

# PHILIPPINES TYPHOON HAIYAN RESPONSE REVIEW

April 2014



**HUMANITARIAN  
COALITION** 

Together saving more lives.

# Executive summary

Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda) that struck the Philippines on 8 November 2013 was one of the most powerful typhoons ever recorded; it caused massive damage across the Visayas and killed over six thousand people. Over four million people were displaced and over one million homes were damaged/destroyed<sup>1</sup>. Livelihoods were severely affected with some 33 million coconut trees damaged<sup>2</sup> and around 30 000 fishing boats damaged and/or destroyed<sup>3</sup>.

The response of the member agencies of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) and the Humanitarian Coalition (HC)<sup>4</sup> to date has been good. Faced with large logistical challenges agencies have on the whole been effective and efficient in their response, providing timely essential assistance such as food, shelter and essential non-food items (NFIs).

The successes achieved by agencies are also due to the resilience of Filipino society. Relative to recent large disasters in other countries, the pace of recovery is swift: agency staff often cited their need to 'keep up' and, to remain relevant, to be flexible in their actions.

That said, there are still massive challenges, and chief among them are livelihoods and shelter. Concerning the former, the coconut industry has been seriously affected and alternative livelihoods concerning income generation and choice of crops to grow are needed for the next three to seven years at least while coconut trees regrow to bear usable fruit. For fishing communities replacing fishing boats and providing lost and/or damaged kit such as nets are essential activities. In urban areas, while livelihood opportunities are more varied, good assessments now need to take place to ensure the right support. There is clearly also an opportunity to capitalise on the large amount of reconstruction needed by engaging for example, in construction skills training programmes.

Concerning shelter, most agencies have adopted shelter kits as a welcome development from transitional shelters, while at least one agency is building costlier semi-permanent houses, which provide a higher-quality product but help fewer people. Where shelter kits have worked well a full package of support is provided to complete the kits (including technical support, materials and/or cash); where they have not, especially vulnerable beneficiaries that do not have the means to complete their homes and are left without walls or in some cases even the means to build.

Vulnerable groups were targeted well by all agencies, with specialist agencies such as Age International working closely with older people to provide appropriate food items and much-valued solar lamps. All agencies had well-developed approaches for engaging communities in assessment and verification of who should receive support.

Cash based programming is increasingly the approach of choice for response and recovery actions in both rural and urban areas. According to one experienced member country director, 'cash is the number one intervention besides food and water'. This is an exciting development, which should be used more in subsequent relief-to-recovery operations. Where cash programming quality was more varied concerned cash for work (CFW) programmes: it is not

---

<sup>1</sup> Figures taken from *USAID Fact Sheet on Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda in Philippines*, 18 February 2014

<sup>2</sup> Chris Howe and Salla Himberg (nd) *Coconut Lumber Technical Working Group, Yolanda Response, Philippines, 2013-2014 Report*, Early Recovery and Livelihood Cluster and Shelter Cluster

<sup>3</sup> Oxfam (2014) *Rebuilding fishing communities and fisheries, post-Haiyan reconstruction in the Philippines*

<sup>4</sup> The Disasters Emergency Committee brings together the 14 leading humanitarian agencies in the UK; the Humanitarian Coalition brings together five of Canada's leading agencies. Both organisations raise funds at times of major humanitarian crises to support the relief and recovery effort

new in relief programming to observe that CFW must be meaningful and productive, and not just a mechanism to disburse funds - cash transfers can do this well enough.

Working with government has been a positive experience, although some agencies should have consulted more closely with mayors and their staff at local government level to provide a better-coordinated response. For the recovery, an important opportunity exists for DEC/HC members, their partner NGOs and others to align their actions with the relatively new Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, which Filipino NGOs with support from INGOs were instrumental in developing. This also builds on the largely unprecedented good relations between government and national NGOs.

DEC/HC members also enjoy very good relations with national partner NGOs, but more could be done for international NGOs in general to share their agency plans with local NGOs.

Coordination between members, mostly through clusters, was good but inevitably could be better: coverage of communities was not equal, with one key informant noting 'the Tacloban effect' of following media-driven interest to provide support to high-profile places. In this regard several members and their partners notably worked in remoter places such as in Eastern Samar and on islands off Panay to good effect.

Coordination was also discussed in terms of agencies getting better at capitalising on each others' strengths to better meet the humanitarian imperative. In one example this might include agencies not immediately present in an affected location immediately after a disaster ceding space to others that are. This is a contentious idea given that agencies arriving after a disaster do provide valuable assistance; however it is still worth noting given that greater efficiencies in response can and must always be achieved.

# Recommendations

Recommendations relate to relief-to-recovery actions of DEC/HC members and partner NGOs, and also to wider lessons in disaster response.

	On page
1 Shelter kits to 'the poorest of the poor' must provide the means for completion, eg provision of grants and/or durable materials for walls and flooring and technical support	3
2 Carry out urban and rural livelihood assessments as quickly as possible, focusing efforts on vulnerabilities	4
3 Invest in reconstruction by training up local carpenters, plumbers and masons and other skills in demand using existing certified schemes	4
4 Cash for work must always be meaningful and productive: prioritise and closely monitor its quality and relevance	6
5 Cash programming should be scaled up for quicker early recovery	7
6 Members need to share and capitalise on each other's respective strengths such as pre-disaster in-country presence to better meet the humanitarian imperative in the immediate relief phase	10
7 Ensure communities are in the driving seat of prioritising their needs, for example agencies use participatory assessments as the basis for recovery programming. Be truly responsive to community needs and, as a sign of respect and accountability, share findings	10
8 Discuss recovery and rehabilitation plans with all stakeholders. Share agency reviews and agency plans locally - after all, whose disaster is it?	14
9 Coordination must be with and through government at all levels from the beginning, with the strong participation of all actors	15
10 Support the capacity of Local Government Units to implement the newly-formed National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act, leaving government and communities stronger than before.	16

# Acronyms

AI	Age International
BRC	British Red Cross
CaLP	Cash Learning Partnership
CCG	Conditional cash grant
CERD	Centre for the Empowerment and Rural Development
CFW	Cash For Work
CGI	Corrugated galvanised iron
COSE	Coalition of Services for the Elderly
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CTTCs	Construction Trade Training Centres
CwC	Communicating with communities
CWG	Cash Working Group
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DPC	Direction de la Protection Civile
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EFSA	Emergency Food Security Assessment
EMMA	Emergency Market Mapping Analysis
ESSU	Eastern Samar State University
FGD	Focus group discussion
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
HC	Humanitarian Coalition
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
I-CODE	Iloilo Consortium of Development NGOs
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
IR	Islamic Relief Worldwide
KI	Key informant
LGU	Local Government Unit
LMMS	Last Mile Mobile Solutions
MIRA	Multi-cluster needs assessment
NDRRM	Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act
NFI	Non-food item
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PCA	Philippines Coconut Authority
PDNA	Post Disaster Needs Assessment
PFI	Pagtambayayong Foundation Inc
PRDC	Panay Rural Development Centre
PTSD	Post traumatic stress disorder
PWD	People living with disabilities
SCF	Save the Children
SK	Shelter Kit
STERR	Skills Training for Early Recovery and Reconstruction program
TESDA	Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
UCG	Unconditional cash grant
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WFP	World Food Programme
WV	World Vision

# Research approach

The primary activity for this review comprised a 19-day visit to areas affected by typhoon Haiyan in Cebu, Leyte, Samar and Panay. A full timetable of activities can be found in Annex One. Activities included:

- Focus group discussions (FGDs) with Barangay (community) members. FGDs were often gender separate and at other times mixed. FGDs and meetings sizes ranged from eight to 75 people
- Meetings with Barangay Captains, local government officials, including mayors, a governor, an assistant secretary and officials from various offices including planning, health, agriculture and social welfare, both at local and national level
- Key informant interviews with academics, business people, an ex-mayor and members of UN agencies and the shelter cluster
- Formal interviews and informal conversations with DEC/HC members staff including country directors, field staff and partner NGOs
- Round table discussions with DEC/HC members. Four discussions were held: one in Cebu, attended by staff from seven DEC/HC members and their partners; one in Ormoc, attended by staff from six DEC/HC agencies and partners; one in Tacloban, attended by six DE/HC members and one partner; and a final session attended by staff from 11 DEC/HC members. Apart from the Cebu round table (which occurred at the beginning of the visit), subsequent round table meetings comprised the discussion of learnings and emerging recommendations. At the final session recommendations were discussed, amended and voted on by participants using 'Planning for Real' methodology, which provided the basis for the 10 recommendations present in this report.

The research approach used questions that derived from the terms of reference provided by DEC/HC as the basis for meetings. Notes of all interviews and meetings were kept; interviewees were informed that anonymity would be assured for all views expressed. Findings were triangulated by other meetings and where necessary checked for factual accuracy. Information provided by DEC/HC included initial proposals and three month progress reports. One draft of a real time evaluation (RTEs) was provided by a member. Other sources included agency assessments such as the Multi-cluster needs assessment (MIRA), cluster documentation gained mostly from cluster websites and documentation provided by government officials.

Visits focused mostly on DEC/HC member projects, although the review team also met with some non-beneficiaries.

Two research teams undertook the work over three weeks. David Sanderson (team leader) and Zenaida Delica Willison (consultant) were present throughout. For week one they were joined by Rodilyn Boyo (Oxfam Philippines), Alex Economou (CARE) and Nicolas Moyer (HC). For weeks two and three they were joined by Annie Devonport (DEC), Alwynn Javier (Christian Aid) and Carmen Tremblay (CARE). Team members did not visit their respective organisations.

# Contents

	Page
1. Gaps, priority areas and unmet needs to inform member agencies' relief-to-recovery plans	2
2. Innovations and exemplary programming	6
3. Member agencies' responses against DAC criteria	9
4. Decision making in relation to recovery and shelter solutions	13
5. Local partnerships and coordination with government structures	14
6. Addressing the needs of the most vulnerable, including people living with disabilities (PWDs) and older people	17
7. Communication with disaster affected communities	19

## Annexes

1. Timetable of activities
2. Community focus group and key informant questions

## Acknowledgements

The team is immensely grateful to all those who gave their time and energy that allowed this report to be produced, including community groups, those in government, DEC/HC agency members and respective United Nations organisations.

In particular we are grateful to Denvie Balidoy, Amy Beaumont, David Bell, Joanna Garbalinska, Bethan Lewis, Kate Nolan and Hayley O'Keeffe for all their help in organising and making the trip work so smoothly.

This report was written by David Sanderson and Zenaida Delica Willison, with contributions from Rodilyn Boyo, Annie Devonport, Alwynn Javier, Nicolas Moyer and Carmen Tremblay.

April 2014

# 1. Gaps, priority areas and unmet needs to inform member agencies' relief-to-recovery plans

All communities, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), NGO partners and government bodies - mayors, Local Government Unit (LGU) staff and Barangay<sup>5</sup> Captains - cited shelter and livelihoods as the two most pressing needs. For shelter, the unmet needs so far concern durable shelter for the one million plus households who lost their homes. For livelihoods the unmet needs are access to income, especially in rural areas where coconut farming has been largely destroyed (new trees take three to seven years to grow before bearing usable fruit) and large numbers of fishing boats have been damaged. A livelihood gap right now concerns the need to develop alternative means of income earning.

## Shelter

Post-disaster shelter programming is riddled with challenges<sup>6</sup>. The shelter need post-Haiyan is immense - right now many living in partially or fully damaged houses live under blankets and tarps while some have been moved to government temporary shelter, known as bunkhouses. According to the shelter cluster, as of March 2014 '493,912 homes were partially damaged and 518,878 totally damaged'<sup>7</sup>. In rural areas poorer communities are almost always tenants, making land tenure for rebuilding an issue. In urban areas informal dwellers are usually living in cramped, poor quality conditions, often with insecure tenure - Oxfam has identified land tenure and shelter as an area of possible advocacy.

Recognising the need, all DEC/HC members have engaged in shelter in one form or another. Nearly all in the initial response provided tarps, which once again have proven useful for meeting some immediate needs, and are far more cost effective than the provision of much more expensive and less flexible options such as small tents. Beyond tarps and tents, shelter engagement by DEC/HC members<sup>8</sup> includes:

**Repair of damaged houses.** A commonly used distinction is partial and fully damaged houses<sup>9</sup>. Responses for partial damage include conditional and/or unconditional cash grants - Age International combines the two in some instances using cash for work (CFW).

**Improvements to government bunkhouses** by providing water, protection and sanitation facilities. Both Oxfam and Plan have been active in this area.

**Shelter kits:** almost always a timber frame comprising four posts and a double pitch roof with corrugated galvanised iron (CGI) covering. The intent is to build a strong frame that can withstand typhoons, and as such is akin to developmental core housing programmes. Good shelter kits include hurricane straps and other forms of ties to make the structure typhoon-resistant. Variations on shelter kits include: the provision of equipment such as saws, wires, hammers and nails; technical assistance such as from trained carpenters; awareness raising about safe building techniques; and in some cases (conditional and/or unconditional) cash grants for beneficiaries to complete the kits.

---

<sup>5</sup> The lowest level of administrative division in the Philippines

<sup>6</sup> See for the example Ashdown *et al.* (2011) *Humanitarian Emergency Response Review*. London

<sup>7</sup> Shelter cluster Philippines. *Strategic Operational Framework for Transition Post-Yolanda*. Draft 3.2, March 2014

<sup>8</sup> The decider on approaches concerns budget and coverage, which is discussed in chapter four

<sup>9</sup> Although CARE reports that this distinction of partial or fully damaged has been a challenge in relation to beneficiary selection criteria based on vulnerability, where those with fully damaged houses might not be eligible for support



Shelter kits allow agencies to provide an affordable shelter response that aims to 'build back safer' and includes an element of beneficiary contribution. When they have not worked well shelter packages have been provided that do not include the means of completion to vulnerable people unable finish the job. This is a concern. When asked her opinion, one DEC/HC member's partner said, 'It's half the job done, if that'. In Tabogan Municipality shelter kits have literally become a joke, with the community coining the term, 'Proyekto Limitado' or 'limited project' in the local dialect (note: shelter kits are discussed further in chapter four and elsewhere in this report).

***Recommendation one: shelter kits to 'the poorest of the poor' must provide the means for completion, eg provision of grants and/or durable materials for walls and flooring and technical support***

**Semi-permanent housing**, usually comprising: a timber frame, blocks up to about a metre in height, plywood walls above the blocks and a CGI roof. Such a building is popular among rural Barangays and is often stated as a desired structure: one FGD participant said, 'the good side of Yolanda (the local name for Typhoon Haiyan) is that we're dreaming of changing our nipa<sup>10</sup> to CGI'. Islamic Relief determined quickly that they would focus a majority of their resources on shelter. Islamic Relief halted their shelter kit distributions after concluding these were inadequate to meet the household needs for the poorest. They reallocated budgets to semi-permanent houses, making a trade-off to produce higher quality structures for a smaller number of beneficiaries. An initial model was designed and built for community input using local materials. Following input by shelter experts and the community, modifications were made, and a second model developed. These structures are intended to last a minimum of 10 years, with a combination of reinforced concrete substructure and treated coco lumber upper structure, with four-way roofing closed off to limit wind intrusion in high winds. These shelters are 4m x 5m and cost approximately \$1000 each and are without sanitation facilities.

A notable point in comparison to other recent large disasters is that transitional shelter has not been a term often cited. This review finds this a welcome development, and the focus on shelter kits an advancement of the transitional shelter approach. This view was supported by one experienced DRR expert working in Cebu's Pagligon Task Force: 'No more transitional shelter - it is a waste of money.'

Finally, permanent houses are being built by private sector companies and wealthy beneficiaries. In such projects the housing cost is in the region of £8000 (USD12000) - a cost that has led DEC/HC members not to contemplate this option.

## **Livelihoods**

At the time of writing, the humanitarian response is transitioning from relief to recovery – although for many affected, relief is still wanted. Early in the response, immediate priorities were food and non-food items (NFIs) such as tarps and tools. As the coconut industry has been severely affected, there is a need to find ways of bringing in income, not just for the next few months, but for several years to come. There is a desire to resume fishing and agricultural activities, and a need for alternative crops to what may have been grown before, and/or take up any other opportunities which may arise that can bring income into the household. In towns and cities livelihoods appear to have been (relatively) less affected, with the re-establishment of markets and, week by week, an increasing return to normalcy: even in Tacloban large parts of the city are now functioning as normal.

---

<sup>10</sup> A commonly used low cost walling option

When asked about their primary needs, women across nearly all FGDs readily replied that it is livelihoods. They clarified this further by adding 'a more sustainable one' to what was before. Most women interviewed expressed concern over the unseen future. They pointed out that many are living mostly on the relief goods they have received and are acutely aware that in the next few months the provision of relief items will stop altogether. Coastal communities made reference to their family's damaged boats and wasted farmlands. They and others talked about the loss coconut trees that were their primary source of income. In one FGD in Barangay Tambongon women explained that prior to Haiyan farming and selling produce (including fish in coastal areas) were their main sources of income.

Having lost their boats, many women and men are working as helpers in nearby farms earning about 80 pesos per day or 12 to 15 pesos per hour (the minimum wage is in the range of 260-327 pesos per day depending on location). Women said that payment often comes late. Some women are also into scrap buying: they buy waste plastics, tin cans and scrap steel. They buy it per kilo for a minimal amount and then sell it to a junkshop nearby, earning 50 pesos or more on a good day. Of the 35 women present during the discussion, 12 are receiving conditional cash grants (CCGs) and receive government subsidy for children going to school. In an FGD of older people in Barangay Sherwood, those present noted that livelihoods activities, in their case, would be limited.

Fishing stocks and fish breeding grounds have also been damaged by the typhoon. This latter problem may in some areas be fairly short term as the reduction in fishing will help stocks to recover as long as the protected zones are not violated in the meantime. Where coral reefs have been damaged, for example in northern Panay, there have been discussions about creating artificial reefs.

***Recommendation two: carry out urban and rural livelihood assessments as quickly as possible, focusing efforts on vulnerabilities***

### **Livelihood opportunities**

There is clearly an opportunity to capitalise on the huge amount of reconstruction needed by providing training in construction skills such as masonry, carpentry and plumbing. Such an approach has been tried and tested in previous post-disaster recovery operations by DEC/HC members and their partners to good effect, eg SEEDS Masons Associations in India and Christian Aid and its partners' Construction Trade Training Centres (CTTC) programmes in Pakistan. For this to work however, training needs to be to a high standard, and preferably accredited. In this regard INGOs could explore using existing schemes such as the Skills Training for Early Recovery and Reconstruction (STERR) programme (UNDP is supporting a STERR programme, training around 1000 selected masons, plumbers and carpenters in 16 affected municipalities in Cebu Province. The intent is that they then train others).

Also, accreditation could use existing schemes such as the government's Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), an approach that CAFOD's partner Catholic Relief Services (CRS) has undertaken in the training of 10 carpenters with Eastern Samar State University (ESSU), all of whom are currently employed by CRS and which could be scaled up.

***Recommendation three: Invest in reconstruction by training up local carpenters, plumbers and masons and other skills in demand using existing certified schemes***

The following ideas have been presented by various key informants (KIs) from government (Municipality, LGU and Barangay levels) NGOs:

- Milling coconut timber<sup>11</sup> and setting up co-operatives
- Petty cabs. Men reported renting out motorbikes at 80 pesos per day and seek out passengers in towns and cities
- Adoption of the Thai tradition of OTOP - one town one product
- Making furniture from trees and basket weaving
- Developing fish ponds and vegetable gardens
- Mobile markets: villagers transport excess produce to other villages to sell
- In the islands off Panay alternatives to fishing such as raising livestock
- For fishing communities, preparing squid balls and squid rings.

## **Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)**

Although there has been no recorded large-scale sanitation-related disease outbreak, WASH needs registered highly among those spoken with. In Eastern Samar, hard hit by the typhoon and already poor, there were a higher number of families who did not have proper sanitation in their houses before, and many sanitation facilities that did exist were damaged.

Open defecation is still common in many (mostly rural) areas and there is contamination of surface water sources. The WASH cluster co-lead in Cebu fears ongoing high risk of water born disease, particularly at the return of the next typhoon season. In his assessment, the priorities are: getting sanitation facilities up to pre-typhoon levels; targeting school facilities to upgrade water supplies; and longer-term planning to support LGU capacity to monitor and maintain their water systems.

In urban areas water access is present and numerous NGOs have provided support in this area. LGUs have also rehabilitated water systems in many municipalities. Many people however are spending significant portions of their income on purchasing potable water. This is also true in rural areas where fewer people have access to municipal water sources and where private water sources are used. Significant support is still needed to rehabilitate water access in schools and underserved areas.

## **Cash for work (CFW)**

In the immediate relief phase livelihoods were not so much considered as the provision of cash, which was provided via several routes, including CFW programmes. CFW activities commonly undertaken include street cleaning, debris removal, house repair, mangrove clearing and boat repairs.

Many Barangay members spoken with were very grateful for the provision of CFW, which provided a much-needed means of income, and where this worked well the work contributed towards meaningful improvements. This includes, for example, removing debris from roads, clearing of sites for new housing and unblocking drains. There is tremendous appreciation on display in Bantayan for Oxfam's CFW efforts.

However, as is often the case in CFW, less meaningful work can take place: some CFW programmes (not managed by DEC/HC members) witnessed weeding of remote roads and painting stones. One senior government official stated that CFW too often was used 'to make backyards pretty,' while another stated 'don't weed the road; repair schools and health centres'.

---

<sup>11</sup> See the Early Recovery and Livelihood Cluster and Shelter Cluster's *Coconut Lumber Technical Working Group* report by Chris Howe and Salla Himberg (no date) for further discussion on coconut lumber uses

Some CFW programmes of DEC/HC members included initiatives that would almost certainly take place regardless of CFW. An example of this is clearing mangroves or clearing dams. A fine line therefore exists between supporting good work and creating a form of dependency, where (as witnessed on several occasions) community members were waiting for the CFW assessment to take place to begin important work that they themselves may not have waited for had CFW not been an option.

***Recommendation four: cash for work must always be meaningful and productive: prioritise and closely monitor its quality and relevance***

## Education

Several women, particularly those with small children, when asked what they would hope for in the coming months answered that they would want scholarship grants for their children. With their livelihoods gone, they said they no longer know where to get the resources to ensure that their children will continue attending school. While public schools for elementary and high school do not require tuition fees, school needs such as uniforms, school materials and daily allowances are hard to come by since the typhoon. One FGD group noted that some people use cash grants to enable children and grandchildren to continue education at the expense of meeting their own shelter and/or livelihood needs.

## 2. Innovations and exemplary programming

Good examples and innovations include:

**Shelter beneficiary identification process.** CARE's shelter kits delivery approach, working to ensure transparency concerning beneficiary identification and quality at an affordable cost, provides a good model. In Roxas and elsewhere, CARE provides shelter kits composed of materials, cash (total cost 7700 Pesos, with around 4500 Pesos as a CCG) and technical support. The beneficiary selection sequence, which often takes around one week, is as follows:

1. Stakeholders meeting to receive the Department of Social Welfare and Development's (DSWD) housing damage assessment list from the mayor
2. Receive a second assessment list updated house damage assessment report from the Barangay Captain: hold stakeholder meeting and within that meeting elect a committee, usually of 4-8 people, including health workers, community group members and Barangay council members and from that ask the committee to develop a first list of beneficiaries that meet the criteria
3. Hold a 'General Assembly' community meeting to introduce messages on building back safer, and describe the project, the criteria and selection process
4. Post initial beneficiary list in Barangay with criteria and suggestions box for feedback
5. Review feedback - suggestions usually query who is and/or is not on the list
6. Validation of final list, including random sample and/or follow up on specific feedback points
7. Posting of final list and dates for distributions
8. Distribution of materials and cash to beneficiaries
9. Technical follow up with community-led roving teams to ensure inclusion of building back safer messages.

CARE intends to follow up some time later in phase two to ensure those most vulnerable who received shelter kits and cannot complete a basic shelter are entitled to a top up payment.

**Cash based approaches.** One DEC/HC member country director noted, 'cash is coming of age; now it's the number one intervention besides food and water.' Unconditional cash grants (UCGs) have been welcome among beneficiaries and agencies, and its scaling up would also be welcome. Beneficiaries said they appreciated the freedom to make choices with the funds. In FGDs most people spent the cash on very basic items, such as food and shelter material. A few mentioned having bought medicine or paid school fees. In some conditions UCGs might be preferential to distributions: soon after the typhoon Oxfam in Eastern Samar took a decision to provide blanket UCGs of 3000 Pesos, in recognition of immediate need and of the time that assessments would take. In Sante Antonio, some beneficiaries stated they would have preferred to have received cash to enable them to start repairing or rebuilding their homes as soon as markets were open, rather than waiting for the NGO to distribute materials.

***Recommendation five: cash programming should be scaled up for quicker early recovery***

**Aligning cash for work rates.** The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) appointed a Cash Working Group (CWG) coordinator early in the response which helped ensure a more uniform consistency of approaches between agencies, who used comparable daily wage rates commensurate with the minimum wage, and ranged (for DEC/HC members) between 260 and 327 pesos per day, depending on location. A few (non-DEC/HC) agencies paid a much higher rate, which distorted CFW and was reported to have drawn people away from regular employment.

**Partnerships for providing long term housing.** In a short time, Islamic Relief has formed solid partnerships with the Provincial Government of Cebu and with at least two LGUs in Bantayan. Islamic Relief has developed two distinct approaches to shelter construction for identified households. The first is to build in relocation sites where these are deemed to be appropriate by the community. Government has secured access and committed resources to support required infrastructure such as sanitation, water and roads. Land titles will be given to the relocated. The second is to build on existing locations of identified households. For tenants, a tri-partite agreement has been developed with legal counsel to set expectations and a legal framework to protect beneficiaries. This is signed by beneficiaries and the landowner and the LGU, securing a minimum of 10 years tenancy for beneficiaries.

**Boat building production line.** Concern supported the reestablishment of the fishing industry in Conception by working with the municipal mayor, fishermen and women and boat builders to set up a temporary boat building production line. Beneficiaries are those who have lost their boats; they contribute by finishing off the boat by sanding-down and painting it to the design of their choice and fitting bamboo outriggers. Technical advice and on-going quality control seeks to ensure standards are adequate. Owners also receive nets, lines and an outboard engine if these were damaged/destroyed by the typhoon.

**Community committees.** Many DEC/HC members set up community committees to oversee community activities. Save the Children organised the Yolanda Recovery Committee (YRC) composed of representatives from various sectoral groups among the survivors to prioritise those needing shelter assistance. In Mayorga Barangay Save the Children established selection committees to identify those who were most vulnerable. The committees included men and women, young and older people. The criteria were explained to them then they produced the list that was then verified by Save the Children. Lists of beneficiaries were subsequently clearly published in the Barangay hall.

**Volunteer mobilisation.** Christian Aid volunteers reached remote island communities (Talingting and Punta Batuanan in Calagnan Island, Carles municipality). The volunteers, who were themselves survivors of the typhoon, said that they are happy doing this unpaid service for their communities.

**Quick impact projects.** In Ormoc a World Vision health hygiene campaign combined with a clean-up programme and hygiene education saw the reduction of diarrhoeal diseases. Oxfam organised the clearance of debris in the coconut plantations through CFW, which provided lumber for house construction and fuel with the unsuitable coconut trunks. Preparation of the cleared land and provision of seeds for vegetable production on the cleared land has yielded several results: participants have cash in their pockets from the CFW, lumber for construction and will have learned about vegetable growing. In three months they will be able to harvest vegetable crops.

**Use of Technology.** In Tacloban Save the Children used tablets to gather assessment data. They reported that information gathering was quicker and more accurate. In Bantayan Oxfam used Last Mile Mobile Solutions (LMMS) software to capture beneficiary data, which can then be used in monitoring.

**Food fair with coupons.** a Christian Aid partner organised a ‘food fair’ with printed coupons that resembled money. 1,500 pesos in fake money was provided to each family to buy rice, vegetables, and chicken, beef or fish. The partner had made arrangements with 25 vendors who brought their goods to the fair. The 3,500 beneficiaries (about 70 per cent of the population of targeted Barangays) bought the food from the vendors. The vendors then traded in the coupons for cash from the Christian Aid partner. This stimulated the local economy - vendors report making an average of 10,000 pesos net profit - and provided food to the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries also appreciated choosing the items themselves, although the food package was set.

**Texting for accountability mechanisms:** Oxfam set up mobile text messaging hotlines in Bantayan where people can text their feedback and complaints related to the response. A dedicated person ensures that inquiries and complaints are responded to. As many as 200 text messages per week are received. Many Filipinos are comfortable with texting: the Philippines is known by some as ‘the text capital of the world.’ The mechanism also offers a non-threatening way of reporting complaints.

**Community-led assessments using community change plan training,** undertaken by Action Aid’s partner Pagtambayayong Foundation Inc (PFI). Drawing from participatory rapid appraisal and action planning techniques, the seven-day event comprising three days orientation and four days application is designed to enable Barangay members to identify vulnerability and capacities, and to present to agencies and government their key identified needs for the recovery phase. The approach also builds community cohesion and the sharing of risk reduction approaches.



*Findings from a community-led assessment*

## 3. Member agencies' responses against DAC criteria

### Efficiency

DEC/HC members who had a presence in the communities and/or had relationships with local NGOs prior to the typhoon reported being able to work quickly and target more efficiently due to pre-existing relationships. Plan had established strong relationships with government and partners in Eastern Samar, allowing them to respond quickly after the typhoon. Save the Children was among one of the first agencies to provide distributions in Tacloban, having pre-positioned goods and a team in the city prior to the typhoon's arrival. Action Aid, Christian Aid and CARE were able to quickly reach out to their partners in affected areas and begin work on many fronts simultaneously, due to multiple partners.

Many agencies repeatedly noted that the pace of recovery was quicker than they were anticipating. The Governor of Cebu called this 'a condensed relief to recovery process'. More than one agency noted that they had delivered large amounts of hardware, eg water bladders and jerry cans that had little use. As one agency member remarked, 'the water came back after two days; we didn't have any need for water bladders'.

Barangay FGDs frequently stated that food was delivered by INGOs and NGOs promptly. Food packs, often containing rice, sardines and dried fish were welcomed. However at one meeting with some 30 older people a strong view was that only a certain type of rice was palatable to them. Age International also noted that often older people will store food given for their use to give to grandchildren. In coastal areas several Barangay FGDs found that fishing communities did not like tinned sardines. In northern Panay's islands, Christian Aid's partner Panay Rural Development Centre (PRDC) provided NFI kits that comprised blankets and towels as well as soap, sanitary pads for women, toothbrushes and toothpaste. They also provided 25 kilos of rice per household, a much larger amount than government supplies. NFIs and food were distributed to all those on the islands visited. Feedback from Barangay FGDs was that the relief provided was greatly welcomed.

CAFOD's partner CRS provided agricultural inputs and farm tools for five Barangays in Quinapondon, Eastern Samar. CRS provided farmers skills training on gardening and partnered with ESSU for technical guidance on farming and gardening. Several DEC/HC members distributed seeds within a month of the typhoon which importantly allowed many to plant immediately, as opposed to losing out on an entire agricultural cycle.

During one agency round table a discussion concerned whether, in the first few days following a disaster, agencies not already present in-country should cede funds and support to those that are, to maximise efficiency and to better meet the immediate humanitarian imperative. In return agencies not immediately present but who might arrive some days or weeks after the disaster are given appropriate recognition.

This approach was contested by one or two members at the discussion (and at a subsequent round table discussion attended by members in London), who pointed out that while not immediately present, members still played a vital role in relief to recovery operations.

The inclusion of this point in this report is based also on the views gathered from several key informants interviewed during the review (from OCHA, LGU officials and individual members) that efforts at better coordination between members are always needed, and that exploiting opportunities for more joint relief provision immediately after a disaster is one such route.

***Recommendation six: Members need to share and capitalise on each other's respective strengths such as pre-disaster in-country presence to better meet the humanitarian imperative***

## **Effectiveness**

A common belief is that Barangays located further from main regions of focus were slower to receive help. One UN coordinator called this 'the Tacloban effect'. A partner NGO key informant stated, 'Most NGOs focus on popular areas,' while another stated, 'Many NGOs working near highways means lots of other places ignored.' One DEC/HC member partner stated that a key challenge was that things took longer, citing distances and time taken to get to islands, and disruption in travel caused by weather – the understanding that the Philippines comprises several thousand islands needs to be reinforced.

This however was not uniformly the case, and DEC/HC members such as Plan, Age International and Save the Children worked hard to reach more inaccessible communities. Christian Aid through its partners Iloilo Consortium of Development NGOs (I-CODE) and PRDC worked in islands in northern Panay, some of which take some hours to get to from the mainland. Making initial assessments proved hard given a shortage of boat transportation (several islands were assisted with relief items by the Royal Navy's HMS Illustrious).

A frequent problem for all humanitarian actors cited early on after the typhoon was shortage of building materials, in particular lumber and good quality CGI sheeting. At least one agency received poor quality imported CGI which it had to return. In Leyte frequent statements made were that the CGI available in markets was too thin, and to these ends CGI in the early response was imported from Cebu. Lumber was also in short supply; however this is quickly changing with increasing numbers of lumberyards selling coconut lumber.

All DEC/HC members prioritised the most vulnerable, often referred to as 'the poorest of the poor'. In assessments criteria invariably included people living with disabilities (PWD), single mothers, child headed households and the elderly. In several FGDs comments were sometimes made by one or two people that targeting had been unfair, almost always by people whose houses had been damaged but who had not been eligible for assistance in the criteria by the respective agency, ie they were not among the most vulnerable. In other cases people noted that some people were initially on lists who should not have been; however this was often spotted by agencies in the validation process.

Several communities visited noted that they would have liked organisations to come by after an assessment and explain if aid was going to be given or not. At least one DEC/HC member was cited for having made an assessment but had not returned: the community did not know the reasons. Several Barangay FGDs commented that they had been subject to more than one assessment (one Barangay reported up to five times) and often, they had not heard from the organisation again. This of course raises expectations and builds tiredness when community goodwill to engage is met with silence. Clearly this is not in accord with issues of dignity and respect, and while recognising the urgency of post-disaster relief, some agencies could improve how they connect with communities.

***Recommendation seven: ensure communities are in the driving seat of prioritising their needs, for example agencies use participatory assessments as the basis for recovery programming. Be truly responsive to community needs and, as a sign of respect and accountability, share findings***

Finally, concerning effectiveness, agencies have lessons to learn from the private sector, some of whom mobilised in large ways to support disaster survivors in the immediate aftermath of the Typhoon. Most of the private sector contributions were however organised independently from



NGO activities and coordination appears to have been quite limited between sectors. There were nonetheless welcome contributions of telecommunications and computer equipment to some DEC/HC members. These latter contributions came as a result of proactive outreach by telecommunications firms to NGOs, rather than requests from NGOs. One experienced DEC/HC member country director marvelled at how large private sector companies such as Coca Cola and Nestle had used helicopters to help their staff. 'I would never have thought to do that – we don't think like that in our sector', he said. He added that he would have liked to have sent his staff in on those helicopters.

## **Relevance**

Relief interventions were clearly relevant in the early months, with FGDs across the Visayas confirming NGOs, government and other agencies helped meet priority basic needs. Community consultations have been widespread and appreciation for early interventions was uncontested by beneficiaries. Strategies, approaches, goods and activities were nearly always suited to the situation and the needs of the beneficiaries. Some examples include: distribution of seeds and training/explanations about alternative crops; cash for asset recovery; shelter kits with technical explanations on how to build safer houses, and as noted earlier, the means for completion included for the most vulnerable; building of latrines in hospitals that were severely damaged but were still functioning and treating patients; and the repair of damaged health centres.

Strong clarity and transparency however is needed, and communities must be involved in the identification of who the beneficiaries should be. Community volunteers of one DEC/HC member who facilitated the identification and distribution of shelter kits in one Barangay related how it had become a source of conflict. Several reported being confronted at night by angry neighbours who were not included in the 10 households targeted per sitio (village). They shared that there is an average of 60 to 70 households with totally damaged houses. Targeting only 10 leaves out the remaining 60 to 70 households who are also very much in need of shelter assistance. In another instance, one FGD of Barangay Captains described how the allocation of shelter kits and toilets caused problems. Ten shelter kits were distributed among two sitios, but only one toilet was built, causing both sitios to share. According to the FGD, this caused tension in the Barangay.

Furthermore an adjoining sitio received no support, leading that sitio to conclude that the process was unfair. The Barangay Captains were not aware of how the NGO was distributing resources and learnt of this at a community meeting. 'They (the community) thought we were politicking' one Captain said, when they knew nothing.

## **Contribution to sustainability**

Some government officials interviewed voiced frustration at a shortage of using relief funds to build long-term recovery. One government official stated that in urban areas the provision of free relief goods and services undermines business. This view was confirmed by a business key informant who criticised CFW programmes for providing disincentives for working in meaningful employment. A government DRR advisor in Cebu criticised continuing relief measures, quipping, 'Don't spend your budget on mineral water; restore the municipal water supply,' stating that, 'what's needed is a total package of intervention to develop a culture of resilience'.

DEC/HC members are making efforts to look beyond the emergency phase and link their initiatives with early recovery and development programming. Plan for example is linking its health programming to its pre-existing programming in the Samar region, which includes

## Focus group advice for the next disaster

Twenty three participants from 11 DEC/HC member agencies including three country directors at the final day review round table held in Manila were asked to write on cards advice for the next disaster. Their advice mapped to DAC criteria includes:

### Efficiency

- Activate and contribute to an efficient cluster system early on (avoid individualism)
- Agencies determine more appropriate modality to respond, ie whether to be operational themselves or work through better positioned partners
- Joint needs assessment to be encouraged among partners
- Coordinate on the ground during implementation – a consortium approach is the way forward, leveraging knowledge and experience in country to avoid overlap of efforts

### Effectiveness

- Increase logistics and coordination of staff deployments
- Map partner intervention areas from day one
- Stronger leadership in cluster coordination leading to faster more efficient decision-making specifically related to minimum standard issues

### Relevance

- Make response flexible to fast changing needs, ie with early recovery support part of an emergency package
- Take a step back; avoid rushing in

### Contribution to sustainability

- Feedback to communities the outcomes of assessments
- If we see this post-disaster phase as an opportunity, we should be focusing on integrating resilience into everything we do. The next disaster will be a test of how well we do that now
- Let's really try to get the coordination happening at the municipal level at the outset next time. Support LGUs to take lead on coordination.

capacity building in health (support and training), training of community mobilisers and developing a 'young leaders' programme.

Plan is hoping to invest more in DRR, building on what it has learned from this disaster - having worked in four of the six Barangays bordering the Pacific ocean in Salcedo, Samar, it hopes to capture lessons learned from this experience, comparing the resilience in the four Barangays they assisted to those in the two they did not.

Right now there are opportunities for DEC/HC members and others to progress learning on resilience through:

- Research - for example whether communities engaged in DRR programmes before the typhoon were better prepared than others
- Advocacy - both local governments and communities are currently motivated to invest time and effort in DRR
- Joint action - rallying behind the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act.

## 4. Decision-making in relation to recovery and shelter solutions

A decision faced by all DEC/HC members engaged in shelter beyond tarps and tents is whether to provide lower quality shelter solutions to a larger number of households or higher quality options to fewer people, ie breadth or depth. Good arguments are made that shelter kits which provide a strong frame with CGI sheeting are a lower cost option that households can build upon over time. However, these options also present some significant difficulties. As they are targeted to the most vulnerable, these very households are also the least likely to be able to afford adding quality flooring and walls, raising the prospect that these shelters will not in fact be used for a period of time.

Where shelter kits are concerned, the 'building back better' statement is only accurate, for now at least, relative to the highly vulnerable pre-existing state of beneficiaries, and may well not be accurate in terms of household resilience in the longer term. Conversely, higher quality options are a preferable housing option - but, only for the lower number of those who gain access to them. Such approaches however require that agencies prioritise quality over quantity.

While not questioning the decision making of any agency deciding on the provision of more expensive housing, this review supports the use of shelter kits *when they are well implemented*. Shelter kits present a welcome advancement on transitional shelters and where done well adhere to developmental principles of a strong core from which to build; however, there is the challenge of targeting. Shelter provided to especially vulnerable people - often cited as 'the poorest of the poor' - must be complete, or the household provided with the means to complete their house: by definition, such people do not have the means to complete an unfinished shelter.

This review met with too many poorer individuals with piled up shelter materials or just a frame. One older person who lived in a low-income urban settlement was given cash for shelter - she purchased some lumber and CGI, which had been stored inside her damaged house. She had no immediate plans to put it up, as she had no knowledge of how to do it, or money to pay for labour - her monthly income washing clothes is some 2,000 pesos. 'I may use the lumber for cooking', she joked.



*A shelter kit with temporary tarp walls*

## 5. Local partnerships and coordination with government structures

Local partnerships between INGO members and local NGOs have mostly been very good. Relations between INGO members and government structures have also mostly been very positive, although better efforts could be made for stronger relations at the local government level.

### Partnerships

Several DEC/HC members worked with local partners to good effect – the Philippines comprises a skilled and experienced civil society. Pre-existing relationships with partners, established over years of working on developmental issues, strengthened understandings. In some instances pre-existing partners were not present in the location of the response, and so shifted to affected areas to set up a presence. In such cases communities were new to the partners. Partnerships worked less well when partners were inexperienced.

Partnerships between INGO and local NGO organisations were criticised by one Filipino NGO network who observed that too often the mode and content of response had been predetermined by INGOs, often in other countries, before discussions with Filipino NGOs took place. In these instances they argue that local expertise, knowledge and possible alternative approaches for response had been ignored.

***Recommendation eight: discuss recovery and rehabilitation plans with all stakeholders. Share agency reviews and agency plans locally - after all, whose disaster is it?***

### Working with and through experienced partners

The purpose of DEC/HC members partnering with local organisations is in part to tap into their expertise. There are many examples to demonstrate where this worked well. CARE's partnership with PVDCI in Roxas has been truly collaborative and mutually reinforcing, and Christian Aid's long standing relations with partners has been put to good effect, where partners are also in the driving seat. In Daanbantayan ActionAid worked through Visayas Primary Health Care Services (VPHCS), a voluntary organisation of nurses and psychologists whose programme provides psychosocial support, comprising three group sessions of two hours each (at the time of writing two sessions remain). In one village both women and men's FGDs reported they found the first session helpful – 'everyone was weeping'.

Where this did not work well, partners were inexperienced and failed to be monitored and supported by the respective DEC/HC member. One example is of a partner building shelter kits (excluding walls) at a cost of USD1,200 each using timber imported from New Zealand. The rationale was that the timber was longer lasting, but in fact this was only by a few years. The community contribution is that the beneficiary provides gravel, sand and concrete for the foundation. Phase two plans are for the shelters to have additional straps, which would increase the cost to USD1,600 per shelter kit - a very expensive option indeed given that more complete houses are being built to a high standard at a lower cost using local materials (for instance Islamic Relief's semi-permanent housing described in chapter one). This example is provided in this section as the partner NGO team, while committed and enthusiastic, were inexperienced, and would have benefitted from the support and guidance of the respective member.

## Government structures

Engagement and communication between INGOs and government appears relatively strong and positive at most levels, though many LGUs expressed concern at NGOs bypassing them to work with Barangays. Regular meetings take place and LGUs are aware of NGO activities. However, it is not at all clear that government offices are equipped to lead recovery efforts in all locations or that good communications are consistently translating into concrete coordination.

Leadership levels displayed by authorities vary greatly from one location to another. In Cebu the governmental Task Force Pagligon has helped in developing consistency and coordinated leadership. Appreciation of the leadership provided by this task force was uniformly expressed. In Concepcion Concern worked closely with the mayor to find a suitable location for their boat building yard and continues to support the recovery.

Most DEC/HC members stated that they had coordinated with LGUs from the beginning, and were continuing to do so. One member observed that 'if we visit the Mayor and he then doesn't tell his staff then that is his concern'. The reverse point should also be made concerning capacity of LGUs, who became (and are still) stretched. In addition to this, it was not fully clear in several meetings attended whether some LGU personnel met with had clarity on cluster continuation once agencies begin to leave, and who will lead them.

LGU capacity varies. Eastern Samar is poorer and less equipped for instance than Tacloban or Ormoc City. However in Salcedo the newly elected mayor, described as 'a go go action mayor', organised stockpiling of food and evacuations in advance of the typhoon. There were cases when the government asked the agencies to assist them: for example the municipalities of Mac Arthur, Mayorga and Dulag in the province of Leyte requested Save the Children to assist irrigation cooperatives to restore their irrigation canals, which are essential for a good harvest. This resulted in a close working relation between Save the Children and the irrigation cooperatives. One mayor, faced with the typhoon said, 'I had absolutely no idea what to do'. This reinforces the need, and opportunity, for NGOs to work to strengthen the capacity of LGUs.

### ***Recommendation nine: coordination must be with and through government at all levels from the beginning, with the strong participation of all actors***

Inevitably there are also tensions between LGUs and Barangays. A common perception encountered is the 'top down' nature of government action. As one Barangay Captain put it when experiencing a perceived lack of listening on behalf of his LGU, 'the problem that we give them is not the problem ... they (the government) assign the problem.'

Officials repeatedly identified a strength of INGO and NGO engagement to build skills, advance municipal development plans and better serve their constituents. Many public officials genuinely want to ensure aid is channelled effectively. While there are exceptions to this, it is clear that working with officials in this context has been smoother than other recent disasters elsewhere. INGOs and NGOs can support government and build capacity in a way not possible elsewhere, and this is an opportunity not to be wasted.

To achieve this a vehicle identified early on in the review and strongly endorsed at all subsequent round table meetings with DEC/HC members is to align support with the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) Act, a new law approved in 2010 that seeks to transform the Philippines' disaster management system from disaster relief and response towards disaster risk reduction. The new Act emphasises the strengthening of people's capacities. It recognises the good practices of the communities on implementing DRRM in local territories. The Act is progressive in content: it includes community based disaster risk reduction approaches, partnership with a broad range of civil society organisations, recognition of the role of women, elderly and children, considerations to vulnerable people (sick,

elderly, the very young and the differently able people) and most of all, the call to address root causes of vulnerability.

***Recommendation ten: support the capacity of LGUs to implement the NDRRM Act leaving government stronger than before***

## **NGO government cooperation**

At probably no other time in the history of emergency response and recovery in the Philippines has NGO cooperation and collaboration with the government been more conducive than during and after Typhoon Haiyan.

Some 25 years ago the tension between progressive NGOs and their partner community organisations on the one hand and the government agencies including the military on the other was at its height. Both doubted the integrity of the other: NGOs suspected and accused the government of being corrupt, while the government blamed NGOs of causing trouble by supporting the rebels through various means.

In the course of time however the relationship improved. NGOs, realising that they could not change the world by themselves, have become more respectful of existing structures - after all they are part of those being governed. The government on the other hand came to appreciate the fact that it could not do the job alone, particularly with regards to disaster management.

International instruments and standards have helped the NGOs' advocacy work. The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), which the Philippines was active in creating, helped NGOs in pressuring the government to take action to reduce disaster losses. Since the overarching goal of the HFA is to build the resilience of nations and communities to disasters, it is more logical to cooperate with many entities in order to avoid or to limit the adverse impacts of hazards.

In 2011 UNISDR reported that the world cannot expect the attainment of the HFA goals by 2015, despite the many initiatives undertaken by communities and nations to fulfil their commitments in reducing disaster risks. The HFA stressed in the fourth priority for action 'the reduction of the underlying risk, the root causes of vulnerability'. To these ends, while the advocacy agenda of many NGOs concerning DRR has been listened to in part in the past, a stronger message regarding the addressing of underlying risks such as land ownership is now timely. NGOs are well placed to achieve this: they have a wide reach, have funding and are generally accepted by both local people and Barangay leaders, LGUs and national agencies.

## **Cluster coordination**

All DEC/HC members reported attending coordination meetings. When asked which was the most efficient cluster meeting, nearly all cited the health and shelter clusters. Aid agencies working in Samar spoke of the challenges of attending coordination meetings in that region. With NGO operations spread out throughout the island, many felt that going to Guian or Tacloban for cluster meetings was neither easy nor convenient. All said they preferred investing their time in coordination at a municipal level or through one-to-one meetings with other organisations working in the same areas. They also said that many UN experts or cluster leaders come to Samar only occasionally, limiting their ability to engage. Plan related that they approached one mayor and asked him to host coordination meetings at the municipal level

because 'that is where the action is'. One member stated that, more and more, junior officers were sent to the larger cluster meetings because the meetings were so time-consuming.

Local government representatives such as mayors reported they appreciated cluster meetings because they saw these as opportunities to 'connect with NGOs' and put forward appeals.

While there are good examples of private sector participation in some clusters at the national level (for instance cash, shelter and livelihoods), these were not significant beyond the attendance of certain companies. One exception is the co-chair role played by the Chamber of Commerce in the livelihoods cluster. For the most part private sector organisations tended to coordinate their efforts directly through government channels, including LGUs. Stories were related regarding large truckloads of goods being offloaded in LGU facilities (in one case, many people 'rushed to help', causing a queue of trucks and vans laden with goods of several kilometres in one ferry terminal). Many of those spoken to however flagged issues with the transparency of the aid channelled in this way, with concerns about political or commercial opportunism and lack of private sector targeting of the most vulnerable.

## **6. Addressing the needs of the most vulnerable, including people living with disabilities (PWDs) and older people**

All DEC/HC members include PWDs and older people within the most vulnerable groups for relief and recovery assistance. Concerning PWDs, OCHA is concerned that this issue is nearly invisible. It is not much discussed and programmes dealing with disability are few. In FGDs little information on PWDs was gleaned, other than that PWDs were being looked after by community members.

Across several FGDs older people said their priority was livelihoods, because 'we are strong, we want to work, we want to earn money'. The livelihoods they most often cited were small livestock projects, such as raising pigs and hens. Some older people said they wanted cash; Age International noted that older people's priorities include information on services and health.

Several FGDs recounted an increase in mortality from cold weather among older people immediately after the typhoon: with the torrential rain that followed the typhoon and without shelter some were unable to keep warm and dry, lowering their resistance and stamina.

Age International's partner COSE was one of the first agencies to arrive in Leyte. They provided well-stocked packs to older people that contained dried fish, rice, soap for washing clothes, soap for washing, coffee, salt, sugar, toothbrush, comb, toothpaste, pain relief oil, sardines and noodles. Age International is working with older people in Leyte and Samar. Age International also distributed seeds and farm inputs in time for planting in January. While this was greatly appreciated, one beneficiary noted that fertilizers and pesticides might also have been distributed along with the seeds.

For the recovery, in some instances UCGs might be preferential to distributions. One older couple visited was provided enough rice seed to grow 12 bags of rice. This will take upwards of three months. When harvested, three bags will go to the landowner six bags to repay loans and interest for living expenses and hiring labour, leaving the family with only three bags. A better option may have been to provide UCGs (a similar shelter-related example is given in chapter four). However, this also has its own issues. One very elderly lady in Barangay Palarao had

used a shelter CCG for her grandchild's education so now has no adequate shelter or means to improve what she does have.

Older people were found and reported to be engaged in activities that included all age groups. Action Aid's partner PFI's community change planning (see chapter two) involved all age groups, including older people, who stated they found the process valuable. One older woman said, 'I felt so important today; I was part of a community activity'. Several FGDs noted that older people were involved in CFW programmes. Where the work was too arduous older people were given less physical tasks, eg timekeeping. In one example after two days of working, older people engaged in a CFW programme who had become tired were given income directly without the need for work.

Plan organises family health days, which provides consultation, support to pregnant and lactating women, and family planning and reproductive health. The family health day visited in Barangay Buabua in Eastern Samar taking place under tarps was well attended, with peer to peer sessions on sexual health taking place led by teenage volunteers. Older people's needs, eg for hypertension are treated, and trained staff undertake trauma related case-finding and referral.

Attendance at both clinics clearly showed these facilities were meeting a real need. Treatment, consultation and medicines at the clinic were free as was the opportunity for children to meet a psychosocial worker. Emergency obstetric care for women in Eastern Samar however meant a trip to Tacloban, which can take up to three hours. If a problem presents itself during delivery this would be too long for effective treatment. Health staff seemed to accept this and mitigated the risk of maternal and neonatal death through training of midwives. In terms of sexual based violence, or dangers to children, both OCHA and Plan mentioned that this is of concern, particularly in the bunkhouses. Plan works with teenage leaders in peer-to-peer programmes to speak to other youth about risks such as sexual exploitation. In Eastern Samar Oxfam undertakes the provision of women-friendly spaces in bunkhouses.



*A meeting with older people*



## 7. Communication with disaster affected communities

From many Barangay-level FGDs it was clear that DEC/HC members sought to communicate with communities, explaining who they were, what they were planning to do and how beneficiaries were targeted. Activities included organised meetings, informal contact and the placing of information boards with information concerning beneficiary numbers and distributed items - this is always an important activity for transparency, and one that all members should routinely undertake. In many instances of both DEC/HC members and their partners it was clear that relations were good in the communities where they worked, with issues freely raised and discussed.

In the early stages of the response mobile networks were down and whereas these were re-established within around two weeks, the lack of power meant that for many phones could not be charged. OCHA along with World Vision used radio stations in Guian and Tacloban, which broadcast useful information such as hygiene awareness messages. It also had a 'text me number' and at times received up to 200 text messages in a day. Messages included information on gaps, needs and complaints which was fed back to OCHA.

The Communicating with Communities (CwC) initiative involving OCHA was a valued contribution to agency engagement with communities. Through CwC NGOs shared information on complaints and feedback and were able to track issues flagged by communities as these came up in the response. Open and available information further contributed to transparent reporting of issues and encouraged greater accountability for NGOs. These contributions helped redress many initial problems reported with community consultations in programme planning.

There is however an opportunity to improve this. Only a few DEC/HC members were reported by OCHA to be providing feedback. As one OCHA staff member stated, 'Everyone says they have feedback mechanisms, so where is the feedback?'

As one example, Oxfam's communication with communities in Bantayan was good. Strong comment, complaint and feedback mechanisms are in place and are being used. Two-way communication with communities and beneficiaries is apparent, engaging staff in the Bantayan office. In addition to suggestion and complaint boxes, phone and SMS hotlines have been successful, collecting around 150 messages per week, which are followed up on by staff.

Some agencies also placed phone numbers on posters and vehicles. However across several FGDs it was clear that many community members did not know what the phone numbers were for (the point was also made that a 'culture of complaining' is seldom part of Filipino society). Several FGDs noted that, if they had cause to complain, they would channel complaints via the Barangay Captain as per the cultural norm, which adds a filter that may be seen as positive or negative. In some cases it was noted that DEC/HC members that worked through partners were less accessible by communities. While this perhaps is not surprising, it is important that members do not become remote to those they are serving.



Children at a shelter event

# Annexes

## 1. Timetable of activities

Date	Where	Who	Activities
24/2	Cebu	All	AA inception meeting
		Team A	Round table meeting with Islamic Relief and Oxfam
		Team B	Meeting with staff from Task Force Pagligon and government officials
		All	Team methodology and approach discussion; meeting with Governor of Cebu; travel to Cebu
25/2	Bantayan	Team A	Ferry to Bantayan Meeting with Oxfam Visit to Santa Fe and Madridejos municipalities Meetings with Mayor of Madridejos, WASH Cluster Coordinator Visits to affected communities, FGDs with 30 women in Madridejos (CFW beneficiaries) and 5 women in Santa Fe (recipients of livelihoods support: fishing boat repairs)
		Team B	Meeting with AA and partner NGO Fardek; meetings with Barangay leaders; separate FGDs with 35 women, and 9 men; visits to affected communities
26/2		Team A	Meeting with IR and site visits to areas where shelter provided 4 home visits and individual interviews, FGD with 15 people Meeting with MPDC Coordinator in Bantayan Municipality Site visit to relocation site provided by Bantayan and supported by IR
	Daan-bantayan	Team B	Visits with AA and NGO partner Pagtambayayong Foundation Inc (PFI); Medellin meeting with 3 Barangay captains and 20 community volunteers (all women) and Gaius from LGU mayoral office Women's FGD, 30 approx, community training outcomes, Sitio Matiar, Kawit; meeting with Mayor of Daanbatayan; 4 women Barangay leaders FGD – Pay Pay, Maya, Agujo, Bitoon; visit to Sitio Maya to see shelter kits and comm vol work
27/2		All	Tabogon Municipality – meeting with 4 Barangay captains Visits with AA and NGO partner Pagtambayayong Visit to shelter kit recipients Evening round table discussion with academics from the University of San Carlos, Task Force Pagligon, a businessman, the Central Visayas Network of NGOs and a former mayor
28/2	Ormoc	All	Meeting with public affairs, DRR designate for Ormoc, Planning and finance officers, a City Agriculturist and a City Administrator
			NGO round table meeting attended by 15 staff from SCF, CA, CA partners, AI, Oxfam, CARE, WV
1/3	Ormoc	Team A	KI interview with AI area co ordinator; KI interviews with AI community organisers ; FGD with 15 women and men older people; visit to Barangay Sherwood. FGD with 30 women and men older people

		Team B	FGD with World Vision supported group in Sante Antonio KI with Barangay leader and 4 community volunteers Site visits with Christian Aid and partner RDI Leyte FGDs with 45 community members Individual interviews with 2 families
	Ormoc City		Interviews with 2 x women older people SRK and cash recipients
2/3		All	Consolidation day
3/3	Tacloban	Team A	Meeting with SAVE THE CHILDREN staff Visits to Dulog Municipality to Barangay Cabaton (Elementary School) and Barangay Bulod (elementary school) For FGDs with school teachers (2 x FGDs of 6 and 8 teachers)
	Ormoc	Team B	Meetings with AI and partner COSE KI interviews with Mayor and Secretary, Leyte FGD in Siteo Canlaya with about 80 older people KI with 2 Beneficiaries of rice seeds, Barangay Palarao Proper FGDs in Siteo Pandacan, Barangay Belen with Barangay Captain and senior citizen FGD of 30 – 35 people KI with Sitio Pandacan beneficiary household of shelter items
4/3	Tacloban	All	Round table with seven agencies (5 DEC/HC members, one local NGO and one funder): reflection on lessons learnt and formulation of recommendations using planning for real methodology
		Team A	Meeting with Shelter Cluster Coordinators Visit to CARE shelter projects FGD with 20 beneficiaries Meeting with Mayor, Barangay Captains and CARE partners
		Team B	Visit to Jaro Municipality with SCG to mobile health clinic and psychosocial session for children
5/3	Tacloban	Team A	Individual key informant meetings with Tacloban's City's Planning and Development Coordinator; OCHA Officer for Leyte; Chief of staff to the Mayor of Tacloban, Assistant Secretary of DSWD (during a general meeting of the Secretary with mayors of the affected municipalities of Leyte); visit to Barangay Salvacion, Dulag Municipality, to Tearfund and partner Medair SK project: meeting with staff, visits to several houses, meeting with Barangay Captain and debrief; transect walk in the No Build Zone in Tacloban (Barangays 66,67,68 and 69)
		Team B	KI meeting with OCHA CwC; round table with Christian Aid partner, Tearfund, AI; FGD Mayorga Municipality, Talisay Barangay, Save the Children: Barangay Captain and beneficiary selection committee for FSL/Shelter programme x 8 people; KI Barangay Camansi, Irrigation Association Chairwoman and Treasurer; FGD Barangay Council and community Ormocay x 30 people
6/3/	Eastern Samar	Team A	Visit to Oxfam and projects, Lawaan; FGD with 18 people in Barangay Lawaan concerning planned dam clearing; visit to two bunkhouses in Guiwan and discussion with occupants; FGD with 4 people including Barangay Captain in Barangay Beta-og concerning planned seaweed growing; visit to planned mangrove clearing site; round table discussion with 7 Oxfam staff

		Team B	Visit Balangiga health facility (infirmary), Oxfam WASH facilities. KI interview with hospital administrator and nurse; FGD Bacjao 60 – 70 people, beneficiaries of Oxfam cash programme; KI in Paya Mariota with two beneficiaries, one man and one woman who received cash and relief goods; visit to debris clearing site; round table discussion with 7 Oxfam staff
7/3	Eastern Samar	All	Meeting with Mayor of Salcedo Municipality, Plan and CA staff, CA partner Coastal Core and Centre for Empowerment and Rural Development (CERD) and 8 Municipality staff; visit to CA partners concerning NFIs and livelihoods programming. FGD with beneficiaries; visit to child friendly space centre with Plan; visit to Barangay Buabua to Plan family health day clinic; visit to Barangay Punong to visit CRS agricultural project. FGD with about 50 men and women; visit to Quinapondan, Bagti Barangay
8/3	Tacloban	All	Travel from Tacloban to Estancia, Panay Island via Cebu
9/3		All	Consolidation day
10/3	Roxas, Panay	Team A	Visit to island Barangays (Barangays Talingting and Punta Batuanan) in Calagnan Island, Carles Municipality, Iloilo, with Christian Aid and partner Iloilo Consortium of Development NGOs (I-CODE) and Panay Rural Development Centre Incorporated (PRDCI) in Panay Island. FGD with about 75 men and women. KI interviews with PRDCI staff FGD with 15 government staff in Carles Municipality (Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Coordinator, Municipal Department of Social Work and Development, Department of Health, etc.) with Christian Aid and partner NGOs
		Team B	Meeting with Concern staff; Concepcion Municipality. Travel to Polopina Island; informal FG discussion with the community and individual beneficiaries (NFIs, boat repair); KI Mayor of Concepcion; visit to boat yard and beneficiaries of boat building project; visit to bunkhouse with Mayor of Conception
11/3		All	CARE and partner Panay Volunteers Development Cooperative Incorporated (PVDCI) visit to community general assembly in Cabugcabug – beneficiary selection and shelter programming, President Roxas Municipality, Capiz
12/3	Manila	All	Review team report development and team discussion of findings
13/3		All	Round table with 23 staff from 11 DEC/HC members including three Country Directors, using 'planning for real' methodology to negotiate recommendations, discussion and reflection on lessons KIs with Save the Children, British Red Cross

## 2. Key informant interview questions

---

DEC/HC Philippines typhoon appeal – response review, Feb/March 2014

- For DEC/HC personnel, government officials and others
- Each question is an invitation for the interviewee to elaborate with examples
- Choose which questions to ask: not all questions will be relevant to all interviewees
- Disaggregate questions by gender where applicable

### General

1. What are the priority issues right now? How have these changed over time?
2. What are the key unmet needs right now? How have these changed over time?
3. Any examples of innovations and/or exemplary programming (such as use of cash)? What's worked really well? What's worked less well?

### DAC criteria (relating to DEC/HC INGOs' work) – see notes

4. How **efficient** has the response been (eg coordination, clusters, use of resources)? Examples?
5. How **effective** has the response been? Examples?
6. How **relevant** have actions been? How has monitoring been used? Any examples?
7. How have actions contributed to **sustainability** (eg of communities, working with government)? Examples?

### Decision-making (of DEC/HC members) in relation to recovery and shelter solutions

8. Any examples of particularly effective decision-making? Please explain
9. Which shelter approaches worked best for communities? Which have not? Why?
10. How well have shelter approaches contributed to recovery? Why?

### Local partnerships and coordination with government structures

11. How well have DEC/HC members' actions supported the government's response? Any examples?
12. How well have DEC/HC members worked with others, eg from civil society, private sector, UN, army, other? Any examples?

### Addressing the needs of the most vulnerable, including disabled and older people

13. How were the most vulnerable identified (eg assessment approaches)? Any examples? What worked and what did not?
14. How were assessment findings used? Any examples?
15. How have needs been met? Any examples?

### Communication with disaster affected communities?

16. What communication approaches were used? Which have been the best?
17. What technology was used (eg radio, phones, internet)? Any examples of good use?
18. What could be done differently next time?

# Community focus group questions

---

DEC/HC Philippines typhoon appeal – response review, Feb/March 2014

- 'NGO' refers to the respective DEC/HC member(s) active in this community
- Each question is an *invitation* for community members to elaborate with examples
- Disaggregate questions *by gender* if in gender-mixed groups

## General

1. How well are you recovering?
2. What are your key unmet needs right now? How have these changed over time?

## DAC criteria (relating to DEC/HC INGOs' work) – see notes

3. How well has the NGO helped you? Any examples?
4. How will the NGO's work help you in the long term? Why?
5. What should the NGO do better next time?

## Decision-making (of DEC/HC members) in relation to recovery and shelter solutions

6. How did the NGO and/or others know what your main needs are?
7. How did the NGO help to meet your shelter needs? How good has this been?
8. What could be done better next time?

## Local partnerships and coordination with government structures

9. How well did the NGO work with government, if at all? Any examples?

## Addressing the needs of the most vulnerable, including disabled and older people

10. How well has the NGO helped the most vulnerable in your community? Any examples?
11. How did they know who the most vulnerable are?

## Communication with disaster affected communities?

12. How often have you seen the NGO? What happened when you met?
13. How has the NGO communicated with you?
14. How has anyone else communicated with you, eg from government?
15. What technology was used (eg radio, phones, internet)?