Ebola and beyond:
Equality, sustainability, security - interlaced challenges in a global development era

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and
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Introduction

The Ebola crisis in West Africa is a global emergency and a set of personal tragedies. But beyond the urgent headlines and struggles to control the epidemic, what deeper stories should be told? Using Ebola as a lens and connecting local experiences with a global stage, in this lecture I trace how inequalities, unsustainability and insecurity can interact, enhanced by misguided interventions, to render people and places deeply vulnerable – and why addressing these interactions must become central to a renewed vision of development for all.

As Director of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), I am currently working with colleagues to think about big picture shifts in a global development landscape and the strategic contributions that development studies, and IDS, should be making. At the same time, as an anthropologist who has lived and worked long-term in Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, with deep personal and field relationships there around health, environment and everyday issues, as well as current projects on zoonotic disease (www.driversofdisease.org), I've found myself personally, morally and intellectually obliged to engage with the Ebola response. I'm doing this as the social scientist on the UK government's Scientific Advisory Group on Emergencies (SAGE) for Ebola, in advising the Wellcome Trust on funding rapid response research, experimental drugs and vaccines; as a member of the WHO's expanded ethics committee, and through launching an Ebola Response Anthropology Platform with colleagues at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the universities of Sussex and Exeter to build networks and contributions from and across the region and beyond.

This paper, originally presented as a Sussex Development Lecture, tries to connect these engagements. It asks how the Ebola crisis might offer a lens to reflect on interlaced challenges around curbing inequalities, accelerating sustainability, and building inclusive, secure societies, and why these matter so much. And it comes from a sense of outrage that these bigger, deeper questions are not yet being asked around Ebola, and that they must be if crises like this are not to repeat.

Ebola crisis narratives

So we start in West Africa where Ebola is on an exponential curve. The epidemic in Sierra Leone is currently growing with a doubling time of around 30 days. Around 250 new cases are occurring every week, projected to rise to as much as 1000 a week by the end of October. Recent projections for Guinea and Liberia flatten these curves a little – but we must be aware that data are poor and that many cases go unreported.

What narratives are circulating around this drama? As Margaret Chan of the WHO put it on 26th September 2014:

> The Ebola epidemic ravaging parts of West Africa is the most severe acute public health emergency seen in modern times. Never before in recorded history has a biosafety level four pathogen infected so many people so quickly, over such a broad geographical area, for so long.[1]

One pervasive storyline links the epidemic to a chance spillover event in Guinea in December 2013, when a two year old happened to come into contact with a virus-carrying fruit bat; a haphazard happening in a poor, out of the way place in uncertain world.

Another scales this up into a classic 'global outbreak narrative', seen around so many other emerging infectious diseases , in which a disease 'out of Africa' threatens a world of mobile people and microbes, reaching its tentacles out to affect the powerful global North. Media coverage of deaths in the US and Europe are effective in stirring publics and politicians alike.

And so Ebola becomes an international emergency, belatedly mustering the world's armies, as Obama adds to the 3000 troops sent to Liberia, and the UK announces that it is adding a warship and three helicopters to its forces. Scientists, meanwhile, gather to rush-develop experimental drugs and treatments.

In another set of stories, Ebola is of course a set of personal tragedies for rural and urban women, men and children, losing loved ones, and a tragedy for a social fabric where people now fear to hug, to shake hands, to make love – and where doing the social and moral good of caring well for the sick and the dead well brings likely sickness and death. Beyond this, Ebola presages a set of livelihood tragedies as food and trade routes break down.

There is truth in all of these narratives, but they tell very different stories, from different positions and interests. I find myself angered by the disjuncture – fuelled by northern media – between the global outbreak narrative that has brought response of a certain

[1] http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/ebola/26-september-2014/en/, accessed 15 October 2014

militarised kind, and the realities as the people I know in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia are experiencing them on the ground.

I am also angered by the relative silence afforded to another set of stories, beneath the frontlines and the headlines. These tell of 'structural violence' as Johan Galtung (1969) would put it; referring to a form of violence where some social structure or social institution may harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs. James Gilligan defines structural violence as 'the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted with the relatively lower death rates experienced by those who are above them' (Gilligan 1997).

Is the Ebola crisis in some respects a manifestation of structural violence? If so, we are not talking of a single social institution, but of an interlocking of institutions which have produced longer-term interlaced inequalities, unsustainabilities, insecurities. This is in a set of localities long interconnected with a global world – through political and economic relations, and more recently with 'development' in its narrower sense of the discourses and practices of an aid industry that has itself been culpable in producing, or at least failing to tackle, structural violence.

These stories of structural violence help explain why this epidemic has become an epidemic of fear – of 'Ebola panic disease' (EPD) not just Ebola virus disease (EVD) – and why 'bending the curve' of transmission below R = 1 – necessary for the epidemic, eventually, to grind to a halt - now requires bending the curve of trust – of agencies and communities in each other - in relation to control efforts.

These stories also hint, therefore, towards some lessons about what a broader sense of development – one that curbs inequalities, accelerates environmental sustainability, and builds inclusive and secure societies – might look like.

Ebola, development and structural violence

The underlying stories about the Ebola crisis are emerging from social science and anthropology, from people on the ground, and from the more nuanced response agencies. They reveal a more complex, historically-embedded picture with multiple dimensions, highlighted just briefly here.

First, Ebola is transmitting along social networks and trade routes, shaped through decades and centuries of mobility for trade and kin visits across borders, in a region that was a vital pre-colonial trading empire. The geographies of spread differ between Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia, reflecting their different political-economic histories. But in all cases, they reflect deep connectedness internally and with a wider world. This region is no global backwater.

Second, while the Ebola epidemic has rural hotspots and pulses, it has crucially 'gone urban', powering through growing and crowded urban centres and slums. These are places whose massive growth is a legacy of neglected rural and agricultural development, dislocation and displacement due to war. They now house many unemployed or underemployed young people, in cities underserved by basic services and planning.

Third, Ebola is spreading through countries where war and limited post-conflict recovery still leave their legacy in impoverished infrastructure, capacities and discontent – fuelled by the failure of post-conflict recovery processes fully to address the questions of rights, resources and employment that underlay the civil wars in the first place (Richards 1996).

Fourth, it is spreading through countries where 'development' in recent years has meant private sector and internationally-backed schemes to annex land for mining, palm oil, biofuels and agriculture. Large foreign private investors generate FDI, but in the process often displace people's livelihoods and undermine rural institutions.

Fifth, Ebola is spreading through places where in a narrative of environmental blame, a story runs that it is farmers deforesting a landscape and exposing themselves to bats for the first time that caused the epidemic, and that avoiding bushmeat is a means of protection. This is the sort of misinformation that is all too common in environment-development approaches that assume local people to do damage and so keep them out of forests now to be protected and separated from people for biodiversity, carbon or indeed now as viral reservoirs. As so much of my earlier work with James Fairhead showed (Fairhead and Leach 1996, 1998), such narratives justify people losing control over natural resources – despite longer histories of human-ecology interaction in enriched anthropogenic landscapes that have co-evolved with often sustainable livelihoods. That narratives of environmental blame and deforestation have suddenly been given new life by Ebola is deeply worrying, not least in obscuring attention to the more complex interactions between people, bats, landscapes and disease in patchy, anthropogenic landscapes that badly need to be understood and addressed.

Crucially, Ebola is transmitting through neglected health systems - a legacy of conflict and underdevelopment, of aid and development intervention fragmented under multiple NGOs and private sector agencies and beset by corruption, failing to build basic capacity. Sierra Leone's population of 6 million is served by about 120 doctors and as resource-poor hospitals became infection grounds, many succumbed. They included Dr. Khan at Kenema Government Hospital, the country's only haemorrhagic fever specialist. More than 10% of deaths have been of healthcare workers that these countries couldn't afford to lose. The recent aid focus on universal access hasn't been directed in ways that would build the resilient accessible networks of rural health and paramedicine that might have led rural people, in pre-epidemic contexts as well as now, to see hospitals and health centres as places of care – as opposed to ones to be avoided, neglected, in favour of home care and traditional healers within their pluralistic framings of disease and therapy.

Currently, it is the deep rural areas that have managed to isolate themselves from such 'development' that are now successfully isolating themselves from Ebola, drawing on still-intact chieftaincy and local structures to enact bye-laws to prevent kin from infected areas entering. Malema Chiefdom, where I lived in the late 1980s, is surviving Ebola as it survived the war – and very likely the smallpox epidemics of the 1970s – by withdrawing, and locally-managed quarantines.

Elsewhere we are seeing an epidemic of fear and distrust; some rush to now outstripped treatment facilities, but others still shun them and the outbreak control teams. There have been many incidents of people attacking treatment facilities. In Guinea 20 villages stoned MSF vehicles. Sierra Leonean villagers dug trenches to keep teams out. And three weeks ago villagers in Guinea murdered 6 members of a sensitisation team including 3 doctors.

Do such incidents reflect local ignorance and superstition – or worse, barbarism – as so much western media coverage has suggested? Or are they better understood as logical reactions to a deep history and continuity of structural violence, and its everyday forms? We need to recognise how offensive and dangerous people find the quelling of local funeral practices and disrespectful by-passing of the men's and women's initiation societies and related social institutions that control matters of life, health and death. We need to appreciate how anxieties fly when a previously distant state suddenly intervenes – so that it in Guinea the pumping of disinfectant in markets was thought to be pumping virus. We need to acknowledge unsettled national politics in post-conflict democracies – so that in Sierra Leone, fears circulated that Ebola was a government plot to depopulate the opposition-supporting east. We need to appreciate how distrust of foreigners in the region has been fuelled by decades of extractivism and disrespect, and now by private schemes that accrue great material wealth to some while dispossessing others. In this context fears of sorcery and related body-part theft circulate as a longstanding idiom, a way of making sense of the extraordinary wealth and power that accrues to a few. The supposed sorcery of today's Ebola outbreak control teams finds a logic in memories and discourses of the slave trade and before – grounded not in traditional myths or timeless culture, but history and political economy, as so well documented by historical anthropologist Rosalind Shaw.

One can surmise that such fears may worsen with a heavy-handed militarised response. Bending the epidemic and trust curve therefore needs community collaboration, local involvement, respectful dialogue and joint solution-finding, in areas like ritual creativity to identify new burial practices that meet both socio-cultural needs and infection-reducing protocols; and in how triage and treatment units are located, designed and staffed. Fortunately those designing and funding the response are now listening. But will it be quick enough, and can it overcome such a history of de-development and structural violence?

In terms of lessons for development, these stories tell us that humanitarianism is vital but it must be early enough, and appropriate. It tells us that development as aid to so-called 'fragile states' is important, but that if privatised, fragmented and spent in projects not attuned to local realities and knowledge, it can be deeply unproductive and damaging – as so much around health, environment and rural development in the region has been. More fundamentally, they underline that development is much broader – not just the practices of an aid industry – but pathways of progressive change - social, economic and political – that enables people to realise wellbeing and justice in terms that make sense to them. Many actors and forms of agency are part of these processes – and their opposite, negative pathways, or de-development – from international agencies and finance through businesses to forms of grassroots activism, and the many policies and social-political-economic relations that affect all of these, linking local and global.

In West Africa, despite the vibrancy of local life, the ways this wider set of forces has played out have reduced a vibrant trading region of the 19th century to one with a set of interlaced inequalities, unsustainabilities and insecurities – sometimes exacerbated by misguided 'development' policies – that have in turn left people vulnerable to this current crisis of biblical proportions.

Going global

Tuning up to a world stage, one can argue that we are entering an era where development is recognised, even formally, as a broader set of change processes implicating multiple sets of global-local relations, and the intersection of economic, social, environmental and political processes. The emerging post-2015 agenda redefines development not as a north-south issue, but as a matter of mutual responsibilities amongst all people and countries. Development is everywhere, in Brighton as well as Bogota, in Greece as well as Ghana.

Next year is likely to see international agreement on a set of Sustainable Development Goals that apply to all. As the process to turn common goals into differentiated targets and then to implement them unfolds over the next year and beyond, we may see the same ills that beset the MDGs – including sectoral silos and a narrow target orientation that fails to influence underlying processes. But for now, as aspirational goals, the set of 17 proposed SDGs are different from the MDGs in some key respects. Environmental sustainability recurs and is integrated throughout, rather than being marginalised to a single goal as in the MDGs. There is a goal on inequality, not just poverty, and a goal on peace, security and inclusivity. These were struggled for in the negotiations of the Open Working Group, but their inclusion represents an important set of shifts in the ways that international development is conceived.

For the challenges of curbing inequalities, accelerating environmental sustainability and building inclusive and secure societies are, I suggest, the key ones of our era. These

challenges are themselves deeply and multiply interlaced, in ways that I want now very briefly to sketch.

Inequalities

Inequalities are rising, fast. Statistics now tell us that the richest 85 people in the world are worth more than the poorest 3.5 billion (Oxfam 2014). Critical too are within-country inequalities. There is powerful evidence – brought together so compellingly by Thomas Piketty (2014) in Capital in the 21st Century – of rising inequalities across Europe, now at their highest levels since the 1920s.



Similar patterns are found in the so-called emerging countries:



Inequality here is of both income and assets, including novel financialised assets, and these reinforce each other.

Recent debates highlight why this matters – why poverty matters for sure, but why just building the assets and upward mobility of the poor isn't enough if the gaps are not also addresses. Here, the work of Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) in The Spirit Level has been particularly helpful in underlining why equality is better for everyone. In the rich countries they focus on, greater inequality links with poor outcomes across many social and health indicators, from life expectancy and teenage pregnancy, to trust and social mobility. The mechanisms, they suggest, are social, psychological and ideological, and linked centrally to the ways that people internalise hierarchies – so that inequality as they put it 'gets under the skin'.



What of Africa? Searching for data, the first observation is how difficult it is to find; African countries face data inequalities as well as many others. Looking one available data source - from the World Bank, drawing on household surveys – for a broad-brush assessment, I was initially surprised. Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea show levels of inequality similar to the UK – when one might have expected them to be greater. Yet reflecting further, household surveys are of course likely to miss semi-illicit incomes amongst economic elites at the top (a reality in the UK too of course, but arguably even more likely in West Africa) and minimal, informal incomes at the bottom. One can surmise that wider income inequalities are likely, therefore – though better and different kinds of data are certainly needed to confirm this.

Income distribution in Upper Guinea countries, with UK for comparison
Source: World Bank household survey data 2011[2]

% income earned by:	Bottom 20%	Top 10%	Top 20%
Guinea	22	30	46
Sierra Leone	22	30	44
Liberia	21	29	44
UK	22	28	44

[2] http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/SSA. Accessed 7 October 2014

These figures refer to income/asset inequality. Yet as Frances Stewart's work and many others remind us, 'horizontal' inequalities – across gender, ethnicity, religion, location, and contextual attributes of social status – also matter, very much, and intersect both with each other and with income in shaping patterns of disadvantage and advantage.

Inequalities of opportunity and outcome can't be separated in these dynamics; they interact and shape each other in multiple ways. The institutions that maintain these dynamics need, I would suggest, to be seen as part of the maintenance of structural violence.

Inequalities can contribute to conflict and insecurity, and to difficulties in building workable political settlements – as we have seen from Gaza to Rwanda, from Syria to Sierra Leone – with all the textured complexities of these situations. This is not about narrow relationships between poverty and conflict – an often problematic discourse. It is about more subtle relationships between multiple inequalities and political inclusion/exclusion, and here we find many interlacings.

One among possible routes to untangling these is provided by recent arguments from Dani Rodrik of Princeton University. He reflects on 'how the rich rule',[3] drawing on evidence from political scientists Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page that in US politics, where the interests of the masses and the economic elite (top 10%) of the population differ, the latter tend systematically to be systematically favoured. How then do politicians get re-elected? Rodrik suggests that:

> A politician who represents the interests primarily of economic elites has to find other means of appealing to the masses. Such an alternative is provided by the politics of nationalism, sectarianism, and identity – a politics based on cultural values and symbolism rather than bread-and-butter interests.

In a modern-day version of Marx's 'religion is the opium of the people', he suggests that in the US this appealing values-glue is provided by the cultural politics of family values and the religious right. Elsewhere, it may be appeals to mass-interests in identity politics – whether around religion, ethnicity or region. In making such appeals, politicians:

> ..... typically inflame passions against religious and ethnic minorities... Widening inequality in the world's advanced and developing countries thus inflicts two blows against democratic politics. Not only does it lead to greater disenfranchisement of the middle and lower classes; it also fosters among the elite a poisonous politics of sectarianism (Gilens and Page 2014).

[3] http://www.social-europe.eu/2014/09/us-democracy-2/. Accessed 7 October 2014

Sierra Leone's politicians appeal to ethnic regionalisms. This has had repercussions around Ebola; the epidemic originated in the East, in the heartland of the Mende-supported Sierra Leone People's Party, currently in opposition to the All People's Congress with its longstanding support base amongst Temne people and others of the centre and North. Sectarian politics may partly have underlain both the central government's perceived slowness to intervene – casting the epidemic as a problem of the distant East – and later, fears that outbreak control teams were spreading virus as part of a political genocide campaign.

In such instances, we see a non-inclusive politics playing off horizontal inequalities against economic ones, in ways that can in turn fuel conflict..... and in this case, an epidemic crisis.

Sustainability

Turning to environmental sustainability, there is rising scientific evidence of pressures on our planet. Powerful scientific and political discourses – such as those around planetary boundaries - suggest that business as usual is not an option; there is a need to bend the curve of carbon emissions and other forms of environmental degradation, and urgently, to keep societies within a 'safe operating space' for humanity.

Catastrophist environmental narratives have a lot in common with catastrophist outbreak narratives; they tell only selective versions of complex stories, and ones that can justify problematic and repressive forms of intervention. However the key point I want to make here is that both sustainability problems and challenges in moving forward on them are deeply interlaced with questions of inequality.

At a global scale, it is almost too obvious to state that climate change is driven primarily by the polluting effects of richer countries and people, yet poorer people and countries bear the brunt. Questions of distribution of rights and opportunities to use a limited safe operating space, nationally or globally, loom large, from the Indian Centre for Science and Environment's raising of the difference between 'luxury emissions' and 'survival emissions' in the early 90s, to more recent evidence of the very different paths that countries would need to take to reach a 'fair' share of a global carbon budget needed to have a decent chance of keeping warning below 2 degrees C. Versions of such arguments have driven heated geopolitical debates amongst countries through, and making difficult to negotiate, global agreements.



Inequalities at multiple scales contribute to unsustainability, and make it more difficult to build sustainable paths. For instance, they make co-operation more difficult – whether within societies, or globally – and environmental issues are ones where co-operation around 'public' goods is vital. This was a key message of Elinor Ostrom's Nobel prize-winning work, showing how institutions can enable co-operation at and across multiple scales. But it has also been long-known by local people managing common forests and fisheries, water and rangelands. People working together in effective institutions don't need homogeneity but they do need mutual respect. In a different though related dynamic, inequalities can drive competition for status which if linked to material consumption, can reinforce unsustainable consumption practices and lifestyles.

There are also many ways in which environmental degradation and growing resource pressures contribute to poverty and to inequality. Environmental shocks and stresses, mediated by socio-economic and political processes and institutions, can contribute to scarcities which bear on those who are already poor, driving inequalities further in terms of gaps between those who can protect themselves and those who cannot; who can grab scarce resources and who cannot.

Resource scarcities as felt by particular people and groups are scarcities more of access than of overall availability. Major questions arise about how limited natural resources are distributed; the world arguably has enough food to feed all, but inequalities in distribution of access and control create food insecurity and deprivation. As Lyla Mehta's work has shown, scarcities are 'manufactured' as much as natural, including by elites who stand to benefit from them, while as Jesse Ribot points out:

> Vulnerability does not just fall from the sky... The damages associated with storms, droughts, and slow climate changes are shaped by the social, political, and economic vulnerabilities of people and societies on the ground (Ribot, 2009).

There are also debates and apparent evidence that environmental pressures contribute to conflict and insecurity, and will do further in the future. So we find pervasive and repeated arguments about threatened 'water wars' in the middle east, and that resource pressures underlie African conflicts - from South Sudan to Sierra Leone.

However we need to be really careful here. Relations are complex and there is a real danger of catastrophist narratives that misrepresent environmental change and overlook political-economic causal dynamics in conflict; in short, the ways that inequality dynamics are interlaced too.

So we see dynamics linked to what Collier called resource curses – countries with rich resources (minerals, timber) that are easily captured by elites and put into global trading networks, bringing unrest and fuelling conflict (as diamonds did in Sierra Leone and Liberia).

Crucially, we see dynamics linked to interventions to deal with environmental change. For instance, today market-led schemes to conserve carbon (through selling credits and offsets), payments for ecosystem services, and conservation are sometimes associated with 'green grabs' that play into a dynamic of dispossession of local livelihoods and resource rights, in favour of private market profit, justified by an interpretation of global environmental need. Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea offer several examples. These build on a long history of interventions in name of (global) environment misinterpreting the social dynamics of environmental change, and labelling people as resource destroyers, justifying restrictions on them that contribute to inequality, and sometimes conflict.

Indeed environmental interventions have since colonial times been ways for powerful interests to demobilise threatening populations – whether in restricting the movements of pastoralists, or as in Guinea under Sekou Toure, using state using forest guards to discipline unruly rural areas through fire laws. And conflict can and does result, as seen in the past and as seen today in resistance to and attacks on forest guards emerging in forest carbon schemes around the world.

In this process, local ways of living with environments in socially and ecologically sustainable ways – whether in rural or urban settings, amongst pastoralist, agricultural or forest communities – are often ignored or undermined, along with local knowledge of ecologies and ways to manage them.

There is much talk now of green transformations – restructuring of economies and societies in ways that can generate win-wins. But crucially this cannot just be through markets and techno-fixes – it will require addressing inequalities, and wellbeing and security questions as locally experienced; and to be effective rather than fuel conflict and inequality further, green transformations will need to be driven by inclusive forms of politics.

Securities

To come to security, I first want to emphasise some things that I am not talking about – amidst debates on the 'security-development' nexus of recent years.

We need to be very wary of a securitisation of development, in the sense of a justification for development primarily in terms of its contributions to national security - averting threats and hazards to national state security interests, usually of rich nations, whether from people (refuges, environmental refugees, terrorists...) or microbes (Ebola). We also need to beware the intertwining of development with military and defence aims, when this becomes an unfortunate transfer of development spending to defence, or an inappropriate use of military force and styles in development approaches.

However, we cannot deny that in a global era, there are important interconnections between development, foreign affairs and the military; the challenge is to re-vision these connections and those with other actors, ideas and practices towards building what I would tentatively call 'inclusive security'.

This is a concept that needs working out, elaborating or nuancing by those more fully embedded in the scholarly and political debates than I. It is in some respects akin to notions of 'human security'. But whereas this emphasises security in the achievement of material needs and wellbeing, inclusive security as I see it is also very much about political inclusion.

Lack of inclusion in this broadest sense underlies and drives some of the processes that create violence and insecurity, as groups whose claims are unheard or marginalised resort to violence. We have seen this in many civil wars, and it is part of the dynamic of current challenges from extremist groups.

The Sierra Leonean war was, as Paul Richards writes, at least in part a rebellion of disenfranchised youth objecting to extreme economic inequality and political exclusion, as urbanised elites pocketed mineral wealth, and they faced lack of jobs and

opportunities, and lack of access to land and their own labour in agrarian systems weighted in favour of ex-colonial paramount chiefs. The DFID-supported process of post-conflict paramount chieftaincy rehabilitation wasn't able to address – and in some ways worsened – young people's ability to influence the decisions that affect their lives.

Lack of inclusion also drives fear and insecurity in more subtle ways. As we are seeing in the Ebola crisis, longstanding experiences of states that are distant and alien, have been oppressive, or seen to be serving other agendas (whether private enrichment or ethno-regionalisms) can feed suspicion and distrust of motives even when action is taken in avowed common good. The legacy of Guinea's deeply non-inclusive state socialism lives on in people's fear that government outbreak control teams are pumping viruses into their crowded markets.

Inequality is interlaced with non-inclusive insecurity; people living in highly unequal societies, unless at the top, are unlikely to feel that decisions are serving their interests and are more likely to feel disenfranchised. And horizontal inequalities are deeply interconnected with non-inclusion and insecurity, whether gender-based forms of violence or ethnic marginalisation.

(In)security and (un)sustainability are also interlaced, not just because environmental degradation and interventions can create insecurity, but crucially because people need to feel included and secure if to feel, and co-operate in building, a future worth sustaining.

Inclusive security then is multi-dimensional, and what it means will vary for different societies and people. But it certainly encompasses recognition of and support for political enfranchisement; for justice claims, and the building of institutions and mutual trust between authorities and communities. Inclusion implies the ability to influence and be part of the decisions that affect one's life, as an individual or group; and with it respect for rights, beliefs and freedoms.

The SDGs include a goal on peace and governance. But while this is a landmark, acknowledging these aims as part of sustainable development, it needs to be recognised as thoroughly interlinked with other goals, around sustainability and social/economic change. And must move beyond inter-state dimensions of peace-and security-building, to encompass the multi-level dimensions of security from the personal through the regional to the global, and the embedded histories of interaction that shape conditions of insecurity, and possibilities of greater security, for different people in different places.

Conclusions

I have only touched here on a few elements of complex relationships and dynamics within the arenas of (in)equality, (un)sustainability and (in) security, and in what I've termed their interlacing.

In many ways it has seemed hubristic and over-reaching even to offer such a sketch, or to delineate links that perhaps seem to some to be too obvious and general to be worth stating. Of course these dynamics are multiple, local, historically embedded, and badly need to be understood and addressed in all their nuance. Of course there are large scholarly literatures, and decades of vital thinking and activism, connected with each. The tentative links I have suggested here are only some amongst many, that badly need the energies of many, scholars, practitioners, people, in different places, to add to, elaborate, untangle, contest and debate.

But it is not to deny but precisely to underline these things that I pitch big; a vision for a more ambitious development, and development studies, for a global era now and into the future, and to call for a bigger-pitched but also vibrant and thoroughly grounded debate about them. Big but also people-focused, nuanced and shaped by context.

A new vision of development as transformational politics towards equality, sustainability, security will need to include fresh thinking and action in several arenas. These include several where the Ebola crisis has, as I have suggested, revealed current approaches to development to be seriously wanting, and where different approaches could have made a real difference.

One is in relation to global public goods and regulatory capacities. In areas like finance, climate, trade, tax and peace and multilateralism, greater attention and support is badly needed to address inequalities, unsustainability and insecurity. Health, and universal health care access, are recognised as global public goods, yet there is a need to (re)build funding and capabilities, in organisations like the WHO which so woefully failed the early stages of the Ebola outbreak. Capacities need to be there to be drawn down when needed, in responsive ways that build resilience – not in the kind of unseemly scramble for bilateral pledges of funding and personnel when crisis hits that we are seeing with Ebola now. And global public goods need to be built in recognition of common humanity and interconnectedness, not (just) narrow partisan interests – as we are seeing now in the struggle to keep Ebola from powerful Northern shores.

A second focus would be the building of inclusive institutions – from the state up and down, and linking formal and informal. The ways that different institutional mixes and interactions can shape different kinds of growth and prosperity needs attention and support. Questions turn not just on how institutions contribute to the satisfaction of material and non-material needs, but also how they contribute to trust, access to justice, and greater equality and security. Working through inclusive institutions in ways that further trust amongst them would have made all the difference in the Ebola case.
A third emphasis is recognition of people-led politics in all their diversity, on the streets and in fields, and combining activism, grassroots ingenuity, challenges and claims. It is community knowledge and practice that is currently driving the most effective Ebola responses. Activism around treatment rights has been vital in other situations of

structural violence relating to health – such as around HIV in South Africa. Failure to pick up and work with the pulse of people's real political concerns and modes of expression has underlain past development failures in West Africa and elsewhere, and a new transformational politics needs to rectify this.

But it would be naive and romantic to re-vision development simply in bottom-up terms. Instead, notions of transformational alliances – amongst different interest groups, and amongst actors in public, private and community sectors – may offer ways forward to recognise how progressive change is already happening in some places, and how it might become more widespread. There is much mutual learning that could happen - across and between low income countries, emerging economies, and richer, declining economies on a world stage about how such transformational alliances can be forged, and operate.

Finally, though, serious attention to power and political economy needs to infuse the ways that transformation and alliances are understood and shaped. Structural political economy, coupled with disciplinary power-knowledge, has configured structural violence in places like West Africa. Development lessons will be no more than tokenistic unless they recognise and seek to address these legacies.

So can Ebola teach us something? The preaching messages that 'Ebola is Real' adorning banners on the rainy streets of Monrovia smack of distant authority. Now, late in the day, the WHO and the Sierra Leonean government are, it seems, abandoning lockdowns in favour of a more community-engaged approach, and recalling recalling lessons from previous Ebola outbreaks in DRC and Uganda, where local knowledge drove responses. Will it ultimately be people's own capacities, and creative solutions as they claim the most basic forms of justice – to live (not die from disease), and to die acceptably, in funerals that are safe from infection but also enable respect for relatives living and in the afterlife – that turn this horrendous epidemic round? Will the world's military and financial resources be harnessed to support these effectively – and to re-build systems that can provide greater resilience into the future?

And will all of us then take the time to reflect on lessons for development more broadly – a development where inequality, unsustainability, insecurity and inappropriate 'development' interventions can interlace to produce conditions of structural violence that let crisis loose, and which need to be turned round if development – more equal, sustainable, and secure societies, for people – is to unfold?

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