Searching for Lasting Peace

Population-Based Survey on Perceptions and Attitudes about Peace, Security and Justice in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

Patrick Vinck and Phuong Pham

Harvard Humanitarian Initiative
& United Nations Development Programme
SERIES ON PEACE, JUSTICE & RECONSTRUCTION

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the results of a mixed-methods study conducted in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) between November and December 2013, to assess the population's perceptions, knowledge, and attitudes about peace, security and justice. The study included a survey of 5,166 randomly selected adult residents, to provide results that are representative of the adult population of territories[1] and major urban areas in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu, and the district of Ituri. The study sought to contribute to an understanding of the following questions:

1. What is the population's sense of security and how do they perceive security actors?
2. What is the population's understanding of, access to and perception of justice and justice actors?
3. What are the sources of tensions and factors hindering or promoting social cohesion?
4. What are the priorities of the population?
5. What is the prevalence of various forms of violence and crimes?
6. How are disputes and crimes addressed/resolved? By whom? How are these processes perceived?
7. How is progress toward peace and stability perceived?
8. How are institutions and their capacity for response perceived by the population?

Detailed results outline the challenges of building a lasting peace, ensuring security, and achieving justice after decades of conflicts and poor governance. Highlights from the findings are presented here.

[1] Provinces in DRC are subdivided into districts and cities. Districts are subdivided into *territoires*.

Respondents' priorities for themselves and for the government highlight the continued need for the consolidation of peace and security, as well as for economic revitalization. For respondents, achieving a lasting peace is possible (92%) but will require a wide range of measures, including having inter-ethnic dialogue (31%), defeating armed groups (26%), establishing the truth about the conflict (17%), arresting those responsible for the violence (16%), providing jobs and reviving the economy (16%), and having a dialogue with armed groups (15%). Respondents most frequently identified the government (73%) as the key actor that must take action, followed by God (35%), and the population/communities themselves (30%).

Despite the critical role of the government in bringing peace, respondents questioned the commitment of the government to improve security, peace, and services. Just half the respondents (57%) believe the government is working to improve security, and slightly more (61%) believed it is working to establish peace. Just 29 percent believed the government is working to improve their daily lives. In 2008, a reference survey on the same indicators showed that 56 percent of the respondents believed the government was working to improve their daily lives. The results suggest a decreasing belief that the government is working to improve the respondents' conditions.

Social relations show improvement according to the data. In 2008, just 60 percent of survey respondents ranked positively their relations with members of any other ethnic group, compared to 79 percent in 2013. (No reference was made to nationality/country of origin). The change is most important in North Kivu, where 78 percent of the respondents were positive about their relations with members of other ethnic groups, compared to 52 percent in 2008. Respondents also felt increasingly comfortable in social situations in the presence of former combatants.

Respondents' sense of security also shows improvement over time. Compared to the 2008 survey, the sense of security walking at night improved in North Kivu (58% in 2013 v. 17% in 2008) and remained

roughly similar in Ituri (52% in 2013 v. 48% in 2008). However, it worsened in South Kivu (38% in 2013 v. 58% in 2008), likely driven by poor and worsening sense of security in the territories of Shabunda, Walungu, and Uvira. For the entire study area, nearly half the respondents (48%) indicated that their security situation had improved over the previous year, compared to 24 percent who said their security situation had worsened.

Overall, improvements in sense of security and social relations mask some negative trends. Women, for example, were significantly less secure than men, and were more likely to report no improvement in security over the last year. Many respondents (32%) also report that nobody (but God) provides them with security. Respondents further indicated that in most cases (69%), they did not have any form of community-level mechanism to ensure security.

The security role of the United Nations stabilization mission (*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo* - MONUSCO) is perceived negatively, with respondents showing distrust: 77 percent of the respondents judge the contribution of MONUSCO to security as being weak to non-existent, and more than half the respondents (58%) had overall a negative perception of MONUSCO. However, there were important differences. For example, in the territories of Rutshuru and Nyiragongo, nearly half the respondents (42% and 45% respectively) judged positively the contribution of MONUSCO to security, likely reflecting recent progress against the M23 armed group in and near those territories. Overall, however, the results indicate that any possible contribution to peace is largely unrecognized by the population.

When asked what needed to be done to improve security in their neighborhoods or villages, respondents most frequently mentioned measures concerning security actors, especially the FARDC, and common security sector reforms. The most common responses were for the Congolese Army (*Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo – FARDC*) to attack armed groups (29%), for the FARDC to

be paid (27%) and deployed (17%), for the police to be paid (26%) and deployed (18%), and for both the police and FARDC to be trained (13% and 14% respectively). Among measures not related to specific security actors, respondents emphasized the need to provide education (22%) and jobs (19%) to the population as a means for security.

The justice system remains negatively perceived overall. Despite significant improvement, knowledge of formal justice systems was low, with just 16 percent of the respondents describing their knowledge of tribunals / courts as good or very good, and 9 percent similarly rating their knowledge of military justice. A larger percentage of respondents ranked positively their knowledge and access to traditional and local justice mechanisms. Women, however, had lower reported knowledge levels and access, especially with regard to customary and local justice mechanisms.

A majority of respondents described the formal justice system as corrupted (54%), non-existent / enabling impunity (41%), being biased / in favor of the rich (35%), and requiring payment (24%).

Despite the negative views of the formal justice system in eastern DRC, most respondents (85%) believe that it is possible to achieve justice. Their recommendations to improve justice reflect their criticisms, and include fighting corruption (59%), training judges and lawyers (31%), paying staff and judges (27%), and informing the population about justice (25%).

Accountability and justice for the serious crimes committed during the wars and conflicts between the government and rebel groups are very important to most people in eastern DRC (89%). Given the choice, most respondents said they would like to see those responsible for the violence punished (60%), put in jail (42%), or facing trial in a tribunal (38%).

Awareness and knowledge about the International Criminal Court (ICC) has increased significantly (53% have heard of the Court in 2013 compared to 28% in 2008), but most respondents believe that the na-

tional court system is more appropriate to achieve justice for war-related crimes (48%), and just one in five respondents said the Court had had positive impacts on peace (20%) and/or justice (22%).

Based on these findings and other results outlined in the report, we offer the following recommendations to the Congolese government and to actors in the international community engaged in supporting DRC's reconstruction:

1. **The state must take steps to be trusted among the population** so that it is perceived as working to improve daily lives, rather than being perceived as corrupted, focused on rapid gains, and failing to deliver basic services. These steps must include (a) effective execution of public policies and service delivery, (b) inclusiveness, (c) increased transparency and accountability, and (d) public outreach and communication to engage the population with the role and capacity of the state.

2. **All actors must continue initiatives that promote peace and inter-communal dialogue.** There are already significant improvements in social relations; these should be supported and reinforced. Socio-economic drivers of conflicts and recruitment in armed groups beyond ethnic divisions should be explored and addressed.

3. There is a need to **deploy, train, pay regularly, and equip properly the FARDC and the police.** Security actors must ensure that protection services are available locally and contribute to rebuilding security and trust in government institutions, as well as the reduction of violence. Respondents highlighted the need for more patrols and presence in the field.

4. At the same time, **MONUSCO should step up and improve its community outreach and dialogue efforts, including information exchange, and develop better strategies to increase its visibility among other security actors and communities.**

5. **Salaries that reflect work completed and cost of living should be paid to civil servants in a manner that is consistent and timely**, es-

pecially in the security sector at large, including justice actors. The absence of payment was seen as a main driver of insecurity and corruption within the protection and justice sectors.

6. **The independence of the justice system, including military courts, must be established and maintained.** Anti-corruption policies and programs to establish the rule of law and support the local prosecution of perpetrators of atrocities from all sides of the conflict must be supported.

7. Considering the heavy reliance on local and customary justice systems, it is necessary to **build the capacity of the local actors administering those systems and take steps to ensure that they uphold the rights of all parties in disputes.** This may include efforts to strengthen administrative capacities, enhance capacities to respect due processes and knowledge of national laws, and possibly integrate these actors better within a national framework for local justice. These mechanisms must ensure that it is easy and comfortable for anyone, especially women, to seek justice. Improving knowledge and access to customary and local justice mechanisms among women must be prioritized given the limited range of formal justice mechanisms.

8. ICC outreach shows significant improvement in awareness about the Court, but **more local engagement about the mandate and reality of the ICC is needed** to manage expectations. This should also be an opportunity to **reach out to the population to improve understanding of the formal court system (national and international)**. Any outreach strategy must recognize the limited use of media, especially among those with limited information.

9. There is a need for **better monitoring and evaluation of peace and stabilization efforts**, with on-going analysis and research to develop the necessary knowledge and evidence-based contextual analysis, program design, and implementation.

1. INTRODUCTION

Over the last decades, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been plagued by conflict, poor governance and a protracted humanitarian crisis. The international response has been unprecedented. From 2005 to 2010, $2.5 billion USD in aid has been provided by donors to the humanitarian response within the country. The international community has typically focused its efforts on integrating aid and security in order to stabilize the country and promote early recovery. Interventions have ranged from relief efforts to development programs, and notably include two areas of specialized programming: protection of civilians and support to the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peacebuilding efforts.

However, there has been a dearth of programming based on the needs, experiences and desires of the Congolese population and result-based programming that is informed by evidence. Further, the monitoring and evaluation of program impact has been hindered by the lack of an agreed-upon framework for establishing clear objectives for the many interventions that have been supported. There is also no active data collection system to provide inputs against which to measure progress toward objectives for peacebuilding and stabilization, including justice or civilian security and indicators of protection.

This represents a critical gap in achieving effective humanitarian programming. United Nations agencies, MONUSCO, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and governmental actors urgently require these data to understand both the Congolese population's needs and opinions, and to evaluate the impact of the various interventions upon their daily lives. In order to develop more useful programming in this complicated context, agencies must understand the factors (such as perception of security or the level of confidence in service providers) that

influence Congolese day-to-day lives, and more broadly the population's prospects for a peaceful and secure future.

This study seeks to fill that gap and is the first phase of a multi-year program to provide quality information for program implementation and relevant national policies on stabilization and consolidation of peace, with a focus on protection and access to justice.

The present report is based on the analysis of consultations with key informants and a survey of 5,166 randomly selected respondents in the district of Ituri and the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu in eastern DRC.

2. BACKGROUND

For the past five decades, the Democratic Republic of Congo has struggled with varying levels of conflict. Persistent armed violence in the eastern part of the country continues to impede peace and reconstruction efforts. The instability has resulted in dismal living conditions for Congolese civilians with their security regularly being threatened by various domestic and foreign-backed militias as well as the Congolese armed forces (FARDC).

Although the DRC has been the focus of many humanitarian and development initiatives, peace and security for a significant part of the population has not yet been achieved. Donors from western countries and regional actors have implemented security and justice mechanisms to stem the rise in violence and put an end to impunity. However, these policies and programs have brought about mixed results.

Following the first post-conflict democratic elections in 2006, the government remained in a weak position and did little to maintain stability in the east. Numerous armed groups continued to clash and plunder resources, resulting in the displacement of over 2.6 million people by mid-2013.[2] In January 2008, a first-of-its-kind peace conference was held in Goma between local communities and various armed groups in the region. The Goma Conference resulted in a signed peace pact between the Congolese Government, General Laurent Nkunda's National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) and twenty-five other armed groups present.[3]

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2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "2014 Democratic Republic of the Congo Operations Profile".

3 Jason Stearns, "From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in eastern Congo," Rift Valley Institute, (2012).

The ceasefire, however, lasted just a few months before hostilities resumed. Human rights abuses and armed violence continued between the FARDC, CNDP, FDLR (*Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda* - a Rwandan rebel group) and various Mai Mai militias.[4] In December 2008, the UN Group of Experts provided evidence that a proxy war was unfolding in the Kivus between DRC and Rwanda, with Kinshasa backing the Mai Mai militias and FDLR and Kigali backing the CNDP.[5] The civilian population bore the brunt of the renewed fighting as the CNDP began to gain momentum and advance toward Goma. Limited operational capacity, logistical and technical problems, along with competing priorities and poor relations with the FARDC resulted in the failure of the *Mission de l'Organisation de Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo* (MONUC, the pre-cursor to MONUSCO) to protect civilians.[6]

The FARDC and other armed groups took advantage of the chaos, looting villages and disrupting security. Eventually, more attempts at peace talks between Congo and Rwanda as well as involvement from the international community led to the Ihusi Agreement in January 2009. Shortly after the peace agreement, General Nkunda was arrested in Rwanda and Bosco Ntaganda, who had an ICC warrant out for his arrest since 2006, installed himself as the new leader of the CNDP. He negotiated a deal with President Kabila to integrate the CNDP forces into the national army. Senior CNDP leaders were promised prominent roles in the FARDC and were assured they would not serve outside of the Kivus. This agreement was brokered between the gov-

[4] Mai Mai militias are armed groups that claim to act in defense of the community.

[5] UN Security Council, Letter dated 10 December 2008 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council, (December 2008), S/2009/253.

[6] Human Rights Watch. (December 2008). Killings in Kiwanja: The UN's inability to protect civilians.

ernment and CNDP as well as a separate agreement with the government and other armed groups on 23 March 2009.[7]

During the same time period of 2006 to 2008, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) entered DRC and wreaked havoc in northeastern villages. In particular in 2008, the LRA committed atrocities against civilian populations, claiming to act in retaliation against Ugandan government forces. These attacks—which became known as the "Christmas Massacres" of 2008 and the "Makombo Massacre" of 2009—resulted in an estimated 1,100 civilian deaths and 250 abductions.[8]

The international community has responded to the protracted conflict in the east with various policies and measures for justice. The ICC opened an investigation in 2004 pursuant to a referral by the Congolese government and has issued six arrest warrants since 2006 with charges including but not limited to: conscription of child soldiers, mass sexual violence and slavery, murder, torture and pillaging.[9] The United Nations has had extensive involvement since the outset of the DRC conflicts and in 2008 developed a comprehensive Strategy to Support Security and Stability (UNSSSS) in the DRC. The following year, Secretary Clinton was the first US Secretary of State to visit the eastern Kivu region. After her visit, the US pledged $17 million USD in aid for survivors of sexual violence and to prevent similar crimes in the future. In addition, she urged President Kabila's government to ensure justice for all such crimes.[10] Following the 2009 agreement, the government finalized its Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC), and the United Nations system and key partners revised the UNSSSS—

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7 Peace Agreement between the Congolese Government and the CNDP, Goma, 23 March 2009.

8 Human Rights Watch, "The Christmas Massacres: LRA Attacks on Civilians in Northern Congo" (February 2009); Human Rights Watch, "Trail of Death: LRA Atrocities in Northeastern Congo" (March 2010).

9 Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/Pages/situations%20index.aspx.

10 Kelly Daniel, "United States Pledges $17 Million to Aid Rape Survivors in DRC," *US Department of State IIP Digital*, 12 August 2009.

now the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS)—to align better with government priorities.[11] There was an opportunity to reaffirm the presence and authority of the State in these areas, to strengthen security, and to revise the economy.

In 2010, the US government passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requiring publicly traded companies to report to the Securities and Exchange Commission about whether or not they source 'conflict minerals' from Congo or its neighbors. The law also subjected companies who do source minerals from DRC or the surrounding area to new auditing requirements and regulations intended to increase transparency. One study estimates, however, that this policy measure has resulted in the loss of tens of thousands of jobs for Congolese miners and has done little to improve security for civilians.[12] Armed groups continue to control select mining sites and smuggle minerals out of the country to finance their activities.[13]

In addition to the US policy implementation, the United Nations shifted the peacekeeping mission to reflect a phase of "stability" following the official ending of the two Congo wars. On 1 July 2010, Security Council Resolution 1925 renamed MONUC as the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The new force was allowed a maximum of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 members of formed police units. MONUSCO was authorized to use all means

[11] International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy—Integrated Program Framework 2009-2012. Democratic Republic of the Congo.

[12] Laura Seay, "What's wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict minerals, civilian livelihoods, and the unintended consequences of western advocacy." Center for Global Development, Working Paper 284 (2012).

[13] UN Security Council, Letter dated 22 January 2014 from the Coordinator of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council, (January 2014), S/2014/42.

necessary to carry out its mandate of protecting civilians and other humanitarian and human rights personnel.[14]

Despite these policy measures, steady levels of violence continued in the eastern region. The second post-civil war presidential and National Assembly elections were held on 28 November 2011 in the midst of growing instability. Incumbent Joseph Kabila was declared president with 49 per cent of the vote in December 2011.[15] Shortly after the announcement, the opposition filed a petition to dispute the results but the DRC Supreme Court rejected it. Kabila was inaugurated for another five-year term on 20 December 2011. Election observers cited violence, intimidation, and other major irregularities during the polling but the domestic courts and international community urged the opposition to accept the results.[16] Following this turmoil, Kabila ordered the government security forces to crack down on any groups who challenged the outcome.

Kabila's newly elected government, lacking legitimacy, did little to bring security reforms and peace in the eastern part of the country. Armed conflict continued throughout the region, and civilians were again subjected to high levels of violence and crime. However in 2012, the ICC had unprecedented progress in its DRC cases. On 14 March 2012, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo—former leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots—was the first defendant to be successfully convicted and sentenced in the ICC's history. He was found guilty of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 years and using them to

14 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1925 (2010) [on the extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)], (May 2010), S/RES/1925(2010).

15 Dizolele, M. P., and P. Kalume Kambale, "The DRC's Crumbling Legitimacy," *Journal of Democracy* 23 (2012): 109-120.

16 Ibid.

participate actively in hostilities. For these charges he was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment.[17]

Following Lubanga's landmark conviction, Bosco Ntaganda mobilized troops within the FARDC to mutiny. He primarily called upon ex-CNDP soldiers to defect with the stated motivation of fighting until the stalled 23 March 2009 agreement was fully implemented. The new rebellion, reportedly backed by Rwanda, was called the 'March 23 Movement (Mouvement du 23 mars)', often abbreviated as M23.[18]

M23 began to make progress and attempted to gain legitimacy by forming a political party and formally creating an armed wing, known as the Congolese Revolutionary Army (known by its French acronym ARC).[19] The rebellion increased insecurity in the region and displaced thousands of civilians. For several months, eruptions of fierce fighting occurred with many armed groups including M23, FDLR and FARDC attacking and looting civilian populations. With continued support from Rwanda, M23 gained military strength and occupied Goma in November 2012 until the beginning of 2013.

In response to the advances made by M23, eleven countries in the region signed the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 24 February 2013 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. As part of this agreement, the Security Council authorized resolution 2098 on 28 March 2013, which called for the creation and deployment of a specialized "intervention brigade" as part of MONUSCO, to strengthen the peacekeeping operation.[20] This consisted

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17 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200106/Pages/democratic%20republic%20of%20the%20congo.aspx.

18 Jason Stearns, "From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in eastern Congo," Rift Valley Institute, (2012).

19 Ibid.

20 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2098 (2013) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic

of three infantry battalions, one artillery and one special force and reconnaissance company. The intent of this unprecedented intervention brigade was to "neutralize armed groups" and to "make space for stabilization activities" by using all means necessary and carrying out targeted offensive operations unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC.[21] After their deployment, the battle for control of the region continued between the armed groups and the FARDC, now with the involvement of the intervention brigade.

In March 2013, the M23 rebellion had weakened and Bosco Ntaganda fled with 788 of his soldiers to Rwanda. Ntaganda went to the US Embassy in Kigali and voluntarily surrendered to the ICC on 22 March 2013. Two arrests warrants were outstanding against him: one since 2006 and the other issued in 2012.[22] M23 was eventually militarily defeated on 4 November 2013. The UN Group of Experts credits the defeat to the FARDC and MONUSCO as well as international pressure on Rwanda to decrease its support. In addition the Group of Experts claims the defeat has led some armed groups to surrender and show willingness to join the Congolese security sector.[23] Others, such as the FDLR, ADF, and Kata Katanga remain aggressive, pose security threats to the region, and make civilians continually vulnerable to extreme violence and gross abuses of human rights.

The FARDC and the intervention brigade are continuing operations against these groups and others operating on Congolese soil.

Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) until 31 Mar. 2014], 28 March 2013, S/RES/2098 (2013)

21 Ibid.

22 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200206/Pages/icc%200104%200206.aspx.

23 UN Security Council, Letter dated 22 January 2014 from the Coordinator of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council, (January 2014), S/2014/42.

3. THE STUDY

This study was conducted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the eastern provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu and the district of Ituri to assess the population's perceptions, knowledge, and attitudes towards peace, security, and justice. The study was designed to address the lack of data, consultative planning, monitoring, and evaluation in relation to peace building efforts. The study sought to answer the following questions:

1. What is the population's sense of security and how do they perceive security actors?
2. What is the population's understanding of, access to and perception of justice and justice actors?
3. What are the sources of tensions and factors hindering or promoting social cohesion?
4. What are the priorities of the population?
5. What is the prevalence of various forms of violence and crimes?
6. How are disputes and crimes addressed/resolved? By whom? How are these processes perceived?
7. How is progress toward peace and stability perceived?
8. How are institutions and their capacity for response perceived by the population?

To achieve its objectives, the study used a mixed-methods approach and a survey of 5,166 randomly selected adult residents. The survey was designed to provide results that are representative of the population at the administrative level of the territories and major urban areas.

3.1. Survey Design and Sample

The selection of respondents for the survey was based on a random multi-stage cluster sampling procedure. In each of the territories, a subdivision of districts, and major urban areas, a random sample of adult residents was selected for interview. At the first stage, *groupements* (subdivision of territories in rural zones) and neighborhoods were randomly selected from a list of all groupements and neighborhoods. The selection was made proportionately to the population size in each area using the best available estimates.

At the second stage, a list of all populated places (villages or streets / avenues) within the selected groupements and neighborhoods was established. A minimum of three villages or avenues were chosen in each selected groupement and neighborhood. In each location, interviewers used a random geographic method to select a dwelling. Interviewers identified the center of the location and randomly selected a direction. In that direction, interviewers selected every other settlement unit. In each selected dwelling, interviewers randomly selected one adult in the household (defined as a group of people normally sleeping under the same roof and eating together) to be interviewed from a list of all eligible respondents. Three attempts were made to contact a household or individual before replacement. Due to the sensitivity of some questions, interviewers were assigned to same-sex respondents. Thus, male interviewers were assigned to male respondents and female interviewers were assigned to female respondents.

In each location, a team of two interviewers conducted a minimum of eight interviews total. The minimum target sample size for each stratum was 210. In total, the interviewers approached 5,621 dwellings. At 455 (8%) of these dwellings, the interviewers could not conduct interviews. At the 5,166 dwellings where interviews occurred, interviewers approached a total of 5,511 adults who reported being 18 years old or older and conducted 5,166 interviews. A total of 345 (6%) individuals who were approached were not interviewed because they were ab-

sent, refused, or were unable to participate. The survey's margin of error for the entire sample is ±3.0 percentage points. This means that in 95 out of every 100 samples drawn using the same methodology, estimated proportions based on the entire sample will be no more than 3.0 percentage points away from their true values in the population.

The research was reviewed by the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at Harvard University and a local board of experts. Approval to conduct interviews was also obtained from provincial and local authorities at survey sites. The interviewers obtained oral informed consent from each selected participant; neither monetary nor material incentives were offered for participation.

3.2. Survey Instruments

Interviews were conducted by trained interviewers using a standardized structured questionnaire with open-ended questions installed on a tablet. The questionnaire included a total of 15 sections addressing: Demographics, Priorities and Services, Information, Wealth, Trust, Elections, Disputes, Safety / Security, Peacebuilding, Justice and Accountability, Transitional Justice, and Experience of Violence. The questionnaire took approximately one hour to one and one-half hours to administer. The identification of indicators was guided by consultation with local experts and an ad-hoc consultative committee composed of representatives from UN agencies, MONUSCO, non-governmental organizations, and government representatives. The research team developed the questionnaire and consent form in English and French.

Response options based on pilot interviews were provided to the interviewer for coding but never read to study participants, with the exception of questions employing a scaling format (e.g., the Likert scale). An open-ended field was always available for interviewers to record complete responses. These answers were coded for analysis.

Figure 1: Sample distribution (5,166 interviews)



Once the questionnaire was complete, it was programmed into Android Nexus 7 Tablets running KoBoToolbox, our custom data collection package.[24] The use of the tablets allowed interviewers to enter the data directly as the interviews were conducted. Built-in verification systems reduced the risk of skipping questions or entering erroneous values, resulting in data of high quality.

3.3. Data Collection and Analysis

The data were collected over a total of six weeks, from November 14 to December 25, 2013. Thirty-eight teams, each composed of one man and one woman, were deployed throughout the area, following the research plan and random selection of over 600 villages and neighborhoods. The teams conducted the interviews under the guidance of four field coordinators and two lead researchers. The interviewers were selected and trained in close collaboration with local universities: the Université Libre des Pays des Grands Lacs (ULPGL), the Université de Bunia, and Université Catholique de Bukavu. They were all professionals with research experience.

Prior to collecting the data, the interviewers participated in a weeklong training that covered interview techniques, the content of the questionnaire, the use of tablets to collect digital data, troubleshooting, and methods for solving technical problems. The training included mock interviews and pilot-testing with randomly selected individuals at non-sampled sites. Three training sessions were organized for a total of 88 interviewers, from whom 76 were selected and deployed.

The research protocol required each team to collect data in one location per day. Interviews were conducted one-on-one, anonymously, and in confidential settings. When possible, data were synchronized

[24] Since 2007, the authors have developed KoBoToolbox, a set of tools to facilitate electronic data collection—www.kobotoolbox.org.

with a central computer, enabling the lead researchers to check data for completion, consistency, and outliers. The lead researchers and supervisors discussed any issues that arose with the team prior to the next data collection. Once the data collection was completed, the database was imported into Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 16 for data analysis. The results presented here are adjusted for the complex sample design and weighted to correct known disproportionate stratification of the sample and unequal probability of selection down to the household level.

After analysis, all of the results were imported online in an interactive map platform to enable users to browse detailed results at the territory and district/provincial levels.

Figure 2: Interactive maps at www.peacebuildingdata.org



Where possible comparisons are made with a similar survey conducted by the authors in 2008 with a similar geographic scope and identical questions.[25]

3.4. Limitations

The present study was developed and implemented carefully to ensure that the results would accurately represent the views and opinions of the adult population residing in the district of Ituri and the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu during the period the data were collected in November and December 2013. As with any social science research, there are limitations.

Some selected individuals could not be interviewed for various reasons (see Section 3.1: Survey Design and Sample). It is uncertain how responses from individuals who could not be interviewed would have differed from those of the sampled individuals, but the sampling approach was designed to reduce any potential for selection biases. Results also represent the adult population at the time of the survey, and opinions may change over time.

The study relies on self-reported data. A number of factors may have affected the quality and validity of the data collected. These factors include inaccurate recall of past events, misunderstanding of the questions or concepts, reactivity to the interviewer due to the sensitive nature of the questions, and intentional misreporting (e.g., for socially unacceptable answers). We minimized such risks through careful development of the questionnaire to make the questions sufficiently clear and to reduce potential bias.

[25] Vinck P, Pham PN, Baldo S, Shigekane R. Living with Fear: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice and Social Reconstruction in Eastern Congo. Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley; Payson Center for International Development, Tulane University; International Center for Transitional Justice, New York. 2008 August.

Figure 3: Main ethnic group by territories and main urban areas



3.5. Characteristics of Respondents

As outlined in section 3.1, the sample was designed so that results are representative for each of the territories and urban areas in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. The sample was selected regardless of any selection criteria with the exception that only adults aged 18 or older were to be interviewed and that same-sex interviews were to be conducted. The sample was equally distributed between men (50%) and women (50%).

The resulting sample reflects the diverse ethnic composition of eastern DRC. Overall, the sample comprises more than 80 ethnic groups, with six groups accounting for 64 percent of respondents: Nande (22%), Shi (15%), Hutu (9%), Alur (7%), Lega (7%), and Hunde (6%). The results suggest an ethnic composition similar to the findings of the 2008 study and other studies. The ethnic composition varies greatly by district/province and territories. In North Kivu, the Nande account for 52 percent of the sample, followed by the Hutu (21%), and Hunde (14%). In South Kivu, the Shi (42%), Lega (18%), Fulero (12%), and Bembe (9%) are the largest groups. Finally, in Ituri, the Alur (26%), Lugbara (18%), Lendu (17%), and Hema (10%) account for more than two-thirds of the sample.

Results at the territories/urban areas level show that while there is diversity in every location, 13 out of 24 zones were composed of 70 percent or more of a single ethnic group (including six territories with over 90 percent of the population coming from a single ethnic group). Another five territories had one ethnic group accounting for 50 percent to 70 percent of their population.

The mean age of respondents was 36 years (S.D. 13.9), with 15 percent of the respondents being young adults below the age of 25, and 4 percent being 65 or above. Most respondents described themselves as married or in a marital relationship (74%), and the average household size was 7.0 (S.D. 4.8). Regarding religion, most respondents described themselves as Catholic (51%) or Protestant (34%). Only one percent of

the respondents described themselves as Muslim, with the highest percentage found in Mambasa (13%).

With regard to education, 23 percent of respondents indicated having no formal education, 23 percent had some primary education (incomplete) and 11 percent completed primary education but had no secondary education. Less than half of the respondents (43%) had at least some secondary education, including 31 percent with incomplete secondary education, and just 12 percent who completed secondary education or more.

Women were less likely to have some education compared to men: 36 percent of the women had no formal education compared to 9 percent of the men, and 32 percent of the women had more than primary level education, compared to 56 percent of the men.

4. SOCIAL DYNAMICS AND LIVELIHOOD

One of the objectives of the survey was to understand respondents' priorities and access to and perception of basic services. The survey also explored social relations, resources, and social engagement. The information provides some understanding of and context to respondents' views on security, justice and peace.

4.1. Respondents' Priorities

The survey asked respondents to identify their own top priority and what they thought the top priority of the government should be. As was the case in 2008, achieving peace was the most frequent individual priority (26%).[26] Financial or employment priorities followed, mentioned by respectively 16 percent and 14 percent of respondents. Obtaining services, including education was a priority for 10% of the respondents. The priorities highlight the continued need for the consolidation of peace and for economic revitalization. This was also confirmed by what respondents say the main priority of the government should be. Peace was again the most frequent answer (35%). Other priorities for the government include security (22%), jobs/employment (11%), and education (9%).

Security was more frequently mentioned (22%) as a main priority for the government compared to respondents' own priorities. This likely reflects the view that it is the role of the government to provide security. In fact a direct question about what the main role of the government is showed that ensuring security is largely seen as its main function (56%).

[26] Peace was most frequently defined by respondents as the absence of violence (49%), living together, united (46%), being free (41%), and having no more fear (35%).

Figure 4: Respondents' priorities



Figure 5: Respondents' priorities for the government



Figure 6: Main role of the government



While responses about priorities and role of the government were consistent across provinces/districts, there were important differences across genders: women were more likely to identify peace as the main priority for the government compared to men (43% v. 27%). Inversely, men were more likely to say that livelihood concerns such as employment should be the main priority of the government (16% v. 7%).

4.2. Peace

Peace was most frequently defined by respondents as the absence of violence (49%), living together, united (46%), being free (41%), and having no more fear (35%).Peace was also the main priority of respondents, a topic explored further in the survey. A majority of respondents (92%) believe peace can be achieved in eastern DRC, and that all of the ethnic groups can live together peacefully (79%). Respondents provided a large variety of responses when asked what needed to be done to achieve a lasting peace. The most frequent responses included having a dialogue between ethnic groups (31%), defeating armed groups (26%), establishing the truth about the conflict (17%), arresting those responsible for the violence (16%), providing jobs and reviving the economy (16%), and having a dialogue with armed groups (15%). The wide range of responses likely reflects the fact that no single approach can achieve peace, but rather that a mix of approaches is needed.

The responses, however, did not correspond neatly with what respondents identified as the origins of the conflict. Here, responses centered on the exploitation of natural resources (46%), fighting for power (34%), ethnic divisions (32%), land disputes (30%), and poverty (22%).

When asked who needed to take action to achieve peace, responses were more focused, suggesting three key actors: the government (73%), the community itself (30%), and God (35%). Respondents clearly identify peace as resting in the government's hands and actions.

Figure 7: Origins of conflict—natural resources (% of respondents)



Figure 8: Origins of conflict—ethnic divisions (% of respondents)



4.3. Services

Security was a priority for respondents and was also identified as a key role of the government. Over half the respondents (57%) believed the government was working to improve security at the time of the survey, and slightly more (61%) believed it was working to establish peace. Smaller percentages of respondents, however, believed the government was working to fight impunity (39%), improve respondents' daily lives (29%), and fight corruption (25%). The results suggest a lower belief that the government was working to improve the respondents' conditions compared to 2008. In 2008, the reference survey showed for example that 56 percent of the respondents believed the government was working to improve their daily lives, compared to 29 percent in 2013.

A series of questions was also asked about perceptions of other services. In most cases, few respondents ranked their access to or quality of services as being good or very good. Respondents were most positive about the quality of education (45% good/very good) and healthcare (42% good/very good). However, fewer ranked their access to either education or healthcare positively (22% healthcare, 17% school). The lowest satisfaction ranking related to opportunities to find work, with just 6 percent identifying that work opportunities are good or very good in their area. This confirms the importance of economic revitalization as a key priority.

Figure 9: Is the government working to improve … (% yes)



Figure 10: Perception of services and basic needs
(% good –very good)



4.4. Wealth and Livelihoods

After peace and security, respondents frequently mentioned money, jobs and employment among their own priorities or priorities for the government, which is further reiterated by the low percentage of respondents who ranked their opportunities to find work positively (6% good/very good).

Respondents' self-reported wealth and livelihood activities. By far the most common main activity for households was agriculture (59%) followed by small trade (16%). Other main activities included working for the state/civil servant (6%), day labor (4%), and relying on external aid (3%).

Wealth is typically challenging to assess, but both reported income and asset wealth correlated well with other known dimensions or risk factors of poverty (e.g. education level). Overall, one-third of the respondents (33%) self-reported a household income level below $15 per month, and about half (47%) had an income below $30 per month. To better measure wealth, ownership of ten non-productive assets, such as bed, tables or chairs was assessed. The poorest quartile (26 percent of the respondents) owned two assets or fewer. The asset wealth correlated well with self-reported income: 68% of the households in the poorest wealth quartile reported income below $30 per month, compared to 54 percent in the second quartile, 32 percent in the third quartile, and 15 percent in the fourth and richest quartile.

The proportion of households in the poorest wealth quartile was highest in North Kivu (31%), compared to South Kivu (23%) and Ituri (23%). Similarly, the proportion of households with income below $30 per month was highest in North Kivu (50%), compared to Ituri (48%), and South Kivu (44%). There were important differences at the territories level. Over half the respondents in Mambasa (65%), Rutshuru (59%), and Walikale (58%) belonged to the poorest wealth quartile.

Figure 11: Percentage of households in the poorest wealth quartile.



Box 1 Information

Access to information is critical in shaping views and opinions on issues such as peace and justice. It also contributes to increased transparency and accountability of the government to its citizens.

In eastern DRC, few respondents reported being well or very well informed about news, including provincial news (26%) and national news (24%), as well as the conflicts in the east (26%). The survey also assessed level of information about MONUSCO (14%), justice (14%), and the ICC (10%) to provide context for the analysis. There were little or no differences among North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. However, urban areas typically reported better levels of information compared to rural territories.

Figure 12: Level of information

(self-reported, % well—very well informed)



The relatively low percentages of respondents who reported being well or very well informed reflect limited access to information sources. Radio was the most commonly identified main source of information (63%), followed by friends and family (32%). Radio was also the most trusted source of information (71%). Two out of five respondents or more relied on friends and family as their main source of information in Masisi (50%), Nyiragongo (44%), Rutshuru (55%), Kalehe (43%), Uvira (41%), and Djugu (40%).

Figure 13: Sources of information



Despite radio's being the main source of information, however, just 43 percent of the respondents listened to the radio on a daily basis, and 20 percent never listened to it. Other sources of information were rarely used, including newspaper, television, and the internet which are never used by 85 percent, 79 percent, and 95 percent of the respondents respectively.

Figure 14: Media consumption



Women were twice as likely as men to rely on friends and family as their main source of information (43% vs 21%) and reported lower levels of information on every item. For example, just 19 percent of the women reported being well or very well informed about national news compared to 29 percent of the men.

Figure 15: Main source of information—radio
(% of respondents)



Figure 16 Main source of information—family/friends
(% of respondents)



4.5. Social Relationships and Community Engagement

How individuals interact with each other, their social capital and existing levels of social cohesion are both potential sources and outcomes of conflicts. The survey raised several questions on social relations and engagement of respondents in their communities. Two sets of indicators suggest relatively high level of engagement and positive relations: self-reported ranking of social relationships with various groups and membership in groups and associations.

Social Relationships

More than four out of five respondents ranked as good or very good their relations with their family (89%), neighbors (87%), and community (86%). Relations with other ethnic groups were almost as frequently ranked as very good or good (79%). Respondents in Ituri were on average the most positive about their social relations, and those in South Kivu more negative,

The results suggest good community-level relations and further suggest improvement compared to 2008. In 2008, just 60 percent ranked positively their relations with members of any other ethnic group, compared to 79 percent in 2013. The change is most important in North Kivu, where 78 percent of the respondents were positive about their relations with members of other ethnic groups, compared to 52 percent in 2008. It is challenging to attribute the effect of improved social relationships to any single factor, but it is likely that community-based work and increased interaction in associations contributed to the improvement, along with changes in the dynamics of the conflict.

Despite the positive rating of relationships, few respondents indicated that it is often or always possible to do things together in their communities (28%). Around two out of five also said that they turn to friends and family for advice (41%) and a quarter for help (24%). This may suggest that while relations are ranked positively, the level of interdependence in daily interactions and activities remains low.

Figure 17: Ranking of relations
(% good—very good)



Figure 18: Social relations
(% good—very good)



The survey then asked respondents to rank their level of comfort in a range of situations in the presence of members of any other ethnic group. More than four out of five respondents felt comfortable in all of the situations, with lower percentages only in the event a member of another ethnic group became a member of the household (78% comfortable), or married someone from the household (73%). The results point to overall reported improvement in relations between ethnic groups, but with some tensions remaining nevertheless. This is also highlighted in the finding that 19 percent of the respondents have experienced discrimination due to their ethnicity, and the same percentage experienced discrimination due to their religious affiliation. This also suggests that ethnicity may not be the only source of social divide.

The survey results reflect some difference among respondents in North Kivu who were, on average, less comfortable in all of the situations explored with other ethnic groups compared to respondents in South Kivu and Ituri. This suggests that ethnic relationships remain more polarized in the province. At the territories levels, the lowest levels of comfort across situations were found in the territories of Walikale, Lubero and Beni. There were little to no differences across gender in comfort with members of other ethnic groups. Among respondents who said they were uncomfortable with members of any ethnic groups, the Hutu and Tutsi groups were most frequently identified.

Despite a remaining lack of comfort between ethnic groups, the results suggest significant improvements in inter-ethnic relations over time when comparing to the 2008 survey. In 2008, just 56 percent of the respondents felt comfortable having someone of another ethnic group as a household member, and 47 percent felt comfortable having someone from another ethnic group marry someone from their households. In 2013, those percentages were 78 percent and 73 percent, respectively—still the least comfortable events, but with a vast improvement in the percentage of comfortable respondents.

Figure 19: Relations with other ethnic groups
(% comfortable)



Figure 20: Change in comfort level having a member of another ethnic group marrying a household member (% comfortable)



Figure 21: Comfortable with members of any other ethnic group as household member (% of respondents)



Former Combatants

A similar series of questions about social comfort was asked of respondents, but this time focused on former combatants rather than members of any other ethnic group. The possible affiliations of the former combatants were not discussed. As was the case in 2008, for all the situations, fewer respondents felt comfortable with former combatants compared to members of other ethnic groups. Respondents were, on average, least comfortable with having a former combatant marry a family member (44%) or live in the same household (48%).

There were geographic disparities similar to perceptions of members of any other ethnic group: respondents in North Kivu were, on average, less comfortable with combatants in all of the situations explored compared to respondents in South Kivu and especially Ituri. This may reflect the more recent history of widespread violence in North Kivu, as well as the local socio-ethnic context. While levels of comfort with former combatants have improved in general, the largest positive change is observed in North Kivu. For example, whereas 22 percent of the respondents in North Kivu in 2008 felt comfortable having a former combatant member of their household, that percentage has risen to 44% in 2013.

Groups and Associations

Another indicator of social participation is the engagement of respondents in groups and associations. Membership in groups and associations is relatively frequent in eastern DRC: 52 percent of the respondents were members of at least one organization, and 15 percent were members of two or more. One in four (23%) held some sort of leadership position.

Figure 22: Relations with former combatants
(% comfortable)



Figure 23: Change in comfort level having a former combatant living in the respondent's household (% comfortable)



Figure 24: Comfortable with former combatants as household member (% of respondents)



There was a wide variety of groups, with the most frequent being religious groups (16%), agricultural or farming groups (12%), women's groups (7%), or youth groups (5%). These numbers represent active groups or associations rather than membership of a community grouping such as a religious congregation. Respondents who were members of a group or association frequently participated in two or more meeting per month (59%). Among other community involvement, 60 percent of the respondents indicated participating in community meetings at least occasionally.

With regard to gender, men reported being a member of a group more frequently than women (58% v. 46%). Men reported especially more frequent membership in agricultural/farming groups (17% vs 7%).

Social Engagement and Elections

Although many respondents are active in their communities through groups and associations, few report being able to engage their representatives and influence political processes. A large majority (84%) said they had little to no ability to participate in national political processes. Slightly fewer (82%) said they had little to no ability to participate in provincial political processes, and fewer still (68%) said they had little to no ability to participate in local political processes. Just 63 percent felt they were able to share issues or concerns with locally elected officials. Perhaps because of this negative perception, few respondents ever seek to contact elected officials (21%).

The negative perceptions of elected officials are further highlighted by a series of direct ranking questions asked of respondents. When asked how well provincial elected officials represent people's interest, a majority (69%) said poorly or very poorly. Considering how national level elected officials represent people's interest, almost the same percentage of respondents (68%) said poorly or very poorly. More than three out of four respondents (76%) also judged electoral promises to be different or very different from what actually happens in reality.

Respondents who did not vote previously were generally not eligible to do so (too young), while those eligible but not planning to vote in the next elections generally identified the reason as a lack of interest and disappointment in prior outcomes.

Figure 25: Perception of elected officials

How provincial elected officials represent people's interest



How national elected officials represent people's interest



Differences between electoral promises and reality



Voting records/intentions



5. SECURITY

Restoring and strengthening public security is a core objective of the ISSSS and a priority for a majority of the respondents. Respondents were asked a series of questions about their perception of security and security actors, and what they saw as the means to improve security.

5.1. Sense of Security

Respondents ranked their perception of security in a range of situations. The results show a significant lack of perceived security, most significantly in situations like walking alone at night (44% safe/very safe), meeting strangers (48%), meeting soldiers or armed groups (37%), speaking openly about war experiences (46%), and complaining to authorities after having experienced a crime (46%).

Despite the relatively high frequency of insecurity in most of the situations discussed, nearly half the respondents (48%) indicated that their security situation had improved over the previous year, compared to 24 percent who said their security situation had worsened. The percentages were similar across provinces/districts. At the level of the territories, gains in security were most important in Rutshuru (88%), Mwenga (74%), and Fizi (67%). Inversely, a decreased sense of security was most frequently reported in Shabunda (53%), Irumu (41%), and the city of Beni (40%).

Compared to 2008 survey, the sense of security when walking at night improved in North Kivu (58% in 2013 v. 17% in 2008) and Ituri (52% in 2013 v. 48% in 2008). However, it worsened in South Kivu (38% in 2013 v. 58% in 2008), likely as a result of the poor and worsening sense of security in the territories of Shabunda, Walungu, and Uvira.

Figure 26: Sense of security (% safe—very safe)

	N. Kivu	S. Kivu	Ituri	Total
Go to field, fetch wood, run errands	63%	64%	76%	67%
Walk alone during the day	79%	77%	83%	79%
Walk alone at night	43%	38%	52%	44%
Sleep at night	53%	51%	63%	55%
Go to nearest village, town	57%	61%	74%	63%
Go to nearest market	62%	72%	77%	69%
Meet people you don't know	46%	46%	55%	48%
Meet people from another ethnic group	48%	56%	61%	54%
Meet soldiers / armed groups	32%	38%	43%	37%
Meet policemen	47%	56%	55%	52%
Speak openly of war experience	42%	47%	50%	46%
Complain when victim of a theft	40%	48%	53%	46%

Figure 27: Improvement in security compared to one year ago



Figure 28: Sense of security walking alone at night (%safe—very safe)



Figure 29: Improvement in security compared to one year before



Box 2 Proximity and Security

In order to evaluate the association between the respondents' perceived sense of security and the presence of security forces, respondents were asked whether FARDC and/or MONUSCO deployments were present in their neighborhoods or villages. In total, 42% of the respondents indicated the presence of a FARDC deployment nearby, with over half (53%) seeing daily patrols. Just 11% indicated the presence of a MONUSCO deployment nearby, and among them, only 26% saw daily patrols. However, a geographic analysis showed that 32 percent of the respondents lived within 5 kilometers of a MONUSCO base, and 52 percent lived within 10 kilometers of a base. The analysis shows no difference in perceived safety based on the presence of FARDC. The presence and proximity of MONUSCO bases, however, was statistically associated with a lower sense of safety. This may be explained by the fact that the bases are strategically located in conflict and urban areas which are typically described as less secure.

Figure 30: Sense of security walking at night and presence of security actors (% safe—very safe)



Data on the sense of security in the various situations explored showed no differences across gender. However, women were less likely than men to see the security situation as improving: 53 percent of the men said security improved over the last year, compared to 42 percent of the women. Inversely, 30 percent of the women felt less secure than the year before, compared to 17 percent of the men.

5.2. Sources of Insecurity: Criminal Activities

The main sources of insecurity were identified as the presence of bandits (23%), the presence of armed groups (20%), and a more general fear of being assaulted/attacked (18%). Poverty (2%) or ethnic tensions (2%) were rarely mentioned as sources of insecurity although it is likely that these socio-economic dynamics are considered underlying causes rather than direct sources. Sources of insecurity were similar across districts and provinces, except that the presence of armed groups which was most frequently mentioned in North Kivu (29%), compared to south Kivu (17%) and Ituri (8%).

Insecurity was associated with a fear of being attacked. One driver of this fear was the presence of petty crimes / misdemeanors and banditry throughout eastern DRC. The direct experience of criminal activities was assessed, showing that two out of five respondents (39%) had experienced a theft or burglary in the 12 months prior to the survey. Fewer reported experience of physical assault with or without a weapon (16% in both cases). About the same percentage (18%) reported experience of sorcery during that period.

5.3. Security Actors

The presence and role of various actors as agents of security and/or insecurity was explored through a dedicated section of the survey. Interviewers asked respondents who, in their view, protected them (one response). The responses included security actors such as the FARDC

(20%) and the police (18%), but rarely MONUSCO (<1%). On the other hand, one in three respondents said nobody, or God (32%). Another 13 percent mentioned the community itself, further indicating the absence of actors to ensure security. These results may reflect a lack of faith in security actors after years of violence with limited protection of civilians and complete impunity. The results suggest no improvement compared to 2008.

Figure 31: Actors providing security



Respondents further indicated that in most cases (69%), they did not have any form of community-level mechanism to ensure security. Some indicated the presence of self-defense groups (19%), and few mentioned the presence of the police or army (6%) and community alert systems (5%).

Self-defense groups, however, play an important role. A range of small arms and weapons remain in the hands of civilians, and a small but nevertheless significant number of respondents indicate that it would be acceptable to use those weapons to defend the community from its enemy (15%) or to render justice and punish those responsible for a crime (13%). Fewer said it would be acceptable to take arms to defend the interest of an ethnic (9%) or religious (5%) group, or to maintain a politician in power (5%). Just 3 percent of the respondents had been part of an armed group, which they joined most frequently for defense purposes (52%), or because they were forced by armed groups (22%) and/or their families (15%). Respondents reported less frequently that economic incentives made them join armed groups (10%).

Figure 32: Who provides security—nobody / God only



5.4. Perception of Security Actors

The perception of specific security actors—the Police, FARDC, and MONUSCO—was also explored. Overall over half the respondents trusted the police (61%) and FARDC (53%) to provide security, a finding seemingly inconsistent with the poor human rights record of security actors in eastern DRC, but possibly indicating that despite their performances, security actors are still entrusted with providing basic security services. Fewer respondents (25%) trusted MONUSCO to provide security.

When asked whether security actors either protect civilians, have no impact on civilian protection, or are involved in crimes against civilians, respondents confirmed the somewhat frequent view that the police protects civilians (57%), rather than prey on them (15%). A slightly higher percentage of respondents (23%) believed the FARDC were involved in crimes rather than protecting civilians, but the majority still viewed the FARDC as rather protective (52%). With regards to MONUSCO, views were more divided, with the most frequent answer being that the body does nothing for the protection of civilians (34%). The results are based on self-reported perceptions and attitudes and may not represent the actual effect of the various security actors on security; rather, they demonstrate how that impact is viewed among the population. Results may also represent high expectations of the population about MONUSCO, and what respondents see as the normal role of the police and FARDC, even if that role is not fulfilled.

Views of MONUSCO were least positive in the territory of Mambasa where just 8% of the respondents saw the peacekeeping force as protecting civilians, as well as the terrirtoires of Walungu (9%), Irumu (10%), Kalehe (10%), Idjwi (12%), Kabare (12%), and Lubero (13%).

Figure 33: Perception of security actors



Despite the lower level of trust in MONUSCO in providing security compared to other actors, respondents are somewhat knowledgeable of the missions' mandate. Although just 14 percent of the respondents judge their knowledge of the mission as being good to very good, when given the possibility to provide multiple responses about MONUSCO's mandates, 35 percent mentioned it was to protect civilians and 35 percent mentioned that it was to restore peace. Others mentioned fighting armed groups (12%), supporting the government (7%) and denouncing crimes (7%). Over one in four respondent (27%) said they did not know about MONUSCO's mandate.

The perception of MONUSCO was examined further, showing that 77 percent of the respondents judge the contribution of MONUSCO to security as being weak to non-existent. More than half the respondents (58%) had overall a negative perception of MONUSCO. These results must be seen in relation to the relatively limited self-reported knowledge of MONUSCO, beyond their mandate.

5.5. Services and Accountability of Security Actors

The perception of security and security actors may be affected by the frequency of contact/engagement, as well as how accountable security actors are for their actions. As noted in the proximity analysis, 42 percent of the respondents indicated the presence of an FARDC deployment nearby, with over half (53%) seeing daily patrols, and just 11% indicated the presence of a MONUSCO deployment nearby, with 26% seeing daily patrols. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents (62%) indicated having good access to the police. In practice however, direct engagement is less frequent. Fourteen percent of the respondents indicated having received assistance or services from the police in the 12 months prior to the survey, and the same percentage (14%) received services or assistance from the FARDC over that period. Direct services or assistance from MONUSCO was less frequent (6%).

Over the same period, the percentage of respondents having been the victim of bad behaviors and actions by the police and the FARDC are almost identical to those having received services (11% and 12% respectively). In both cases the most commonly reported incidents were cases of corruption/extortion of money. Few respondents reported incidents involving MONUSCO.

Figure 34: Services and crimes by security actors

Among victims of a crime by a security actor, few respondents filed a complaint. Just one in four people (24%) who had been the victim of acts by the police filed a complaint, compared to 16 percent among those victims of crimes by the FARDC and 16 percent among those victims of crimes by MONUSCO.

Despite these results, a majority of respondents believed it is possible to file complaints against the police (75%) and/or FARDC (73%) when a victim of a crime. Possibly the low level of complaints stems from the fact that the police and FARDC are frequently seen as being immune from prosecution and/or punishment: 41 percent said impunity prevailed within the FARDC, and 35 percent said the same about the police. The view that bribing the police to avoid arrest is possible is also frequent (70%).

Box 3 Exposure to War-related Violence Since 2002

The violence of the conflicts in eastern DRC and its impact has been well documented, including the association between experiences of war-related violence and perceptions about peace and justice.[27] This study examined overall exposure to violence in eastern DRC since 2002. Exposure to 20 events caused by armed groups such as witnessing violence, direct experience of violence, family losses, and coercion during the conflict was assessed. Displacement (67%), looting/theft (49%), and witnessing combat were the most frequently reported events. Over half the respondents (57%) also thought they would die as a result of the conflicts. Experience of violence is similar across provinces/district, although generally respondents in North Kivu reported exposure to violence more frequently than others.

Violence continues and exposure was assessed over a 12 month period prior to the survey. Again displacement was the most commonly experienced form of violence (28%). Incidence of violence in the year prior to the survey was reported much more frequently in North Kivu compared to South Kivu and Ituri.

[27] See for example Coghlan, B., Brennan, R. J., Ngoy, P., Dofara, D., Otto, B., Clements, M., & Stewart, T. (2006). Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: a nationwide survey. The Lancet, 367(9504), 44-51; Johnson, K., Scott, J., Rughita, B., Kisielewski, M., Asher, J., Ong, R., & Lawry, L. (2010). Association of sexual violence and human rights violations with physical and mental health in territories of the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Jama, 304(5), 553-562; 7; Vinck P, Pham PN. Ownership and Participation in Transitional Justice Mechanisms: a Sustainable Human Development Perspective from Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. International Journal of Transitional Justice (IJTJ). 2008 October; 2 (3): 398-411.

Figure 35: Experiences of violence caused by armed group since 2002 (% of respondents)



Figure 36: Experiences of violence caused by armed group over 12 months period prior to survey (% of respondents)



5.6. Improving Security

When asked what needed to be done to improve security in their neighborhoods or villages, respondents mentioned most frequently measures concerning security actors, especially the FARDC, and traditional security sector reforms. The most common responses were for the FARDC to attack armed groups (29%), for the FARDC to be paid (27%) and deployed (17%), for the police to be paid (26%) and deployed (18%), and for both the police and FARDC to be trained (13% and 14% respectively). Among the measures not related to security actors, respondents emphasized the need to provide education (22%) and jobs (19%).

The survey also asked respondents for specific measures that the FARDC and MONUSCO should undertake to improve security.

- For the FARDC, the most common response was first that soldiers need to be paid (45%), likely reflecting the fact that unpaid soldiers may represent a risk rather than an asset for security. Respondents also mentioned the need for more deployments of the FARDC (39%) and additional bases (19%). One in three respondents also said that the FARDC needed to fight the armed groups in order to improve security.

- For MONUSCO, respondents also mentioned the need for more deployments (22%) and bases (17%), but many said that in order to improve security, MONUSCO needed to share information better (14%) and/or that it should leave (28%). The view that MONUSCO needed to leave in order to improve security was most frequent in Kalehe (58%), Kabare (54%), Butembo (46%), and Fizi (41%).

Figure 37: Improving security



6. JUSTICE

Functioning security and justice sectors are key components of a country's governance, enabling a safe environment where the rule of law and basic human rights are respected. This section examines specifically the role and perception of justice actors and the justice system.

6.1. Dispute and Crime Resolution Mechanisms

The survey examined respondents' experiences regarding many types of disputes. The availability of avenues for the population to resolve disputes is indicative of the effectiveness and accessibility of the justice system. In addition, such disputes, if left unaddressed, have the potential to threaten stability and evolve into violent conflicts. Respondents were asked to identify the most common forms of disputes that exist in their village or neighborhood. According to them, disputes over the limits of land/plots and over land ownership are by far the most frequent (50% and 43% of the respondents, respectively), followed by domestic issues (28%), theft (27%), and money issues (16%). Disputes were most frequently reported in South Kivu. One in four respondents (26%) reported having experienced a dispute in the 12 months prior to the survey, including 7 percent who experienced domestic disputes, 5 percent who had disputes over money, and some who had disputes over land limits (4%) or land ownership (4%).

Crimes and disputes are frequently addressed or resolved outside of formal justice systems. The survey asked respondents whom they would contact to resolve specified crimes or disputes. The question was presented in hypothetical terms but nevertheless reflects the actions likely to be undertaken should respondents be confronted with any of the events listed.

Figure 38: Main disputes in community



Figure 39: Main dispute resolution mechanisms



Respondents said that local leaders (56%) and customary chiefs (39%) are the main actors resolving conflicts in their community. Other frequent mechanisms include resolving disputes between families (27%), and involving the police (26%). The national justice system was mentioned by 13% of the respondents, most frequently in Fizi and Mwenga. The type of mechanism used, however, depends on the issue. For example, 86 percent of the respondents said that domestic disputes are generally resolved by the parties themselves and/or their parents and family. Land disputes on the other hand, are much more likely to be resolved by local and customary leaders (60% and 54% respectively).

Respondents who experienced disputes relied on a range of mechanisms to resolve them, which proved generally positive: roughly three out of five (62%) of the respondents who experienced a dispute were satisfied with the outcome. Those who were not satisfied generally mentioned that nothing had been done. With regard to crimes, however, few respondents filed complaints (8%), and just 48% were satisfied with the process. Respondents who were not satisfied generally mentioned that nothing had been done to identify those responsible and that they did not receive compensation.

6.2. Defining Justice

Prior to asking specific questions about justice mechanisms, the survey asked respondents to define "justice." Establishing the truth (53%), applying the law (51%), and being just or fair (39%) were cited most frequently. Punishment was mentioned by more respondents (28%) than trials (15%), possibly underlining a retributive understanding of justice. This is confirmed by the fact that apologies and forgiveness were only mentioned by a few respondents (5%). Obtaining compensation for the victims was included in the definition of justice by 11 percent of the respondents.

6.3. Knowledge, Access, and Trust

The definition of justice likely reflects respondents' experience with the Congolese justice system. A series of questions was designed to assess respondents' knowledge of, access to, and trust in several justice mechanisms.

Overall, knowledge of formal justice systems was low, with just 16 percent of the respondents describing their knowledge of tribunals/courts as good or very good, and 9 percent similarly rating their knowledge of military justice. Traditional systems were more frequently well known, including customary justice systems in general (43%), and *Barza communautaires*, a local justice mechanism (37%). Justice projects managed by NGOs, such as mobile courts, were better known than the formal justice systems, with 24 percent of respondents describing their knowledge of NGO justice projects as good or very good.

The level of knowledge reflects ranking of access to the various justice mechanisms. Respondents most frequently reported good or very good access to the customary justice systems (47%) and *Barza communautaires* (38%), followed by NGO justice projects (25%). Few respondents described positively their access to tribunals/courts (16%) and the military justice system (9%). Knowledge and access changed across province/district and territories. Urban areas had higher levels of knowledge of formal justice systems. Knowledge of and access to traditional systems was highest in Ituri.

Finally, trust in the various institutions was proportionate to their knowledge and access. Respondents least trusted military justice, with 69 percent having no or little trust, followed by the formal court system (65%). Fewer respondents had little or no trust in NGO justice projects (41%), *Barza communautaires* (38%), and customary justice systems (34%).

Figure 40: Knowledge, access and trust in justice mechanisms



Figure 41: Knowledge of customary justice (%good-very good)



6.4. Perception of the Justice System

Several questions were asked to obtain more information on perceptions of the formal (court) justice system. The results confirm that the majority of respondents find the courts corrupt and unresponsive to their needs. A large percentage (75%) believed that there must be some sort of payment for the court to take a case. Few believed that courts make decisions independently from the government (35%), that judges and prosecutors follow the law (27%), that tribunals treat everyone fairly (19%), and that tribunal decisions are taken fairly (17%).

When asked their opinion of the courts using an open-ended question, a majority of respondents described the system as corrupted (54%), non-existent/enabling impunity (41%), being biased/in favor of the rich (35%), and requiring payment (24%). Only 17 percent said the court system worked well. It is unclear how much the lack of access and knowledge about the court system influences the responses, but together these results highlight the disconnect between people's conception of justice and what the justice system actually delivers (or is perceived to deliver).

Despite the negative views of the formal justice system in eastern DRC, most respondents (85%) believed that it is possible to achieve justice. A majority believed that victims of sexual violence can have their case prosecuted (63%). Their recommendations to improve justice reflect their criticisms, and include fighting corruption (59%), training judges and lawyers (31%), paying staff and judges (27%), and informing the population about justice (25%).

Figure 42: Perception of the formal justice system (1)
(% agree)



Figure 43: Perception of the formal justice system (2)
(% of respondents)

	N. Kivu	S. Kivu	Ituri	Total
Does not exist / impunity	42%	44%	35%	41%
Corrupted	50%	63%	49%	54%
Have to pay	20%	24%	29%	24%
Justice of the rich	30%	36%	40%	35%
Works well	18%	10%	26%	17%
Other	13%	5%	11%	10%

Figure 44: Measures to improve justice
(% of respondents)

	N. Kivu	S. Kivu	Ituri	Total
Impossible	3%	5%	5%	4%
Train judges / lawyers	25%	32%	40%	31%
Fight corruption	55%	67%	56%	59%
Build infrastructure	7%	7%	13%	8%
Inform population	21%	28%	30%	25%
Pay staff, judges,...	22%	26%	36%	27%
Other	42%	18%	30%	31%

Box 4 Gender and Justice

Men and women defined justice in similar terms—establishing the truth, applying the law, and being just or fair—but their experience of justice varied considerably.

Women's knowledge of justice mechanisms was lower than their male counterparts', especially for traditional and local mechanisms: 34 percent of the women said they had good or very good knowledge of customary justice compared to 52 percent of the men. For the *Barza communautaires*, the percentages were respectively 32 percent and 43 percent of women and men with good or very good knowledge.

Similarly, access to justice mechanisms was ranked on average more poorly by women compared to men. The differences were most important with regard to customary justice and *Barza communautaires.* Over half the men (55%) described having good or very good access to customary justice compared to roughly one-third of the women (38%). For *Barza communautaires*, the percentage of women and men with good or very good access were 33 percent and 44 percent, respectively.

Trust in justice systems was similar across gender, although men tended to have little or no trust in the formal justice system more frequently than women (70% v. 59%).

The results suggest that women have less knowledge and access to the most common justice mechanisms, that is, the traditional and local systems that are most frequently used to resolve disputes and conflicts. The differences likely reflect structural inequalities in how these systems consider women.

Figure 45: Knowledge of justice mechanisms by gender
(% good—very good knowledge)



Figure 46: Access to justice mechanisms by gender
(% good—very good knowledge)



Figure 47: Mistrust in justice mechanisms by gender
(% little—no trust)



6.5. Justice and War-related Violence

Accountability and justice for the serious crimes committed during the wars and conflicts between the government and rebel groups are very important to most people in eastern DRC: 89 percent said accountability was important, and 92 percent said it was possible to have justice for the violence. At the same time, most respondents were willing to forgive if it was the only way to achieve peace, but given the choice (open-ended question), most respondents said they would like to see those responsible for the violence punished (60%), put in jail (42%), or facing trial in a tribunal (38%). Respondents most frequently said that the national court system was the most appropriate to achieve justice for war-related crimes (48%), compared to roughly one in four who identified military tribunals (28%), and the ICC (28%).

Figure 48: What should happen to those responsible for war violence



Box 5 The International Criminal Court

In 2004, the Congolese government invited the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate and prosecute war crimes that had occurred on its territory since July 2002. Since then the ICC has issued arrest warrants for and prosecuted Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, and two other alleged militia leaders—Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. One more alleged perpetrator of serious crimes, Bosco Ntaganda, is in custody, and another remains wanted.

Since beginning its operation, awareness about the work of the ICC in eastern DRC has increased. In 2008, just one in four respondents (28%) had heard of the ICC, compared to 52 percent in 2013. Knowledge of the Court, however, remains low. Just 9 percent of the respondents described their knowledge of the ICC as good or very good, and 5% said they had good or very good access to the Court. Over half the respondents were neutral about their views of the impact of the ICC on peace and justice, while slightly more were negative compared to those who were positive.

Figure 49: Impact of the ICC



7. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

The detailed results provided in the report outline the challenges of building a lasting peace, ensuring security, and achieving justice after decades of conflicts and poor governance. The data show important gains in security and social relations, but that challenges remain. Gains in security were not due to an effective presence of security actors on the ground, and more is needed to strengthen the effectiveness of State institutions in responding to the needs of the population, and by extension, the population's confidence in State institutions. International efforts such as MONUSCO and the ICC are known to the population, but their mandates are not well understood. Despite improvement in social relations, some tensions remain among ethnic groups, particularly with regard to the most intimate social interactions. The exploitation of natural resources, the fight for power, and land disputes are seen as major drivers of the conflicts in addition to ethnic divisions. Women continue to suffer from structural inequalities. They are on average poorer and less educated than their male counterparts. Most important, women have less knowledge and access to the most common avenues to resolve disputes, i.e. customary and local systems.

Based on these findings and other results outlined in the report, we offer the following recommendations to the Congolese government and to actors in the international community engaged in supporting DRC's reconstruction:

1. **The state must take steps to be trusted among the population** so that it is perceived as working to improve daily lives, rather than being perceived as corrupted, focused on rapid gains, and failing to deliver basic services. These steps must include (a) effective execution of public policies and service delivery, (b) inclusiveness, (c)

increased transparency and accountability, and (d) public outreach and communication to engage the population with the role and capacity of the state.

2. **All actors must continue initiatives that promote peace and intercommunal dialogue.** There are already significant improvements in social relations; these should be supported and reinforced. Socioeconomic drivers of conflicts and recruitment in armed groups beyond ethnic divisions should be explored and addressed.

3. There is a need to **deploy, train, pay regularly, and equip properly the FARDC and the police.** Security actors must ensure that protection services are available locally and contribute to rebuilding security and trust in government institutions, as well as the reduction of violence. Respondents highlighted the need for more patrols and presence in the field.

4. At the same time, **MONUSCO should step up and improve its community outreach and dialogue efforts, including information exchange, and develop better strategies to increase its visibility among other security actors and communities.**

5. **Salaries that reflect work completed and cost of living should be paid to civil servants in a manner that is consistent and timely**, especially in the security sector at large, including justice actors. The absence of payment was seen as a main driver of insecurity and corruption within the protection and justice sectors.

6. **The independence of the justice system, including military courts, must be established and maintained.** Anti-corruption policies and programs to establish the rule of law and support the local prosecution of perpetrators of atrocities from all sides of the conflict must be supported.

7. Considering the heavy reliance on local and customary justice systems, it is necessary to **build the capacity of the local actors administering those systems and take steps to ensure that they uphold the rights of all parties in disputes.** This may include efforts to

strengthen administrative capacities, enhance capacities to respect due processes and knowledge of national laws, and possibly integrate these actors better within a national framework for local justice. These mechanisms must ensure that it is easy and comfortable for anyone, especially women, to seek justice. Improving knowledge and access to customary and local justice mechanisms among women must be prioritized given the limited range of formal justice mechanisms.

8. ICC outreach shows significant improvement in awareness about the Court, but **more local engagement about the mandate and reality of the ICC is needed** to manage expectations. This should also be an opportunity to **reach out to the population to improve understanding of the formal court system (national and international)**. Any outreach strategy must recognize the limited use of media, especially among those with limited information.

9. There is a need for **better monitoring and evaluation of peace and stabilization efforts**, with on-going analysis and research to develop the necessary knowledge and evidence-based contextual analysis, program design, and implementation.

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Patrick Vinck and Phuong Pham led the survey design and analysis, and wrote this report.

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"Searching for Lasting Peace" presents the results of a large-scale study of perceptions and attitudes about peace, security, and justice conducted in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is based on a population survey conducted in December 2013 among a random sample of over 5,000 individuals, representative of the adult population at the level of *territoires* and urban centers in North kivu, South kivu, and Ituri .

The study seeks to contribute to the development of evidence-based stabilization and reconstruction projects and programs that respond to the needs of the population. The report features a background to the conflict and analysis of:

- Perception and Presence of State Services
- Access to Information
- Social Capital and Relations
- Experiences of Disputes, Crimes, and War-related Violence
- Perception of Security and Security Actors
- Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
- Perception of Justice and Justice Actors
- Means for Peace

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