Evaluation of Oxfam's South Sudan Humanitarian Response

Using Oxfam's Global Humanitarian Indicator Tool

Andy Featherstone

Oxfam GB
December, 2012

Evaluation of Oxfam's South Sudan Humanitarian Response

OGB Global Humanitarian Indicator Tool

Andy Featherstone, December 2012

Evaluation of Oxfam's South Sudan Humanitarian Response
OGB Global Humanitarian Indicator Tool

Andy Featherstone, December 2012

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background & Methodology

Context of the crises and Oxfam's response

Following the referendum on independence from Sudan in January 2011 the Republic of South Sudan was born on 9th July 2011 but the optimism and excitement which followed has been tempered by political tensions with its neighbour on issues unresolved from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which include border demarcation, wealth-sharing and the fate of the disputed territory of Abyei.

Intense fighting broke out in the Blue Nile State of Sudan in early-September 2011 between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army Movement-North (SPLM-N). Following aerial bombardment and shelling, significant numbers of people began moving to Upper Nile in South Sudan for safety. While this crisis was the touch-paper for the Category 2 declaration called on 24 February 2012 the categorisation was based on an analysis of the multiple threats facing South Sudan which included tensions with its neighbour, potential returnees and refugees from Sudan and a more general food insecurity and livelihoods crises affecting over 3 million people.

The goal of Oxfam's humanitarian operations in its main area of response, Upper Nile, was to contribute to a decrease of mortality and morbidity by providing access to potable water, sanitation and hygiene promotion, as well as improved food security and nutrition. The target populations were the settled refugee population and those in transit; returnees, IDPs and host communities in Maban County, Upper Nile State. Oxfam also supported efforts to improve food security and livelihoods in Malakal for vulnerable returnee and host populations.

Methodology

As part of a wider organisational undertaking to better capture and communicate the effectiveness of its work, Oxfam developed an evaluative method to assess the quality of targeted humanitarian responses. This method uses a global humanitarian indicator tool which is intended to enable Oxfam GB to estimate how many disaster-affected men and women globally have received humanitarian aid that meets establishes standards for excellence. Equally importantly, it enables Oxfam GB to identify the areas of comparative weakness on a global scale that require institutional attention and resources for improvement. This tool consists of 12 quality standards with associated benchmarks, and a scoring system. It requires documented evidence, complemented by verbal evidence, to be collected and analysed against these benchmarks. A score is generated for the programme's results against each standard and as a cumulative total.

Performance of the South Sudan Response against the Global humanitarian Indicator Tool

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 6)	Almost met (score 4)	Partially met (score 2)	Not met (score 0)
1	Timeliness – rapid appraisal/assessment enough to make decisions within 24-hours and initial implementation within three-days			2	

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 3)	Almost met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
2	Coverage – uses 25% of affected population as an planned figure (response should reflect the scale of the disaster) with clear justification for final count			2	
3	Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere standards		4		
4	MEAL strategy and plan in place and being implemented using appropriate indicators	3			
5	Feedback/complaints system for affected population in place and functioning and documented evidence of information sharing, consultation and participation leading to a programme relevant to context and needs		2		
6	Partner relationships defined, capacity assessed and partners fully engaged in all stages of programme cycle	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
7	Programme is considered a safe programme: action taken to avoid harm and programme considered conflict sensitive		2		
8	Programme (including advocacy) addresses gender equity and specific concerns and needs of women, girls, men and boys and vulnerable groups[1]		2		
9	Evidence that preparedness measures were in place and effectively actioned			1	
10	Programme has an advocacy strategy and has incorporated advocacy into programme plans based on evidence from the field			1	
11	Programme has an integrated one programme approach including reducing and managing risk though existing longer-term development programmes and building resilience for the future			1	
12	Evidence of appropriate staff capacity to ensure quality programming			1	
	Cumulative total by score	3	10	8	0
	Final rating				21

---

[1] Elderly, disabled, HIV positive, single women, female-headed households are examples

Table of Contents

Acronyms

CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
EP&R	Emergency Preparedness & Response
EFSL	Emergency Food Security & Livelihoods
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FGD	Focus group Discussions
GHIT	Global humanitarian Indicator Tool
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
GFO	German Foreign Office
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HSP	Humanitarian Support Person
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
JCAS	Joint Country Analysis Strategy
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes & Practices
MEAL	Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability & Learning
MSF	Medicins sans Frontieres
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OGB	Oxfam Great Britain
OI	Oxfam International
ON	Oxfam Novib
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SPLM-N	Sudan People's Liberation Movement - North
SSCS	South Sudan Change Strategy
SWAT	Safe Water Treatment System
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

## South Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot (September 2012)

@ OCHA

South Sudan continues to face considerable humanitarian challenges. High food and fuel prices, seasonal flooding, conflict and displacement and border closure between Sudan and South Sudan have led to rising hunger, malnutrition across the country and deepening vulnerability. About 175,000 refugees have fled Sudan to Upper Nile and Unity states.

Conflict and displacement
Inter-communal fighting, attacks by non-state actors, and cross-border conflict with Sudan have affected communities across the country. This year, about 170,000 people have been displaced in South Sudan due to inter-communal fighting and insecurity.

Abyei displaced
The majority of the 110,000 people from Abyei remain displaced, although conditions for their safe return have improved with the pullout of most security forces from Abyei in May. However, challenges still remain, including the lack of a civilian Abyei Administration and the presence of land mines.

Returns to South Sudan
More than 126,000 people have returned to South Sudan this year. Emergency assistance is provided to people in transit and a reinsertion package upon arrival at final destination.

Refugee influx
The continued influx of Sudanese refugees is straining the humanitarian operation. About 175,000 refugees have fled Sudan's Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile to Upper Nile and Unity states.

Legend:
- Inter-communal fighting
- Other armed incident
- Cross-border attack
- Conflict-related population movement

217 conflict incidents in 2012

Aerial bombardments and clashes on the borders between Sudan and South Sudan.

* Humanitarian partners are working to assess how many people have gone back to the Abyei area and the motivation of returns.

3,000 - 10,000 returned*

108,900 refugees

65,700 refugees

100,000 displaced

Most refugees are crossing from Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan states in Sudan to Upper Nile and Unity states in South Sudan.

Food security
Erratic rains, insecurity, inflation and border closure have doubled the number of people requiring food assistance from 1.2 million to 2.4 million. With South Sudan heavily reliant on imported food, rising prices are hitting households hard and causing an increase of malnutrition rates in six of the nine surveyed states since last year.

Emergency response
Aid workers have assisted about 200,000 people affected by conflict, 110,000 people displaced from Abyei over a year ago, and about 200,000 refugees, the majority from Sudan. There are over 30 ongoing emergency operations.

Seasonal flooding
Seasonal flooding has affected about 260,000 people across South Sudan. The most affected states are Jonglei, Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Unity, Upper Nile and Warrap. Emergency response is ongoing to flood-affected people.

Flood affected areas

Humanitarian access
The operating environment in South Sudan is one of the most expensive and difficult in the region, due to poor infrastructure. Up to 60 per cent of the country is cut-off during the rainy season, raising delivery costs for emergency assistance, which can only be done using scarce and expensive air assets. Access challenges have impacted the safety and security of humanitarian personnel. At least 82 incidents of harassment or interference in humanitarian operations by state actors. have been recorded in 2012

2012 Inter-communal violence flared in December 2011 in Jonglei

160,000 refugees in Unity and Upper Nile states

9 July Independence day

Rainy season

100 km

Creation date: 11 October 2012
Source: OCHA, UNHCR, IOM, NBS
Feedback: imusouth@un.org

Disclaimer: The data in the map are subject to availability of figures at the time of production and represent numbers reported by authorities and assessment teams. It does not claim to be exhaustive or fully verified. The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

Attribution: Map provided courtesy of the ReliefWeb Map Centre, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Evaluation of Oxfam's South Sudan Humanitarian Response
OGB Global Humanitarian Indicator Tool

Andy Featherstone, December 2012

1. Background

1.1 Context of the humanitarian response

The humanitarian context in South Sudan
Following the referendum on independence from Sudan in January 2011 the Republic of South Sudan was born on 9th July but the optimism and excitement which followed has been tempered by political tensions with its neighbour on issues unresolved from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which include border demarcation, wealth-sharing and the fate of the disputed territory of Abyei. In the first half of 2012 inter-communal violence in Jonglei State was estimated to have affected up to 170,000 people through displacement and disruption to livelihoods and by the end of May 165 conflict incidents had been recorded causing new displacement of an estimated 165,000 people since the beginning of the year. The Mid-year Review of the Consolidated Appeal (CAP) notes a further 165,000 refugees arrived from Sudan by mid-May 2012 putting further strain on the fragile humanitarian architecture.[2] This was in addition to the continuing process of return as South Sudanese displaced into the North during the 3-decades of conflict returned to the newly independent state. The April deadline for determining citizenship led to a significant surge early in 2012. Concurrently with the refugee influx and return, there has been growing food insecurity in the country, coupled with more localised flooding during the last rainy season.

Background to Oxfam's work in South Sudan
Oxfam GB has been working in South Sudan since 1983, with initial activities in emergency water supply and health services for refugees. In line with its global mandate, Oxfam GB delivers both humanitarian and longer-term development interventions simultaneously as demanded by the context of long-term poverty punctuated by cyclical natural disasters and violent conflict.

In 2009 Oxfam initiated an in-depth South Sudan Change Strategy (SSCS) process, to identify a three-year Oxfam GB strategy. The strategy is currently under review following the independence of South Sudan. Based on an examination of the current context and developing trends, the SSCS aims to reduce both the effect and vulnerability of people in South Sudan to conflict through policy and advocacy work and direct programming to reduce exposure to conflict and provide peace building opportunities. In this regard there is recognition of the need for an operational emergency response capacity, coupled with a greater focus on disaster risk reduction and preparedness to reduce the vulnerability of communities to disasters. The strategy also aims to increase the sustainability of service delivery in South Sudan with a focus on working with civil society and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS).

Oxfam GB's programmes are currently focused on two main sectors; public health (water, sanitation & hygiene promotion) and livelihoods. Presently in Upper Nile the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) programme focus is mainly on public health, while the Lakes programme is centred on livelihoods with a small scale WASH component. In the period 2010-2012 programmes have been expanded to integrate Public Health and Livelihoods activities to achieve a multi-sectoral programme

---

[2] UNOCHA (2012) Mid-year Review of the Consolidated Appeal for the Republic of South Sudan 2012, July 2012

approach in each location. Finally, policy and advocacy, conflict analysis and harm reduction as well as gender components are included across all the programmes.

The complexity of categorisation
Intense fighting broke out in the Blue Nile State of Sudan in early-September 2011 between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army Movement-North (SPLM-N). Following aerial bombardment and shelling significant numbers of people began moving to Upper Nile in South Sudan for safety. While this crisis was the touch-paper for the Category 2 declaration called on 24 February 2012 the categorisation was based on an analysis of the multiple threats facing South Sudan which included tensions with its neighbour, potential returnees and refugees from Sudan and a more general food insecurity and livelihoods crises (see box 1 below).[3] While the categorisation focused on a country-wide threat, because of the role that Sudan played in the crisis, a joint Category 2 was called for both the Republic of South Sudan and its northern neighbour Sudan.

Box 1: The basis for the declaration of a category 2 emergency in South Sudan[4]

The OI Humanitarian Coordination Team in South Sudan agrees that the current context in South Sudan is as follows:
- An already dire food situation and strong indicators for food insecurity (at least 2.7 million food insecure best case, 3.4 million food insecure worst case scenario)
- Tensions between Sudan and South Sudan (Abyei, Oil field closures etc..)
- Impact of the South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur conflicts - refugees etc. (200k refugees from Blue Nile, 300k from South Kordofan)
- Concerns about the mass influx of returnees (possibility of up to 500k returnees in the next two months.
- South Sudan specific internal conflict(>300k displaced)

With a view to meeting needs as efficiently and effectively as possible, Oxfam's response to the threats identified was split between the three Oxfam's present in the country; OGB, Oxfam Intermon and Oxfam Novib. Oxfam GB undertook to lead the response in Upper Nile and Lakes; while the focus of Oxfam GB's humanitarian efforts during the period under evaluation has largely been Upper Nile State where a multi-sector (WASH, hygiene promotion in Maban County) programme has sought to meet the humanitarian needs of those primarily affected by conflict but also to food insecurity (albeit limited to Malakal), the nature of the livelihoods crisis which spans large parts of the country, has meant that Oxfam GB has also responded to food insecurity and vulnerable livelihoods in its other operational area, Lakes State.

Of note is that the declaration of the Cat 2 was contentious, being called from outside the country rather than from within. While Oxfam's policy of categorisation permits line management to act in this way (and has been successfully applied on a number of occasions since it was developed), on this occasion it was considered problematic largely for reasons of scope and scale;

- At the time of the categorisation fairly modest refugee, returnee and food security programmes were being delivered by Oxfam GB in Upper Nile but there were limitations to scaling up the response, particularly in food security where an emergency response was considered by many to be inappropriate due to the perceived chronic nature of the crisis (albeit prone to seasonal spikes). It took until September 2012 for the South Sudan team to develop a longer-term

---

[3] In both the OGB and HCT communication about the declaration of a Cat 2 emergency, the multiplicity of crises affecting South Sudan was used to justify the categorisation
[4] Minutes of meeting of the Oxfam Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) in South Sudan, Saturday 25 February 2012

> livelihoods strategy which from a timeliness and coverage perspective hobbled the performance of the programme against the respective standards.

▪ Given the limitations on scale-up, the numbers that were used to justify the Cat 2 led to what were considered by many to be unrealistic expectations; Oxfam GB has a geographically-defined programme area and because of the logistical and financial challenges of programming in South Sudan was not in a position to respond outside of its established areas of operation; that the categorisation included country-wide humanitarian statistics made success difficult to achieve. The disappointing coverage figures for the OGB response are a consequence of this decision.

▪ While Sudan has played an important role in contributing to humanitarian crises in the South, it's inclusion in the Cat 2 was contentious because aside from some joint analysis that Oxfam conducted for the purposes of its advocacy there was no programmatic linkages made. It is noteworthy that there was a proposal to drop Sudan from the Cat 2 in September which was agreed.

Given the history of management churn in South Sudan, the high cost of operating in the country and the complexity of the operating environment, the resources that potentially come with the declaration of a Cat 2 emergency were doubtless a significant draw, but beyond a lobbying platform for resources, the justification for the declaration in the form that it was made appears questionable. This issue was raised on successive occasions during interviews as it placed high expectations on the team that have been difficult to deliver against.

As a footnote on the categorisation it is important to highlight that in September a proposal was made by the Country Leadership team/Humanitarian Country Team to maintain the Cat 2 declaration but to de-link it from Sudan and to focus efforts on Upper Nile. A shift away from food security interventions was also proposed in the meeting;

> "Food Insecurity is widespread in S Sudan, however the problem is [that it is] a chronic, structural issue, and while this has been subject to an additional shock by the economic crisis brought on from both the closure of the border and the oil shut down, Oxfam has not been able to respond through cash programming. A small cash project in Malakal was adjusted at the end of June as the cash could no longer meet the minimum needs of the population; there was a shift in focus to livelihoods."

Overview of Oxfam's Humanitarian Response, October 2011 – September 2012
The refugee influx into Upper Nile state of South Sudan occurred towards the end of 2011 with a focus on Maban County.[5] Starting from a relatively small influx of 11,000, the numbers of refugees have increased over time, reaching 106,772 refugees by the end of September 2012 (42,391 in Doro camp, 34,112 in Yusuf Batil camp, 16,582 in Jamam camp and 12,614 in the more recent Gendrassa camp, which accommodates families being relocated from flooded areas of Jamam camp).[6]

The goal of Oxfam's humanitarian operations was to contribute to a decrease of mortality and morbidity by providing access to potable water, sanitation and hygiene promotion, as well as improved food security and nutrition. The target populations are the refugee population in Jamam and Gendrassa Camps (once the latter had been established mid-way through the response), and refugees in transit (WASH Only); returnees, IDPs and host communities in Maban County, Upper Nile State. Oxfam has also been supporting efforts to improve food security and livelihoods in Malakal for vulnerable returnee and host populations[7] and in Lakes State to ensure that men and women in

---

[5] Oxfam Upper Nile Operational Plan, July 2013 – Dec 2014, September 2012
[6] UNHCR Refugees in S Sudan Information Sharing Portal 30.09.2012
[7] Oxfam Upper Nile Operational Plan, July 2013 – Dec 2014, September 2012

target districts are food secure year round and can develop livelihoods strategies that are resilient to shocks and stresses.[8]

Box 2: Summary of sector strategies and interventions

Water provision: Gendrassa, Jamam, and Jamam transit camps; Returnee and IDP Populations; Targeted Host Populations.
- Drilling, developing, operating and maintaining mechanised production boreholes.
- Development of new and improvement to existing water distribution network in the target camps
- Setting up adequate water storage capacity (tanks) and tap stands with appropriate drainage throughout the camps to meet minimum standards.
- Drilling and Installing hand pumps and setting up Water Management committees for the management and maintenance where possible in the refugee camps.
- Provision of drinking water for non-refugee population – through installation of new and rehabilitation of non-functional boreholes in the area where the host communities, IDPs and returnee population are residing, and formation of Water Management Committees and refresher training of hand pump mechanics.
- Improve the capacity of the County Department of Water Supply and Sanitation to enable to proper exit strategy. This will be done through joint action plan, on job coaching and including county staff in training programmes.
- Undertaking routine water quality testing at household and water source levels in collaboration with WHO/UNICEF and county health. This includes setting up a mini field base water testing lab with mobile capacity on agreed and context relevant parameters, focusing on WASH related communicable disease surveillance.
- Rehabilitation and excavation of multi-purpose mega haffir (large surface water body) with controlled water use and access both for human, cattle as well as irrigation and productive purpose.

Sanitation: Gendrassa, Jamam, and Jamam transit camps; Returnee and IDP Populations; Targeted Host Populations
- Support for the construction of adequate shared family latrines in the refugee camps (subject to community participation, adequate land and appropriate soil condition and environmental protection) to Sphere standard indicators in a phased approach.
- Construction of communal trench latrines for the Jamam transit camp in case of large influx.
- De-Commissioning of full and disused latrines.
- Distribution of household level hand washing NFIs and hand washing facilities to temporary schools and child based institutions.
- CLTS approach for IDPs, Returnees and Host Populations to improve access and safe sanitation practices.
- CLTS-H with hygiene and social marketing through incentives, limited materials or market support linking with livelihood/food security support

Hygiene Promotion: Gendrassa, Jamam, and Jamam transit camps; Returnee and IDP Populations; Targeted Host Populations Selecting,
- Distribution of supplementary hygiene kits (scoop, cup, basin, and family hand washing container) and female hygiene kits (new clothes, so old can be used for menstruation) for newly arrived refugees
- Distribution of bed nets as part of the campaign on Malaria prevention
- Distribution of household and communal latrine cleaning kits to refugees
- Monthly distribution of soap to refugees
- Undertaking monthly key hygiene campaigns such as water container cleaning days, importance of safe water chain, hand washing days, proper use of latrines, early health seeking behaviour and production of culturally and context specific Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials in line with identified key hygiene messages.
- Provision of hygiene promotion activities among host communities, IDPs and returnees to ensure safe hygiene and sanitation practices as a preventive measure of water-borne diseases.
- Provision of clean water containers for host community, IDPs and returnees.

---

[8] Oxfam South Sudan Food Security and livelihoods Strategy, Final Version, September 2012

- Hepatitis E awareness and prevention campaign in refugee camp and also host community, IDPs and returnees.
- Addressing conflict sensitivity issues by providing safe sanitation facilities for refugees at boundary areas (with the host community) and thereby discouraging the refugees to use host community land for defecation.

Food Security and Livelihoods
- Extremely volatile food prices due to border closure, insecurity and inflation, combined with large numbers of returnees, refugees and conflict displaced IDPs has made programming in Upper Nile more focused on immediate emergency support through cash transfer initiatives and/or provision of productive inputs.

1.2 Oxfam's Global Humanitarian Indicator Tool (GHIT)

As part of a wider organisational undertaking to better capture and communicate the effectiveness of its work, an evaluative method has been developed by Oxfam to assess the quality of targeted humanitarian responses. This method uses a global humanitarian indicator tool which is intended to enable Oxfam to estimate how many disaster-affected men and women globally have received humanitarian aid from the organisation that meets established standards for excellence. Equally importantly, it enables Oxfam to identify the areas of comparative weakness on a global scale that require institutional attention and resources for improvement. The tool consists of 12 quality standards with associated benchmarks, and a scoring system. It requires documented evidence, complemented by verbal evidence, to be collected and analysed against these benchmarks. A score is generated for the programme's results against each standard, and as a cumulative total.

1.3 Methodology

The GHIT provides details of evidence required for the evaluation (see annex 2) which was collected by the South Sudan team and this was reviewed alongside external contextual data. Where gaps existed in the information the consultant endeavoured to fill these through interviews with Oxfam staff. The evidence from these sources was measured against organizational benchmarks and standards (see annex 3) in order to determine a score for each of the criteria. The time period under evaluation is primarily from the start of the rapid onset refugee crisis (October 2011).

The guidance provided to the consultant is that the evaluation should focus on the WASH response to the refugee crisis in Maban County. For the purposes of the timeliness and coverage criterion this has been extended to include the returnee response in Renk and the EFSL response to food insecurity in Malakal as the Category 2 emergency was declared on the basis of a broader set of refugee, returnee and food insecurity needs.

1.4 Limitations

A successful outcome to the evaluation relies upon rigorous documentation as much as it does on rigorous programme implementation. As a desk-based exercise undertaken without the benefit of field observation or interviews with communities which have been targeted by the response, far greater emphasis is placed on triangulating the written evidence made available to the evaluator. Where this doesn't exist or has been lost as staff have left the programme there is a risk that evaluation results will suffer as a consequence. While key informant interviews with programme staff can go some way to complementing the documentation, triangulating evidence and highlighting gaps, interviews alone are insufficient to replace documented evidence.

1.5 Structure of the report

The report has been structured according to the quality standards with a section for each. At the beginning of each section is a score which is then described below with reference made to the evidence (primary and secondary). Text boxes inserted into the report have been used to highlight innovative practice or particular successes or challenges.

2. Coverage

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 6)	Almost met (score 4)	Partially met (score 2)	Not met (score 0)
2	Coverage – uses 25% of affected population as a planned figure (response should reflect the scale of the disaster) with clear justification for final count			2	

2.1 The refugee response

The refugee influx into Upper Nile grew from 11,000 in October to approximately 105,000 in September 2012 with a significant increase in December (when it doubled), February (when a further 20,000 refugees arrived) and July (when a further 30,000 refugees arrived). Due to the focus of Oxfam's early intervention being in Jamam Camp (once Doro had been handed over early in the response) which in the early months hosted the largest proportion of the refugee population, Oxfam had the opportunity to scale-up its programme and provide support to a significant percentage of those displaced into Maban County.

The extent to which Oxfam met the coverage standard at the beginning of the response between October and December 2011 is unclear because the data is unavailable. In January when the team returned after being evacuated the caseload increased dramatically and Oxfam's intervention struggled to keep up but the team scaled-up its coverage in February, providing some form of assistance (whether water, sanitation or a hygiene-related non-food item) to over 42% of the camp population (see box 3). Coverage over the next 5-months until June kept pace with the slow increase in numbers in Upper Nile, reaching an estimated 49.1% of the refugee population in May. When the numbers increased again in July, Oxfam's coverage fell, but was maintained at or close to the standard albeit only for the refugee caseload. In looking at issues of coverage, it is important to note the limiting role that access to adequate funds played in this (see box 3). The mid-term review notes that;

> "the critical constraint [from the beginning of the refugee influx] until the end of March was the funding situation and one which delayed all other decisions and actions for around 2, perhaps up to 3-months when secured funding rose from $180,000 in March to $2.7 million in April. This needs to be considered in light of the refugee caseload that Oxfam was seeking to support which rose to around 30,000 sometime by late Jan/early Feb. It took over 2-months before a significant amount of new funding was secured for the expanded caseload."

That is not to say that Oxfam positioned itself well to fundraise for the refugee response and the limited fundraising capacity of the team in the early months of the response is dealt with in greater depth in the staff capacity section but there is no doubt that funding was a constraint to implementation.

2.2 The broader context of refugee influx, refugee return and food insecurity

The issue of coverage was flagged by the Humanitarian Director in the report she authored in May 2012 following her visit to Maban County:

> "The humanitarian crisis as it has been categorised includes all of the 300,000 people displaced by conflict across the northern states and several million who are becoming increasingly food insecure. The relatively small programme in Jamam is not the scale of work that we would expect to undertake in such a crisis."

While the challenge of responding appropriately to the Cat 2 issue is dealt with more fully in the introduction, it does complicate the process of evaluating the coverage standard. While the evaluation would have been justified in focusing on the humanitarian situation across the country as

a whole, in fairness to Oxfam's Sudan team the coverage criterion has been viewed through the lens of the totality of Oxfam's humanitarian operations **in Upper Nile** including refugees, returnees and those communities who were considered food insecure as a proportion of the total estimated humanitarian need in the state.

Box 3: Oxfam coverage against the Upper Nile caseload and the total estimated caseload in South Sudan[9]

Date	Oct 11	Nov 11	Dec 11	Jan 12	Feb 12	Mar 12
Oxfam refugee response	0	0	Doro Camp?	4,155	30,373	37,221
OCHA refugee numbers	11000	12,500[10]	20,672	55,250	72,000	78,000
% refugees assisted	0%	0%	0%	7.5%	42.1%	42.1%
Oxfam returnee caseload	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000
IOM Upper Nile returnees	57,172	57,355	58,042	58,424	59,941	60,257
% returnees assisted	10.5%	10.5%	10.3%	10.3%	10.0%	9.9%
Oxfam U Nile EFSL[11]	13,867	13,867	13,867	13,867	13,867	0
Oxfam U Nile Host Comm[12]	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
FAO U Nile Food insecure[13]	134,100	134,100	134,100	574,412	574,412	574,412
% food insecure assisted	14.1%	14.1%	14.1%	3.2%	3.2%	3.2%
Total Oxfam caseload	24,867	24,867	24,867	30,022	54,940	48,221
Total affected in U. Nile	202,272	203,955	212,814	688,086	706,353	712,669
% Oxfam assisted in U. Nile	12.3%	12.2%	11.7%	4.4%	7.8%	6.8%
Total South Sudan caseload			1.86m[14]			

Date	Apr 12	May 12	Jun 12	Jul 12	Aug 12	Sep 12
Oxfam refugee response	36,041[15]	34,871	32,512	26,882	23,154[16]	23,688
OCHA refugee numbers	88,766[17]	70,000	76,736	107k	105.5k	105k
% refugees assisted	40.6%	49.8%	42.4%	25.1%	21.9%	22.6%
Oxfam returnee caseload	8,000	8,000	8,000	8,000	0	0
IOM Upper Nile returnees	60,532	61,729	62,054	73,107	75,000	77,000
% returnee assisted	13.2%	13.0%	12.9%	10.9%	0%	0%
Oxfam U Nile EFSL	0	0	8,400[18]	8,400	8,400	8,400

---

[9]For the refugee influx, figures have been taken from the first OCHA sitrep from each month wherever possible. Oxfam figures are taken from the mid-term review report (for January – August 2012) unless specified. IOM figures (as reported in weekly OCHA humanitarian bulletins) have been used to estimate the total number of returnees to Upper Nile and FEWSNET data has been used to estimate the number of host population food insecure in Maban Country and Upper Nile more generally. This figure does not include refugee or returnee caseloads.

[10] This is an estimate based on the mid-point between the 2 estimates provided by OCHA in its November 17 sitrep

[11] ECHO funded project from August 2011 until March 2012 which targeted 2,000 households (estimated to be 10,000 people)

[12] Numbers are not provided for the host community programme until towards the end of the period under evaluation when figures of approximately 5,000 beneficiaries are given. As the host community programme was ongoing throughout the entire period under evaluation, this figure has been used throughout.

[13] Data has been taken from the annual FAO/WFP crop and food security assessment of Southern Sudan for 2011 and 2012. A mid-point between the best-case scenario and worst-case scenario has been taken.

[14] UNOCHA, Humanitarian Dashboard, Nov 2011 in UN (2012) Consolidated Appeal for South Sudan

[15] This figures is an estimate based on the mid-point between month before and after as no data has been found

[16] Figures taken from refugee camp activity monitoring form, August 2012

[17] The May sitrep notes that this figure is inaccurate and so no % score has been calculated for the month

[18] The second EFSL response is being implemented over a 9-month period but there is very little information available about the response. Reports suggest that it started 1-2-months late which has been reflected in the table

Oxfam U Nile Host Comm	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
FAO U Nile Food insecure	574,412	574,412	574,412	574,412	574,412	574,412
% food insecure assisted	0.9%	0.9%	2.3%	2.3%	2.3%	2.3%
Total Oxfam caseload	**49,041**	**49,871**	**48,282**	**39,882**	**36,554**	**37,088**
Total affected in U. Nile	**723,710**	**706,141**	**713,202**	**754,419**	**754,912**	**756412**
% Oxfam assisted in U. Nile	**6.8%**	**7.1%**	**6.8%**	**5.3%**	**4.8%**	**4.9%**
Total South Sudan caseload			**3.325m[19]**			**4.6m[20]**

At the time of the Declaration, a cash transfer programme was being implemented in Malakal to address the <u>food insecurity</u> which targeted 13,867 beneficiaries and continued until the end of February.[21] A second programme followed which was more focused on livelihood support albeit with a smaller target group of 8,400 beneficiaries. To date there have been no further EFSL interventions in Upper Nile and the strategy has since evolved to be one that focuses on livelihoods assistance due to the perceived chronic nature of food insecurity across the country. Figures on the total number of food insecure in Upper Nile have been gleaned from Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) data and has been presented in the box 3 below alongside the estimated Oxfam beneficiary figures.

Following the influx of <u>returnees</u> from Sudan, Oxfam's EP&R team launched a response in Mina Transit Camp in Renk in July 2011 taking on responsibility for the provision of water, sanitation and hygiene promotion. Mina was one of three camps used as reception/transit centre and was the first point of entry from the North into Upper Nile State of South Sudan. While the anticipation was that returnees continue their journey home, the evaluation of Oxfam's EP&R team undertaken in April 2012 suggests that this has been fraught with problems which have meant that some stayed for long periods at the same time as new arrivals have entered the area which caused congestion. It also raised a challenge of accurately estimating the total population in the returnee camps. Oxfam established a Safe Water Treatment System (SWATS) with a daily distribution of approximately 30,000 litres of drinking water, constructed 90 communal pit latrines, 40 communal bathing shelters and carried out hygiene promotion including a one off distribution of hygiene kits (jerry cans, buckets and soap) to returnee's households.[22] A second phase of the programme, from April 2012 – July 2012 saw the Oxfam presence maintained in addition to maintaining a preparedness capacity for an additional influx of up to 22,000 returnees.

2.3 Towards a judgment on the standard
The coverage figures show both the complexity of estimating numbers of people affected by crises in addition to the challenge of responding to multiple hazards. While Oxfam's coverage against the returnee figures remains fairly constant at approximately 10% during the life of the Renk response, after a slow start, Oxfam's refugee caseload increased significantly, reaching between 30-40% between February and June (which the mid-term review considered the time when the refugee influx began to outpace the scale of the response). It has only been more recently, since July 2012 when a further influx arrived that coverage dropped significantly to between 20-25%. If the judgment on the standard was purely for the refugee response then this would have been an acceptable response. However, the nature of the Cat 2 declaration means that other groups must also be included.

It is the response to the food security and livelihoods crisis that is most problematic as apart from a SIDA/ECHO-funded cash transfer programme undertaken between August 2011 and March 2012, and a smaller ECHO funded response which followed, since the time of the Cat 2 declaration the

---

[19] UN (2012), mid-year review of the South Sudan Consolidated Appeal
[20] This figure is taken from the UN Humanitarian Dashboard published in November and is included to give an indication of the steady increase in the estimated numbers in need of assistance in South Sudan
[21] 2,000 households has been estimated to be 10,000 people (5 people per household)
[22] Oxfam (2012) An Evaluation of Oxfam GB Enhanced Capacity Coordination and Emergency Response Programme in South Sudan, April 2012

needs in Upper Nile and the country as a whole have escalated considerably at the same time as the scale of Oxfam's response began to decrease. It is the sheer numbers affected by food insecure that reduces Oxfam's total estimated coverage to between 0.9% and 3.2% between January 2012 and September 2012.

When placed in the context of the total estimated humanitarian need in South Sudan, Oxfam's response becomes almost negligible; planning figures from the 2012 CAP, the mid-year review and the UNOCHA planning figures for the 2013 CAP see the caseload increase from an estimated 1.86m in November 2011 to 3.325m in June 2012 4.6m and up to 4.6m in November 2012. Even if Oxfam's beneficiary figures for the Lakes and Upper Nile were combined, coverage would be extremely small. Ignoring this and focusing on Upper Nile alone, Oxfam' percentage coverage during the evaluation period failed to reach either the standard for rapid onset (25%, relevant to the refugee and possibly returnee caseload) and slow onset (10%, relevant to the food insecurity caseload). The fact that for most of the post- Cat 2 response Oxfam was reaching less than 8% of the population means that at best only a partially met score can be given.

2.4 Note on methodology and the challenge of obtaining data

Since the methodology for the evaluation has been developed internally and the coverage standard requires a calculation to be made based on the numbers of Oxfam beneficiaries as a proportion of the total number of humanitarian claimants, the onus should be on Oxfam to provide adequate data (supported by evidence) for both of these figures. For quite understandable reasons (complexity in particular) information on total humanitarian need in Upper Nile/Sudan wasn't systematically collated or reported on by Oxfam which has meant that to make a judgment the evaluator has attempted to collate data where it exists. Given the paucity of information and the laxity with which figures are calculated and reported a high degree of error is anticipated but it is hoped that this goes some way to permitting a judgment to be made.

3. Timeliness

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 6)	Almost me (score 4)	Partially met (score 2)	Not met (score 0)
1	Timeliness – rapid appraisal/assessment enough to make decisions within 24-hours and initial implementation within three-days			2[23]	

3.1 The Refugee response

In early October 2011 an OCHA sitrep referred to a report by South Sudanese local authorities of an influx of 11,000 refugees from Blue Nile and South Kordofan in Sudan to Maban County in Upper Nile State of South Sudan.[24] The increase in refugee numbers in Maban County between January 2012 when there were 55,000 and July 2012 when the number was in excess of 100,000 is provided in Box 4 below.

---

[23] The benchmark has had to be contextualised in order to make a sound judgement. The Upper Nile response far pre-dated the declaration of a Category 2 emergency which happened months after Oxfam had started the intervention. Beyond the commencement date of December 2011, no further data has been made available for initial assessments or the early response and there is little institutional knowledge of this. There was not a single influx but a series of increases in refugee population between January and June 2012 which required a proportionate increase in Oxfam's delivery of the programme. The mid-term review is extremely negative in its evaluation the speed of Oxfam's response in the first 4-months after the declaration of the Cat 2.

[24] OCHA, South Sudan Weekly Humanitarian Bulletin, 14-20 October 2011

Box 4: Timeline of displacement from Sudan (Blue Nile and Kordofan) to Maban County, South Sudan[25]

Oxfam has a long history of working in Upper Nile and was active in Renk providing assistance to returnees in transit camps since August 2011. Activities in the camps were curtailed on 11 November due to aerial bombardment from Sudan and the Oxfam team didn't return to the area until early-December although some agencies returned more quickly and the government recommenced their support alongside the International Organisation for Migration and UNHCR returned on 15 November. At this time Oxfam estimates suggest that there were at least 15,000 refugees across 4 different sites.

On Oxfam's return, work quickly commenced by the EP&R team in Doro camp on 12th December (which was handed over to MSF in the early days of the response) and activities started in Jamam Camp on 5th January. Due to the extraordinary challenges of finding water it became evident in February that Jamam camp could not provide more than 8 litres per person per day for 37,000 people. In view of the limited water availability negotiations commenced with UNHCR to select an alternative site, an issue which became protracted and became a major preoccupation for Oxfam in Jamam. It took several months and a severe flood before a new site, Gendrassa was found and the refugees were moved in July (the camp was about 55 km from Jamam 1 and 5 km. away from Batil 1 camp). Gendrassa had capacity for 20,000 people, which was sufficient to accommodate Jamam 1 refugees (which at that time numbered approximately 14,000) as well as a small number of new arrivals from Sudan. Oxfam was selected by UNHCR as the lead WASH provider for Gendrassa and work started at the beginning of July 2012. At the same time, Oxfam's work continued in Jamam 2.

The mid-term review of the refugee response is very critical of the speed of Oxfam's response, noting that the rising refugee population began to outpace Oxfam's ability to meet needs effectively and to deliver against sphere standards and as a consequence the "*momentum began to stall around March throughout April/May and into June.*"[26] The analysis provided in box 5 (above) and box 6 (below) tends to bear this out with the arrival of significant WASH and PHP equipment only occurring in April at the time that funding started to increase and only a gradual increase in key staff (particularly HSPs) over a 2-3-month period (Feb – April). Interviews corroborated the assertion that

---

[25] Developed from OCHA weekly refugee reporting figures – see also box 5 for raw data
[26] Luff (2012) Mid-term review: South Sudan emergency response in Maban County, Upper Nile State, September 2012 pp16

it took time for a strong team to be deployed which compromised the timeliness of the intervention (see also the capacity standard). A trip report by a departing member of staff reports the poor state of equipment (vehicles and communications – see the preparedness standard), the lack of readiness of systems (no funding grid until April and a lack of understanding about how to implement key organisational systems such as the minimum standards for procurement) and the failure to deploy a dedicated funding coordinator despite the reliance of the response on donor funds until as late as May which all conspired to hinder timely response to the increase in refugee numbers.

Box 5: Timeline of Oxfam's response to the Sudanese refugee influx into Upper Nile[27]

Month	Oxfam caseload	Monthly £	Scale-up funding	Charter Flights	Main WASH activities
October	Oxfam response focused on returnees in Renk rather than the refugee influx				
November	Oxfam team evacuated 11 Nov – 30 Nov, programme activities scale-down/cease				
December	Initial response in Doro refugee camp from December 12				
January	4,155	762,672		1	Jamam refugee WASH and handover of 30000 Doro camp caseload to IOM
February	30,373	433,836	£120k cat fund grant		Jamam refugee WASH expands significantly with new caseload
March	37,221	816,635	£180k secure, £380k cat fund loan		Jamam continues to scale-up
April		758,315	£2.7m secure, £200k cat fund grant, £330k cat fund loan	8	Latrine construction put on hold for 2-3 weeks as Jamam camp is supposed to be moving
May	34,871	1.48m	£2.9m secure	12	Jamam scale-up
June	32,512	1.50m	£2.9m secure, £1m cat fund loan	1	Jamam scale-up Oxfam builds Jamam transit camp for 10,000 refugees 200 latrines collapse due to heavy rain. Reconstruction takes place
July		532,685	£3.25m secure		WASH in Jamam continues Gendrassa refugee work commences
August	26,882			5	Jamam WASH ongoing Gendrassa scale-up

It is important also to highlight some of the successes; the initial response, prior to the Cat 2 being declared was amongst the quickest of any humanitarian agency and while this was 6-weeks after the first refugee influx, the delay was largely as a result of the need to evacuate the team. Post Cat 2, and despite a lack of capacity, the analysis of Oxfam's beneficiary figures provided in box 3 suggests that there was a significant increase in the absolute numbers of refugees assisted by Oxfam. While this may have outpaced Oxfam's ability to deliver a comprehensive response, the lack of significant public health outbreaks during this time suggests that the most basic needs were being met. It is also important to note that the period from June/July to the present has been far more impressive in terms of Oxfam's performance and ability to deliver needs-based assistance to standard. Changes in staffing and decisions about the management of the response have doubtless led to considerable improvements which will be detailed later on in this report.

While the timeliness standard which requires an assessment within 24-hours and a response within 72-hours may be inappropriate for such a complex context (and for a response which had already

---

[27] The information contained in the table for January – August has been taken from the mid-term review of the response authored by Richard Luff (September 2012). Additional information was gleaned from a review of the documentation made available on the KARL database

started), once the Cat 2 had been declared in February, it took significant time for the team to organise itself to expand its work; the laboured scale-up which followed can be put down in part to the complexity of the environment which was logistically challenging, a lack of funds, and as an operational response, the need to recruit-in large numbers of expatriate staff into a difficult working environment, but Oxfam's knowledge in-country, access to globally mobile resources and competence in WASH should have made for a more fluent increase in the scale and improvement in the quality of the programme. The finding of the mid-term review that "*Oxfam's comparative advantage was lost as other agencies, namely IOM and Medicins sans Frontiers (MSF) seemed to mobilise/scale-up faster than Oxfam,*"[28] is particularly disappointing.

Box 6: Key organisational and resource decisions in support of the scale-up[29]

- End-October – decision to respond to initial influx by South Sudan EP&R team
- 11-30 November team evacuated following aerial bombardment
- Mid-Nov – Maban County Response Plan prepared by South Sudan team
- 17/18 Feb – HSP PHE arrives in country
- 23rd Feb - new HPC arrives in-country
- 24th Feb – Declaration that the refugee influx was a category 2 regional emergency for the Republic of South Sudan and Sudan
- End-Feb – Declaration of scale-up and RC requested the Country Director to double the size of the programme and budget from £6m to £11m
- Early-March – First humanitarian funding grid produced
- March – April – first Humanitarian Support Personnel (HSP) arrived in-country to support the scale-up
- Mid-April – Public Health strategy paper prepared in support of the scale-up
- End-July Upper Nile programme Manager reports directly to the Deputy Regional Director as part of the step-aside arrangement with the Country Director
- Aug – Jamam water supply strategy finalised
- Sep – EFSL strategy produced which includes Upper Nile humanitarian response

3.2 The broader context of refugee influx, refugee return and food insecurity

As for the coverage criterion, making a judgment on the timeliness standard is further complicated by the folding in of the broader caseload of humanitarian claimants. As discussed above, the anticipated levels of humanitarian need to call a Cat 2 is between 200,000 and 2,000,000 people and communications surrounding the declaration spoke of a level of humanitarian need that far outstripped even these figures (2.7m people were reported as food insecure alone as a 'best-case' scenario – see box 1).

At the time the Cat 2 was declared in February, Oxfam was already responding to the needs of returnees in Renk and food insecure communities in Malakal which was impressive, albeit at a comparatively modest scale. However, after February there was no further scale-up and ironically the food security response ended that same month while the needs continued to increase. While the decision to end the programme was made for good reasons[30] the fact that Oxfam's food security and livelihoods strategy wasn't finalised until September and that no significant EFSL programming was initiated in Upper Nile during the period of the evaluation suggests at the least that the numbers Oxfam used to justify the Category 2 response and its ambition for a response were out of kilter.

---

[28] ibid

[29] Adapted from the mid-term review of the response undertaken by Richard Luff (September 2012), communications about the scale-up and review of the response strategies

[30] The cash transfer programme was considered to be inappropriate given the escalating needs and the reduction in food availability in the market

3.3 Towards a judgment on the standard

The standard leaves very little space for success in the context of an insecure and extremely logistically challenging country. While Oxfam's early EP&R responses were commendable, once the Cat 2 emergency had been declared the team struggled to quickly scale-up its work and in fact lost pace against peer agencies. While an increase in capacity and funding allowed the team to respond in a timely manner to the creation of Gendrassa camp in July, beyond the pre-existing work of the EP&R team, the same capacity and speed was not evident in the early months of the response justifying a partially met score.

4. Technical quality

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 6)	Almost met (score 4)	Partially met (score 2)	Not met (score 0)
3	Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere standards		4		

4.1 Contextually relevant inclusion of Sphere in public health strategy document and proposals

The South Sudan public health strategy (April 2012) makes frequent and contextually-relevant reference to Sphere standards for both the public health engineering and promotion activities in the refugee camps. The updated strategy which focuses on water provision and was written in August 2012 uses Sphere as the benchmark but also includes UNHCR's standard for water provision which is 5 litres/per person/per day higher than for Sphere. The strategy goes as far as estimating the maximum amount of water available for the camp and uses this figure as a means of calculating camp capacity. The Sphere indicator for sanitation is less frequently referred to in the early months of the response although this may be as a consequence of the challenges that Oxfam faced in reaching minimum standards (due to UXO, soil conditions and internal capacity).

Figures for water quantity are provided in the earliest sitreps (mid-April) which gives regular updates on the quantity (litres/person/day) of water provided by Oxfam. Reference is made to the sanitation coverage figures against Sphere from May (53%) although not in June. From July a total figure of the number of latrines built in each of Jamam and Gendrassa is provided but this is not put in the context of the quantity of latrines required to be in compliance with the Sphere indicator. Scant reference is made in the sitreps to (perceived) lower order indicators such as distance to water points and queuing time (although monitoring reports for the latter are available from June); the same is true for the excreta disposal standard; the focus of attention is on the number of latrines with little reference made in sitreps to issues of contamination. Hygiene promotion outputs are described in the sitreps but are not contextualised against the Sphere indicators. While this may be considered pedantic, the inclusion of both targets and outputs in Oxfam sitreps would provide far more compelling evidence of what has been achieved and the progress that is still required. Greater detail on progress against key Sphere indicators is provided in the technical monitoring reports (see box 5 below).

Project proposals are generally strong on including relevant technical standards and use appropriate indicators (see the MEAL standard below).

4.2 Public health delivery to Sphere standards

<u>Water & sanitation</u>
Achieving Sphere standards in Jamam camp was a challenge for the Oxfam team for a multitude of reasons. it was initially suggested that there may be unexploded ordnance in both the original

Jamam camp (as well as in the first refugee site at Doro camp)[31] and it wasn't until the end of February that de-mining agencies officially pronounced the camp as 'safe' which made digging latrines impossible until that time. In any case, the camp was later moved as it was located on a floodplain, and it replaced with 'Jamam 2 camp'. The move was delayed until late April/early May, and had a significant impact on the pace with which project outputs were achieved. Construction of water points and latrines was temporarily halted in April, while the team waited to learn about how the relocation would affect the population distribution and how the decommissioning of the original Jamam camp was going to be implemented. The construction and siting of latrines was further complicated by the difficulties in allocating suitable land which was in limited supply in the camp and tended to compete with shelters, schools and other public infrastructure. This coupled with the failure to drill successful boreholes within the area of the refugee camp made implementation of water and sanitation activities extremely difficult as reported in a trip report from one of the departing members of the public health team.

> "It is proving very difficult to provide more than survival water needs in the Jamam camps due to soil and ground water conditions. In the vicinity of Jamam camps there were only 6 existing boreholes which were either not functioning or had hand pumps fitted to them. Many areas within Jamam have heavy clay content or black cotton soil which is extremely friable. The EP&R team drilling rigs are unable to deal with the heavy clay content and in many places the water table is estimated at 100+ meters, and again the drill rig Oxfam has can only successfully drill to between 60 to a max of 100 meters. As a result of this the team have unsuccessfully drilled 5 boreholes." [32]

As a consequence, a major trucking operation was required to deliver adequate water supplies to the camp, which was not initially planned. On the issue of water provision, the mid-term review concludes that *"…it has taken 6-months from when the refugee caseload was above 30,000 (since late Jan/start Feb) until the end of July to get water collection distances mostly within the Sphere indicator for maximum walking distance."* While some of the reasons for this are beyond Oxfam's control (the self-settled nature of the camp, insufficient funds, insufficient water, uncertainty about whether the camp will be moved and movements within the camp itself), the review makes the point that increased funding was available in April and water provision to settled communities is one of the "*most predictable disaster scenarios that Oxfam faces.*"[33]

The mid-term review also notes the slow start to Oxfam's sanitation work and calculates that the quantity of latrines built by Oxfam was low in comparison to population needs in Jamam in the period March – May and in comparison with IOM in Doro camp. The slow pace and the challenge Oxfam faced in finding sanitation solutions which dealt with issue of the soil type and the impact of flooding on latrine collapse led to a perception among peer agencies that "*Oxfam were [initially] weak in this area of work*". In saying this, it's also important to note that due to the multiple relocation of Oxfam's camps it inherited a task that other agencies avoided – that of constantly shifting targets; the need to decommission hundreds of existing latrines and delays experienced in constructing new latrines due to the relocation required a shift in focus to communal or shared family latrines, instead of the anticipated household latrines, in order to achieve adequate sanitation coverage prior to the rainy season.

One of the donor reports submitted to the evaluator shows the early difficulties Oxfam experienced in reaching sphere standards for water provision (in addition to showing their transparency in

---

[31] As reported in the third paragraph of Bibi Lamond's trip report, dated 12th March 2012
[32] Ibid
[33] This statement is challenged by the team due to the uncertainty in the situation of the refugees in Jamam camps in the early months of the response. While they were settled in a camp, it was felt to offer inadequate access to water and for that reason was not considered a permanent solution.

reporting the challenges they faced) while also highlighting the achievement of Sphere standards for sanitation and the broader life-saving nature of the intervention;

> "The project has been life-saving for the 37,000 refugees of Jamam camp. While water supplies have not been achieved to SPHERE or UNHCR standards, they have been a critical lifeline for the camp. Emergency sanitation figures of 50 people/latrine have been surpassed, and the hygiene knowledge of the population is high, based on monitoring results. Diarrhoea disease rates continue to be high throughout the camp, but have not increased with the advent of the rainy season, which is a significant achievement considering the living conditions of Jamam camp. To date there has not been an outbreak of communicable disease."

This tone is echoed in trip reports made by other key regional and Humanitarian Directorate staff – that some excellent work was achieved by a very committed team, but that standards were not consistently achieved in the early response. A paper by the Emergency Public Health Advisor exploring the reasons behind the failure to provide adequate quantities of potable water during the period August 2011 to March 2012 speaks of continued hopes that drilling would yield positive results (based on experiences drilling in Doro camp which yielded 4 successful boreholes) but also raises issues of poor performance of key drilling staff, a more general lack of national PHE staff (dealt with in the Staff Capacity section below) and the poor condition of the drilling rig (dealt with in the Preparedness Section).

It is important to balance out the challenges with the later successes of the team. The water supply in Jamam increased tremendously from an average of 7l/p/d in April to an average of 19.95l/p/d in the last week of September. This has been due to relocation of some of the refugees, Oxfam taking over the water trucking contract and therefore improved supervision of water trucking, diversifying sources of water and finally completed connection of the main borehole by ICRC using a pipeline to the camp.

Once the dedicated Oxfam sanitation team leader arrived and additional funding had been secured, progress quickly picked up and Oxfam had considerable success in preparing both sanitation services and ensuring water provision to Gendrassa camp to the relevant standards in an extremely short space of time. The water supply in Gendrassa when all the drilling is complete should be able to comfortably supply the design population of 20,000 people with 20l/p/d. In addition to the water distribution in Jamam and Gendrassa camp, Oxfam has distributed PUR and water maker sachets for haffir water treatment and hygiene promotion in Jamam, KM18 and Hofra sites.[34] Moreover, Oxfam also provided support with drilling in Doro and Yusuf Batil camps, hosting over 40,000 and 35,000 refugees respectively.

<u>Public Health Promotion</u>
Interviews with Oxfam staff and evaluative reports suggest that the public health promotion component of the programme was well-resourced and had contingency stocks of basic hygiene items which permitted a relatively swift first response.

The public health strategy for South Sudan, written in April 2012 outlines a focus on working through and with affected communities on public health promotion issues and creating awareness on maintaining water and sanitation-related facilities. It highlights the importance of securing baseline data through knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) surveys to provide a baseline and outlines the following main activities;

[34] Oxfam distribution Report March - Sept 2012

- Target households have water collection and storage containers in line with Sphere minimum indicators and that those containers are kept clean in order to reduce post water collection contamination.
- Building awareness on safe usage of existing water and promoting safe excreta disposal practices and link this with health.
- Provision of and promoting hand washing with soap at key identified times
- Provision and promoting the correct use of mosquito nets
- Provision of beneficiary designed and culturally appropriate female hygiene kits
- Household visits, health education sessions and community discussions on key identified public health issues with maximum involvement of (or through) volunteers.

The baseline survey undertaken by the EP&R team is refreshingly succinct and extremely informative, providing both quantitative date and qualitative analysis and as such provided an important foundation for Oxfam's work. As is reported below the monitoring undertaken through a variety of different means by the PHP team is both informative and goes a considerable distance to providing compelling evidence of the performance (both good and bad) of Oxfam's public health work. The data provided makes for a mixed picture in terms of Oxfam's ability to reach and maintain standards of PHP provision as an analysis taken from a PHP report in 30 May and 13 July (the 2 monitoring reports made available to the evaluator) suggests that while some gains were made such as adult latrine use in Jamam camp, many of the indicators monitored revealed a worse situation in mid-July than at the end of May.

Box 7: Comparative analysis of Oxfam's PHP performance in Jamam camp

Note: The bar charts on the left hand side are taken from the 30 May 2012 monitoring report and the bar charts on the right hand side are taken from the 13 July 2012 monitoring report.

Access to a container to store water (May 30 and July 13)

Cleanliness of the containers (May 30 and June 13)

Adult latrine use (May 30 and June 13)

Access to soap (May 30 and June 13)

While the existence of monitoring data is extremely positive, the lack of comparative analysis over time makes the task of evaluating performance against standards a challenge. As the bar charts above show, in several cases performance appears to have fallen against coverage or usage figures (access to containers to store water decreased in both Jamam 1 and Jamam 2 between the end-of-May and mid-July as did access to soap and the percentage of water containers that were both clean and covered in both camps also dropped by a significant amount). There may be a justification for the reduction in performance (numbers of refugees increased and hence percentage coverage dropped, or that a soap distribution was pending in July which accounts for the decrease in access) but the fact that the monitoring reports contain little or no justification for these anomalies means that it's impossible to account for the downward trend.

Monitoring data aside key informant interviews and the mid-term review suggest that the team performed well in terms of delivering services to acceptable quality standards, although the latter also mentions the limited analysis of the programme that was undertaken during the review. It does note, however that *"Oxfam's provision of material for menstrual hygiene and plastic sheeting for bathing cubicles suggest that Oxfam work on hygiene promotion was possibly more advanced than other agencies."*

4.3 Towards a judgment on the standard

Oxfam routinely monitored their work against relevant standards, particularly Sphere indicators which were most often included in proposals and were referred to in strategy documents. While more consistent articulation and reporting of targets (based on the relevant indicators) in addition to outputs would have been helpful, this is a relatively minor issue. While the team struggled to meet key standards for water quantity and sanitation coverage in the early months of the response, there were mitigating reasons for this although these should be tempered by Oxfam's internal capacity constraints which should have been resolved more swiftly.

Given that the technical quality standard focuses on technical aspects of the programme *"being monitored against Sphere"* a judgment of almost met is justified. If the standard had focused on *"achievement"* of Sphere standards the judgment would have been partially met.

5. MEAL

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 3)	Almost met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
4	MEAL strategy and plan in place and being implemented using appropriate indicators	3			

5.1 Logic model, logical framework and indicators

The refugee response benefits from a PIP, project and a series of proposals, some of which have logical frameworks and most of which have indicators of success. The PIP provides a top line list of outcome indicators and means and frequency of collection which are fairly general but are clear and with the exception of the 2 protection outcome indicators for which the evaluator has no evidence of data collection and the indicator for CBO partners which isn't relevant to the refugee response,

other data (particularly related to the technical programme) appears to have been routinely collected.

The proposals contain logical frameworks which have relatively SMART indicators with the exception of capacity building activities for which in the smaller proposals success tends to be predicated on the achievement of quantitative indicators (e.g. the number of trainings undertaken) rather than qualitative ones (e.g. the knowledge, attitudes and beliefs of those trained). The 2 ECHO proposals (for EP&R and specifically for the Maban County response) have the most fully developed logical frameworks which provide greater detail on the proportion of beneficiaries that are expected to benefit from each of the results and which includes a comprehensive set of indicators. The UNHCR proposal benefits from a stand-alone document (dated 19 July 2012) outlining in great detail a set of technical indicators which should be considered good practice. This tends to suggest that while performance is uniformly acceptable against the standard, the rigour that is put into the development of indicators is likely to be dependent to some extent on the format and expectations of the donor and the scale of the funding that is being requested.

A trip report by the MEAL coordinator in September 2012 provides recent evidence of efforts made to ensure that the monitoring data collected continued to be relevant to the indicators outlined in proposals which is worthy of note and suggests that data collection is appropriate and in line with contractual requirements;

> "A meeting was held with funding to discuss the upcoming ECHO report and the updated project proposal that had since been admitted. Time was taken to look through the indicators, and check where they were gaps in terms of the data currently being collected. Gaps were mainly noted in collecting information on distance from household to the water point and time spent waiting at the water point. Concerns were raised about information on morbidity and mortality, and it was agreed that these should be looked into by MEAL."

Furthermore there is significant evidence that relevant technical data was routinely collected and recorded (albeit with reference made in the documentation to some fairly minor gaps). The areas where there is least or no evidence are for (i) the initial needs assessments, (ii) indicators relating to protection outputs, and (iii) for some of the anticipated behaviour changes for the hygiene promotion outputs. It is not possible to make any generalisations about the quality of donor reporting against the indicators identified in the proposal as only a single report was submitted during the period under evaluation, although the proposal that was submitted performed well against this benchmark.

5.2 MEAL strategy in place and being implemented
The MEAL system for Jamam refugee camp was set up in April by the HSP MEAL Coordinator who was based in Jamam. A monitoring framework was developed, with 10 tools (see box 8 below) which was trialed in Jamam camp and is in the process of being rolled out to Gendrassa camp. The tools use a prescribed format with an enumerator recording the answers of an individual discussion with beneficiaries. This was frequently combined with observation or focus group discussions, as shown below.

At the end of his deployment in June, the HSP recruited a MEAL officer who was to take over the implementation of the MEAL framework for the camp, with a matrix line to the new MEAL Coordinator, who joined on the 1st of August and was based in Juba. The transition from the MEAL HSP to the MEAL officer and the coming in of the MEAL coordinator was not a smooth one although the task of data collection and analysis appears to have been broadly maintained throughout the change in staffing.

Box 8: Jamam refugee camp monitoring framework

Tool	What	How	Where	When
1	Water point monitoring	Interview tool & Observation by enumerator	At water point	Weekly data collection
2	Latrine maintenance monitoring	Interview tool & Observation by enumerator	At latrine site	Weekly data collection
3	Bathing facility maintenance monitoring	Interview tool & Observation by enumerator	At bathing facility site	Weekly data collection
4	Complaints-Feedback collection	Interview tool	Complaints/feedback desk location	Weekly
5	Water usage survey	Interview tool	Different places at camp	Monthly
6	PHP household monitoring (Survey)	Interview tool	Different places at camp	Monthly
6a	PHP household monitoring (FGD)	Interview tool & Focus group discussion with beneficiaries	Different places at camp	Monthly
7	Post distribution monitoring	Interview tool	Different places at camp	Within 2 weeks of distribution
8	Water chlorination monitoring at tap stand and water tankers	Use the prescribed format	At tap stand and at water trucks	Daily
9	Progress report	Use the prescribed format for reporting	At office	Instructions given inside the format
10	Monthly learning exercise	3 hours participatory session: • Quick presentation of monthly monitoring findings • Quick exercise on achievements • What is the learning? • What are the challenges? • How to overcome these challenges?	At office	Monthly (by first week of following month)

A wealth of MEAL templates, monitoring and lessons learnt documents were submitted for the evaluation which collectively present compelling evidence of the commitment of Oxfam to capture (through the use of 10 MEAL tools – see box 8 above), document (through regular MEAL reports – see box 9 below) and learn from (through lessons learnt reports) its interventions. While there is evidence that the extent of the monitoring framework might have been over-burdensome for a team which at times has lacked capacity, sensible decisions over frequency of reporting and data to be collected has allowed the system to be maintained at an appropriate scope and scale.

Programme activities are regularly monitored and results against indicators are collected in monthly reports as well as for each intervention report. Focus group discussions with both men and women, transect walks, household interviews and village visits to reach the most vulnerable are conducted as part of the activities and there is evidence to suggest that findings have been incorporated in the reports. Attention is paid to collecting information both from women and from men, with some of the interviews and monitoring discussions being conducted separately in order to capture the impression of the two groups.

Box 9: Approach to MEAL in the South Sudan response and evidence submitted to the evaluator

	MEAL activity	#docs submitted
1	The initial assessment before starting the intervention	0
2	MEAL plan	3
3	Weekly sitreps	1
4	MEAL visit report	1
5	Technical trip report	5
6	Monthly learning exercise	1
7	Technical monitoring reports	29 (see section 3)
8	Real Time Evaluation 'Lite'	0

5.3 Towards a judgment on the standard

Overall this standard has been met and while there are some areas that could benefit from further strengthening, evidence of the use of logical frameworks, the development of SMART indicators and the existence of a coherent and broadly comprehensive data collection and reporting process is impressive.

6. Participation of & Accountability to crisis-affected communities

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 3)	Almost met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
5	Feedback/complaints system for affected population in place and functioning and documented evidence of information sharing, consultation and participation leading to a programme relevant to context and needs		2		

6.1 Community participation in programme design and delivery

During the initial rapid assessments conducted by Oxfam interviews with technical staff suggest that community focus group discussions (FGD) and meetings with community representatives were conducted although no documented evidence exists to support this. FGDs in Jamam were reportedly undertaken with refugee and host community chiefs, men and women respectively. Participants were asked about roles, challenges and priorities and these were shared on a daily basis with the emergency response and logistics teams in Jamam. Livelihoods-related information arising from these discussions was shared with the initial EFSL assessment team via a debrief in Malakal. These considerations - direct from host and refugee populations - were included in the initial assessment in Jamam. The ECHO proposal suggests that lessons learnt from the previous year's ECHO-funded EP&R responses, which worked with village development committees also assisted in project design.

Technical monitoring data which is of a high quality and adequate quantity show that the refugee programme took into account the expressed needs for bathing shelters, sanitary items for women and household latrines. Where community latrines were necessary, feedback from project participants also played a part in influencing the decision to provide sex-specific facilities to ensure a greater level of privacy. The willingness to elicit feedback on project design and listen to the views of project participants should be considered a strength of the programme.

In targeting the programme to specific beneficiaries, interviews suggest that Oxfam staff took steps to ensure that each neighbourhood within the boma was represented; that representatives from each tribe were sought out as well as women and youth. Household selection was conducted by the committee through house-to-house visits and the resulting beneficiary lists were verified by Oxfam staff through sampling of selected households.

While programme delivery was managed by Oxfam directly, it incorporated mechanisms to elicit the views of project participants through the use of committees. For example, members of WASH committees routinely fed back on programme progress and issues to Oxfam technical staff in both ad-hoc and formal meetings. In a monthly learning exercise report (10 June 2012), details are provided of a meeting at Jamam refugee camp where committee members were requested to share their feedback about the programme. The forum was also used as an opportunity to provide responses to issues raised (such as the fallacy that chlorination was contributing to the number of diarrhoea cases). The use of WASH committees in this way represents good practice in participation of project participants in programme planning.

While the lack of documentary evidence to support some of the assertions made above is a weakness (particularly the lack of any assessment reports), the abundance of monitoring data which captures the views of project participants suggests there was a good level of participation in the project.

6.2 Feedback and redress
There is evidence that a formal system to share information, to elicit complaints and provide redress exists in Jamam camp which has been documented in a case study. The system functions formally through several weekly complaints collection desks and informally via ongoing monitoring by the Oxfam technical team. A flow chart on how each of the mechanisms works has been produced as a guide and is supported by a series of photos which explains each of the steps. There is evidence over a number of weeks from May 2012 (5-months into the response) of complaints that have been elicited and some of the reports show action which has been taken (which is further backed up by photographic evidence – see box 10 below). The majority of issues raised relate to the quality and effectiveness of Oxfam's programme and suggest that communities understand the purpose of the desks and are using them effectively. Broader issues outside of Oxfam's immediate influence are also logged although it's not clear how these are raised and dealt with.

Box 10: Complaints Desk at Jamam Camp

A post-distribution monitoring report undertaken in Jamam Camp (1 and 2) in June 2012 provides mixed feedback on the refugee's awareness of the system that Oxfam had put in place. From 96 randomly selected households, the report notes that 94% of those questioned in Jamam 1 camp and 67% in Jamam 2 camp knew where to lodge complaints; in Jamam 2 camp 64% would use an Oxfam-established means of feeding back (be it the complaints desk, an Oxfam staff member or a WASH committee member), however, in Jamam 1 camp, this dropped to 43% with the majority of complaints being bought to the Sheikhs to escalate. The strength of the accountability system is that

it does not rely on a single mechanism but has several to draw from which and regular meetings with the sheiks filled an important potential gap.

MEAL reports that were made available to the evaluator provide a degree of evidence that feedback from project participants was routinely acted upon. In one such report from June 2012, a list of 6 actions taken by the team in response to concerns are listed (these match concerns that were listed in earlier MEAL reports and which included (i) quick construction of latrines to fill the gap reported by beneficiaries, (ii) latrine slab design improved – wider entrance and firm slab, (iii) clarification of misconception about chlorine causing diarrhoea, (iv) started registration of those who missed out on NFI distribution, (v) explained overall shortage of water in Jamam, and (vi) distributed water storage containers and soap.

The Oxfam MEAL HSP has produced a very informative report on the process which highlights lessons (see box 11 below) and challenges of the process; key among these is a concern that the system is not appropriate for serious complaints such as fraud, sexual harassment or protection issues and that these should be reported directly to the human resources department. There is no evidence to show that such complaints have been raised, reported or acted upon and no evidence was provided of similar mechanisms in existence in other camps although interviews confirmed that while it has taken time to establish a robust monitoring framework this is now close to being in place in Gendrassa camp.

Box 11: Lessons learnt from the implementation of the complaints-handling mechanism in Jamam camp

- Share project activities in details with beneficiaries. Otherwise beneficiaries will share a list of complaints/ feedback not relevant to Oxfam project activities;
- Continuous follow up and actions on registered complaints and feedback had created beneficiaries confidence on complaints/ feedback desks;
- Existing community structure (Sheikhs, Umdas) needs further explanation on complaints and feedback mechanism to strengthen the approach and this would result in sustainability of this mechanism.

6.3 Towards a judgment on the standard

Significant efforts have been made to attain this standard and while there was a notable gap for a couple of months between staff deployments and rolling out the framework in Gendrassa has taken some time, the evidence provided of the different mechanisms to elicit information and complaints from project participants in Jamam, to process this and to incorporate it into programme planning means that this standard is almost met. Had the monitoring framework been fully operational in Gendrassa camp the standard would have been met.

7. Partnership

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 3)	Almost met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
6	Partner relationships defined, capacity assessed and partners fully engaged in all stages of programme cycle	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

The humanitarian response was implemented as an operational programme and partners played no direct part in it. For this reason this standard is not applicable.

8. Conflict sensitivity & harm reduction

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 3)	Almost met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
7	Programme is considered a safe programme: action taken to avoid harm and programme considered conflict sensitive		2		

Oxfam deals with protection (meaning the "*improving the safety of civilians*")[35] through a variety of means including;

- Safe and conflict-sensitive response: Oxfam adheres to do no harm principles and seek to ensure their humanitarian response activities and the ways they are implemented do not result in negative or harmful consequences to their beneficiaries.
- Integrating protection: In its humanitarian response, Oxfam takes account of threats to safety and well-being of people affected and displaced by disasters and armed conflict at each stage of the project cycle through analysis, referrals, lobbying and advocacy.

The DRAFT Joint Country Analysis Strategy (JCAS) for South Sudan (04 April 2012) notes the challenges of delivering conflict sensitive programmes. It considers that the underlying causes of conflict and violence that continuously interrupt development in South Sudan are complex, different in different areas of the country and often inter-woven, and relate largely to structural issues such as tribalism, attitudes and beliefs, which influence cycles of violence and conflict and grievance respectively. It considers that while it's important for humanitarian programmes to understand these and to successfully navigate their way around them, it will only be through long-term change that they can be properly addressed. With this in mind, the JCAS makes a commitment to…

> "…design interventions in ways that do not exacerbate underlying drivers of conflict; build in the most appropriate protection measures for the context; and adapt programmes where necessary."

In the context of Oxfam in South Sudan, "*safe programming*" means that all programmes are carefully tested with the active participation of partners and communities to ensure that the activities involved do not increase the risks faced by beneficiaries, and where possible reduce them. The second, more pro-active approach to protection that aims to specifically reduce risk will also be adopted and will be achieved by strategies to reduce threats, through for example advocacy and/or building the capacity of the authorities to protect civilians, and strategies to reduce women's and men's vulnerability, through for example supporting them to have a voice and negotiating their own safety.

Box 12: Integration of protection and safe programming into proposals

Proposal	Conflict Reduction	Safe programming & protection
Oxfam Novib (ON)	Analysis of issues that may contribute to conflict and outline of steps taken to mitigate this	A section on gender and protection which outlines steps taken to mitigate protection risks to women
Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)	Not referred to in the proposal	Protection is referred to in relation to safe access by women
European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO)	Not referred to in the proposal	Reference to protection assessments and log frame includes protection-related indicators for one of the results

---

[35] Taken from the Oxfam document 'What is protection?" (date unknown)

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Not referred to in the proposal	Not referred to in the proposal
German Foreign Office (GFO)	Not referred to in the proposal	Protection-related indicators for one of the results

8.1 Safe programming and protection

There is significant evidence of efforts made by Oxfam to ensure the safety of its beneficiaries both through safe programming and more directly through lobbying and advocacy work. A protection analysis was prepared by the HSP after her arrival in May and at which time there was also regular analyses, updates and lobby points included in sitreps. Protection information gathering was conducted with the support of the PHP team which facilitated regular interviews with refugees and host populations. In order to build the capacity of the team, a protection induction toolkit was prepared and circulated to teams (including to HR for induction purposes) and included, (i) a summary of Oxfam's understanding of protection, (ii) contextualised guidelines for referrals from Jamam, (iii) a checklist for safe programming in WASH and (iv) guidelines for dealing with abuses signed off by the Jamam humanitarian manager and PM. The toolkit and guidance it contains is both accessible and comprehensive. Beyond the toolkit, a protection workshop was conducted which was attended by most of the PHE and PHP staff (with a few exceptions). The protection HSP also worked with the MEAL coordinator to seek to ensure regular monitoring and focus group discussions were relevant to strengthening Oxfam's protection analysis and highlighting abuses. A draft 6-month protection strategy was prepared by the HSP prior to her departure.

From a programmatic perspective, technical reports outline some of the steps Oxfam took to ensure adequate protection for women using their latrines and water points, ensuring that they were accessible and were located in areas considered safe. While a lack of staff capacity and the uncertainties and relocation of the Jamam camp hampered the sanitation work, efforts to ensure the safety and dignity of women were a consistent feature of Oxfam's activities. MEAL reports provided important analysis and feedback to the team; a review of the weekly summary of complaints and feedback from 31 May 2012 show that the issue of separate latrines was raised with a follow-up/action note specifying Oxfam's proposed targets for male/female toilets and giving an update on progress made in extending sanitation coverage in the camp. An extract from a latrine monitoring report from September 2012 shows that issues of privacy were being monitored (at that time) and that privacy was considered to be adequate.

Box 13: Female privacy - extract from latrine monitoring report, 10 September 2012

Enough privacy for female

200%

100%

0%   0%

■ % of people

Yes   No

Analysis: "There is a significant improvement this week. 100% (60) beneficiaries mentioned that there is adequate privacy for females at the latrine as compared to the previous monitoring results where 10% mentioned there is not enough privacy for females in the latrine."

Methodology: "Data was collected from Jamam 2. A total of 60 beneficiaries were randomly interviewed in the camp to monitor the latrine maintenance and hand washing facilities both at latrine site and at household in Jamam 2. Data was not collected from Jamam 1 this week as most of the households there have already moved to Gendrassa."

One of the issues of greatest concern was the militarisation of the refugee camps. In Jamam camp, Oxfam reported the blurring of civilian and military presence due to the presence of SPLA-N soldiers and their families in the camp which threatened the humanitarian mandate of the camp and increased the insecurity for the civilian residents. The presence of the SPLA was also of concern as it

was considered to impede humanitarian access and contravened international humanitarian law. In order to address the issue, lobby notes were prepared and meetings held with duty bearers prepared by Oxfam (this issue is dealt with more fully in the advocacy standard) and the issue was escalated to the UN through the regular Protection Working Group meeting. While there was no evidence of the contribution that Oxfam's analysis, lobbying and advocacy efforts made to resolving the issue, the products prepared are of a high quality and Oxfam's commitment to addressing them by the means available to the organisation is worthy of praise.

The Protection Working group meeting was also used as a forum for Oxfam to share observations about the nature of threats and to call on those with formal mandates, such as UNHCR to fulfil these. Staff were careful in ensuring they did not give details of specific protection incidents during these meetings and maintained strict confidentiality. The response team did not did not specifically collect specific protection incidents – but, acknowledging that it is inevitable that some beneficiaries will volunteer information about specific incidents and seek assistance, Oxfam emphasised the importance of our staff responding by giving referral messages in these instances.

8.2 Conflict Reduction

While there is scant written evidence of conflict-sensitive programming being practiced prior to the deployment of the HSP in May this may be more a result of the lack of documentation than it is a reflection of reality. While little is also documented about the work of the host community (or long-term) public health team, by ensuring that some of the most urgent public health needs of the host communities were being met, this team went some way to de-escalating tensions. Interviews suggest that after the refugee influx, one of the first activities undertaken by the team was to repair the motorised borehole of the local population and to fix hand pumps which support this assertion.

The lack of an identified 'lead' person for conflict sensitive programming in the early days of the response may also account for the failure to refer to this important aspect of programming in the majority of Oxfam's proposals. Given the importance afforded to this in the JCAS (which, admittedly was authored in April, after many of the proposals had already been submitted), it's disappointing that conflict sensitivity wasn't referred to more often in Oxfam's proposal submissions.

After May when the protection HSP arrived there were more visible efforts made to ensure conflict-sensitive programming was preached and practiced and efforts were made to prepare guidelines to support programme staff in addition to targeted capacity building efforts. The 'guidelines for dealing with conflict and violence' is a good example of this and provides a set of easy-to-understand and contextually relevant actions for Oxfam staff to take which should be considered good practice. Beyond guidance, specific issues have been taken up by the team to understand the potential impact of local practices on conflict. A good example is the investigation about water-selling activities in Jamam market which was conducted following concerns about a few individuals selling water from the village water-points and the potential for this to contribute to the growing animosity between host population and refugees. However, on this issue, opportunities were also missed as one report suggests;

> "[One opportunity that was] missed to prevent conflict was the lack of briefing of the water point attendants regarding the soft measures or social measures to ensure orderly queues and equitable access of refugees. A few incidents of fighting at the water point, involving people fighting because of people not respecting queues came to our attention. The importance of orienting and supporting the water point attendants to implement guidelines in water collection, complemented by community education about guidelines on water collection and sharing had been highlighted very early on in the protection reports – but taking this action was de-prioritised or sidelined by the need to respond to equally urgent, unplanned developments – such as hosting of transit refugees, and later preparing refugees for relocation."

While the support that was provided lasted only a couple of months, the focus on providing written guidelines and on training staff was a sound approach to adopt and has ensured a level of understanding and oversight of such an important issue that has gone beyond the individuals deployment.

8.3 Towards a judgment on the standard
While it took several month to meet Oxfam's commitment to safe-programming and protection, within 3-5 months after the Cat 2 was declared, the Oxfam team in Jamam had made extremely good progress. Initial resourcing decisions made after the departure of the HSP appear have led to some compromises being made as technical outputs were prioritised over maintaining a focus on protection, but this decision has been recently overturned and the return of a dedicated post-holder for this important role will now ensure that it receives the support that it requires. Despite the capacity gap, the evidence that exists of analysis and action at both a programmatic and advocacy level is impressive and means that the standard has been almost met.

9. Gender & vulnerability

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 3)	Almost met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
8	Programme (including advocacy) addresses gender equity and specific concerns and needs of women, girls, men and boys and vulnerable groups[36]		2		

As for the previous standard, the DRAFT South Sudan JCAS (04 April 2012) provides a benchmark for Oxfam's approach to gender sensitive programming which is very relevant to this standard:

> "Women and men's different experiences and responses to crisis situations vary and needs to be thoroughly understood in each context. Men and boys need to find alternative strategies to a recourse to violence and crisis events can present opportunities for attitudes and beliefs around gender roles to be shifted, and at the very least will inform protection needs and feed into strategies for safe programming."

A gender analysis was undertaken in February 2012 which included Oxfam programmes in the Lakes and Upper Nile. The report is extremely informative, makes recommendations for Oxfam's programme and provides a wealth of contextual analysis. It also makes specific recommendations for Oxfam's programme which given the timeliness of the document provided a target for the team to work towards. The recommendations included the following;

Recommendations for Oxfam's WASH programme in Maban
- Awareness creation and change in the cultural and traditional harmful and negative attitudes;
- Build separate toilets for girls and boys;
- Ensure water is near latrines;
- Provision of more boreholes and latrines for both the host community and the refugees;
- Provision of more boreholes and hand dug wells.

Recommendations for capacity building of staff in Maban and Malakal:
- All HR staff to be trained on gender concept, mainstreaming and cross cutting to help them sanitize newly recruited staff on the importance of gender at work place;
- Training of all staff on gender and gender mainstreaming;

---

[36] Elderly, disabled, HIV positive, single women, female-headed households are examples

- Develop policies that encourages women to apply for positions that traditional hold by men;
- Provision of day care facilities for women in the work place.

A review of Oxfam's proposals shows a fairly consistent approach to incorporating gender considerations into submissions with specific sections in four out of the five proposals submitted. Performance was patchy when it came to the use of sex- and age-disaggregated data with only two of the five proposals containing this level of detail. The same can be said of the technical reports with the baseline report offering no disaggregated data (although it does differentiate between adults and children in some of the analyses); importantly, the latrine monitoring reports do focus attention on women's perceptions of privacy and in so doing monitors one of the recommendations of the gender analysis although it's disappointing that other data presented in the monitoring reports is not disaggregated by gender. The same can be said for monthly public health monitoring reports and the June NFI post-distribution monitoring report (despite the fact that the questionnaire for both asked the sex of the respondent and hence it's assumed that the results could be disaggregated) and PHP progress reports. There is no mention of Oxfam's Minimum Standards of Gender Equality and Women's Rights in Emergencies in the documents that were reviewed.

Box 14: Integration of gender considerations and sex-disaggregated data into proposals

Proposal	Gender considerations	sex/age-disaggregated data
Oxfam Novib (ON)	Significant analysis and tangible steps that will be taken to mainstream gender in programme operations	No disaggregated data
Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)	Gender considerations included in cross-cutting issues	No disaggregated data
European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO)	Section included in the proposal on gender equity and in promoting the needs of women in the response. Reference is made to specific programmatic responses	Reference made to particularly vulnerable groups and their specific needs although no disaggregated data provided. Gender-specific indicators in log frame
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Not referred to in the proposal	No disaggregated data
German Foreign Office (GFO)	Specific gendered indicators included in the proposal	A sex- and age-disaggregated table is included in the proposal which presents estimates based on a survey of the camp population in Jamam

While the level of analysis doesn't appear to have attained Oxfam's standard, the programme has performed well in systematically assessing issues related to both men and women and in incorporating a gender perspective into its programming. Outputs from the MEAL framework show that the views of women were systematically elicited and acted on; particular issues that were raised and acted on related to the importance of separate latrines for men and women and the need to increase privacy in bathing areas (see box 13 above). This issue was tracked through the monthly monitoring reports with some very positive results in terms of women's satisfaction levels.

The composition of hygiene kits included items specifically for women and while reports and monitoring data for the utility of these items weren't made available to the evaluator, the mid-term review of the response and interviews with public health staff suggest that the incorporation of cloths for menstrual hygiene were considered to be of great value by women. Women also played an active part in the programme through their participation in WASH committees. Towards the end of the Maban County gender analysis document, feedback is provided on Oxfam's performance with regard to incorporating gender concerns into the programme which the findings of the evaluation broadly concur with;

"During the focus group discussions it was noticed that OGB projects address gender issues in both the host community and the refugees this has been clearly manifested in their WASH, health and income generation activities. These activities will continue to impact women positively through confidence building, self-esteem and economic empowerment. For example, women participation in water committees, women targeted income generation activities and hygiene promotion and camp management committee. These activities provide a space for dialogue and interaction between men and women and give an opportunity for men to understand the women better in order to work as partners in development rather than rivals."

While there is scope for strengthening monitoring by using sex- and age-disaggregated data to better understand the perceived benefits of the programme on women, the existence of a strategy document and the focus placed on participation of women and listening to feedback provides an indication of the commitment of the Oxfam team to seeking to understand and meet the needs of women. This standard is almost met.

10. Preparedness

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 3)	Almost met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
9	Evidence that preparedness measures were in place and effectively actioned			1	

An OI contingency plan existed at the time the response commenced although interviews suggest that it did little to influence the response. Despite this feedback, a review of the document which was updated in July 2011 and was valid until the end of the same year, the time at which the response commenced shows that the contextual analysis provided is relevant to the response being evaluated both in terms of the estimates of potential numbers affected and their geographic locations. The identification of floods and food insecurity as secondary hazards was also accurate and reflected reality.

In the detailed section on response by state, Upper Nile is correctly identified as a potential recipient of an additional caseload of refugees and makes a fairly shrewd estimation of scale – between 150k and 300k being the worst case. At the time the document was written, Oxfam wasn't working in the areas that hosted the influx but it identifies sectors that it would respond in (WASH for 50,000 and EFSL based on assessments) and gives an approximate budget (£850,000). It also provided a trigger for assessments to be launched; an influx of 10,000 persons. The contingency plan outlines a standing EP&R team and provides an overview of WASH stocks that are available for response (for up to 50,000 people). Because of its operational presence and long-experience in humanitarian response in the country, the Oxfam team was considered to have benefitted from considerable humanitarian experience from within the standing team which is listed in the document. This should have provided an ideal launch pad for an initial assessment and response.

Beyond the existence of a plan, successful scale-up requires that stand-by capacity is fit-for purpose and ready for deployment. In this regard, Oxfam's performance was mixed. The ECHO-funded EP&R team which had initiated the Renk response were one of the first agencies with an operational presence in Doro refugee camp and then Jamam and established the early response which, although modest in size, delivered life-saving assistance. It is also noteworthy that the response borrowed heavily from Oxfam's existing public health programme in Upper Nile (referred to as the 'host community' team) and reports show staff being seconded into the emergency programme and drilling rigs being redeployed in support of the humanitarian response.

However, while there were some successes in terms of swift access to people and skills, the mid-term review noted considerable deficiencies in the readiness of emergency equipment noting that "*…many assets such as vehicles, communications equipment and drilling rigs were in extremely poor condition.*" During the response technical reports note the frequency with which the drilling rig was out of service due to its poor condition and several trip reports (including that of the Humanitarian Director) refer to the poor condition of communication equipment and vehicles which actively hampered the ability of Oxfam to respond swiftly and effectively. Interviews with Oxfam staff highlighted frustrations with the broader organisational readiness to respond; while the response drew heavily on the HSP pool, and although some arrived in February, other members of the team took time to arrive which contributed to the complexities of the response, and while the response benefitted considerably from the Catastrophe Fund, in the context of a very logistically challenging and hence expensive project, the lack of adequate funds served to exacerbate delays in implementation with most of the freight arriving 6-weeks after the Cat 2 was declared once significant donor funds began to arrive.

Launching an effective response in South Sudan clearly stretched Oxfam's country-level and global preparedness resources albeit due to a complex array of challenges. What will be important in seeking to ensure timely and proportionate responses in the future is to go beyond paper-based preparedness plans and making realistic plans for what is achievable, particularly in the absence of significant donor funds. Given the deficiencies in Oxfam's preparedness, this standard is only partially met.

11. Advocacy

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 3)	Almost met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
10	Programme has an advocacy strategy and has incorporated advocacy into programme plans based on evidence from the field			1	

The Cat 2 emergency declared in February included both South Sudan and Sudan and internal communications justify the basis for this decision on the basis that it will provide "*an opportunity in making it cat 2 would be to incorporate cross border issues and the joint advocacy work that we have already started.*"[37] The figures used to justify the declaration didn't include Sudan and there was no plan (or possibility) to link the response in the two countries. Oxfam has a long history of advocating on behalf of those in need of humanitarian assistance in Sudan and given the profile of the crisis in South Sudan and the numbers of people affected, linked to the political interest there clearly was an opportunity to seek to influence policy and decision-makers.

The advocacy work that Oxfam undertook can be separated into two parts; policy and lobbying work targeted at international actors (governments, the UN, donors) to ensure effective and timely assistance for and protection to those affected by the conflict, and; programmatic advocacy undertaken by the country team targeted at improving the national-level response. Oxfam undertook both of these and each will be reviewed separately.

11.1 International lobbying and advocacy work
A strategy paper entitled 'Food insecurity – conflict, displacement and lack of food security for a more secure republic of Sudan and South Sudan' was prepared in March with a 3-month duration as

---

[37] Email exchange between regional and Oxford-based senior management, 24 February 2012

a 2-country strategy seeking to address the root causes of the crises and the humanitarian impacts on people affected by it (details of the key issues highlighted in the paper are provided in box 1).

The overall aim of the initial strategy was to help the people of the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan to live together in peace and security with access to basic services and sustainable livelihoods as well as a secure environment free from conflict. It was anticipated that the strategy would play a part in addressing the immediate and long-term concerns facing the people of South Kordofan State and Blue Nile State in Sudan and in the border regions of South Sudan, with a focus on food insecure and conflict affected populations in Sudan and South Sudan. Within this overarching aim Oxfam sought to work towards ensuring consensual humanitarian access to the affected States in Sudan, with freedom of movement and the protection of those populations and improving security, including food security, along the border. Lobbying activities were focused on ensuring humanitarian assistance including for food security, WASH, and other interventions would be guaranteed with clear recommendations for better and sustainable access to livelihoods for refugees and returnees.

The strategy contained key messages, identified ways of working and assigned tasks to global, regional and national leads. A risk analysis and power analysis was undertaken as part of the strategy. There is no evidence of how this strategy engaged project staff and the extent to which it contributed to positive change in the situation and so it's impossible to make a judgment on how effective it was (efforts were made to contact advocacy staff but these did not yield fruit) but considerable efforts were made to engage targets on issues outlined in the advocacy strategy. A review of the sitreps shows a significant range of lobbying and advocacy activities which include the following;

Box 15: Lobbying and media activities reported in Oxfam sitreps between March and October 2012

March	scale-up advocacy team confirmed and deployed
March	OI Advocacy and media strategy finalised
March	Joint messaging with NRC on returnees
March	hosting of a joint DFID/FCO visit to Maban County
April	donor ministerial briefings
April	joint briefing notes prepared with peer agencies
May	border lobby note prepared
June	1-year on food security lobby note finalised
June	UNMISS lobby note finalised
June	note to donors on the need for relocation of Jamam refugees
June	Oxfam hosts team of journalists to Jamam camp
October	1-year anniversary of the conflict in Blue Nile lobby note
October	lobby meetings with DFID, ECHO, OCHA. UNHCR
October	interviews with 4 media houses on the situation at the border
October	joint agency letter on funding needs sent to 12-donors
October	lobby meeting with BPRM
October	joint NGO policy paper 'Striking the Balance' (between hum/dev needs in fragile states)
October	updated media briefing with key top lines (about the humanitarian situation in the camps)

The extent to which the decision to include both the Republic of Sudan and South Sudan in the strategy benefitted each or either is not reported, however there is evidence that the decision was opposed by some of the team in the South and in September, 6-months after it was declared a joint emergency, a recommendation was made by the South Sudan HCT to de-link the two as it was considered *"no longer relevant, had hampered rather than assisted the response."*[38] There was an

---

[38] South Sudan Cat 2 Crisis, Review document, September 2012 (author unknown)

agreement for respective policy teams to continue to liaise to mitigate any negative impact but given that joint appeals had not been launched and that joint programming was not possible, the South Sudan HCT considered there was little added value to continuing the partnership.

11.2 Media

A review of Oxfam's press releases and online content suggests that efforts were made to raise programmatic issues of concern from the early days of the refugee response in January; fears of water shortages in April; floods in May; the urgent need to relocate the refugees in September, and; security concerns in November. Two press statements were made in May and September in support of ending the political deadlock between the Sudans and these opportunities were linked to lobby meetings (see box 16 below).

While some of Oxfam's press releases were linked to the broader political situation, the majority had strong links to the programme and many were focused on seeking to bring about necessary changes. Oxfam's media work was generally of a high quality although no data was provided to the evaluator on its effectiveness or contribution to bringing about positive change and so this cannot be assessed.

Box 16: List of press releases, blogs etc. in support of Oxfam's advocacy work

Press Releases
- 9th January 2012 - South Sudan Struggling in face of growing refugee crisis
- 26th April 2012 - Options running out for 37,000 refugees in South Sudan's Jamam camp, Oxfam warns
- 15th May 2012 - Imminent rains will jeopardise response to Sudans conflict, aid agencies warn
- 5th July 2012 – One year on - South Sudan falters over failing economy
- 6th September 2011 - Don't squander the chance to build a better South Sudan (joint agency press release to go with report 'Getting it Right from the Start')
- 20th September – 2012 New Sites for refugees must be found
- 11th November 2011 - Oxfam relocates staff after surge of violence along Sudan / South Sudan border

Statements:
- 2nd May 2012 Oxfam reaction on Sudan / South Sudan resolution at security council
- 27th September 2012 - Oxfam reaction to end of Sudan / South Sudan talks in Addis Ababa

Blogs
- 10th January 2012 – South Sudan a blue print for a food secure future
- 5th June 2012– As difficult as it gets – new influx of refugees in South Sudan
- 10th July 2012 - In Jamam refugee camp, a community approach to sanitation
- September 2011 - Planting the seeds of a better future
- October 2012 - Singing and soap unite communities on global hand washing day

11.3 Programme-level advocacy work

Efforts to document and raise issues of concern were routinely undertaken at the programme level and there is significant evidence of issues being addressed proactively by the team across a variety of different themes and directed towards different duty bearers. While the results from these efforts are similarly mixed, the breadth of issues tackled suggest that there was a team that felt passionately about the welfare of the communities they worked with and put considerable effort into challenging the status quo and lobbying for solutions to be found to pressing programmatic and protection concerns.

One of the most challenging issues that Oxfam escalated with mixed results was a call to relocate the refugees in Jamam camp due to concerns about the capacity of the water system and the need for contingency plans for problems associated with lack of water availability more generally. A report by the former Public Health Advisor provides details of the efforts taken to address the water shortages

in the camp including the issue of lobbying UNHCR, the agency with responsibility for the overall welfare of the refugees.

Box 17: Oxfam lobbying activities for relocation of refugees in Jamam camp

"It was noted internally in November that water could be an issue if a camp was to exist in Jamam. It was first raised to HCR at Juba level the concern of water availability in Jamam in mid-January by the Oxfam Country PH Coordinator. A draft paper was then prepared by the team with inputs from advocacy and released publically at Juba and field level on the 10th of February. An email exchange with HCR site planner on 23rd of January acted as a reminder of Oxfam's concerns and acknowledgement from HCR that there may not be enough water in Jamam. Concerned by a lack of contingency planning by HCR, Oxfam offered at field level to conduct a contingency planning workshop for all sectors looking at possible scenarios including no water and cholera. This spurred HCR to host the workshop themselves the next week on the 28th of February. During this day workshop the option of moving people was written off by UNHCR due to logistical reasons. An 'emergency' meeting was called by Oxfam at field level in the 1st week of March with all actors (HCR, Acted, MSF, InterSOS) to raise again the scenario that there may not be water (which would be confirmed within a week); it was recommended by Oxfam at field level to plan to move people to a new location, probably Yusif Batil (Doro 2) if water availability was confirmed. However UNHCR stated that it was now 'too late' to consider moving people due to the proximity to the rainy season and stated that Oxfam will need to find 'bridging' solutions and relocation would be reconsidered after the rainy season."

While early efforts to influence the decision to relocate refugees to a new camp in the early months of the response ultimately failed, sustained pressure did lead to the eventual transfer in July of refugees to Gendrassa in which Oxfam was far more successful in finding water of the right quantity and quality.

A second area in which Oxfam has demonstrated the value of linking programme and advocacy work is in protection and safe programming which required advocacy at several different levels. There is evidence of protection issues being documented with and addressed directly to UNHCR in protection working group meetings in Jamam; significant effort was also focused on the complex issue of the militarisation of the refugee camps by parties to the conflict on and around the border. At the end of June, an advocacy paper was prepared which provided an overview of the situation, a detailed context analysis, a set of recommendations for action and a number of advocacy messages for duty bearers. At the time of the departure of the HSP Gender and Protection Officer in August the routine collection and analysis of data about security incidents and systematically raising these with UNHCR and other responsible parties was still work in progress. The lack of evidence since her departure means that it has not been possible to assess the extent to which this work continued although after a brief gap a new post-holder has been identified and recruited.

11.4 Towards a judgment on the standard

Oxfam was engaged in a significant level of policy and advocacy work at both a national and international level. Particularly impressive are the efforts to raise programme issues such as militarisation and water shortages at a local, national and, at times, international level which suggests a good level of coherence between programme issues and advocacy agendas. The inclusion of Sudan in the initial advocacy strategy and subsequent de-linking several months later suggests a lack of agreement within Oxfam about how to approach the cross-border issue and certainly caused a level of internal debate.

The most significant weakness on Oxfam's advocacy work is the absence of any evidence of monitoring or evaluative data on its impact (or contribution to impact). The checklist requires *"that the MEAL plan includes a theory of change, [and] regular monitoring",* and it is in this area that Oxfam has performed poorly; the strategy does not include a theory of change, indicators of success or a MEAL plan. In the absence of these quality measures only a partially met score can be awarded.

12. One Programme Approach

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 3)	Almost met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
11	Programme has an integrated one programme approach including reducing and managing risk though existing longer-term development programmes and building resilience for the future			1	

The DRAFT/FINAL South Sudan JCAS (28/03/12) notes the challenge facing Oxfam GB of how to integrate disaster risk reduction and resilience together in order to place more emphasis on preparedness rather than response. As evidenced by the preparedness standard against which Oxfam scored poorly, there is a challenge in how the organisation can segue between the different modes of response and seek to ensure that its longer-term efforts can mitigate and prevent disasters. The same document notes that the current response in Upper Nile will serve to detract from the organisation's ability to address these questions systematically, presumably because of the additional workload that the humanitarian response has created.

Given the context of South Sudan being a young nation with a government with very limited capacity to provide the basic services required to sustain its population or respond to recurrent natural disasters and violent conflict, it is important to recognise that Oxfam is not alone in facing this complex challenge; of having to act as a substitute for the state when crisis strikes on the one hand while seeking to build long-term resilience on the other. While the ambitions of Oxfam to build resilience and deliver coherent programming are important, the refugee response appears at times to have been quite separate from the rest of the South Sudan programme with the mid-term review suggesting that with the increase in the refugee caseload in January 2012 Oxfam…

> "…has established a whole new programme in South Sudan that takes into account its scale, complexity and reputational risks and created a new management line along with the required business support functions."[39]

While this may have been necessary to respond proportionately to the refugee influx, it may also have served to create an artificial separation from the longer-term South Sudan team. While Oxfam had roots in Upper Nile and a pre-existing 'host community' programme it is not clear the extent to which this team was integrated into the emergency team or whether knowledge was routinely shared. While reports suggest that staff was transferred from this team to the emergency team which doubtless supported scale-up, it's unclear how much space they were given to influence the humanitarian response. During an interview, one technical staff member spoke of the significant role that this team played in providing information and access to the local community which it had very strong links with, however, it's only at the end of June that the team are first referred to in the sitrep in the context of defusing potential animosities between host and refugee population by providing vital services to the former. Later in a separate document it is reported that other agencies had started to replicate the activities of the host community team which suggests the value of their presence and makes the failure to report on their work for the first 6-months of the refugee response all the more disappointing. An internal report adds weight to these concerns;

> "[The] Long term programme in Jamam…funded by Top Projects for £220k, was allowed to continue separately from the large scale up response for the refugees (£6 million), instead of being merged into one response. Therefore long term staff and resources were not used for the refugee response."[40]

---

[39] Luff (2012) Mid-term review: South Sudan emergency response in Maban County, Upper Nile State, September 2012 pp34

[40] HSP report on the programme in South Sudan, May 2012

It's also important to note the contribution made to programme integration by the EP&R team. As an integral part of Oxfam's South Sudan team and also the first on the scene in both Renk and in Jamam, the knowledge that this team had of Oxfam's South Sudan programme and the context in the country would have been invaluable. What is more difficult to determine is the extent to which these links were maintained once the EP&R team had been replaced by contract staff and HSPs, many of whom were new to the organisation (and many of the internationals had relatively little experience of working for Oxfam in Sudan). The change in leadership as a consequence of the activation of the step-aside policy and the transfer of reporting lines to the Deputy Regional Director during this time doubtless also militated against integration in the short-term and while several of the staff interviewed spoke of this positively in terms of ensuring the programme was prioritised and resourced appropriately, addressing the legacy of disjointed management will take time and talented leadership.

A review of the Public Health Strategy for Emergency Response dated April 2012 refers to the importance of links with the longer-term programme and outlines an exit strategy which explicitly refers to handing the programme back to the Renk and Melu EP&R team with the involvement of the long-term PH team (the 'host community' team). A date of mid-October is given for handover design to commence with a view to a November transition and while this continued to be unrealistic due to the complex nature of the response, the ambition and plans to transition in this way are positive. Towards the end of the period under evaluation there were more encouraging signs of greater programmatic coherence; the EP&R team have recently been incorporated into the Maban County team and while the host community team remain distinct, efforts have been taken to benefit from their links with communities and to better coordinate activities.

These are indeed positive steps but there continues to be significant progress to be made before Oxfam can speak of a 'one programme approach' and in making a judgment on the standard, the sentiment expressed in the JCAS is pertinent; that there is still work to do for Oxfam to better link preparedness more closely to response and resilience. While some programmatic links have been made, capacity gaps and the complexity of response necessitated the initial creation of an independent team. Efforts to strengthen the leadership of the programme and the relatively recent development of programme strategies will potentially lay the groundwork for greater programmatic coherence and for Oxfam to make a greater contribution to resilience in the future, but even with an enabling internal environment (including careful management, talented support and a settled team) it will be a difficult standard to meet in such a challenging and complex country.

13. Staff Capacity

Number	Quality standard	Met (score 3)	Almost met (score 2)	Partially met (score 1)	Not met (score 0)
12	Evidence of appropriate staff capacity to ensure quality programming			1	

Evaluating staff capacity in the context of a remotely-implemented evaluation is extremely difficult. The evidence that was made available to the evaluator included the capacity planning spread sheets and 3 trip reports. There is also the broader evidence of what has been achieved during the project and the extent to which this was timely and effective.

While this report has praised the initial work of the EP&R team, there is considerable criticism in the project documentation about the lack of capacity at key points in the programme and for specific posts. Particularly problematic recruitments and staff capacity issues that are flagged in the documentation received by the evaluator include the following;

- Driller: In an October trip report, an Oxfam Advisor notes satisfactory progress against achieving sphere standards, but also raises issue a concern about the drilling team not working at "*full capacity*" in the early months of the response due to "*frequent absences of drilling staff*" as well as operation and maintenance of the drilling rig. The report refers to the recruitment of a Master Driller post to "*build the capacity of the team*" which can be considered a responsible measure to take.

- PHE scale-up staff: The mid-term review places some of the responsibility for the perceived slow response to meeting public health needs in Jamam camp in early 2012 on the "*poor HR performance in contracting the necessary staff*" particularly at levels D and E; it goes onto note that there had been an improvement by mid-June 2012.

- Strategic Leadership: There are references made to significant change in the country-level senior management team and of divisions between the existing team and new arrivals. While the step-aside policy that was initiated towards the end of July, 5-months after the declaration of the category 2 emergency dealt with some of these issues and should be considered a positive move it also suggests the level of organizational concern about the standing country leadership.

- HR staffing and coordination: Concern was raised by programme leadership about the lack of additional HR capacity for the scale-up prior to April 2012 (2-months after the declaration of the Cat 2 emergency) and goes on to question the deployment of key HR staff from the capital to the field leaving gaps in recruitment capacity. The lack of flexibility in HR decision-making for urgent posts and to support succession planning was also raised as a concern during several of the interviews.

- Funding Coordination: The capacity and experience of the funding team in the early months of the refugee response was considered to be a significant limitation to Oxfam's ability to raise much-needed funds. These concerns were partially addressed by the active involvement of the regional funding officer which was followed in May by the recruitment and deployment of a dedicated, experienced international funding officer.

- MEAL Coordination: Of the trip reports received by the evaluator, all of which were written several months after the start of the programme, the 'back to office' report of the MEAL Coordinator in September notes a disruption in continuity between MEAL post-holders which impacted negatively on implementation.

> "The transition from the MEAL HSP to the MEAL officer and the coming in of the MEAL coordinator was not a smooth one, and concerns were raised by management in Jamam about the significant decrease in the intensity of monitoring at the camps, given the demand for timely data for coordination and internal Oxfam purposes."

There is evidence of a sound approach being taken to capacity planning including recruitment and retention. The numerous spread sheets (27 XL documents from Dec 2011 to November 2012) indicate the challenges faced by Oxfam in maintaining a full team of between 54 - 87 staff (not including guards and drivers) working in a very remote part of an extremely difficult country to recruit staff into. Highlights from an analysis of the documents include the appropriate use of HSP to cover staffing gaps throughout the response; regular updates about which posts were required and for how long; and appropriate use of contract extensions when these were justified. It is also noteworthy that there is evidence of capacity building measures that were undertaken during the programme to strengthen the team including monthly learning events and targeted capacity building on issues such as protection.

That said, there have been some important gaps (see box 18 below which analyses 3 of the HR capacity spread sheets from 13 December 2011, April 16 2012 and August 16 2012 respectively), which at times had a significant negative impact on programme implementation. There is also fairly consistent reference to poor HR systems which at times served to hinder rather than strengthen the programme scale-up which is summarised well in the mid-term review report;

> "Their [Regional Centres] processes were considered transactional, overly complex and administrative steps were not followed through in a timely way by RC staff. The same also appears to be true of Juba, though their [staffing] constraints have been highlighted."

A rudimentary analysis of the Oxfam capacity spread sheets gives an indication provides greater detail on where the gaps were and the overall trend in recruitment and retention with time. While there are variations in the format of the spread sheets with time which makes rigorous comparison impossible and the inability to differentiate between pre-existing posts and pipeline posts likely negatively skews the data, it is noteworthy that there is a small positive trend both in the percentage of filled posts but also in the number of senior posts that are filled. The spread sheets show that with time there was greater continuity within the senior staff and fewer vacancies in these key positions and also shows a positive trend with time in the recruitment and retention of public health engineering staff which were vital for programme implementation.

Box 18: Statistics on recruitment needs vs. gaps throughout the Upper Nile response[41]

December 13 2011				
Type of post	No.	Filled	Empty	Notes
PHE	13	8	5	Key senior posts vacant including PHE Coord and PHE team leader
PHP	12	12	1	PHP Coord post vacant
EFSL	4	0	4	Team not yet recruited
Other	25	15	10	Some key posts vacant – media and communications, advocacy and policy advisor, funding coordinator, finance manager, response logs coordinator[42]
Total	54	35	20	
%		65%	35%	

April 16 2012				
Type of post	No.	Filled	Empty	Notes
PHE	23	15	8	Interviews for 8 water technician posts were ongoing at the time that the capacity spread sheet was prepared (16/04/12). All other posts were filled
PHP	19	15	4	4 community mobiliser posts were vacant
EFSL	0	0	0	
Other	39	24	15	Included in the empty posts are a number (6) of junior logistics, storekeepers and drivers. However, there are also some senior posts vacant including the MEAL coordinator (which had been vacant from programme commencement), finance and systems manager, gender advisor and funding coordinator
Total	81	54	27	
%		67%	33%	

August 16 2012				
Type of post	No.	Filled	Empty	Notes
PHE	33	28	5	Senior posts are largely filled with the exception of the PHE Team Leader for sanitation. Several of the vacancies appear to be either new or being advertised in Juba
PHP	22	17	5	All senior posts filled. 3 of the 5 vacant posts are listed as being

---

[41] These tables and the analyses they contains have been generated from the capacity spread sheets submitted to the evaluator. Because of inconsistencies in the data provided, there are likely to be some errors, but it provide a useful indicator of Oxfam's successes and challenges in recruitment and retention of staff

[42] It is noteworthy that a number of these posts are not required for a response *per se* (such as the advocacy and media posts) but Oxfam consider them necessary to deliver against their broader mandate which goes beyond delivering a technical response that meets basic needs

				under-recruitment
EFSL	0	0	0	
Other	32	15	17	The Gendrassa project manager post is the most senior vacancy. Protection and policy, media and communications are also of note. Other vacancies are for more junior staff
Total	**87**	**60**	**27**	
%		**69%**	**31%**	

With time came capacity and interviews highlighted consistently positive feedback for a small number of HSPs who were deployed within the first 3-4-months of the Cat 2 being declared and who made a very positive contribution to the programme. From June there was far greater implementation capacity and the hard work of some of these early post-holders to define technical strategy and project approach began to bear fruit as decisions were made about programme leadership and there was greater strength in depth across the technical team. Alongside the positive changes in capacity came improvements in standards of living for the team which doubtless had a positive impact on motivation and morale given they were working in such a challenging environment. With a more settled team and with the important decision also taken about the commissioning of the new camp, Gendrasssa, the greater clarity concerning the task made Oxfam's work more predictable and allowed the team to deliver quality programming at speed.

While the positive changes were welcome, the slow initial start and the gaps that Oxfam have faced at key points of the response and in key posts means that during the period covered by the evaluation the standard was only partially met

Annex 1: Evaluation Participants

HSP staff
Pauline Ballaman, HSP Programme Representative (deployed to South Sudan)
Hassan Mahmood, HSP MEAL Advisor (deployed to South Sudan)
Peter Struijf, HSP Project Manager (deployed to South Sudan)
Abraham Kausa, HSP Human Resources (deployed to South Sudan)
Francesco Rigamonti, HSP Programme Manager (deployed to South Sudan)
Lou Lasap, HSP Protection Advisor
Andrew Davies, HSP Business Support Manager

Contract Staff
Christian Snoad, PHE team leader (& currently HSP)
Darya Musiyenko, Country Funding Coordinator
Destelia Ngwenya, MEAL Coordinator

Annex 2: Secondary Data Sources

The table below lists documents referred to in the '*documents used for evidence*' and lists the quantity (not quality) of the documents made available to the evaluator and gives an indication of where the gaps were.

Document	Source	No. of Docs
Initial assessment report	Country	0
Other agency assessments	Country	0
UN report for figures affected	Reliefweb/OCHA website	10
RTE report	Sumus/PPAT	0
Sitreps from first three weeks	Sumus /PPAT	0
Sample of Sitreps from later weeks (random)	Sumus/PPAT	12
Request for Cat Funds	Country	4
Concept note	Country	0
Funding grid	Sumus/PPAT	4
Telecom minutes	HDOs/PPAT	2
Proposals and Log Frames	Country	7
WASH and EFSL strategies	Country	10
Training agendas and presentations	Country	0
Technical adviser visits	O drive /PPAT	5
donor reports	Country	3
evaluation reports	Sumus/PPAT	1
Monitoring reviews/learning events	Country	1
Internal audit (where applicable)	PPAT	0
Logic model and outcome statements in PIPs (plus dates)	PPAT	30
MEAL strategy and plan (with formats)	Country	15
MEAL coordinator field visit reports	Country	3
Recovery/exit plan	Country	0
Feedback/complaints system protocol	Country	7
Database for feedback and formats	Country	
Follow up mechanism	Country	
Evidence of complaints being addressed and reported on to complainant	Country	
Evidence of consultation with community – technical reports and strategies	Country	
Evidence that changes have been made to a programme due to feedback - Sitreps, technical reports, MEAL reports	Country	
Pictures of billboards, banners, ration cards	Country	0
Media reports on accountability	Oxfam website and Intranet/PPAT	0
Partnership agreements and assessments	Country	0
Planning meeting minutes	Country	3
Partner reports	Country	0
Gender analysis and strategy	Country	5
Advocacy strategy and evidence of results	Country	7
Affected population feedback session reports	Country	1
Pictures of structures adjusted to vulnerable groups	Country	3
Protection advisor/HSP visit reports	O drive/PPAT	10
Other protection actor reports	O drive/PPAT	1
JCAS/contingency plan	Sumus/PPAT	2
Country operating model	Sumus/PPAT	1

GOLD information	HD HR/PPAT	0
Job profiles	HD HR/PPAT	0
Capacity planning spread sheet	HD HR/PPAT	28
Technical handover notes/end of deployment reports	Country or O drive/PPAT	1
Blogs ,mention of Oxfam	BBC, Reliefweb, Alertnet	6 blogs
Environmental risk analysis	Country	0
Long-term programme strategy	Country	1
Competency frameworks	Sumus/PPAT	0
Country self-assessments	Sumus/PPAT	0
Interview questions/tests/TORs for HSPs	HD HR/PPAT	0

Annex 3: Benchmarks & Standards

The standards listed below are either internal to Oxfam International or are those which Oxfam has made a commitment to delivering against. It is important to note that several pre-date the drought scale-up and hence can't be applied to the early months of the response (e.g. the OI gender minimum standards were not completed and rolled out until November 2011).

Standard	Available where?
Sphere standards	www.sphereproject.org
HAP standards	http://www.hapinternational.org/standards.aspx
People in Aid standards	http://www.peopleinaid.org/pool/files/code/code-en.pdf
WASH minimum standards	https://sumus.oxfam.org/emn-emergency-food-security-and-vulnerable-livelihoods-subgroup
EFSVL minimum standards	https://sumus.oxfam.org/emn-wash-subgroup
MEAL minimum standards	https://sumus.oxfam.org/emn-meal-subgroup
Gender minimum standards	http://sumus.oxfam.org/emn-gender-subgroup
Oxfam Programme standards (standard 8 especially)	https://sumus.oxfam.org/emn-meal-subgroup/documents/program-standards-oxfam-working-towards-agreed-set-standards-across-oi
Red Cross Code of Conduct	http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p1067.htm
Oxfam Protection Minimum standards	
Oxfam Programme Cycle Management	http://intranet.oxfam.org.uk/programme/pm/guide-to-pcm/index.htm#resources
Minimum DRR	

Annex 4: Analysis of Evidence

The evaluation is primarily evidence-based and both the GHIT and the checklist below were developed internally by Oxfam. It is hoped that the traffic light system below provides an indication of the quality and quantity of the evidence provided (green = adequate evidence, amber = some evidence, red = no evidence).

Please note that the traffic light scheme does not represent a score for the quality standards themselves it represents the extent to which adequate evidence was provided with which to make a judgment. In cases where no or inadequate evidence was provided efforts were made to fill the gaps through key informant interviews.

Benchmark		Evidence		Quality check	
1	Timeliness - rapid appraisal/assessment enough to make decisions within 24 hours and initial implementation within three days	Initial assessment report – partner and Oxfam Other agency assessment reports RTE report Sitreps from first two weeks Request for Cat Funds Date of first concept note Telecon notes with region or HD Date of new PIP or project on OPAL	X (red) X (amber) X (red) X (red) X (red) X (amber) X (red) X (green)	Check the date of the assessment report – both when the assessment was carried out and when the report was written – not more than three days between dates Check that assessment report has proposed intervention included Check the RTE under benchmark 1 and 2 for mention of timeliness The Sitreps should give the date of first implementation Concept note should be written within 2-3 days The request for Cat Funds will also show timeliness as it should be within 2-3 days	(red)
2	Coverage uses 25% of affected population as an planned figure (response should reflect the scale of the disaster) with clear justification for final count	Coverage assessment using the scale - RTE reports Initial assessment report Telecon notes stating categorisation Minimum standards in place[43] Concept notes with proposed aspirational coverage Proposed budget for aspirational figure Revised coverage figure and budget with justification UN reports for actual affected figures	X (red) X (red) X (green) X (red) X (red) X (red) X (amber) X (green)	Look at the assessment report and the concept note for the total number of affected UN reports will also give total number affected The RTE will give an estimate of programme targets and whether these have been reached In the case where 25% of the population has not been reached, look for explanations such as lack of funds, access issues or good government or UN response – the explanation needs to have been documented If the explanation is plausible and unavoidable, the rating can be met Check in telecon minutes that categorisation was agreed and minimum standards were implemented	(amber)
3	Technical aspects of programme measured against Sphere standards	Proposals MEAL strategy and plans PH and EFSL strategies Technical adviser	X (green) X (green) X (green) X (green) X (amber)	Check proposals and strategies to see if standards are mentioned not just as a possibility but that they are considered in the context of the response – this might mean that Sphere has been adapted to suit the context	(green)

[43] HR, logistics and finance minimum standards for faster implementation

		visits Training agendas and presentations Log Frames and monitoring frameworks donor reports RTE and other evaluation reports learning event or review reports	X X X X	The indicators on the Log Frame for technical areas should reflect Sphere standards The MEAL strategy should have Sphere as indicators and for data collection methods Check adviser reports for mention of standards and how these were implemented Check the RTE report for mention of Sphere standards Check WASH and EFSL strategies and adviser reports to see if any training was carried out for staff and partners Check review and evaluation reports for mention of standards	
4	MEAL strategy and plan in place and being implemented using appropriate indicators	Log Frame in proposals Logic model and outcome statements in PIPs Monitoring framework Evidence of formats for data collection being used Reporting – technical reports, donor reports Evaluations Outcome statement on OPAL	X X X X X X X	Check the indicators – are they SMART? Is there a target, quantity and quality? Are there indicators at the different levels that reflect that level? Are the same indicators used at different levels? Do the indicators reflect gender? Are there clear Means of Verification (MOV)? Is there a monitoring framework with MOVs and a timeline? Is there evidence of monitoring data collected and analysed against indicators being used to inform programme progress and maintain activity quality? Check the logic model (for the PIP) and an outcome statement that is replicated in the project Log Frame Check if there has been an evaluation that looks at the outcome indicators – what was the method used and is it robust enough to measure outcomes? Check the donor reports for mention of monitoring and measurement of outcome – are the conclusions plausible and well demonstrated? Check monthly/quarterly reports for mention of monitoring and measurement of progress towards meeting indicators Check if unintended outcomes have been reported or documented in internal or donor reports	
5	Feedback/complaints system for affected population in place and functioning and documented evidence of information sharing, consultation and participation leading	Assessment reports with comparison with final proposals to check needs expressed and addressed Feedback/complaints system protocol Follow up mechanism and database	X X X X X	Check evidence of a system in place including logging of feedback/complaints and a method for follow-up Check for evidence of feedback/complaints leading to changes in programming Check for evidence that serious complaints were dealt with appropriately (satisfactory outcome for both complainant and Oxfam) – maybe in Sitreps Check for evidence of consultation with the	

#		Documents	Status	Checks	
	to a programme relevant to context and needs	Reporting format and collation of complaints form MEAL strategy and reports Technical reviews and visit reports Pictures of banners, billboards and ration cards with numbers Donor reports Media reports and productions (both internal and external) Case studies Feedback session reports from community (if available) RTE reports and other evaluations Sitreps (a sample)	X X X X X X X X X	population regarding methods in place and satisfaction levels with the system (look at evaluation reports, RTEs and MEAL reports) Check assessment reports for degree of consultation (especially more in-depth assessments) Check especially technical reports for degree of community participation and decision-making Check MEAL strategy and technical strategies for participation of communities in MEAL Check to see if OI MEAL minimum standards and dimensions are mentioned anywhere Check to made sure information was given out and the feedback system for complaints about lack of information Check evaluation reports to see if needs were addressed	
6	Partner relationships defined, capacity assessed and partners fully engaged in all stages of programme cycle	Partnership agreements Partner assessment report RTE reports Planning meeting minutes Evaluation reports Technical adviser visits Partner reports Training agendas and participant lists	n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a	Oxfam International has a policy around partnership and an assessment tool – check that these are known and have been followed Check partnership agreements that they have been carried out and signed Check that partnership agreements clearly state expectations and outcomes for both parties Check agreements for mention of capacity building and how this will happen Check assessment report for mention of partner engagement Check planning meeting reports and technical adviser reports for partner involvement Check monitoring and accountability framework/strategy for partner involvement Check learning event reports for partner involvement Check technical adviser reports for mention of partner training or capacity Check partner reports for satisfaction around partnership Check evaluation reports for partner capacity assessment and views on Oxfam Interview partners (if possible) for their perceptions around the working relationship	
7	Programme is considered a safe programme: action taken to avoid harm	Assessment report Gender analysis and strategy Protection analysis	X X X	Check that protection was considered and that a risk analysis was carried out (proposals and Sitreps) In situations deemed to be risky, check that	

and programme considered conflict sensitive	Protection HSP report (if applicable)	X (green)	protection was integrated into the programme (protection strategy)	
	Advocacy strategies	X (green)	If above check that Sphere protection standards or other sector-specific standards were used	
	Technical reports	X (amber)		
	RTE reports	X (red)		
	Evaluation	X (amber)	Check in early Sitreps if protection staff were requested and when the request was filled	
	Affected population feedback session reports	X (amber)		
			Check WASH and EFSL strategies to ensure that dignity and safety were considered and addressed	
	Protection and other advisor visit reports	X (amber)		
	Other protection actor reports (according to Sphere Protection Principles and sector-specific protection standards)	X (red)	Check reports for evidence of feedback from separate women and men's groups Check that Oxfam staff are aware of other actors protection activities if not being addressed by Oxfam Check advocacy strategy to see if protection issues were considered Check evaluations for mention of protection and addressing issues Check feedback/complaints from community for protection issues and were these addressed	
8	Programme (including advocacy) addresses gender equity and specific concerns and needs of women, girls, men and boys and vulnerable groups[44]	Assessment report	X (red)	Check the assessment report for a rapid gender analysis	
	Gender analysis	X (green)	Check the proposal for sex and age disaggregated data and a plan for addressing needs for separate groups	
	Gender strategy	X (green)		
	MEAL plan	X (green)		
	Gender adviser reports and debrief notes	X (red)	Check that an in-depth gender analysis and strategy had been done and evidence that it has influenced programming	
	Technical strategies	X (amber)	Check that women's as well as men's needs were taken into consideration in programming	
	Technical reports	X (amber)		
	RTE reports	X (red)		
	Evaluation	X (amber)	Check that feedback was obtained from both men and women regarding specific needs and whether the programme addressed these	
	Affected population feedback session reports	X (amber)		
	Pictures of adjusted services for vulnerable groups	X (red)	Check if vulnerable groups were identified and how the identification process was chosen Check if facilities provided took into account the needs of vulnerable groups Check if vulnerable groups were involved in the different stages of the interventions and in evaluating the services provided Check if gender- specific indicators and related gender outcomes exist in the programme Log Frame and that gender specific monitoring data is being collected and analysed Check if Oxfam Minimum Standards of Gender Equality and Women's Rights in Emergencies were used or mentioned in	

[44] Elderly, disabled, HIV positive, single women, female-headed households are examples

				any document	
9	Evidence that preparedness measures were in place and effectively actioned	Contingency plan	X	Check contingency plan for preparedness measures, risk analysis including environmental) and surge capacity	
		Staff register (country and regional)	X	Check if emergency response team named in plan were still in post and responded	
		Emergency response team named	X	Scale-up HR plans still relevant	
		Job profiles for ongoing programmes mention scale-up responsibility	X	Were PCVA done for any communities and were these documented and used for the response?	
		Existing DRR programme OPAL pages stating outcomes	X	Check RTE report for mention of preparedness measures that affected the response	
		Telecon notes or emails	X	Check evaluation reports for preparedness Check JCAS for preparedness measures and surge capacity plans	
		Media reports	X		
		Scale-up plans and proposals linking preparedness	X		
		RTE report	X		
		Evaluation report	X		
		PCVA reports and community plans if available	X		
		JCAS	X		
10	Programme has an advocacy strategy and has incorporated advocacy into programme plans based on evidence from the field	Advocacy strategy	X	Check the strategy for:	
		Correspondence with field offices	X	• realistic objectives given the timeframe but linked to longer term goals	
		Evaluation reports	X	• Mentions working with national/local partners but also INGOs, research institutes and think tanks	
		RTE report	X		
		RiC telecon minutes	X		
		Blogs and other media work	X	• Includes gender and protection as part of the response	
		Examples of lobbying on national and international targets	X	Check that country teams, programme teams and other advocacy staff have been consulted	
		National or international policy changes reflecting Oxfam focus on advocacy and campaigns (Oxfam website, BBC, Alertnet, Reliefweb)	X	Check that the MEAL plan includes a theory of change, regular monitoring and a yearly evaluation	
		Op Eds		Do a web search for mention of Oxfam's influencing in the response Number of times mentioned on the BBC website Number of hits for blogs	
11	Programme has an integrated one programme approach including reducing and managing risk though existing longer-term development programmes and	Proposals	X	Check contingency plans for risk assessment (including environmental) and strategy for response	
		Staffing plans and organograms	X	Check if village disaster plans are in place and if PCVA was carried out and subsequently used	
		Long-term programme strategy	X	Were risk assessments used in the response – check reports, proposals and evaluations	
		Transition/ Recovery strategy	X		
		RTE report	X		
		Evaluation reports	X	Check organograms for number of long-	

	building resilience for the future	Capacity planning spreadsheet (HR) JCAS Environmental risk analysis	X X X	term staff slotted into emergency programme positions – compare organograms in contingency plan with programme ones Check for transition/recovery for mention of resilience building	
12	Evidence of appropriate staff capacity to ensure quality programming	Job profiles compared to competency frameworks Interview questions and tests TOR for HSPs End of deployment appraisals Country self-assessment reports Job profiles and team objectives show surge capacity RTE and other evaluation reports GOLD – turnover data + absence data	X X X X X X X	Check job profiles against competency frameworks Check self-assessment reports against actual deployments If possible, ask country for sample of staff objectives and Personal development plans (without names or job titles) If possible ask for end of deployment appraisals without names or job titles	