability to collaborate.

It was also found that a level of competitiveness and consequent duplication in surge practices does continue between agencies hindering collaboration. For example, during Nock Ten in 2016 (the Philippines), there was no common assessment made by INGOs, NNGOs and the authorities with separate and overlapping assessments made. This contributed to possible issues of duplication in the response. By comparison, in the 2016 Bangladesh floods, a joint needs assessment was carried out by I/NNGOs, the UN and local authorities. This then formed the basis for the response. Competition over funding continued although positive examples were seen where agencies collaborated on joint funding requests, such as for the coalition led by Action Against Hunger for the Nock Ten response (see highlight box above).

There was general consensus that collaboration was beneficial to the agencies and that any costs, in terms of staff time and resources, were outweighed by the benefits gained. Key benefits identified were:

- **Greater cost effectiveness and efficiency** through the sharing of resources. For example, agencies saved considerable time by creating shared rosters and training modules collaboratively rather than creating them alone.
- **More reach and influence** in the activities carried out. For example, by producing a joint report on Women and Surge, ActionAid and CARE amplified its message and extended its influence within the sector.
- **Increased access to a larger pool of surge expertise** was seen in the shared rosters created. For example Christian Aid was able to benefit from a staff member being deployed to India from the Go Asia shared roster.
- **Greater learning and knowledge exchange** was a benefit highlighted by agencies. Examples were given where the participation of agencies in the platforms directly influenced their surge policies and practices as described at the beginning of this report.

Inception Workshop of the Transforming Surge Capacity Project, 2015



Allan Vera/Christian Aid

## Recommendations

### Humanitarian actors:

- Give greater priority to collaborative actions in key aspects of surge, for instance coordination mechanisms, joint assessments and shared services and initiatives such as joint rosters, research, training and advocacy.
- Focus collaborative efforts where they are primarily occurring – at the national/local level and shift resources to these levels.
- Donors should support collaboration by considering the funding needs of specific collaborative mechanisms such as coordination mechanisms, shared rosters and other shared services.
- Donors should give priority to collaborative proposals in surge funding over ad-hoc consortiums and alliances.

### Shared rosters

The regional and national platforms have all established shared rosters as key components of the project:

**Go Team Asia** has been established by the regional platform and has some 50 members from seven organisations and nine countries. The roster was preceded by a mapping of the competencies lacking in the region (initially logistics and supply chain, cash and voucher programming, and gender, inclusion, and protection). Roster members have been trained and a roster simulation carried out. The roster has deployed four times: one member to India, a second to Nigeria and two members for the Rohingya refugee response.

**On Call Surge Philippines** with membership of 30 organisations (13 INGOs, 13 NNGOs, 2 professional associations and 2 private consulting firms focused on WASH and shelter). Altogether the 30 organisations have contributed 450 individual humanitarian responders to a joint roster. On Call Surge Philippines is aided by a web-based platform that allows HR and emergency managers to access roster members for deployment when activated during emergencies. The roster has deployed three staff as part of the Nock Ten response and several staff for the conflict in Marawi.

**Pakistan shared roster** has some 120 members, some one third from INGO staff and the remaining from local actors. The National Humanitarian Network has agreed to maintain the roster database which will support its sustainability. Currently a competency analysis is underway to assess the capacities and skills of the roster members. The roster is yet to be used for deployments.

Key learning from the shared roster development was:

- The rosters are able to expand the pool of available surge staff for its agencies.
- Constant communication is needed so agencies know of the availability of roster members.
- Working together on a practical tool allowed agencies to overcome their differences and concretely see the benefits of a collaborative approach.
- A solid technological solution is needed to minimize the administrative burden for the host agency and facilitates the members' interface.
- Maintaining a gender balance of roster members requires particular attention.
- Sustainability of the rosters remains an issue - funding for deployments, running costs and ownership beyond the TSC Project.

### 6.3 Engagement with the wider sector

#### Key learning:

- Engagement with the wider sector increases the reach and breadth of emergency response.
- Engagement takes time and responding in crises is supported by pre-existing relationships with governments, UN agencies, the private sector and academia.
- Engagement often occurs locally and with other humanitarian actors rather than globally and with the private sector or academia.

Student volunteer academic pilot, University of Sindh, Pakistan



Fast Rural Development Program/Pakistan

Today, humanitarian crises and disasters are responded to by an increasing range of actors. It has been found that coordination and collaboration amongst these actors during emergencies is often limited, which contributes to duplicated efforts and gaps in aid coverage<sup>33</sup>. At the same time, as crises have increasingly become protracted, collaboration has been found to be essential for both resource mobilisation and response implementation<sup>34</sup>. Collaboration was a foundation of the TSC Project and it has carried out its activities collaboratively through a consortium approach both with agencies involved in the project as well as with an enlarged network of the wider sector. These non-consortium external actors include UN agencies, academia, governments and I/N/L NGOs and their networks. Engagement with the wider sector was seen as key for the project in increasing the reach and breadth of surge responses.

Since 2015, TSC Project agencies reported that engagement with external stakeholders mostly increased or remained unchanged, as seen in the graph below. However, some TSC Project agencies reported notable decreases in external engagement, including with INGOs and UN agencies in Asia and INGOs, governments and UN agencies in Pakistan. These decreases were thought to be due to collaboration coming to an end (e.g. between two INGOs), illustrating the temporary nature of most engagements, but not necessarily due to the TSC Project itself. Some marked increases, such as that of engagement with private sector bodies in the Asia region, were partially due to the involvement of agencies in the TSC Project private sector pilot (see highlight box below). It was highlighted that most of the engagement initiated through the project was temporary, such as one-off training or co-hosting events with external stakeholders, with only some examples of more long-term collaboration, such as the Pakistan 1122 project (see highlight box below).

<sup>33</sup> ALNAP: "Working in the field for effective humanitarian response: Background Paper," 2015.

<sup>34</sup> TSC: "Slow onset crises: review of surge practices", March 2017.

Figure 7: Percentage of TSC Project agencies collaborating with select stakeholders for surge response – 2015 & 2017



Engagement with the wider sector during the course of the project emphasised two main trends:

- It focused on I/N/LNGOs within the sector; and
- It was mainly carried out at the national level, followed by regional and global.

	Challenges	Opportunities	Examples
<b>Government</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Availability of government services.</li> <li>● Time required to establish collaboration.</li> <li>● Reputation risk for humanitarian actors if too close to authorities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Extends response at the local level.</li> <li>● Contributes to more efficient assessment and coordination as it involves government services.</li> <li>● Complements existing skills/ services of government agencies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Pakistan: Local surge response project with Rescue 1122 (see highlight box).</li> <li>● Pakistan and Philippines: engagement with National Disaster Management Authorities – national and local.</li> </ul>
<b>UN</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Many UN surge and capacity building mechanisms closed to local civil society.</li> <li>● Engagement requires long-term commitment.</li> <li>● Risk of diverting resources to UN-led response and neglecting local / NGO led responses.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Enables a more balanced response (UN and NGO; national and local).</li> <li>● Brings NGO perspective into UN</li> <li>● Maintains and builds skills of NGO surge staff in surge response.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● TSC Project research on UN/ INGO collaboration.</li> <li>● Global, Asia, Pakistan and Philippines: engagement with OCHA, notably shared rosters.</li> </ul>
<b>Academia</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Education on surge not necessarily a priority for universities.</li> <li>● Time required to establish collaboration.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Extends education on surge to new groups (students/ academics).</li> <li>● Increases potential for research on surge and related activities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Asia and Philippines: engagement with universities for hosting mindfulness training modules.</li> <li>● Pakistan: pilot project engaging with three universities on course development.</li> </ul>
<b>Private sector</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Private sector more engaged during a crisis more so than before or after (as public and staff interest is high then).</li> <li>● Requires commitment of companies – often through their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) goals.</li> <li>● Private sector not accountable to same standards, e.g. CHS.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Extends response in crises – both reach and breadth (services offered).</li> <li>● Educates and advocates on local and collaborative surge to private sector.</li> <li>● Private sector support can go beyond financial, e.g. technical/ staff skills.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Asia: regional private sector project (see highlight box below).</li> <li>● Philippines: two private sector groups part of On Call roster.</li> <li>● Philippines: IBM linked with Mindfulness &amp; Wellbeing Component, to explore CSR links with TSC Project and is piloting the project's "Introduction to Mindfulness" training sessions for its own staff as well as requesting direct training on mindfulness.</li> </ul>
<b>Partner organisations - INGOs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● INGOs focused on engaging with own network and partner.</li> <li>● Time required to maintain relationships.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Advocates on local and collaborative surge to INGOs.</li> <li>● Promotes common approaches to surge amongst INGOs e.g. in training and HR practices.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Global, Asia, Pakistan and Philippines: engagement with INGOs and through other DEPP projects.</li> <li>● Surge Online HR platform has over 170 members from the sector (many INGOs).</li> <li>● Development of surge training modules in collaboration with Humanitarian Leadership Academy and networks/INGOs.</li> </ul>
<b>Partner organisations- L/NNGOs)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Support needed is considerable amongst L/NNGOs.</li> <li>● Sustainability of partner organisations as surge responders – due to lack of funding and other priorities.</li> <li>● Pre-existing relations with L/ NNGOs key but difficult to maintain due to their other priorities/capacity.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Extends response at the local level</li> <li>● Increases capacity of L/NNGOs and their networks.</li> <li>● Facilitates access to region and global levels for L/NNGOs and their networks.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Asia, Pakistan and Philippines: engagement with L/NNGOs and their networks.</li> </ul>

Table 3: Challenges and opportunities for engagement

### Challenges and opportunities for agency engagement with the wider sector

The table above provides examples of TSC Project engagement with external stakeholders highlighting challenges and opportunities seen.

### NGO and UN collaboration

Collaboration between the UN and INGOs is occurring in many aspects of surge. These range from deployment of INGO staff within UN agencies, supporting the cluster-system with seconded staff and expertise, and working as partners of UN's main response mechanism, the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC). Some of the key findings of the TSC Project study on UN and INGO collaboration were:

- Collaboration is generally one way, with INGOs providing UN agencies with surge capacity and not vice-versa.
- Working collaboratively with the UN is time and resource intensive and therefore has to be worth the outcome.
- Engagement with the UN can bring the NGO perspective within the UN and also build the expertise of NGO staff although risks of staff poaching exist.
- Opportunities exist for INGOs in further integration with UNDAC and their response set-up.
- The role of I/L/NNGOs in the UN-led Humanitarian Country Team could be reviewed and updated to represent the current environment.
- I/L/NNGOs could take a more active role in participating and possibly seconding staff to sub-national clusters, i.e. those present at the field level.

Source: TSC Project - UN/INGO Collaboration research report.

### Humanitarian actors:

- At the country level, fostering strong and lasting relationships with wider stakeholders (such as government, UN, private sector and academia) outside of crises is recommended to facilitate surge response.
- At the global level, recognise that most collaboration will occur at the national/local level and re-orientate support and resources accordingly.
- Donors should prioritise and support engagement both within the humanitarian sector and with other stakeholders such as the private sector and academia.

The following approaches to increasing engagement between INGOs and key stakeholders were also identified by the TSC Project:

- UN agencies: Advocate for UN surge mechanisms to be more open to L/NNGOs for example at the sub-national cluster level. Proactively position and facilitate L/NNGOs as the link between UN-led responses and the community level; advocate for a review of the role of I/L/NNGOs in the UN-led Humanitarian Country Teams.
- Governments: Explore what complementary role I/NNGOs can play in government-led response such as support for local/national coordination mechanisms, joint assessments and responses.
- Academia: Engage with academia on teaching, policy and practice research, both to increase awareness amongst students and academics and to develop further research in the field.
- Private sector: Secure the support of private sector for DRR and resilience building through a dialogue outside crisis situations. Advocate with private sector organisations to collaborate using their technical expertise and staff skills rather than just funding; encourage private sector to link their surge responses to their CSR goals respecting the CHS.

### **Pakistan: Working with government emergency services on localised surge**

Under the auspices of the TSC Project Pakistan platform, Plan International led a pilot project on community led response in collaboration with the Punjab province government emergency service, Rescue 1122. The project involved setting up CERTs in 15 most vulnerable flood prone villages in the South Punjab Layyah district. Rescue 1122 brought their specific skill-set to the project in assisting in registering volunteers (over 450), establishing the CERTs and carrying out training on surge and life-saving skills. In May 2017, a simulation exercise was held to test the response of the CERTs and a central emergency response centre established in the Rescue 1122 HQ. With a focus on women-led responses, it was the first time that Rescue 1122 directly trained women in emergency response.

Key learning was:

- The involvement of a government service led to increased advocacy by government staff for locally-led response.
- The combination of the skill-set of the rescue service and the INGOs increased the reach and range of preparedness activities for the surge response.
- The project was an opportunity to emphasise the role of women-led surge with government.
- Concrete projects with government services were a viable alternative given the restrictions of INGOs to operate as humanitarian actors.

### **Regional Private Sector pilot project: Learnings from the corporate partnerships (Chennai floods) and community contingency plans for disaster preparedness (Ganjam, Odisha) in India**

Managed by the TSC Project Asia platform and led by ActionAid India, this project aimed to identify areas where the private sector could collaborate on community contingency plans (CCPs) in the cyclone prone belt of the Bay of Bengal. This involved both revitalising pre-existing CCPs in 12 villages of the Bay (Ganjam, Odisha) and collecting five case studies of private sector collaboration with ActionAid in the Chennai floods of 2015.

In revitalising the CCPs, an inclusive approach was adopted working with the participation of women leaders, vulnerable groups such as Dalits and persons with disabilities and grass roots organisations. Private companies of the local area were briefed about revisiting the CCPs and although they agreed to collaborate in implementation some activities in crises, they were not available to participate in the planning process (due to lack of time or their perception of its relevance for them).

The five case studies examined the collaboration between five companies (Siemens, MasterCard, CIPLA, TATA and INFOSYS) and ActionAid in responding to the Chennai floods. The collaboration ranged from supplying relief goods (such as solar lights) to company staff volunteers working in emergency distributions. The feedback from communities indicated that the companies' support enabled ActionAid and its partners to reach vulnerable groups and extend the reach of its response.

**Key learning was:**

- Corporate partnerships work best if they are involved from the beginning of the response at the needs assessment stage.
- Engagement of private sector staff at the local level during the response ensures an emotional connection with the community and a better collaboration.
- Women leaders and grassroots groups lack information and know-how to contact and engage with private sector companies.
- Some companies will engage based on their corporate social responsibility goals whereas others will hesitate if they cannot see a commercial opportunity.
- The private sector is mainly intervening during the response and more awareness is needed on the value of intervening for DRR and resilience building.
- The role of the private sector in surge should go beyond funding and towards human resource and technical support.
- The role of local partners is crucial in building relationships with private businesses in the area.

Source: Regional private sector pilot: Corporate and community engagement learnings, 2017

Local partners receiving Community Emergency Response Team training lead by Rescue 1122



Youth Education Foundation [YEF]



## 6.4 Capacity building for surge

### Key learning:

- Those on surge rosters will always need specific technical as well as behavioural skills to ensure they can function in high-pressure environments.
- Appropriate behaviour is essential for surge staff; training on these skills as well as on stress management is critical.
- Sustainability of training efforts in surge remains a key gap to be met with possible solutions including: online learning, mentoring, app technology, and shadowing.
- Capacity building in the form of training, simulation exercises, one-to-one-coaching and training of trainers can be a strategy to build collaboration and improve the ability of individuals and organisations to work together.
- There remain capacity building gaps in terms of supporting localisation, including key issues such as inclusion of localised elements into needs assessment training.
- Collaboration between agencies on surge training led to rich content and the uptake of materials within agencies own training programmes.
- Having mixed groups of trainees ensures a higher impact across sectors and across organisations.

Go Team Asia roster training, Bangkok



Transforming Surge Capacity Project

Within the project timeframe a variety of surge training materials have been developed and a number of training courses held. The key activity was the development by CAFOD (with the support of the project agencies through the project's Training Working Group) of surge-specific capacity training modules. These modules were piloted and then used in other training undertaken during the project, such as the roster training and roster simulation training. The training courses undertaken are as follows:

Figure 8: Training carried out by the TSC Project

<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2017</b>
<b>AUGUST - SEPTEMBER</b> 4 MBSR trainings, Philippines	<b>MARCH 2016</b> Surge capacity pilot training, Philippines	<b>JANUARY 2017</b> Asia regional roster training	<b>MAY 2017</b> Philippines roster training
	<b>MAY 2016</b> Surge capacity pilot training, Thailand	<b>JANUARY 2017</b> MBSR training, Philippines	<b>MAY 2017</b> 3 Mindfulness trainings, InterHealth, London
	<b>JULY 2016</b> Mindfulness training, Oxfam, Thailand	<b>MARCH 2017</b> Asia regional roster simulation	<b>JUNE - JULY 2017</b> 3 MBSR trainings, Philippines
	<b>AUGUST 2016</b> Regional roster training	<b>MARCH 2017</b> Philippines roster training	<b>JULY 2017</b> 2-Day Mindfulness training, Cebu Philippines
	<b>SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 2016</b> Roster ToT, Philippines and Pakistan	<b>MARCH 2017</b> Mindfulness training, IMC, London	<b>SHADO ONLINE TRAINING</b>
	<b>SEPTEMBER 2016</b> Pakistan roster training	<b>MARCH - MAY 2017</b> 4 MBSR trainings, London	<b>SEPTEMBER 2017</b> CHS Training for roster member organisations
	<b>NOVEMBER 2016</b> Philippines roster training	<b>APRIL 2017</b> Pakistan roster training	<b>OCTOBER 2017</b> 3-day Mindfulness training, IBM, Philippines
	<b>DECEMBER 2016</b> Pakistan roster training	<b>MAY 2017</b> Philippines roster simulation	

Figure 8: Training carried out by the TSC Project

Capacity building for surge is a central element of the project with its stated outcome of **“increased capacity of skilled surge personnel for civil society at international, national and regional levels”**. There are many factors which have made this an ambitious element of the project including individual agency agendas and approaches to surge; funding competitiveness; and caution in relation to partnership working.

### Surge capacity training

The project designed and piloted a specific surge capacity training programme in order to help achieve the project’s outcome. Led by CAFOD, an online survey for surge staff and a detailed mapping of existing training and training providers informed the training curriculum. The training takes place over five days and covers eight modules. The programme was designed to work in conjunction with other DEPP projects. The project also benefitted from outside engagement with the HLA.

The training curriculum covers the following topics:

Humanitarian sector	Culture and diversity
Women’s rights	Accountability and participation
People management	Stress and wellbeing
Working with others	Introduction to mindfulness

The training modules developed have been used by project agencies for their own agency non-project training, with some organisations adapting them as necessary and selecting those modules which are most pertinent for them. For example, in November 2016 Islamic Relief used the training modules for its Asia team emergency response training. They utilised the modules on stress management, working with others, wellbeing and cultural diversity. The Introduction to Mindfulness sessions have been adopted and adapted via various collaborative relationships with the HLA and the Wellbeing and Resilience Advisory Group, and Save the Children’s Mid-Level Manager’s Programme, and will be hosted on the DisasterReady.org portal. Several agencies have already used them independently (e.g. IMC, Action Aid and Action Against Hunger). In the private sector, IBM Philippines has also piloted the use of the audio-visual sessions as webinars for its staff.

Following the pilot training courses each platform used the curriculum to hold a five-day roster training, providing feedback to the training working group to adapt the modules for future use. The Pakistan platform undertook training in collaboration with National Humanitarian Network (NHN) and helped to identify trainers and specialists to deliver the training. Training was provided through webinars to roster members on specific topics, such as HR in emergencies. Using this approach has facilitated a regular interaction with roster members. Collaborative approaches were also adopted in the Philippines whereby the Humanitarian Leadership Academy (HLA) – Philippines Academy Centre – supported one of the On Call trainings in an effort to support localised surge. The HLA facilitated the online learning session that was part of the course.

In order to assess the effectiveness of the surge training, pre-and post-training surveys were carried out with participants. By December 2016 200 individuals were trained in surge best practice. Responses to the pre-and post-training surveys noted an overall improvement in knowledge with the number of trainees who felt “ready for deployment” increasing from 25% to 61% post training.

These training activities for roster members and the simulation exercises that took place at all platforms were key capacity building activities undertaken through the project. The March 2017 regional simulation exercise was set up for the Go Team Asia regional roster personnel. Some of the key learning from the exercise included:


- Deployees who were trained in the surge modules and participated in the simulation showed a high level of readiness to deploy, and to work in a collaborative manner during their deployment.
- The simulation uncovered that apart from individual-level capacity, organisational capacity also needs to be taken into account during preparedness for surge. This is due to the fact that the systems and procedures of some roster members’ organisations at country/regional level were not adapted to react quickly and in a timely way to the demands of the deployments.
- Having a proactive, solution-focused, professional Roster Coordinator with existing knowledge of roster systems was crucial for the success of the exercise.

As part of the project, two Training of Trainers (ToT) of shared roster members were undertaken in 2016. The ToT was designed to equip a pool of trained individuals in order to roll out the TSC roster training at local level. The Go Team Asia roster found that by pooling agency capacities and getting each to deliver modules which were relevant to their own focus, ensured that organisations were able to bring their strengths together in a positive collaborative manner.

### Capacity building gaps

The 2015 State of Surge report highlighted a lack of training at the regional level combined with the practice of deploying experienced international staff who were considered to be more reliable and effective. The project has to an extent tried to address this through its surge training and roster training courses and its focus on localisation. By the end of the project there remained some gaps in organisational surge training, with the most acute gap being the follow-up or sustainability of training as highlighted in Figure 9 below. The inclusion of local context in training material was the second largest gap identified, followed by the subject material of behavioural skills. On this last point, the training material developed by the project had started to respond to this gap, according to the TSC Project agencies.

Figure 9: Current gaps in organisational surge training as identified by TSC Project agencies



**“The best part of the roster training is on behavioural skills. It actually emphasises the basis of humanitarian behavior and principles, and not just content expertise.”**

### Roster training attendee

In addition, feedback from trainees highlighted that gaps in relation to knowledge of local context could be addressed by strengthening pre-deployment briefing processes. Another gap noted from the Philippines is capacity building for localised needs assessments, an area highlighted in chapter 6.2 where collaboration was sometimes lacking.

Joint capacity building initiatives, such as the Go Team Asia roster training, were found to strengthen the collaborative mind-set needed by humanitarian rosters and allow agencies to jointly prepare for disasters.

### SHADO training

The Asia Regional Platform supported CARE and Plan International's START Humanitarian Action Deployment Opportunities for Gender in Emergencies (SHADO for GiE) pilot project in 2017. The pilot consisted of an online training on gender rolled-out to 20 selected participants based in the Asia region, and shadow deployments for selected trainees to emergency responses. Plan and CARE collaborated to identify gaps in GiE expertise among humanitarian responders in Asia and SHADO was created to address the gaps. The online training simulated real deployment conditions through email assignments that participants had to complete to tight deadlines as well as softer components such as communication and prioritisation skills. Two shadow deployments took place in Ethiopia and East Timor.

Key learnings were:

- Deployments which focus not only on the deployment of women but equally focus on men, will be beneficial to mainstream GiE across the sector, as it is a crucial asset regardless of gender.
- Investment in on-the-job training goes a long way to filling a key gap by building expertise, effectiveness, commitment and capacity for future humanitarian work. This eventually leads to an enhanced quality of emergency response.

### Recommendations

#### Humanitarian actors:

- As well as technical training, agencies should ensure that adequate behavioural skills training is provided to surge staff, such as the surge training modules developed by this project.
- Humanitarian organisations should explore more options to pool their efforts and resources to collaborate on training materials and courses which should prove to be cost-effective and facilitate relationship-building between surge professionals, while also focusing on organisations and not only individuals.
- Mentoring and buddy systems at different stages of capacity building should be put in place for those involved in surge responses.
- A more holistic approach to training should be pursued, moving away from classroom settings.
- Sustainability and follow-up of training needs to be a focus to ensure its continuing benefits.
- There is the need for the development of a training curriculum on women's leadership including gender based violence/protection from sexual exploitation and abuse, confidence building and skills development.

## 6.5 Sustainability

### Key learning

- Considerable progress has been made towards the sustainability of surge at the HQ level although it requires more funding for preparedness at the local level.
- Sustainability of surge at the national and local level implies involving partners, networks and authorities to support activities and finding alternative financial mechanisms.
- Establishing local funding and coordination mechanisms are possible solutions to sustainability of local surge and help to reduce individual agency costs through collaborative cost-sharing approaches.
- Some roles, such as fundraising and proposal writing positions, can support sustainable localised surge from the global and regional levels given their access to networks and donors.

The 2015 TSC Project baseline found that considerable progress had been made towards the sustainability of surge activities, notably through the setting up of HQ surge management teams and contingency funds available rapidly for crises. This was complemented by capacity building activities, such as training that was reinforced through the TSC Project (see Chapter 6.4).


In 2017, the focus has largely moved towards ensuring that regional and national surge is sustainable. TSC Project agencies reported that they had taken action to ensure that surge is financially sustainable as seen in Figure 10 below. The most common approach across platforms was training regional and national staff in fundraising and/or proposal writing. There were considerable differences between agencies at the global, regional and national level. At the global level, one sustainability measure mentioned (under “Other”) was recovery of surge funding through emergency appeals. Regional agencies were also focusing on supporting staff in fundraising and/or proposal writing. This support role of the region was also seen in the crises tracked during the project, such as during the Bangladesh floods (2016) and Hurricane Matthew (Haiti) in 2016 where regional offices (and some head offices) provided fundraising support, both in putting together proposals and identifying donors.

Launch of the On Call Roster, Philippines



Christian Aid

Figure 10: Actions taken by TSC Project agencies to ensure that surge is financially sustainable



The TSC Project considered what approaches are more cost-effective and therefore more supportive of sustainability. In the financial sustainability research carried out by the project<sup>35</sup>, sustainability of key elements of the project were highlighted as follows:

**Localisation:** the study found that localised deployment has both benefits for speed and costs as described in the localisation chapter above (Chapter 6.1). Although the study is not able to compare the quality of local to global staff, it does indicate other potential benefits of locally-led surge, such as increasing participation rates of local communities in recovery efforts.

<sup>35</sup> Financial Sustainability of Surge Study, MZN International, 2017

**Collaboration:** collaborating in certain areas achieves a more cost-effective surge which was both logical and necessary, such as for shared rosters. This was seen as necessary due to the growing number of communities affected by disasters and limited availability of funds.

**Preparedness:** the study identified a need for an investment of unrestricted funding in preparedness. Agencies reported an overall lack of funding from donors for preparedness and less publicised emergencies. Funding for agencies at the regional and national levels for surge response was also limited. One result according to the study was that rosters are maintained at a global level while regional and national rosters are underfunded.

### Sustainability of TSC Project initiatives

To demonstrate the sustainability of surge, TSC Project agencies and platforms put in place initiatives to support the sustainability of the main pilots and activities of the project once the project is over. These initiatives have included:

- **Having another humanitarian actor host the initiative:** For example, the Pakistan platform is organising for the National Humanitarian Network to take over responsibility for the shared roster.
- **More involvement of national authorities:** There is the potential for certain aspects of the project to be sustained due to further involvement from local authorities. For example, the joint project with Rescue 1122 in Pakistan.
- **Fee-sharing:** For example, an option being considered for the Go Team Asia roster is that each participating organisation would contribute some funding to cover the costs of a central coordinator.
- **Membership/user fees:** For example, an option being considered for the On Call Surge Philippines roster would be to collect membership and user fees. This is also being developed for the planned wellbeing clusters at the country-level.
- **Local fundraising:** The four NGO network members of the Philippines platform have set up a Local Humanitarian Fund to mobilise funds as a possible revenue source (see below).

The lack of funding directly available to L/NNGOs for surge activities was discussed in Chapter 6.1. The TSC Project has supported initiatives to find alternative solutions to the reliance on international funding. For example, the Philippines platform has supported a localisation initiative called PONDO (Filipino for 'fund'), which aims to:

- Establish a quick emergency response funding mechanism, which can be mobilised within days after a disaster.
- Develop a public appeals mechanism, into which the Filipino general public in the country and abroad can donate funds for specific emergencies.
- Create an augmentation fund that adds on to existing funds of members or qualified partners/beneficiaries so that they can quickly respond to immediate needs of affected communities.
- Establish an accountable funding mechanism that ensures that the donating public can track how their contributions have been spent, where it was spent, and what communities think of the assistance they received.
- Set up a joint funding mechanism managed by Philippine NGOs.

### Recommendations

#### Humanitarian actors:

- Further support should be provided to regional and national INGO offices and L/NNGOs to develop their surge capacities in resource mobilisation.
  - Funding should be reoriented to provide increased support to regional and national surge mechanisms, such as maintaining rosters and capacity building for national staff.
  - The support of localised and collaborative surge to sustainability should be further recognised and resources reallocated accordingly.
  - Donors should orientate financial support to sustainability of surge activities, and particularly at the regional, local and national levels.
-





Prashanth Vishwanathan/ActionAid

## 6.6 The role of women in surge

### Key learning

- Involving women in an active role in emergency response is crucial to ensure that the communities' needs are addressed.
- Building the capacity of local female surge responders helps to improve disaster preparedness for future emergencies.
- Building on existing good practices can encourage more women to take up surge roles and ensure gender equality in international surge.
- Exchanging good practice and harnessing peer support in gender-sensitive surge policies and practices can ensure gender-responsive deployments in which both women and men can be deployed. This is beneficial to ensure that gender in emergencies (GiE) is mainstreamed across the sector.
- Although all major humanitarian organisations have gender policies in place, few have specific surge gender policies.
- Women's networks and other peer support mechanisms can be a cost-effective and pragmatic way to support female staff in humanitarian organisations.

### The current role of women in surge

As identified in the project's 2015 State of Surge report, women play a crucial role in surge response, particularly in reaching the most vulnerable populations and providing support to crisis-affected women and their families. The report noted that although all major humanitarian organisations have gender policies in place, few have specific surge gender policies. Within the project, some agencies (Action Against Hunger in the Philippines for example) practice positive discrimination to ensure the inclusion of women in their approaches to surge.

Two key areas of the project that focused on gender in surge were:

The SHADO pilot project: CARE's "Strengthening Gender Surge Capacity"<sup>36</sup> pilot project which aimed to ensure that personnel with gender expertise were trained through virtual simulation in key principles of gender in emergencies and then given the opportunity to deploy to emergency responses for on the job training. The pilot enabled shadowing deployments for staff with technical skills but with a lack of emergency expertise. The aim was to provide a larger pool for interagency gender deployments in the future, as well as deepening and extending analysis and programmatic recommendations during the deployments.

<sup>36</sup> Financial Sustainability of Surge Study, MZN International, 2017

**Gender-specific research:** Joint research undertaken by ActionAid and CARE<sup>37</sup> highlighted that women and girls affected by humanitarian crises often face specific and complex rights violations. In addition, the critical and urgent needs of women are frequently overlooked in relief efforts, thereby aggravating existing vulnerabilities. The report, which was accompanied by a learning event, finds that the tendency to overlook the needs of women and girls can happen where humanitarian response teams are made up predominantly of men who speak primarily to male leaders. The report also finds that the inclusion of women in surge response teams could potentially increase the recognition of the needs of women and girls in humanitarian responses. This learning was echoed in the findings of the surge response to Hurricane Matthew which identified that active involvement of women in the response helped to ensure that the communities' needs were addressed. The joint research also identified several barriers to the inclusion of women in surge response:

Barrier	Overview
Personal safety and security	Female surge staff feel at greater risk of violence than male counterparts with some having experienced assault or provision of insecure accommodation.
Confidence and skills	Female surge staff feel they need to prove their confidence in order to be taken seriously. Some self-select not to be deployed, particularly at leadership level.
	Multiple deployments increase self-confidence and this is helped by being deployed into teams with a good gender balance.
Personal hygiene	Long field trips can be difficult for women in terms of accessing sufficiently private toilets; and a lack of adequate facilities can be a particular issue during menstruation.
Wellbeing and support	Support in advance of deployment such as defence training; pre-departure packs covering gender issues and discussions on stress are considered important for female deployees.
Accommodation	Female deployees are often put in the same housing with their male colleagues which in some contexts can be awkward for them.

Table 4: Barriers to inclusion of women in surge response teams

For a number of female deployees, ensuring the support of family and friends is essential, particularly for those that are primary care providers for their children and other family members. Since there are often fewer opportunities for women in leadership roles, women may feel the need to prove themselves in a way that their male colleagues do not have to. At the same time, female deployees may have greater access to some communities than men, including increased access to women in the community.

As a result of involvement in the project, some agencies have made changes to their surge gender practice. For example, Muslim Aid has developed a common standard in terms of support packages for deployees which includes a consideration of what protection female deployees might need. Project agencies have reported that they will draw from the ActionAid report in order to improve policies and practice towards female surge personnel. Areas where amendments will be made relate to accommodation, childcare and the need for women in management roles.

<sup>36</sup> START Humanitarian Action Deployment Opportunities for Gender in Emergencies (SHADO for GiE)

<sup>37</sup> Ruparel, S. Bleasdale, C- O'Brien, K. – How can Humanitarian Organisations Encourage More Women in Surge? – ActionAid and Care – April 2017

### Context and gender balance in surge responses

The project has highlighted that whilst some of the issues facing female surge deployees are the same whether the deployments are made from the global, regional or national level, there are some barriers which are specific to context and to country. For example, some countries have rigid gender roles which curtail women's participation in surge. This can be seen in the difference between the project's two national level platforms.

As can be seen from Figure 11 below, ensuring gender balance for deployments at the global level has not been problematic with a current rate of 50/50 in terms of male/female deployments. The same can be said in the Philippines where at the start of the project some 47% of deployees were female, a percentage which remained the same during the response to Typhoon Nock Ten at the end of 2016.<sup>38</sup> Outside the project, and where deployments are international, gender balance is positive. For example, with the project agency response to Hurricane Matthew (Haiti, 2016) some 50% of staff deployed were female, with all eight agencies involved in the response mobilising global level staff.

By comparison, during the course of the project, the TSC agencies in Pakistan have struggled to ensure an equal number of men and women on its roster with a ratio of 75/25. The low participation of women and girls in the Plan International project, which focused on community led response towards disasters in Pakistan, was also observed (see highlight textbox in chapter 6.3). Ensuring female representation in the project's CERTs was extremely challenging. However, through constant mobilisation from project staff, in particular female trainers, the number of women and girls involved in CERTs and trainings increased. Project agencies have made an effort to ensure gender balance and gender sensitivity in their approaches to surge. For example, Muslim Aid in Pakistan provides different residences for men and women which encourages them to participate in surge responses. Other project agencies – IMC, CARE and Save the Children for example – provide both maternity and paternity leave in an effort to ensure gender equality although these strategies have not necessarily come as a result of the project.




Figure 11: Gender balance of surge rosters, teams and deployments of TSC Project agencies

The project has found that whilst some responses are led by men, this does not mean that at the local level the response will also be male-led. For example it was identified that in the project agency response to the 2016 Bangladesh floods, whilst 73% of all surge staff deployed were male, the local level response of some agencies was female-led. Further, this same surge response did see some agencies with high numbers of women in their surge teams, for example, through its "Women-Led Emergency Response" model, ActionAid's surge team was 85% female.

As can be seen from Figure 11 above, there has been little change during the course of the project and whilst some responses have shown a near-equal deployment of men and women, others, such as

<sup>38</sup> TSC, "Typhoon Nock Ten – The Philippines – Review of surge practices", 2017

Bangladesh, have significantly less women involved in surge. This highlights that the ratio of women involved in surge response is context-specific. However, a number of agencies, notably Christian Aid, CARE and ActionAid have proactive women-led response approaches. The project has supported them in advocating this and has also made fellow agencies aware of it.

**“While working with survivors of gender-based violence in disaster-affected communities, I am painfully aware of having left my own daughter at home.”**

### **Women in surge research respondent**

#### **Good practice**

In spite of continued challenges for women in surge, some good practice has been identified in the project’s research. This includes:

- ActionAid has placed women’s leadership at the heart of its humanitarian approaches and within surge, actively encourages women to apply for its surge roster. In 2016 the organisation updated its surge policy to reflect this. The policy now includes: providing those with caregiving responsibilities with an additional 48 hours pre-deployment in order to allow them to make necessary arrangements. In addition, those with caregiving responsibilities are given priority for shorter and non-rapid deployments.
- CARE has a strong programmatic focus on gender equality and women’s empowerment and has a number of gender-related policy guidelines and tools that are used at all levels, including in recruitment.
- Islamic Relief actively encourages women to become involved in surge through encouraging a more flexible internal roster recruitment process. The agency’s HR department operates a “Gender Inclusion” working group which focuses on what measures the organisation can introduce to support female employees achieve their aim of being deployed. In some contexts Islamic Relief maintains separate hostels for female emergency response staff.
- The Philippines platform highlighted that the majority of surge staff are women including senior level managers. This is also highlighted through the project’s Philippine shared roster whose members are predominantly women.


### **Tackling gender imbalance at the regional level**

The Regional Go Team Asia roster identified a relatively low number of women on the roster (approximately 22% of the total). In order to try and balance this, the nomination process for the roster has been adapted to ensure that women are not left out at the recruitment stage and a network of female roster members has been created, providing a space to advocate for gender-related issues in surge and provide peer support. The challenge of ensuring surge gender balance at regional level is also seen in the number of regional deployments by individual agencies with 27% of deployees being female at the start of the project, a number which has slightly reduced (to 21%) in the project’s final year. In Asia, the difficulties in engaging women in surge are linked to the rigidity of gender roles in some countries, a male-dominated working culture in surge, as well as a lack of policies favouring their participation.

#### **Enhancing the role of women in surge**

Through the survey undertaken as part of this learning report, agencies highlighted the following as being ways that the role of women in surge could be strengthened:

Figure 12: How to enhance the role of women in surge – TSC Project agencies



Differences can be seen in the most appropriate changes that respondents felt are required at national (Pakistan), regional and global level. However, all platforms highlighted the need to increase training for women, increase capacity building of female managers, and adopt specific policies and practice for women in surge. The absence of specific policies for women in surge was also highlighted in the project's 2015 State of Surge report.

## Recommendations

### Humanitarian actors:

- For deployments: leadership roles for women in surge need to be promoted; gender balance of deploying teams need to be ensured; where possible, more than one woman from similar cultures/ contexts be deployed.
- For surge briefings/training: include female trainers and more specific reference to gender-related safety and security; gender training needs to be delivered to all surge responders.
- Effort needs to be made to work in partnership with other sectors e.g. engineering to encourage women to join the humanitarian sector.
- Mentoring and secondments should be encouraged, combined with clear HR policies and inclusion of gender-related issues in staff development and learning activities.
- Donors should proactively support women-led surge responses and programming.

## 6.7 Wellbeing and surge

### Key learning

- The mental health of aid workers – affected by stress, anxiety and trauma in the humanitarian sector – is at chronic levels.
- The lack of dedicated wellbeing policies within agencies related to mental wellbeing, combined with a lack of funding, means that the mental wellbeing of aid workers is often inadvertently neglected.
- A shift of emphasis from treatment to prevention could support preparedness to build resilience and mental wellbeing.
- Wellbeing for surge responders requires well defined proactive training and care responses from agencies, pre, post, and during deployment.
- Some agencies conflate duty of care responsibilities (legal duties) with ensuring the wellbeing of surge staff (moral duties).
- Measuring surge staff wellbeing is hindered due to the lack of dedicated monitoring and evaluation systems to gauge this.
- There is often a lack of leadership and prioritisation of wellbeing issues within agencies.

In the last decade, due to increasing evidence and awareness of the chronic levels of stress, anxiety, and trauma prevalent in the sector, ensuring the wellbeing of surge staff has become increasingly important for surge actors<sup>39</sup>. Project agencies have recognised that support for the mental wellbeing of their staff, especially surge personnel, is a critical gap that needs addressing, along with, consequently, the absence of policies and protocols to ensure staff wellbeing.

The wellbeing survey, conducted in late 2016 as part of the project, revealed further critical learning in organisational and staff attitudes to mental health issues, stigma, capacity, and organisational understanding of wellbeing<sup>40</sup>. Some of the key findings of the survey were as follows:

- 48% of staff have experienced a distressing or highly challenging environment or a threat to their life.
- 42% of staff felt organisational support after a critical incident was “bare minimum”.
- 27% of emergency staff consistently received formal debriefings post deployment.
- 60% of staff felt agencies could be doing more in relation to staff welfare.
- Less than 10% of the training budget of 73% of agencies is allocated to staff welfare.
- 63% of agency staff are unaware or have not received training on self-care and stress management.

<sup>39</sup> The Guardian conducted a survey in late 2015, revealing that 79% of humanitarian workers surveyed indicated they had experienced mental health issues, reiterating the widespread ‘internal’ emergency within the humanitarian sector – Young, H. (2015), Guardian research suggests mental health crisis among aid workers: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/nov/23/guardian-research-suggests-mental-health-crisis-among-aid-workers>

<sup>40</sup> Start Network Humanitarian Wellbeing Survey – Key Findings (March 2017); Agency level surveys were completed by 19 organisations and a separate individual staff survey was responded to by 192 individuals from 24 agencies across 36 countries.

These survey findings, in addition to focus group discussions, research, conference engagements, and project interactions, have helped identify the following key learning issues:

- **Defining wellbeing:** Wellbeing is poorly defined and implemented by agencies within the humanitarian sector.
- **Wellbeing versus duty of care:** Wellbeing is very often conflated with duty of care. This blurs the line between responsibility for the legal protection of the organisation, with the humanitarian imperative of ensuring the mental wellbeing of our staff.
- **Locus of responsibility:** This conflation between duty of care and wellbeing has led to several key human resource experts suggesting that wellbeing should be a distinct and separate endeavour within an organisation, and that HR departments are not necessarily best placed to be responsible for it.
- **Resourcing:** The project's wellbeing survey revealed that less than 10% of the allocated training budgets are used for staff wellbeing. On closer scrutiny, the survey revealed that even these resources are often utilised for purposes other than wellbeing.
- **Policies and practice:** The lack of a coherent wellbeing policy within organisations is evident, in that the majority of agencies (87%) indicated that they do not have a specific wellbeing policy in place for emergency and surge staff.
- **Pre, post and during deployment:** The wellbeing survey revealed that this core function within humanitarian agencies is highly inconsistent, and often, poorly planned and implemented.
- **Prevention versus treatment:** The findings also indicate that the emphasis of agencies on dealing with staff wellbeing issues is very much still focussed on treatment, rather than prevention.
- **Leading and prioritising wellbeing:** Focus group discussions, and Wellbeing Consultation Workshops held in the UK and Philippines, as part of the project, revealed that there is often a lack of leadership and prioritisation of wellbeing issues within agencies.

### **Project Approach to Wellbeing**

The wellbeing component of the project, led by Action Against Hunger UK, explored the current state of wellbeing in the sector. It consisted of two main areas of focus in ways to practically support surge staff. The first aspect explored the use of mindfulness meditation training. This was delivered as experiential sessions via an established secular and scientific manner, to ascertain its usefulness in supporting surge personnel in increasing their mental wellbeing and resilience. The second aspect involved exploring wellbeing approaches in the humanitarian sector more generally.

**“The module was considered thought-provoking and helpful to release stress”**

**Roster training participant (Thailand, January 2017)**

Mindfulness session, surge training in Manila



Amy Brathwaite

## Mindfulness

A major focus of the mindfulness and wellbeing component of the project has been to pilot the use of mindfulness-based approaches within the sector in order to support the resilience and mental wellbeing of aid workers.

### Audio-Visual 'Introduction to Mindfulness' Sessions

The initial approach was to develop face-to-face mindfulness training sessions for roster staff across the project platforms, via face-to-face delivery of the established Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) course. With the support of mindfulness teachers and psychotherapists, this eventually was adapted with the development of audio-visual based materials.

These *'Introduction to Mindfulness'* sessions, consist of five 1-hour lessons. They are designed to be self-contained, so that they can be delivered to staff without the need for a trained mindfulness trainer, as well as simultaneously across the three platform countries. These are now part of the project's mindfulness and wellbeing training modules that are components of the global surge training package (see Chapter 6.4).

### Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) Training

Between August 2015 and July 2017, the project delivered 12 MBSR trainings. These were delivered via a traditional 8-week course and a week-long retreat. Approximately 150 people across the Philippines and the UK have been directly trained. The aim of the training was to cultivate self-awareness of thoughts, feelings and bodily sensations. The trainings across the three platform countries cover a number of faiths, ethnicities, traditions and cultures, and yet, despite initial anticipated concerns, the trainings have been positively received.



**“I certainly noticed in the following days a much greater sense of presence. The act of being and staying aware between formal practice and usual life was very useful to me. When I think of the course the feeling of presence comes and the shift in my deepening awareness as the course finished and a few days after was quite awesome’.**

**MBSR training participant (Philippines, July 2017)**

**Enhancing wellbeing in surge responses**


TSC Project agencies have reported that being involved in the project training activities has encouraged better inclusion of important issues such as stress management and wellbeing in their own training programmes for surge staff. Some agencies have placed more emphasis on pre-deployment safety and security briefings since becoming involved in the project and this is also linked to an increased awareness of organisational duty of care. At the regional level, a number of project agencies also indicated a transformation in their approach to wellbeing, both in the creation of policies that incorporate mindfulness and stress management into training, as well as supporting initiatives such as increased deployment compensation. In the Philippines, the project has initiated a large multi-agency group in the creation and piloting of Wellbeing Clusters, or ‘hubs’. These will bring resources, expertise, international and local stakeholders, to establish local centres of excellence and practice that can help agencies in supporting the mental wellbeing and resilience of its workers.

**Recommendations**

**Humanitarian actors:**

- Led by senior management, organisations should develop a dedicated wellbeing policy, focused on mental wellbeing, contextualised for their local situation (similar to security guidelines and protocols) linked to a dedicated monitoring and evaluation framework with set targets.
- A clear distinction and coherence needs to be made between duty of care (i.e. legal requirements and compliance) and wellbeing, so that wellbeing is not mislabelled and lost in organisational priorities.
- Concrete steps need to be put in place for surge staff (pre, post, and during deployment): managers and their staff should receive specific training; dedicated wellbeing staff team or a peer support system should be considered; optional counselling should be provided post-deployment; surge staff should be aware of their entitlements; smaller organisations should consider shared services and support.
- Early indications suggest that mindfulness may provide an effective evidenced-based approach to building the resilience and mental wellbeing of surge staff. It is recommended that the efficacy of mindfulness be further explored and piloted within the sector.
- As self-awareness is an important attribute linked to the Core Humanitarian Competencies Framework (CHCF), mindfulness training can support humanitarian workers to nurture and develop self-awareness to support management and leadership skills, as well as wellbeing.

Surge project meeting in Manila, Philippines



Allan Vera/Christian Aid

## 6.8 HR Good practice

### Key learning

- There remains a need for improved integration of HR teams and programme teams to ensure more effective surge responses.
- If not done ethically, recruiting national staff into INGOs for surge responses risks undermining NNGO capacity and their ability to scale up for humanitarian response.
- Difficulty exists in finding appropriate surge staff for slow-onset crises. Agencies face similar challenges in this area and in other areas related to HR approaches for surge staff.

### Project activities

The HR component of the project has focused on activities to develop and share good practice in HR and people management which will help to transform surge capacity in the platforms and beyond. The activities undertaken were developed on the basis of gaps identified through the project, such as the absence of ethical recruitment policies or guidelines for surge responses and gaps in HR capacity for NNGOs. Key activities undertaken within this component include:

HR Guidelines	<p>Guidelines for Establishing a HR Co-ordination Network during Surge Responses - HR co-ordination can be invaluable during a response to provide support and learning between international and national agencies as well as provide benchmarks that allow employment terms, conditions and practices to be realistic to the specific situation.</p> <p>Ethical Recruitment Guidelines - The document is intended to provide staff involved in recruitment during a surge response with a brief guideline on how to ensure that all recruitment practices are undertaken in the most ethical way possible.</p> <p>Guidelines for the Role of HR in Supporting Staff Care - This guideline uses the 'Essentials of Staff Care' principles on the role of HR in staff care, with input from a wide range of HR professionals in many organisations. Guidelines on Supporting the HR Capacity of NNGOs, Measuring the Impact of HR, and Safer Recruitment guidelines are in the process of being finalised.</p>
HR Platform	Surge Capacity Online HR platform - As part of this project, CHS Alliance has led on the creation of a new online interactive human resources platform, which is intended to help HR and other humanitarian staff share good practices and learn from each other when undertaking surge responses. The platform is open to staff from any organisation involved in humanitarian surge responses in any region.
HR conferences	<p>Two conferences were held to share good HR practice:</p> <p>Regional HR Good Practice Conference, Bangkok, 25-26 January 2016. The purpose of this conference was to share learning from recent surge responses in the region (Nepal and the Philippines) as well as elsewhere (West Africa Ebola virus response). The involvement of the private sector in surge responses and the introduction of new technologies to support HR during times of surge were also central topics.</p> <p>International HR Good Practice Conference, London, 26-26 January 2017. The purpose of this conference was to bring together key HR professionals to make recommendations on gaps that still need to be addressed from an HR perspective.</p>
HR working group	The CHS Alliance hosts a HR working group that includes representatives from Christian Aid, ActionAid, Save the Children, Plan International, CARE, World Vision, Action Against Hunger, IMC, and Tearfund, based in Pakistan, Philippines, Vietnam, India, Singapore, Thailand, Sri Lanka and UK.
HR Research	Research was undertaken looking at ethical recruitment of national staff. <sup>41</sup>

Table 5: Key HR activities of the TSC Project

### Human resources approaches for surge

The HR-focused activities undertaken within the project responded to gaps and challenges identified in the project's initial phases. In the TSC Project 2015 baseline it was noted that humanitarian organisations have reoriented HR to go beyond administrative support for surge and that they were increasingly playing a strategic role. This has included the creation of HR surge posts at headquarters level and with field teams; the development of specific HR policies and procedures; increased involvement of HR personnel in recruiting surge staff; and the centralisation of surge roster management. However, some project agencies have noted that there is a continued need for better integration between HR and programme teams to ensure more effective surge responses.

<sup>41</sup> (2017) Time to Move On: National perspectives on transforming surge capacity.

The 2015 State of Surge report noted that the primary tool for management of surge staff was rosters, combined with an increase in the development of internal standing teams. Through the tracking of various surge responses during the project, it can be seen that different approaches to management of surge staff have been adopted, depending on context and agency set-up. For example, tracking of the response to Hurricane Mathew in 2016 showed that internal rosters and standing teams were the most used surge mechanism, whereas for the Bangladesh floods in 2016, internal rosters and existing staff and partners were mobilised.

The project saw new approaches to developing shared rosters across agencies. These were piloted in Pakistan, the Philippines and at regional level (see highlight box in Chapter 6.2). This has not precluded international surge deployments. During the response to Hurricane Matthew (Haiti 2016) internal international staff from surge rosters and standing emergency teams were relied upon. These international deployments allowed agencies to continue with their regular programming in Haiti as many had a pre-established presence in-country. It also allowed national teams to intervene in the worst-affected region whilst international rapid response teams intervened in different locations and at different times.

In terms of global, national and regional deployments, the project tracking mechanism again shows context specific differences. For example, in response to the Nepal earthquake, 48% of deployees were international; 16% were regionally deployed; and 36% were national staff or from national rosters.<sup>42</sup> By comparison, in response to the 2016 Typhoon Nock Ten in the Philippines, 2% were internationally deployed and 98% were national; in the Bangladesh floods in 2016, 100% were national<sup>43</sup>. This is perhaps a reflection of the strong national surge networks and capacity that is found in these countries but not necessarily reflected in the rest of the region or elsewhere.

Project research considered the difference between surging for sudden onset and slow onset crisis, and the differences seen in HR approaches.<sup>44</sup> In sudden onset situations, a number of agencies use staff that are already on the ground, amending their roles to focus on the emergency. However, it has often been challenging to find appropriate surge staff with the right skills and expertise in slow-onset situations. There is a need to understand transitioning from development to emergency working; experience of undertaking needs assessments; and partner management. It has been difficult for agencies to surge regional staff due to visa barriers and the regional level has been less prepared to surge for slow-onset crises. International support for slow-onset responses has focused more on fundraising as opposed to deploying staff.

## **“Like me, a few of the local staff from my former organisation moved to the UN and INGOs”**

### **Regional INGO officer, Nepal**

#### **HR policies and practice**

As noted in the project baseline, most organisations had some policies in place for surge staff at the beginning of the project. For example, at the global level, 10 of the 11 agencies involved in the project had specific HR surge procedures and policies in place.<sup>45</sup> A more detailed assessment of specific HR surge-related policies and practice (see Figure 13 below) shows encouraging progress in some areas. For example across the platforms performance appraisal systems are in place and the existence of staff welfare policies is high. However, other areas are sorely lacking, for example career planning for surge staff was noticeably low or even absent as were options for coaching/mentoring.


<sup>42</sup> TSCP: Nepal Earthquake 2015 – Review of surge practices – Tracking report, July 2016

<sup>43</sup> TSCP: Typhoon Nock Ten – The Philippines – Review of surge practices – Tracking report, 2017

<sup>44</sup> TSCP: Slow-onset crises – Review of Surge practices – Tracking report – October 2016

<sup>45</sup> TSCP: 2015 Surge Baseline

Figure 13: HR policies and practices for surge of TSC Project agencies



### HR Learning

The development of the interactive HR platform allowed HR and other staff to share and access good practice to support their responses. They were also able to have real time conversations with others on common issues. The absence of such a platform was noted during the initial phase of the project and the project has been able to fill this gap. Whilst members find the site useful to access resources, they have found it more difficult to find the time to use the platform interactively.

A number of project agencies, as well as organisations not participating in the project, came together to share learning at the project's two HR good practices conferences. Some of the learning identified in relation to HR includes:

- Using roster members with whom agencies have established relationships carries less risk than deploying those who are less well known.
- Communicating that agencies are going to be operational beyond the initial surge response stage is important in terms of providing support to local staff. This also facilitates hiring of additional staff on the ground.
- Where possible, humanitarian actors should try to be consistent in terms of using market data benchmarks in order to fix pay scales. In this way they can avoid losing staff to more competitive sectors.
- Investing in local partners is seen as important in terms of building capacity and ensuring sustainability. An example can be seen in Myanmar where IMC has seconded some of its staff to local partners for 12 months. This has supported local partners and fostered increased collaboration and relationship equality.
- There is a need to build the surge capacity of HR in national organisations.

Having recognised that INGOs and UN agencies recruiting national staff for humanitarian response can undermine NNGO capacity, project research looked at the way in which this affects the capacity of LINGOs to respond to crises themselves, and how it impacts their ability to retain high quality staff<sup>46</sup>. Some of the key findings from the research included:

- Whilst the movement of senior staff to INGOs can have benefits, this can present a threat to the organisations that they leave.
- Staff movements have a significant impact on the ability of NNGOs to scale up for humanitarian response.
- High salaries offered by INGOs means that NNGOs are finding it more difficult to recruit new graduate level staff – a traditional labour market for NNGOs.
- Opportunities for career progression and job security influence staff moves from national to INGOs.
- Long hours and difficult working conditions negatively influence NNGO staff retention.

In addition to the learning identified above, one practical tool which was developed by Christian Aid and Tearfund as part of the project, and which can be used by other agencies in the future, was a Terms of Reference for inter-agency deployment.

## **Recommendations**

### **Humanitarian actors:**

- Preparedness actions should include having pre-surge HR capacities and systems in place and time needs to be invested in ensuring this.
- New or unprecedented types or scale of response (as seen during the Ebola crisis) require pre-surge thinking on how to work with non-traditional partners and hiring surge staff with different technical skills. This needs to be factored into organisational surge planning.
- Conditions and support available to local staff should include psychosocial support, acceptable terms and conditions of employment (in line with market scales); and support as contracts come to an end.
- INGOs need to put in place ethical national staff recruitment practices to ensure they don't undermine national surge capacity.
- INGOs and UN agencies should start to shift from investing in their own surge capacity to supporting that of their partners' in advance of crises and linked to other early warning networks.
- Continued use of a shared HR space, such as the project's HR platform, is encouraged, in order to avoid duplication and replicate good practice.

<sup>46</sup> (2017). Time to Move On: National perspectives on transforming surge capacity.

## 7. The future of surge

This study has provided learnings from the TSC Project that provide some indications as to the future of surge response, summarised as follows:

### **Complex and protracted crises will push organisations towards more collaborative surge**

Crises are becoming more frequent, complex and protracted in nature. The increase in number and the complexity of emergency will have an impact on humanitarian organisations as their capacity will be stretched in terms of providing effective surge responses. This will require greater cross-agency working and collaboration both within and outside the sector.

### **Increased government capacity in surge response will prioritise national-led surge**

Asia is transiting into a continent of middle income countries. Governments and their regional associations are increasingly taking ownership for disaster response with a reduced willingness to accept international aid, including humanitarian surge personnel, during emergencies. This is likely to increase opportunities for national-led surge with N/LNGOs in the forefront and INGOs in a supportive role.

### **Increased localised surge will mean readdressing the INGO-L/NNGO power balance**

As localised surge becomes more of a reality given, amongst other issues, its financial savings over other alternatives, L/NNGOs will increasingly demand a more equal role with INGOs in leading surge and securing a greater share of surge funds. Localisation will continue to have limits in highly-charged conflict situations and massive disaster. INGOs will need to adapt their approaches through less surging of global staff in crises but more investment in capacity building for their own local offices and partners, and providing specialised support in crises.

### **Regional and neighbouring collaboration and support will grow**

The crises seen in the Asia region in the past three years shows an increasing reliance of not only local surge staff but those of the region and neighbouring countries. As staff and support systems, such as regional rosters and teams, grow in use, they will increasingly be a key support rather than global headquarters. As agencies pro-actively re-address the gender balance, women will be more active in such deployments.

### **Surge practices will respond better to the needs of affected populations**

As surge practices become more professional and learning is shared within and between agencies, it is anticipated that surge practices will better meet the needs of affected populations. For example, through women-led responses, increased coordination at the field level, more learning and sharing on assessments, and information in general, and more appropriate response tools, e.g. such as cash programming. In addition, a better response will be supported by a more systematic approach to staff wellbeing and HR in general.

Annex 4 provides an update on the “critical enablers” for surge capacity identified in 2007.

## Annex 1: Research methodology

- **Desk research** was carried out to provide background and additional information. This included reviewing learning that had been documented throughout the project starting with the 2015 surge baseline, the State of Surge report, five surge tracking pieces throughout the course of the project and other project-related surge data.<sup>47</sup>
- An **online survey** was created for each of the platforms with the aim of collecting one response per agency working at that given level. The following responses were received: global (10 responses out of 11 agencies), regional (5 responses out of seven agencies), Pakistan (10 responses out of 10 agencies). The Philippines platform did not participate in the survey; instead a feedback workshop was held to collect their input.
- Three consultants at the regional and national platform levels, and the research team at the international level, carried out a series of semi-structured interviews with 66 people from TSC Project agencies, platform members and partners in order to inform the report. The **interviews** provided the opportunity for those involved in the project to highlight key learning points identified over the three-year project timeframe.

A draft of the learning report was shared with the project's ISC and Project Management Unit, prior to finalisation.

Annex 2 contains a list of persons interviewed and annex 3 contains a list of main documents consulted for this research.

<sup>47</sup> All research and tracking reports can be accessed here: <https://disasterpreparedness.ngo/project/transforming-surge-capacity>. See Annex 3 for a list of key documents reviewed.



## Annex 2: Persons interviewed

### Philippines Platform:

Name	Organisation	Position
Juvi Ravanera	Action Against Hunger	HR Manager
Maria Teresa Bayombong	Care International	GAC Project Team Leader
Miraflor Silva	Care International	Human Resource Officer
Lot Felizco	Christian Aid	Country Manager
Allan Vera	Christian Aid	Program Manager
Roselle Rasay	CODE NGO	Deputy Director
Esteban Masagca	HRC	Executive Director
Sumayya Sajjad	Islamic Relief	Head of Mission
Jeanie Curiano	NASSA	Emergency Program Lead/MEAL Coordinator
Sylwyn Sheen Alba	NCCP	Program Assistant for Networking and Advocacy
Daniel Sinnathamby	Oxfam	Country Director
Sholy Malanos	Plan International	HR Specialist
Sanjeev Bhanja	Tearfund	Philippines Response Manager
Ajab R. Macapagat	World Vision	HEA Director
Aivon D. Guanco	World Vision	HEA Manager

### Pakistan Platform:

Name	Organisation	Position
Abdul Khaliq	ActionAid	Head of Programs
Aziz Ahmad	Islamic Relief	Emergency and Preparedness
Aziz Rehman	Care International	Advisor DRR
Ejaz Ahmad	Plan International	School Safety Specialist
Waheed Yousaf	Plan International	Project Coordinator
Bukhtair Ahmad	IMC	DCD/HR Manager
Mujeeb Alam	Save the Children	DRR Specialist
Asim Jaleel	Tearfund	Project Manager
Rizwan Baig	Muslim Aid	Head of Humanitarian
Muhammad Amir	ACF	Agro Coordinator
Majid Awan	Mercy Corp	Preparedness and Response Coordinator
Sana Zulfiqar	NHN	Humanitarian Officer

Name	Organisation	Position
Kashif Hussain	NHN Islamabad	-
Anayt Khan Baloch	Rescue 1122	District Safety Officer
Muhammad Saleem Danish	Youth Development Foundation	Executive Director
Qamar ul Zaman Malik	Aas welfare Society	Executive Director
Khizar Hayat	Sewa Development Organization	CEO
G M Soomro	HWA Foundation	Head of Programs

**Regional Platform:**

Name	Organisation	Position	Location
Amar Nayak	IMC	International Programme Manager - Asia (IHART)	India
Emmanuel Lan Chun Yang	ActionAid	Regional Emergency Coordinator Asia - Pacific	UK
Audrey Fernando	Care International	Global HR Generalist - ARMU & MENA	Sri Lanka
Ram Kishan	Christian Aid	Regional Emergency Manager	India
Vineet Kaushik	Christian Aid	Regional HR Adviser - Asia and Middle East	India
Mudassar Shah	Islamic Relief	Disaster Preparedness & Response Coordinator	Pakistan
Khairul Hafiz	Muslim Aid	Country Director	Penh, Cambodia
Sumant Kumar	Plan International	Regional HR & OD Business Partner	Thailand
Vanda Lengkong	Plan International	Regional DRM Manager	Indonesia
Mim Pornprapunt	Save the Children	Regional HR Manager	Singapore

**Global Platform:**

Name	Organisation	Position	Location
Maria Alexandra "Jing" Pura	TSC Project	Philippines Platform Coordinator	The Philippines
Shahnawaz Khan	TSC Project	Pakistan Platform Coordinator	Pakistan
Sonia Agolli	IMC	Programme Manager	UK
Mohammed Afsar	Islamic Relief Worldwide	Operational Support Manager	UK
Clare Bleasdale	ActionAid	Emergency Systems and Surge Capacity Officer	UK
Chloe Dessemond	Plan International UK	Programme Officer	UK
Maria Eaton	Action Against Hunger UK	Director of HR	UK
Greg Jack	CARE International	Capacity Building Coordinator	UK
Gill Johnson	CAFOD	Head of Humanitarian Operations	UK
Cat Kenyon	TSC Project	International Project Manager	UK
Saba Mahmood	Islamic Relief Worldwide	Humanitarian Officer	UK
Solitaire Morton	CARE International	Humanitarian Programme Coordinator	UK
Alicia Oughton	Plan International	Resourcing Specialist	UK
Laura Purves	CAFOD	Emergency Response officer	UK
Sonya Ruparel	ActionAid	Deputy Humanitarian Director	UK
Hitendra Solanki	TSC Project	Mindfulness and Wellbeing Lead	UK
Justine Tordoff	TSC Project	HR Lead	UK
Niall O'Rourke	Christian Aid	Humanitarian Advisor	Dublin
Ann Start	TSC Project	HR and learning consultant	Belgium
Alex Brans	Save the Children	International Programmes Director	Switzerland
Lisa Joerke	TSC Project	Asia Regional Platform Coordinator	Thailand
Kathleen O'Brien	CARE International	Surge Capacity Coordinator	Canada

## Annex 3: Documents reviewed

- ALNAP. Working in the field for effective humanitarian response: Background Paper, 2015.
- Christian Aid, Start Network Mechanisms in Practice in the Philippines: Assessing and learning from the Typhoon Nock-Ten Alert Activation and Response, 2017.
- Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2017.
- Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme, Learning Report 2016
- ICVA & HPG, Localisation in Humanitarian Practice. Briefing Paper 2016
- IFRC, World Disasters Report 2015
- Patel, S. & Van Brabant, K. The Start Fund, Start Network and Localisation: current situation and future directions, Global Mentoring Initiative, April 2017
- Ruparel.S, Bleasdale.C, O'Brien. K – How can Humanitarian Organisations Encourage More Women in Surge? - ActionAid and Care – April 2017
- Schenkenberg, Ed. The challenges of localised humanitarian aid in armed conflicts. MSF, Emergency Gap Series 03. November 2016
- Solanki.H, Mindfulness and Wellbeing: Mental health and humanitarian aid workers: A shift of emphasis from treatment to prevention – CHS Alliance, 2015
- Solanki.H, Start Network Humanitarian Wellbeing Survey – Key Finding, March 2017
- TSC Project: Asia Regional Platform Final Learning Report, 2017
- TSC Project: Baseline Report 2015
- TSC Project: The state of surge capacity in the humanitarian sector, 2015
- TSC Project: Slow-onset crises – Review of Surge practices, 2016
- TSC Project: Bangladesh Floods – Review of Surge practices, 2017
- TSC Project: Case study: The nuts and bolts of collaboration in the DEPP TSCP, 2017
- TSC Project: Case study: Transforming surge capacity through training, 2017
- TSC Project: Community led response towards disaster – Layyah District, Pakistan – End of project report
- TSC Project: Haiti Hurricane Matthew 2016 – Review of surge practices, 2017
- TSC Project: International Human Resources Good Practice Conference report – London, January 2017
- TSC Project: Financial Sustainability of Surge Study, MZN International, 2017
- TSC Project: Nepal Earthquake 2015 – Review of surge practices, July 2016
- TSC Project: Pakistan Platform Final Learning Report, 2017
- TSC Project: Philippines Platform Final Learning Report, 2017
- TSC Project: Regionalisation of humanitarian action case study, 2017
- TSC Project: Regional Human Resources Good Practice conference Report – Bangkok, January 2016
- TSC Project: Regional private sector pilot: Corporate and community engagement learnings, 2017
- TSC Project: The SHADO pilot project – Learning about Gender in Emergencies through shadow deployments Report, June 2017
- TSC Project: Time to Move On: National perspectives on transforming surge capacity, January 2017
- TSC Project: Training Report – Training of Trainers of shared roster members, Pakistan, October 2016
- TSC Project: Typhoon Nock Ten – The Philippines – Review of surge practices, 2017
- TSC Project: UN/INGO Collaboration research report, 2017

## Annex 4: Update on Critical enablers

A 2007 review of surge capacity and surge capacity mechanisms within INGOs<sup>48</sup> identified ten critical “enablers” for surge. As part of this project, an update on practice was undertaken to gauge the extent to which the project consortium agencies had adapted their surge practices to take on board these “critical enablers”.<sup>49</sup> Two years on, progress has been made in a number of areas, as highlighted in Table 6 below:

Critical enablers – 2007	Update on practice – 2015	Update on practice – 2017
The adoption of a whole organisation approach to surge	Significant steps taken by agencies; internal coordination and capacity issues identified	Agencies continue to build their whole approach to surge with a focus on building capacity internally, with their networks and partners
Matching capacity to mandate and structure	Agencies have in general matched their surge capacity to their mandate and structure	Agencies have continued to match their surge capacity to their mandate and structure.
Pre-positioning of funds	Significant progress seen in pre-positioning; challenges in maintaining national capacity	Pre-positioned funds established; focus on national and local capacity.
Investment in HR as a strategic function and not just administrative	Partial progress made; challenges in a HR national strategic approach	HR increasingly strategic; challenges remain with national HR capacity.
Well-trained and experienced staff, strong and competent leadership	Most agencies have appointed experienced HQ surge management; national staff less so	Experienced HQ surge staff in place; regional staff taking a support role and capacity of national staff increased.
Recruitment for second-wave needs to start at the beginning of the emergency	Second-wave recruitment still requires attention	Less focus on second-wave recruitment as local handover and solutions sought.
Development of surge capacity at country & regional levels, as well as at HQ	HQ capacity reinforced but country and regional remains limited	Country and regional capacity increased.
Investment in rosters and registers	Internal rosters and emergency response teams were dominant models	Internal rosters and emergency response teams complemented by collaborative shared rosters at the regional and national levels.
Development of standard operating procedures on all aspects of a response	Surge procedures very common with some implementation challenges (getting staff released)	Surge procedures in place but needed adjusting as regional and national roles become reinforced.
The adoption of more systematised learning practices	Learning practices have increased in agencies	Learning practices have become more prevalent but not yet systematic.

Table 6: Critical enablers – 2007-2017

<sup>48</sup> Houghton, R, and Emmens, B. People In Aid “Surge capacity in the humanitarian relief and development sector. A review of surge capacity and surge capacity mechanisms within international NGOs” 2007

<sup>49</sup> Austin, L, and O’Neil, G. START Network and CHS Alliance “The state of surge capacity in the humanitarian sector”, 2015

