



HAITI: RECOVERY SHELTER PROGRAMME REVIEW

**A review of the IFRC Secretariat Recovery
Shelter Programme in Haiti 2010 - 2011**

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
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Abbreviations and acronyms


Core Shelter	12 cubic metre shelter, wooden frame
CRC	Canadian Red Cross
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
FACT	Field Assessment and Coordination Team
FRC	French Red Cross
Green House	House that is safe for occupancy, but may have limited damage
HRCS	Haitian Red Cross Society
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INA	Integrated Neighbourhood Approach
M2	Square metre
Movement	The Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement
NRC	Norwegian Red Cross
PADF	Pan American Development Fund
PNS	Participating National Society of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
PPR	Participatory Project Review
Progressive Shelter	Transitional shelter can be transformed to permanent
RAT	Recovery Assessment Team
Red House	Badly damaged house that needs rebuilding
RC/RC	Red Cross Red Crescent
SPHERE	The guidelines on quality standards in humanitarian aid
SQm	Square Metre
STC	Shelter Technical Committee
T Shelter	Transitional Shelter, 18/24 cubic meter wood or steel frame
UN	United Nations
Yellow House	A damaged house that can be repaired

International Federation Secretariat operational areas in Port au Prince



International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
 Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge
 Federación Internacional de Sociedades de la Cruz Roja y de la Media Luna Roja
 الاتحاد الدولي لجمعيات الصليب الأحمر والهلال الأحمر

Red Cross Red Crescent Societies shelter projects: Geographical implementation in Haiti



1. Executive Summary

This review was commissioned by the Shelter Unit of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) Secretariat to report on progress in its shelter early recovery programme two years into the operation and to identify challenges and successes that can be used to inform the next stages of the Haiti operation as well as inform IFRC shelter programmes globally. The review is limited to the shelter early recovery operation directly implemented by the IFRC Secretariat and is not a review of the Federation-wide shelter operation in Haiti.

There was a critical need to find shelter solutions following the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, with an estimated one and a half million people displaced and an estimated 250,000 houses damaged or destroyed. The majority of the affected population was living in formal and informal camps for the internally displaced, mostly in the national capital of Port au Prince. The emergency shelters in the camps were either tents or basic structures made from tarpaulins or plastic and were not appropriate for the longer term and would provide only limited protection from rain and flooding as well as being exposed to the threat of seasonal hurricanes.

The IFRC responded quickly to the disaster with emergency and recovery assessment teams, emergency response units for relief, mass sanitation, water and sanitation, logistics, telecommunications, basic health care and base camps. Over sixty Red Cross Red Crescent national societies sent emergency response personnel to support the relief operation while the collective membership of the IFRC raised over one billion Swiss francs for Haiti.

The IFRC in Port au Prince established a shelter unit to manage the shelter response in the recovery phase of the shelter programme and set up a movement coordination function to work with participating national societies involved in shelter recovery.

The IFRC shelter unit constructed wood-framed transitional shelters for over seven hundred families in two large camps for the internally displaced and, as a major part of the shelter response, provided over three thousand transitional shelter kits for the French, Norwegian and Canadian Red Cross recovery shelter programmes. The shelter unit introduced alternative shelter solutions as part of a camp decongestion programme providing rental solutions in Port au Prince and in the outlying provinces as well as constructing individual transitional shelters. Household and livelihoods grants were linked to the shelter solutions and a vocational training programme was also established.

This evaluation began in December 2010 and concluded in February 2012. The evaluation started with a review of documents, including strategic, operational and technical papers and followed with site visits to internally displaced camps, individual transitional shelter plots, areas where participating national societies were constructing transitional shelters, areas planned for future programming and a visit to the main IFRC construction warehouse in Port au Prince. Over thirty interviews were held with the Haitian Red Cross Society (HRCS), IFRC management and technical staff from the Haiti country office, the zone office in Panama and the secretariat headquarters in Geneva, and with partner Red Cross societies in the shelter recovery programme. One hundred and eighty beneficiaries and local staff were involved in a participatory project review to gain insight into beneficiary attitudes regarding the quality of the shelter recovery programme.

The evaluation came to a number of conclusions, as follows:

The IFRC took on the exceptional challenge of providing early recovery solutions in the shelter sector with courage, imagination and flexibility. The operational context in Haiti is not for the faint-hearted, presenting risks in nearly all programme areas. Through the maze of programme options the IFRC undertook its own multilateral programming with confidence and a flexibility that allowed for continual adaptations as the programme progressed.

The development of a shelter recovery strategy has been somewhat iterative over the last two years and made complex in regard to sustainability with no clear government direction on permanent housing solutions. The original concept of basic short-term transitional shelter developed over time as it became increasingly clear that there were no plans beyond a transitional shelter solution that would lead to something more durable, thus the original designs for transitional shelters were upgraded over the course of the programme. Programme options for the repair of partially damaged houses and the reconstruction of destroyed houses were complicated by the presence of rubble, difficulties in regard to land ownership and the absence of construction guidelines and urban planning regulations. A critical development of the shelter programme was the introduction of rental solutions as camps for the internally displaced were closed. The IFRC took a lead role in finding rental solutions for displaced families.

The key recommendations in regard to **the current programme** are to review the future of the camp populations living in transitional shelters in La Piste and Annexe de la Marie and to consider permanent shelter solutions for these beneficiaries or a maintenance programme to extend the lifetime of the transitional shelters and to review the impact of the rental programme and make adjustments as required. The vocational training programme needs to be more closely aligned to employment outcomes.

In regard to **future shelter programming** it is recommended to be clearer regarding the need for an overall strategy for shelter, especially if not working in permanent shelter and to have a clear record of decision making in this regard, while leaving space for adaptation and flexibility throughout the programme that should be informed through a continuous monitoring process. Emergency shelter is part of a shelter strategy and needs to be included in the conceptual framework of the initial emergency response. The concept of sheltering needs to be understood in its broadest context and assessment and programming efforts need to take into account aspects such as cooking and nutrition, power and lighting, health and protection and water and sanitation. The organizational structure needs to support this more integrated approach to shelter. While shelter targets are usually based on early assessments and budget allocations, there needs to be a clearer strategic understanding of beneficiary needs and operational capacity based on field assessments, which should be reviewed throughout the duration of the programme. Time should be spent on reviewing how support services such as human resources, finance and procurement can be better aligned to support large-scale shelter operations.

Future shelter programmes can benefit from some of the **best practices** identified in the Haiti early recovery shelter programme, including the provision of household and livelihoods grants which allowed shelter beneficiaries to make personal adaptations and improvements to their shelters. The creative partnerships between the IFRC and PNS partners in the Haiti operation maximized the capacity of the International Federation to provide shelter solutions to beneficiaries and provided useful models for future consideration. The Haiti shelter rental programme provided an interesting approach to shelter solutions and should be fully documented for future learning as should the approach to post-earthquake rubble management and the conversion of rubble into building materials. The approaches to beneficiary communications in the Haiti shelter programme provided a number of unique experiences that significantly contributed to the success of the shelter programme: these approaches to beneficiary communications need to be well documented for future learning.

Below are summaries of the recommendations in the sectors covered by this review.

Document management:

There were a wide and interesting number of reports and documents produced throughout the life of the programme, especially in regard to shelter options. While new shelter ideas were progressively integrated into the operation reporting, it was less easy to find reasons for planned activities being dropped out of the programme and not always easy to find the reasoning and rationale behind some key strategic decisions. It is important to maintain good documentation and reasoning as an operational strategy develops over time and explain why new shelter approaches are undertaken or previously planned shelter approaches are dropped.

Integrated Planning

The construction of thousands of transitional shelters was a considerable undertaking, requiring up to fifty construction teams and a major logistics effort. The attention paid to the operational demands of constructing such a large number of shelters may have reduced the required attention to broader sheltering issues, such as power and electricity, health and protection, cooking and nutrition and access to water. A more integrated approach to conducting initial assessments and a more structured approach to monitoring and beneficiary feed-back could have identified issues earlier in the programme, though the provision of household and livelihoods grants linked to transitional shelters mitigated some oversights as beneficiaries were empowered to adapt their shelters and solve sheltering problems not covered by the IFRC Secretariat programme.

Organisational Structure

The separation of shelter programme implementation and Movement coordination for shelter was an important organizational decision, consistent with the post-Indian Ocean Tsunami policy. Efficiency and quality gains could have been achieved if water and sanitation had been folded into the Shelter Unit, as was demonstrated by having the livelihoods and alternative shelter solutions teams working inside the unit. Such a large and complex operation needed a more sophisticated information management system, though the beneficiary mapping function in the Shelter Unit was to be commended.

The scale of the shelter programme put pressure on support functions, such as human resources, finance and procurement, where procedures were not always appropriate to the scale of the operation, leading to employment short-cuts that left daily labour uninsured against accident or injury. Authorization levels and support service capacity need to be reviewed in major operations such as the Haiti earthquake response.

Innovation and flexibility

The shelter programme benefitted considerably from the flexible approaches demonstrated over the life of the shelter programme that led to a large number of adaptations in regard to the transitional shelter design; led to the critical introduction of the household and livelihoods grants and provided a creative management environment that allowed for the development of the rental support programme. Providing opportunities for beneficiaries to adapt their shelter through the provision of household or livelihoods grants is to be encouraged and regular monitoring of household behavior should provide insights into sheltering solutions that may have been overlooked in initial assessments.

PNS Partnerships and services

IFRC Secretariat partnerships with PNS were effective in regard to using capacities where they were best placed and innovative in regard to the types of partnership relationships. All partner PNS were satisfied with the services and support provided by the IFRC Shelter Unit and

commented on the positive problem-solving attitude taken by the Shelter Unit. PNS capacity should always be considered when assessing a multilateral operational response and creative partnerships should be encouraged. There were outstanding shelter needs in areas where PNS were operational after initial shelter targets had been reached which should be assessed and responded to as part of an agreed strategic plan with PNS partners.

The Transitional Shelter project

The construction of transitional shelters formed the backbone of the shelter programme and was only supplemented by rental solutions in mid-2011. Sanitation solutions were occasionally only provided some time after the transitional shelter was constructed and access to water was not adequately assessed during the programme. Adaptations to the shelters and retrofitting took place during the life of the programme as it became increasingly evident that it was unlikely that permanent shelters were to be provided in the longer term. Water and sanitation solutions should be implemented at the same time as shelter construction and the potential for retrofitting be planned for as monitoring results and shelter strategies develop over time.

Camp design

The transitional shelter programme in La Piste and Annexe de la Marie were brave undertakings and provided shelter solutions for over seven hundred families, though exit strategies will need to be negotiated with the public authorities in regard to the future of these camps. Everyone involved in the project agreed that in retrospect the building site at Annexe de la Marie should have been better prepared before shelter construction started, especially in regard to the issue of flooding. Camp and individual house lighting could have been provided at an earlier stage and more attention should have been paid to the need for protection in the camps.

The Future of La Piste and Annexe de la Marie camps

The intentions of the government and local authorities regarding the future of the camps at La Piste and Annexe de la Marie remain unclear, placing the future of these camps in doubt. As the transitional shelters and latrines in these camps will deteriorate over the coming years, decisions are required as to the real or perceived obligations of the IFRC to either maintain the transitional shelters or find permanent shelter solutions for these camp populations. Negotiations need to be opened with the public authorities and programme decisions need to be taken in regard to the future of these camp populations.

Sustainability

The current shelter programmes are unsustainable in their current form, though there were no indications that sustainable solutions were ever considered in the Haiti shelter recovery programme. As mentioned above, solutions are required for the two transitional shelter camps that should also include other transitional shelter beneficiaries. The provisional finding from the rental programme indicates that receiving one year's rental support does not necessarily lead to families finding solutions for the future, once the rental support expires. Further research is required in regard to the rental programme to identify possible types of intervention that could improve resilience and sustainability.

Livelihoods and vocational training

The livelihoods grant is an unconditional grant that was used for livelihoods investments as well as used for a wide number of other basic needs. While this may have relieved immediate financial problems, it is yet to be demonstrated whether the grant has generated sufficient income to get families out of their previous levels of poverty. The results from the participatory project review should be followed up to gain more insight in regard to the future of families receiving the livelihoods grant. Research needs to be undertaken to assess whether the

provision of vocational training has helped beneficiaries to use newly found skills to find employment. There is a need for the vocational training programme to be better linked to employment solutions, thus potentially increasing the likelihood of durable solutions for the future.

Decongestion

If the overriding purpose of the decongestion programme is to clear IDP camps, it must be considered as a success. However it is important to further review the rental support programme to understand the impact the programme has on a family's future resilience and if further adaptations to the programme are required to have a longer-lasting impact.

Rubble

The current pilot project has provided considerable learning about the potential use of rubble as an opportunity to produce construction material, but will require a clearer business plan for the future in regard to the potential support for the INA programme or permanent shelter solutions. Such a business plan could look at the potential for partnerships with NGOs in need of construction materials and partnerships with the private sector.

Water and Sanitation

Sanitation solutions were provided alongside all transitional shelters and sanitation facilities were assessed for the rental programme in Port au Prince. Assumptions were made regarding beneficiary access to water in both the T Shelter and rental programmes that were not borne out by the feedback from the participatory beneficiary review. More could have been done to assess and monitor access to water and technical solutions could have been explored and implemented. Access to water should always be assessed and monitored in shelter programmes and considered in regard to both health and protection as additional to the basic need for cooking and hygiene.

Beneficiary communications

There is much to learn from the beneficiary communications projects in Haiti and how various tools and products were used to support the shelter programme. To build on some excellent work in beneficiary communications one could anticipate how this could be developed for the INA approach and be formalized to provide a mechanism for beneficiary complaints. The approaches, tools and products used in the Haiti earthquake response should be recorded and made accessible for future programmes in order that some 'best practice' is not lost, and such approaches could be considered as the base for a beneficiary complaints system.

Participatory Project Review

The participatory project review provided considerable insight to beneficiary attitudes to the transitional shelter and rental programmes which were overall very positive. The project review demonstrated the importance of continuous programme monitoring but also indicated the importance of finding durable solutions for the future. There were considerable expectations on the future support from the IFRC/Haitian Red Cross that are not part of current plans or budgets. These expectations will need to be addressed either through the provision of durable solutions or through a well-planned beneficiary communications programme. Feedback from the PPR in regard to construction quality, access to electricity and water need to be pursued and taken into consideration in the future INA programmes.

2. Introduction

The 12th January 2010 earthquake in Haiti killed an estimated 200,000 people, injured some 300,000 and left approximately one and a half million people displaced with about 250,000 buildings damaged or destroyed. The earthquake presented the humanitarian community with a challenge possibly exceeding that of the Indian Ocean Tsunami and exceeding the political and logistical challenges of the October 2005 Pakistan earthquake.

The demand of responding to a massive disaster in an urban setting in an impoverished country with a weak political structure was a serious challenge for humanitarian organizations. The scale of death and injury was immense; the geographic scale of the disaster covered much of the country's terrain¹ and the overall level of poverty in Haiti made normative approaches to vulnerability assessment difficult.

In January 2010 the Federation Assessment and Coordination Team (FACT) which had been quickly deployed by the IFRC Secretariat presented a wide range of shelter options for consideration, as did the Recover Assessment Team (RAT) in January and February 2010. A Shelter Support Team was deployed from the IFRC Secretariat in Geneva to provide technical advice on shelter options. In Port au Prince a Shelter Technical Committee was created to bring together the IFRC country team and Participating National Societies (PNS) to propose and consider shelter options.

Over sixty national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies deployed teams in response to the Haiti earthquake while the membership of the Federation attracted over one billion dollars in funding.

On February 8th-9th a Coordination Summit was held in Montreal to bring together the PNS and the IFRC Secretariat leadership. This high-level meeting focused on coordination structures and concluded with the Red Cross Red Crescent Commitment for Haiti; another Coordination Summit was held in April in New York to review coordination structures and roles and responsibilities in regard to the IFRC, the Haitian Red Cross Society and PNS. These two summit meetings focused on coordination mechanisms and did not engage at that time on sectoral strategies or programming priorities, though the Red Cross Red Crescent Commitment for Haiti did commit to the provision of 30,000 transitional shelters.

If the overall objective of the recovery phase was to move vulnerable people from often appalling conditions under canvas into a shelter the Transitional Shelter programme was seen as a success according to beneficiaries, though the failure to implement the proposed 'improved emergency shelter' was perhaps a lost opportunity, noting how long it took to reach the shelter construction targets. Plans for Yellow and Red House repair that could have helped resolve the demand for shelter were coherent but progress was partly constrained by the lack of government planning and by a lack of agreed standards and processes for house repairs.

The broad-minded thinking and leadership that was required from the government or the United Nations partly faltered on the scale of the problem and on the perception that humanitarian response alone could provide a solution. Initiatives from the World Bank and the Clinton Foundation may yet bear fruit, but as a whole the capacity of the humanitarian community to respond effectively to all the emergency and recovery needs was limited when faced with the scale of the disaster.

¹ Especially when taking into account the displacement of over 600,000 people from Port au Prince to the provinces.

One of the major needs after the earthquake was the provision of emergency shelter, following the destruction or damage to a large amount of the national housing stock. The IFRC, recognizing its capacity and also its limitations, targeted 180,000 vulnerable families for emergency relief, representing 400,000 people out of a needy population of 1.5 million people considered as displaced and vulnerable. The emergency response targets were ambitious, but using the resources of the IFRC international disaster response tools and the capacity of the Haitian Red Cross Society, the emergency response from the IFRC and the HRCS was considerable. Despite the response being sometimes more quantitative than qualitative a large proportion of the population was served with basic emergency response assistance in the first weeks after the earthquake, though improved emergency shelter solutions were constrained by a lack of distribution capacity.

After the initial emergency response came the next major challenge for the IFRC and the HRCS: what to do in the early recovery stage of the operation? The Recovery Assessment Team (RAT) had laid out the opportunities and risks of different types of shelter intervention for different beneficiary types, and recommended programming for 10,000 tents, 20,000 emergency shelter kits with wooden frames, 30,000 transitional shelters and an additional support for 3,000 host families. There were various changes to the objectives over the course of the programme, but the core of the IFRC shelter programme over the next two years was building transitional shelters (T Shelters), supporting PNS to build T Shelters, and finding alternative self-sheltering solutions, such as rental support.

The IASC Shelter Cluster, led by the IFRC, planned to construct 130,000 T Shelters, of which the IFRC and Participating National Societies (PNS) planned to construct 30,000 shelters. The original plan for the IFRC Secretariat was to construct 7,500 shelters, later reduced to 6,500 then 5,000 shelters as other shelter solutions were identified. The target of 5,000 shelters included partnerships with national societies for whom the Federation would procure and deliver the T Shelter kits: 2,500 for the French Red Cross in Port au Prince, 700 for the Norwegian Red Cross in Petit Goave and 195 for the Canadian Red Cross in Jacmel and Leogane, as a support to their larger bilateral shelter programme. To ensure some geographical balance the IFRC focused its shelter support in Port au Prince as the majority of the PNS shelter interventions were in regions outside Port au Prince.

The IFRC *directly managed*² T Shelter programme included the PNS support programme (as above); building large T Shelter camps in the locations of Annex de la Marie and La Piste and building T Shelters as part of the camp decongestion programme. The decongestion programme was undertaken in 20 areas, including the Port au Prince localities of Carradeux, St Louis Gonzague, Annex de la Marie, Delmas 75, Simon Pele, Croix de Bouquets and Lilavoi and was intended to reduce the population in these overcrowded camps. Those residing there were offered a number of options to move out of the camp, such as rental support or having a T Shelter constructed on their own land, or land where they have been allowed to build. Decongestion beneficiaries taking a T Shelter as a shelter solution also receive a \$500 Livelihoods Grant, a \$ 150 household grant and were also entitled to receive vocational training.

Alternative shelter options as part of the decongestion programme include rental support for those that could find a suitable accommodation to rent. Those choosing this option receive \$500 for one year's rent, \$500 Livelihood Grant and access to the Vocational Training

² The IFRC shelter programme in Haiti included 'directly managed' shelter which refers to IFRC Secretariat direct implementation of T Shelters or alternative rental solutions, and the direct support of PNS T Shelters for the French, Canadian and Norwegian Red Cross societies. Many other national societies also constructed T Shelters bilaterally as part of the Federation-wide response to the earthquake.

programme. To date over 1,700 families have taken up this option³. A similar option is the Return to Provinces Grant which has so far been used by 611 families.

This review will look at the development of the shelter recovery programme through the documentation produced over the past two years and will look at the shelter options available to the IFRC. Some important aspects of the programme will be covered in chapters on integrated planning; organisational structure; sustainability and an essential review of innovation and flexibility in the recovery programme that laid the foundation for much of the programme success. While the core of the review is based on the transitional shelter programme, there is also a commentary on the supporting role the IFRC played in assisting PNS partners with their own transitional shelter programmes and a note of the recently introduced rental support programme that came out of the camp decongestion project.

There are technical notes on aspects of the transitional shelters and a brief study of the livelihoods and vocational training projects.

A key part of the review is the beneficiary feedback which comes at the end of the document, with a summary of the outcomes of the participatory project review (PPR). This provides some interesting insights into beneficiary expectations of the future, as well as their views on the on-going programme. Three of the nine PPR session results are included in the Annex.

Recommendations cover the future of the on-going programme, recommendations for shelter programmes of a similar nature, and a brief commentary on best-practice observed in this shelter programme that can also be used to inform future recovery shelter operations worldwide.

³ As at 15 December 2011

3. Literature Review

Key documents timeline and summary of content regarding shelter options

Ref	2010	
	January 12 th	7.0 Earthquake, Haiti
01	January 17 th	Shelter options for relief and recovery, Draft 1, RAT <i>30,000 families emergency shelter, 15,000 families shelter materials, integrated shelter and wat/san, core shelters, improved emergency shelters, cash grants for host families, tools and resources to rebuild,</i>
02	February 6 th	Emergency Shelter Fact Sheet <i>Received, distributed and planned tents, tarps, shelter tool kit; plan shelter kit and timber.</i>
03	<u>Undated</u>	Emergency and Transitional Shelter in Haiti <i>80,000 target tarps and rope, 20,000 timber core shelter (12 m2), 10,000 tents, 15,000 transitional shelters (24m2), 3,000 host family support, 150 hurricane shelters.</i>
04	February 8 th	Shelter options for relief and recovery, Draft 2, RAT <i>Constraints and challenges, multiple options, self-help, 50,000 families emergency shelter, 20,000 shelter kit and wood frame, 3,000 cash vouchers, 20,000 steel frame and 10,000 wood frame T Shelters, RC model village at La Piste, shelter with wat/san, 300 hurricane shelters,</i>
05	February 9 th – 10 th	Montreal, RC/RC Commitment for Haiti <i>Support 80,000 families, HRCS auxiliary role, Movement coordination, 30,000 T shelters the shelter priority,</i>
06	<u>Undated</u>	Core Shelter, Transitional Shelter <i>20,000 Core Shelter, 15,000 timber Transitional Shelter, 15,000 steel T Shelter</i>
07	March 29 th	Red Cross Red Crescent Plan of Action, Haiti <i>80,000 emergency shelter, 20,000 tool kit, 30,000 (20,000?) core shelter, 1,200 rubble removal and cash vouchers, 30,000 host family, shelter kit (timber if required), NFI distribution gap between tarps and rope – no wood figures, 80,000 cash transfer,</i>
08	April 2 nd	IFRC Shelter Technical Working Group <i>IFRC to build 300 community hurricane shelters and 10,000 two-tier steel frame shelters</i>
09	April	New York Coordination Summit – an informal shelter paper <i>Outline of constraints, proposed reconstruction credit and private sector engagement, upgrade transitional shelters to permanent, retrofit yellow houses, a strong list of options.</i>
10	1 st October	Haiti Earthquake Operation, Plan of Action <i>Emergency Shelter: 3,000 families helped in use of wood, tarps to improve emergency shelter</i>

		<i>Shelter: 6,500 T Shelters and 1,000 families supported with either host family support, yellow house repairs, rubble removal</i>
	2011	
11	April	Federation-wide Strategic Framework <i>2,524 T Shelters constructed, integrated planning 'camp to community'. Reduce T Shelter target by 10,000 to a total of 20,000 and increase self-sheltering solutions. Members pledge to make T Shelters permanent. Target 5,000 Yellow houses for repair; a further 5,000 families for community focused shelter solutions in Delmas and 5,000 households for alternative shelter solutions.</i> <i>Includes community and social infrastructure.</i>
12	July	Federation-wide Reporting for Haiti, Internal Results Report <i>Report on emergency phase in line with plans, T Shelter plan 25,524, resettlement grant plan 3,100, permanent shelter target 1,400. Report includes community infrastructure for 51 schools, 21 clinics and 2 community centres to be repaired or built.</i>
12a		Beneficiary Communications Evaluation <i>50 – 100 calls a week to Nuala asking for Red Cross T Shelters</i>
13	September	An evaluation of the Haiti Earthquake 2010 – Meeting Shelter Needs: Issues Achievements and Constraints <i>Challenges the focus on T Shelters and lost opportunity to attempt alternative shelter solutions</i>
14	October	Haiti Recovery Operation, Plan of Action <i>Replaces the September 2010 Plan of Action. Introduced the key strategy of INA.</i> <i>Target 5,000 T shelters, 2,500 rental solutions plus 2,200 shelter solutions with INA.</i>
15	November 2 nd	Eighteen Month Progress Report <i>214,000 households receive tarpaulin support (240,000 tarps emergency phase, 86,000 first replacement, 98,000 second replacement), 2,300 T Shelters constructed, 1,500 received resettlement grants, 9,400 tents. Alternative Shelter Solutions target 2,100.</i>
	2012	
16	January 2012	Shelter Technical Brief, Haiti Earthquake Operation 24 months <i>3,035 T Shelters constructed of 5,000 target, 2,996 shelter solutions of 4,500 target</i>

A vast amount of literature was produced early on in the earthquake response in Haiti and indeed decisions were agreed at considerable speed considering the complexity of the contextual environment. Unfortunately the status of many key documents is unknown and

many documents were undated, making the paper-trail on key decision more complex. There is evidence of competing technical approaches to shelter and a submerging, re-emerging and simplification of shelter response options over the first months, possibly more related to personalities than needs assessment, as well as a time-costly technical debate between the options for steel frame or wooden frame T Shelters; the options between core and transitional shelters and differences of opinion between a broad approach responding to various shelter solutions, or a more limited T Shelter approach. These discussions led to a slow start of the shelter programme.

The literature review looks at programming policy or practice of the shelter operation and is included in this review to demonstrate the iterative nature of programme design throughout the two years regarding shelter options, strategies and programming. If this chapter is taken in conjunction with chapter 4.4 on innovation and flexibility one could draw the conclusion that in a programme as complex as the Haiti earthquake response one cannot always be expected to find the right options, strategies and programmes in the early stages of an operation, and as long as there is a management environment that encourages flexibility and innovation, this absence of a high-quality blueprint early in an operation should not be considered negatively.

The literature review starts at the strategic level of the programme and studies how this was developed, as final programme delivery to beneficiaries originated in the strategic debate and identification of shelter needs for varying types of beneficiaries. The literature review is limited to Movement, Federation or Secretariat documents and does not attempt to analyse external documents, for example from the IASC Clusters, Haitian Government or NGOs.

In an independent evaluation of the overall shelter response during the first ten months, commissioned by the IFRC and published in September 2011 (*an evaluation of the Haiti earthquake 2010 – meeting shelter needs: issues, achievements and constraints*)⁴ the authors criticize the shelter cluster strategy as ‘narrowed down to the direct delivery of T Shelters’ and that the ‘transitional shelter response was supply driven’. These are strong remarks which could by extension apply to the IFRC Secretariat shelter programme strategy,⁵ but are they fair or relevant? While this will be discussed further in chapter 4, the literature review has been used to try to understand how the shelter strategy developed during the timeframe of the operation.

On January 17th, only five days after the earthquake, a shelter options paper⁶ was prepared for both the emergency and recovery phases, outlining options, risks and constraints. Options included emergency shelter, improved emergency shelter, shelter materials, core shelters, host family cash grants, and tools and resources to rebuild. The second draft of this document⁷ was issued on February 8th. It reiterated the opportunities, risks and constraints of shelter options, which included emergency shelter for 50,000 families; 20,000 shelter kits with wooden frames; cash vouchers for 3,000 host families; 300 hurricane shelters and 30,000 transitional shelters, of which 20,000 would use a steel frame. On the same date an incomplete document titled *Haiti earthquake shelter response 2010 (recommended strategic*

⁴ Document reference 13

⁵ The IFRC had three key functions in the Haiti earthquake response. Firstly it worked Federation-wide, providing support and services to its membership, secondly, as the Federation Secretariat it was directly operational using multilateral funds from its membership and thirdly it was the convener of the IASC Shelter Cluster from February 2010 to November 2010.

⁶ Document reference 01

⁷ Document reference 04

options) promoted the provision of construction materials to owner occupiers; technical guidelines to families on how to construct; outsourced construction project management and community resource centres that would advise home owners how to project manage their own reconstruction activities.

In an undated document, probably produced in early February, titled *'Emergency and Transitional Shelter in Haiti'*⁸ the plan or target⁹ was for 80,000 emergency shelters (tarpaulins and ropes); 10,000 tents; 20,000 Core Shelters; 15,000 T Shelters; host family support for 30,000 families¹⁰ and 150 hurricane shelters.

At the Red Cross Red Crescent Coordination Summit in Montreal on the 8th and 9th of February 2010 the only recorded shelter plan was: *'Based upon input from the Haitian community and the need to urgently develop and deploy suitable shelters for the rainy and hurricane seasons, the Movement will seek to provide, as quickly as possible, approximately 30,000 families with appropriate transitional shelters'*¹¹. It is unlikely this statement was intended to be exclusive of other sheltering options; however the use of the term *transitional shelters* at this early stage of the programme was to have a long lasting consequence on Federation shelter response in Haiti and was revised much later to read *30,000 sheltering solutions*. One could also comment that the wording *based on input from the Haitian community* was somewhat misleading as the lack of engagement and dialogue with the Haitian community epitomized the beginning of the earthquake response operation and the shelter solutions.

An undated document, probably of the same month, titled *'Core Shelter, Transitional Shelter'*¹², promoted or planned for 20,000 Core Shelters and 30,000 Transitional Shelters, half of which would be steel framed. The contest between both steel or wood frame shelters and the contest between the 12 square meter Core Shelter and the 18 or 24 square meter Transitional Shelter are evidenced in the critical document *Haiti Earthquake Red Cross Red Crescent Plan of Action*¹³ where objective 1.1.2 states:

1.1.2 Core/Transitional Shelter (note that this area is currently under revision regarding the specific type of shelter to be constructed)

Thus despite having produced some useful strategic options for shelter just a few days after the earthquake, there was still disagreement on the shelter design over ten weeks later. This technical dialogue possibly interfered with other programme issues, as it appears that until there was an agreement on the design, the assessment of potential site locations could not begin, as the Plan of Action¹⁴ states *'an integrated team in the field will identify a target population in one of the selected areas.'*

The only other sheltering programmes in the Plan of Action were 1,200 Debris Cleaning Kits for 30,000 families and host family support for 30,000 families. Debris Cleaning Kits had not been mentioned in any prior documentation, nor could it be found how the decision making process had by this time excluded the other sheltering options outlined in the shelter options papers of January and February,¹⁵ such as house repair and the provision of building

⁸ Document reference 03

⁹ The status of this document is unknown

¹⁰ It has been difficult to clearly follow the planning figures for host family support with some documents referring to 3,000 families and others referring to 30,000 families.

¹¹ Document reference 05

¹² Document reference 06

¹³ Document reference 07

¹⁴ Document reference 07

¹⁵ Document references 01, 04

materials, though the Venn diagram in the Plan of Action¹⁶ includes Safe Community Centres¹⁷ though does not explain what these are in the text.

On April 2nd 2010 a shelter Technical Working Group of the IFRC and PNS announced their planning targets.¹⁸ The IFRC planned to construct 300 Community Hurricane Shelters and 10,000 steel framed two-tier house structures, though it was unclear if these plans were based on any assessment or other evidence.

In April 2010 the second *Haiti Red Cross/Red Crescent Coordination Summit* was held in New York. The summit endorsed the IFRC Plan of Action, but from the meeting there was also a paper discussed entitled *Shelter and reconstruction: issues and opportunities*¹⁹ which brought back to the table many of the options that had been outlined in the January and February options papers, including a text for each option regarding programme risk. The options were:

- a) Upgrading and expanding transitional shelters to permanent
- b) Repair of damaged housing
- c) Retrofitting damaged housing to provide seismic resistance
- d) Reconstruction of individual housing in retained urban areas
- e) Reconstruction of multi-occupancy buildings
- f) Construction of new housing for resettled population
- g) Repair and reconstruction of damaged or destroyed public infrastructure – education and health facilities

Unfortunately the paper does not provide any final recommendations or conclusions and its status is unclear. It is unclear why the summit firstly approved the Plan of Action with its limited range of shelter solutions, then opened up a broad range of options, though it is reported that shelter was not on the meeting agenda that was primarily focused on coordination structures and thus shelter was only discussed informally between participants.

The early documentation on the response to the Haiti earthquake included supporting 30,000 host families, after a pilot programme in Les Cayes for 3,000 families, though the host family concept was not included in the New York conference as a shelter option. By October 1st 2010 host family support was incorporated into the *Alternative Shelter Solutions*²⁰ with a target of 1,000 families though it was now called host community instead of host family. By the time of the *Federation-wide Strategic Framework*²¹ in April 2011 there were no further references to a host family programme, but rental solutions were now introduced, though there were no references that this was part of a broader camp decongestion programme.

On October 1st 2010 the IFRC issued a new plan of action²² to cover the next 24 months. This plan included upgrading emergency shelters for three thousand families, though there are no reports indicating that this was done. The shelter recovery plan included 6,500 T Shelters and alternative solutions for 1,000 families including 'host family support' and yellow and

¹⁶ Document reference 07

¹⁷ The Safe Community Centre was a new wording for the hurricane evacuation shelters.

¹⁸ Document reference 08

¹⁹ Document reference 09

²⁰ Document reference 10

²¹ Document reference 11

²² Document reference 14

red house repair. The text also included the option of rubble removal. However ten months later in the *Internal Results Report*²³ there is no reference to rubble removal or clean-up kits.

The key strategic document was the *Federation-wide Strategic Framework*²⁴ issued in April 2011. The strategy was to increase the focus on Port au Prince, take a neighbourhood approach, target 5,000 families for shelter solutions in the district of Delmas plus managing a further 5,000 yellow house repairs while reducing the T Shelter target from 30,000 to 20,000. The approach to this new strategy was interesting, as the *Strategic Framework* was issued by the Secretariat more as a strong recommendation to PNS than as a strategy already negotiated and agreed with PNS partners who had already committed their funds to the T Shelter programme.²⁵ It is yet to be seen if PNS will revise their plans and budgets to fall behind this revised strategy, but it provides an interesting insight into the Federation Secretariat's intellectual leadership in the Haiti operation. In the *Internal Results Report*²⁶ of July 2011 the *planned* column has different figures from the *Strategic Framework*²⁷, with 25,524 T Shelters planned, 1,403 permanent shelters planned and 3,100 settlement grants planned. The difference between these figures comes from a general strategic plan which invited PNS to revisit their own planning in relation to T Shelters and investments in building repairs or housing solutions in Delmas. PNS that had committed to T Shelters would possibly have found it difficult to change course at this stage, either due to back-donor agreements or due to pre-ordered supplies for T Shelters, thus the real T Shelter target changed from a commitment of 30,000 to a revised target of 25,524. At this time there were also some changes in the anticipated use of American Red Cross funds that were not easy to put into the commitments planning. The IFRC Secretariat had planned to budget for repairs to 5,000 houses in a partnership with PADF, funded by the American Red Cross, but the pledge for this programme was reversed before the *Strategic Framework* was issued.

In regard to beneficiary satisfaction of the shelter programme, the *Beneficiary Communications Evaluation*²⁸ provided some interesting commentary, including the high level of calls from beneficiaries to the Noula radio centre requesting Red Cross transitional shelters. A recorded level of dissatisfaction of the Red Cross was directly related to not receiving a T Shelter, providing some indication of the appreciation and demand level for T Shelters. In the June mid-term review of the Norwegian Red Cross T Shelter programme²⁹ all beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries identified receiving a T Shelter as a higher desire than school fee support or livelihoods grants.

The IFRC Emergency Appeal reporting does not entirely help in understanding the development of the IFRC shelter strategy.³⁰ The three and six month progress reports³¹ provide little insight to alternative shelter plans while the October 2010 *Summary of the Plan*

²³ Document reference 12

²⁴ Document reference 11

²⁵ The shelter component of the Strategic Framework was discussed with PNS in the field through the Shelter Technical Committee (STC), but not with PNS headquarters.

²⁶ Document reference 12

²⁷ Document reference 11

²⁸ Document reference 21a

²⁹ Internal consultancy report

³⁰ Standard Emergency Appeal reporting is expected to report against the goals and activities outlined in the Emergency Appeal. This does not exclude other types of reporting, for example the IFRC Secretariat work-plan or Federation-wide reporting that will include bilateral PNS programmes that are outside the Emergency Appeal goals, or, as in this case, reporting against both Emergency Appeals as well as the iterations of the Strategic frameworks. Reporting becomes more complicated when activities outlined in an emergency appeal are implemented bilaterally and thus become outside the overall control of the IFRC Secretariat.

³¹ See IFRC Appeals and Reports, Americas, Haiti, Haiti earthquake 2010

of Action³² document refers to 7,500 T Shelters to be built by the IFRC Secretariat (the balance of the total of 30,000 to be built by RC/RC partners), as well as 3,600 shelter solutions, including the support of family return to their original building and help in repairing homes and rubble removal as an IFRC activity. The twelve month report³³ indicates the IFRC had completed 445 T Shelters but does not report against the Federation-wide 30,000 target. The IFRC eighteen month progress report³⁴ updates the IFRC Secretariat T Shelter construction progress and includes the delivery agreements with the French, Canadian and Norwegian Red Cross societies but does not report against the Federation-wide 30,000 T Shelter target. The report refers to the settlement grants programme and the return to the provinces programme as well as decongestion solutions. It is reported that 330m3 of a targeted 25,000 m3 of rubble had been removed.

The *Haiti Recovery Operation, Plan of Action Summary July 2011 – December 2012*³⁵ (issued in either October or November 2011) maintains a shelter solution target of 7,500 families and an additional 2,000 families to receive shelter solutions through the Integrated Neighbourhood Approach (INA) programme though the document does not explain what these INA solutions are expected to be.

Throughout the IFRC appeal reporting there was inconsistency in regard to what the IFRC planned to do in shelter and a lack of reporting against objectives. Things that had originally been planned, such as the 20,000 Core Shelters, 3,000 host family support and construction materials fell out of the reporting (unless explanations have been given in some the 26 Operations Updates³⁶ which have not been reviewed). One should not, however, be too critical on the ever-changing plans and numbers that were not always clearly captured in the reporting, as the Federation worked as a gap-filler in the IFRC shelter response and had to revise plans each time a PNS revised their planning targets.

Conclusions: Unfortunately it has not been possible to fully track the shelter strategy through the published documents, and understand when or why alternative shelters projects or approaches were introduced or discontinued. It has not been possible to fully understand why certain shelter options were excluded over time or why new approaches were introduced.

There were many important and relevant documents that outlined strategies and budgets, but these were not always incorporated into standard IFRC Appeals management, such as Emergency Appeal revisions.

Recommendations

- Document *and explain* the decision making process throughout the course of a programme in either internal or external documents. A separate management file should be held for this purpose. An e mail trail is not sufficient.
- Use the planning and reporting tools to clearly explain when plans or targets are changed. If specific plans are dropped these should be reported on and explained.

³² See IFRC Appeals and Reports, Americas, Haiti, Haiti earthquake 2010 or DMIS ongoing operations, Haiti, key documents

³³ See IFRC Appeals and Reports, Americas, Haiti, Haiti earthquake 2010

³⁴ Document reference 15

³⁵ Document reference 14

³⁶ See IFRC Appeals and Reports, Americas, Haiti, Haiti earthquake 2010

- Use the words *plans* and *commitments* carefully to ensure the reader is clear on the status of the shelter targets.
- Changes in direction, projects or budgets should be reflected through the standard IFRC Appeals and Reports procedures.
- Date documents and clearly indicate their status.

4. Programme Strategy

4.1 Sheltering Options

All organisations involved in shelter in Haiti faced complex options. The extent of the disaster required solutions that had sufficient scale to make an impact, but should one move from emergency shelter to permanent shelter or have a transitional shelter solution, and if a transitional shelter, transitional to what? What level of quality should be provided for the emergency shelter phase, noting the longer timescale to implement transitional shelter? Within a transitional shelter response should there be a 'one size fits all' approach, or different solutions for rural and urban communities? What should be understood by transitional shelter regarding the size of the shelter and the design in regard to local customs, water, sanitation, health, nutrition and infrastructure? What sort of 'package' could be offered along with a transitional shelter, such as paint, household grants, tools, livelihood grants and vocational training? How much should the speed of providing sheltering solutions be related to cost or how much to need, or indeed risk, and how should sheltering options be considered in relation to sheltering constraints such as land ownership, rubble removal, lack of space, and a lack of urban planning and direction from the government? There was a lack of a mortgage or a credit system from banks for house owners to borrow money to repair or rebuild houses which limited the opportunities for self-help solutions and the potential promotion of the private-sector construction industry. The concept of linking shelter solutions with micro-credit organizations, which could have improved overall family resilience, was not explored.

Between January 17th and February 8th the FACT, RAT and Shelter Support Team presented wide-ranging options for the shelter recovery phase, including (a)³⁷ emergency shelter, improved emergency shelters, the provision of shelter materials, cash grants for host families and the provision of tools and resources for rebuilding; (b)³⁸ core shelters (12 m2), tents, transitional shelters, host family support and hurricane shelters; (c)³⁹ emergency shelters, self-help options, shelter kits, cash vouchers, transitional shelters, model village (La Piste) and hurricane shelters. At the Haiti Coordination Summit in Montreal on February 9th-10th the IFRC commitment was for 30,000 transitional shelters only. However six weeks later in the Red Cross Red Crescent Plan of Action⁴⁰ the shelter options included core shelters, rubble removal kits, host family support and shelter kits. Even by October 1st 2010 the Haiti Earthquake Plan of Action included the provision of wood and tarpaulins to improve emergency shelters, provide support to host families, remove of rubble and repair yellow houses. Some plans were never implemented, such as the improvement of emergency shelters, the construction of hurricane shelters and the removal of rubble. Based on IFRC Secretariat and PNS partner stakeholder interviews it appears that there were differences of opinion on shelter priorities between the shelter technical team and the in-country IFRC management team, especially in regard to improved emergency shelter.

³⁷ RAT Shelter Options January 17th 2010.

³⁸ Emergency and transitional shelter in Haiti, undated and not sourced, but probably early February 2010.

³⁹ RAT Draft 2, shelter and recovery options, February 8th 2010.

⁴⁰ March 29th 2010

The decision-making process regarding sheltering options was made confusing by the cluster arrangements of the IASC which split sheltering solutions between three different clusters⁴¹ that had very different capacities and a general lack of coordination between the clusters, let alone sufficient joint planning between the three shelter clusters and the water and sanitation cluster.

The main options for sheltering solutions being discussed in the first months were:

Rebuilding 'Red' houses

Repairing 'Yellow' or 'Green' houses⁴²

Building transitional shelters

- Wooden frame
- Steel frame
- Rubble based walls

Building progressive shelters

Improving emergency shelter

Providing building materials and tools

Providing rental support

Providing support to host families

While the key shelter programme undertaken by the Federation was the construction of transitional shelters, the camp decongestion programme had a considerable uptake in favour of the rental support programme, which currently represents 43% of all IFRC Secretariat shelter solutions. Rental was selected by 92% of families when offered options between rental support and transitional shelter solutions, though it should be noted that the communities in the camps that were offered these options were mostly from the inner-city where transitional shelters were more complicated as a shelter solution as compared to the semi-rural and rural areas.

The early documentation on the response to the Haiti earthquake included supporting 30,000 host families, after a planned pilot programme in Les Cayes, though the host family concept was not included in the New York conference as a shelter option. By October 1st 2010 host family support was incorporated into the Alternative Solutions with a target of 1,000 families though it was now renamed host community support.⁴³ By the time of the Federation-wide Strategic Framework in April 2011 there were no further references to a host family programme, but rental solutions were now introduced.

The provision of shelter materials to IDPs was only explored as part of the emergency shelter support⁴⁴ and not as part of early recovery, though 306 families did accept such a package as part of the decongestion of Annex de la Marie. Due to poor registration of this group, there was no follow up to explore if this could be seen as a viable option. Likewise the provision of a house repair grant of \$ 500 to five families was never followed up as a possible programme option.

The decision by IFRC Secretariat not to get involved in house repairs at the early stage seems justified if the objective was to ensure a sufficient volume of housing solutions, noting that

⁴¹ The Shelter Cluster dealt with T Shelters, the Early Recovery Cluster dealt with Yellow and Red House repair under which the Lodgement Quartiere dealt with aspects of community and urban planning, and shelters in camps fell under the CCCM Cluster (Camp Coordination and Camp Management).

⁴² See annex 10.2 for definitions.

⁴³ Targets for host family support were reduced as the Danish Red Cross undertook such programming bilaterally.

⁴⁴ As part of emergency shelter support to 3,000 families reflected in the revision of the October 2010 Plan of Action.

by January 6th 2012 only 150 houses had been repaired or rebuilt by the Federation members out of a planned 6,553 houses, while by the same date 25,480 families had received a shelter solution through the T Shelter or rental programme out of a planned 31,675 families.

Noting the large beneficiary uptake of the rental programme and beneficiary appreciation and occupancy rates of the transitional shelter programme, it is considered that the IFRC took appropriate choices regarding the shelter options for 2010-2011 that assisted over 8,400 families, though the exceptional focus on T Shelters drove out other shelter options that could have been explored in parallel to the T Shelters. The IFRC Secretariat was the first organization to try the rental option and became a reference point in rentals to the rest of the humanitarian community, especially regarding the option on resettlement in the provinces. The experience gathered on rental programmes and decongestion led to the highly efficient decongestion of the MaisGaté camp by the IFRC Secretariat in December 2011 in response to the Government of Haiti declaration 16/6.⁴⁵

With the recovery phase of the IFRC shelter programme coming to a close over the coming months, new shelter ideas will be required to support the Integrated Neighbourhood Approach (INA). The lessons learnt from the T Shelter and rental programmes should benefit the INA, and the human resources involved in those programmes be transferred, where possible, to the INA.

Beyond the scope of this review is the larger question of macro-level interventions, where a mixture of risk-underwriting, credit and mortgages and rent support could have brought the private financial and construction sectors into the earthquake response, and probably have provided faster, more sustainable and higher-impact solutions.

⁴⁵ Government Strategy 16.6 designed to assist sixteen neighbourhoods and six camps.

4.2 Integrated planning and implementation

Organisational structure is usually sectoral while beneficiary needs are nearly always multiple and inter-related, thus there is a requirement for organisations to approach needs assessment, planning and implementation in a cross-sectoral manner. The importance of this inter-connectivity was made clear in the *Federation-wide Strategic Framework* issued in April 2011. While this approach was supported at the strategic level, it was not converted into planning or implementation at the operational level. The Shelter Programme opened doors to a more integrated approach, but without much success. Adaptations to shelter design through the duration of the programme were generally a result of HRCS and beneficiary commentaries, rather than coming from a management driven integration approach to planning and implementation. The lack of any structured monitoring of the programme meant that lessons were learnt later than necessary.

Integration in the recovery phase was not aided by a lack of integration in the emergency phase. Emergency shelter was seen as a separate intervention from relief, though the IFRC relief team was responsible for the planning and distribution of tents, tarpaulins and ropes. The approach to maximize the number of beneficiaries reached meant that the opportunity to re-visit IDP camps that had received basic shelter materials to upgrade the emergency shelters was not supported. Even the opportunity of upgrading emergency shelter when the original tarpaulins were replaced after three to four months was not taken.

If the IFRC was to provide improved emergency shelter, including wood, it needed full integration with the relief sector, including the relief ERUs. Instead of integration, the Shelter Unit was provided with one Relief ERU⁴⁶ to support the distribution of shelter materials, while three other Relief ERUs were used for the distribution of non-food items (NFI). An integrated approach between relief and shelter should have been taken from the beginning of the programme.

There is a risk in a programme such as the one in Haiti that the structure of a shelter can become a goal in itself, rather than the goal being based around the shelter needs of the beneficiary. It is interesting to note that the heated discussions between IFRC and PNS architects in February 2010 were design based, not needs based, not culturally based and certainly not based on an integrated planning approach.⁴⁷

The planning environment is, of course, heavily driven by donors and their need to demonstrate results to back donors or their public. This pressure probably influenced the original shelter product design and the drive for construction figures, rather than effective well-considered sheltering solutions. The problem of a quantitative results driven approach was evident also in the emergency phase where emergency shelter solutions were driven more by distribution numbers than beneficiary solutions. Tarpaulin distributions were taking place in 'virtual' camps organized by local 'committees' where beneficiaries did not actually live in these 'virtual camps' but saw this as an opportunity to receive relief supplies, as evidenced by the lack of NFI after distributions, the lack of evidence of shelter habitation or cooking and the absence of children in these camps.⁴⁸ While emergency shelter items did reach a vast beneficiary population, there were distributions of tarpaulins and ropes to IDPs living in fields, where wooden poles were also an obvious requirement. Unfortunately these are still reported on rather proudly as *successful shelter solutions*.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Danish Red Cross Relief ERU.

⁴⁷ Though early FACT documents did have recommendations based on a broader more integrated approach.

⁴⁸ Report to Netherlands Red Cross on recovery opportunities, Rees-Gildea, March 2010

⁴⁹ E.g.: Haiti Recovery Operation, Plan of Action: 'results include the provision of 100,920 shelter solutions'.

In some cases transitional shelters have been built with a latrine solution coming much later. In many cases no water solutions were sought or found related to transitional shelters. Lighting and power solutions were not sought, though beneficiary families often found their own solutions. Public health education was often provided to T Shelter beneficiaries, but items such as mosquito nets were only provided when requested by IDP families.⁵⁰ The issue of cooking and nutrition was apparently never discussed. Some shelter beneficiaries added a lean-to against the shelter for cooking. The Household Grant was probably the most important solution to many of these problems, though the general lack of curiosity or interest about understanding these sheltering issues has to be of concern. Guidelines on shelter and gender⁵¹ were prepared from the Gender Based Violence delegate, but there is little evidence of the use or impact of these guidelines.

While the shelter programme required its own organizational structure, it effectively became a logistics and construction unit, with too little effort taken to discuss with beneficiaries issues of health, nutrition, water and sanitation. While this can be understandable to some degree in such a massive operation, it can also be seen as a lost opportunity.

Recommendations:

1. When assessing sheltering needs, include water, sanitation, health, nutrition and protection, using NGO or PNS partnerships in areas where the IFRC may lack experience.
2. The design of a shelter needs to take into account water, sanitation, health, protection and nutrition.
3. Conduct beneficiary interviews early in the programme as part of a monitoring process to see if the chosen solutions were appropriate.
4. Emergency shelter and relief need to be integrated.

⁵⁰IDP demands from Annexe de la Marie

⁵¹Shelter and Gender introduction, Mayliss De Verneuil, IFRC, 27th June 2011

4.3 Organisational Structure

The shelter programme represents the backbone of IFRC operations in Haiti and has required skill, courage and determination. It will have inevitably had an impact on the services areas such as human resources, administration, finance and logistics and likewise the qualities and capacities of these departments will have had an impact of the shelter programme. The shelter programme is both large and complex and has required a considerable amount of flexibility and creativity. It is much larger than usual IFRC operations and thus may require different approaches, especially when looking at support services.

Water and Sanitation capacity should have been integrated into the Shelter Programme from the beginning of the operation. Wat/San was integral to the shelter project and was not going to be efficient if water and sanitation was seen as a service to the Shelter Operation rather than being under the direct management of the Shelter Unit.

Relief and Shelter were seen as separate identities throughout the programme, though Relief took responsibility for emergency shelter at the beginning of the operation. The Shelter Technical Team could have been most closely integrated into the emergency relief operation and their advice on emergency shelter been taken on board. Better integration between relief and shelter could have led to improved distribution solutions for shelter materials, such as the wooden supports for emergency shelters that were never distributed, mostly due to a lack of distribution capacity.

Based on lessons learned from the Indian Ocean Tsunami about large scale operations the IFRC revised the Movement Coordination Policies and Procedures to ensure separate functions between coordination and programme implementation. This is especially important in operations where the IFRC has also taken the Shelter Cluster role, as was the case in Haiti. It was reported that the IFRC delegation in Haiti initially decided not to follow this policy, but subsequently reverted to the correct management structure in shelter⁵² and had two types of shelter coordinator, one for Movement shelter coordination and the other for the coordination of the IFRC Secretariat managed shelter programme, including technical support to PNS. This clarity around IFRC shelter roles and responsibilities has proved to be successful, enhancing the perception of the IFRC as a leading agency in shelter both within the Federation and with external partners.

The very large size of the construction teams went far beyond the capacity of the human resources to manage, leading to many regular staff being paid on the daily labour rate instead of being under contract. This meant that these staff contracted as daily labour were not insured in case of accident through any formal insurance arrangement, though the IFRC did cover any costs for accidents and loss of earnings through what was effectively a self-insurance approach, though this was not translated into policy or written documentation.

To facilitate procurement, upon which the Shelter Programme was highly dependent, it could have been more efficient to have procurement staff working inside the Shelter Operation instead of being treated as an external service.

The finance and procurement approval levels should have been seriously revised for this operation, as the procurement limits meant there were too many signatures required for approving a purchase order, reducing efficiency and flexibility; a similar review of finance approval authority could also have led to revised levels of authorization promoting efficiency

⁵²Though this separation of duties was not implemented in other technical areas, such as water/sanitation and health.


gains. The head of the Shelter Unit was required to get approvals for purchases over \$10,000, with the authorization level moving from the head of country delegation to the zone office in Panama for small amounts. In a programme spending over CHF 50 million a year this budget and procurement approval process was not helping quick decision making and efficient programme delivery.

The balance of accountability to the organization and accountability to the beneficiary is currently biased towards the organization and needs to be reviewed to ensure organizational procedures support effective response to beneficiary needs.

Having the rental and livelihoods programmes working within the Shelter Programme made eminent sense. Likewise the Shelter Programme benefitted from managing its own vehicle fleet and drivers and was not dependent on the Fleet Office at the base camp.

The Shelter Programme had its own information management system, locating the position and ownership of every T Shelter with a Google Earth application. This data may be critical in future years as land rental agreements come to an end. Early requests from the Shelter Unit for an independent information management software were initially rejected. An operation on the scale of the Haiti earthquake response requires modern information management tools, a lesson already learnt by the IFRC Shelter Cluster which used state of the art information and mapping tools to fulfil its highly acclaimed shelter coordination role.

The high level of management experience found in the IFRC management team in Haiti was essential in providing an environment of support, flexibility and risk taking in the recovery phase that was essential to the success of the programme as was the delegate selection for the programme, though an earlier transition from emergency relief expertise to recovery expertise could have been beneficial. While the recruitment process was sometimes contested, the IFRC Haiti management team recruited first class delegates that set the environment for success. Not all these delegates met the usual requirements for academic qualifications in the shelter sector, or even basic university education requirements. This is probably just as well, as the project management skills required for this huge task did not require university degrees or qualifications in architecture or engineering, **it required delegates that could work under tough conditions, project-manage large workforces and big budgets, take risks, promote partnerships, remain flexible and solve problems.** The success of the shelter programme is a ringing endorsement of



the types of delegates contracted within the shelter unit, including those involved in the 'alternative shelter solutions', as well as support units such as the beneficiary communications unit.

While the coordination with the Beneficiary Communications unit in the shelter programme clearly helped in programme implementation, there was

GPS information on Shelter locations

a general lack of any organized and structured monitoring and evaluation process. While a number of evaluations were commissioned by the shelter unit, a stronger monitoring role should have been planned throughout the programme, both at the strategic level as well as the beneficiary level. At the strategic level this would have identified issues such as the gaps in terms of needs and targets for the PNS shelter partnership programmes and at the beneficiary level identified at an earlier point in the programme some of the re-design needs as well as the integrated needs regarding health, nutrition, protection and water.

Unfortunately the author did not have sufficient time to effectively review logistics and procurement challenges. These were essential services to the Shelter Unit and a deeper analysis of logistics and procurement demands and services would have added to the value of this review, especially in regard to potential efficiency gains in the programme.

Recommendations:

1. Ensure construction teams are insured against injury by either incorporating staff into the IFRC contract process or by introducing an insurance scheme for daily labour.
2. Review authorization levels of finance and procurement for large budget operations to enable efficient programme delivery and empower programme managers. Risk management processes can be used to maintain an adequate level of checks and controls to balance the increased risks in increasing budget authorization levels.
3. Ensure high quality information management systems with large shelter programmes.
4. Integrate key functions such as Wat/San into shelter and ensure a cross-departmental management approach to ensure shelter decisions are advised by, e.g., health, Wat/San, relief, protection, beneficiary communications.
5. In large shelter programmes separate the functions of programme implementation and Movement coordination.

4.4 Innovation and flexibility

'Organisations that seek to advance change in the world must also create internal spaces for people to discover their potential through experimentation. In practice this means celebrating people who take initiative, even when their ideas don't work.'

David Bornstein and Susan Davis, *Social entrepreneurship: what everyone needs to know*. OUP USA, 27 May 2010.

One reason for the success of the recovery shelter programme has been the innovative nature of the programme and the flexibility in being prepared to adapt and revise the shelter approaches and products. One of the largest innovations to the programme was the introduction of the rental



Shelter paint options, Norwegian Red Cross

support programme to assist with camp decongestion. Despite differences of opinion with the government regarding the size of the livelihoods support, the IFRC went ahead and led an innovative programme that has helped thousands of families find a shelter solution. Adding the American Red Cross funded Household Grant for T Shelter beneficiaries has had a demonstrable impact on family dignity and well-being and certainly contributed to families making adaptations to their shelters, such as adding patios, fences, lighting, electricity supply and interior furniture.

When paint for the T Shelters was being planned by the IFRC Shelter Unit it was decided to offer beneficiaries a choice of five colours. This provided families closer involvement with their shelter and reduced the potential image of institutionalization. The Norwegian Red Cross introduced water harvesting solutions for their programme in Petit Goave having a direct and important impact for those that had to walk long distances to get water. This was also tried in Port au Prince, but failed due to the fear of theft of the water containers, which people put inside their houses, and therefore didn't install roof guttering. The NRC water tubs were embedded in concrete, thus discouraging theft. New ways of costing and paying construction teams were



Water harvesting, Norwegian Red Cross

introduced during the programme, leading to improved efficiency. The IFRC and all partner PNS started T Shelter construction paying daily rates to the construction teams but after some months changed to a piece-rate payment agreement. This significantly increased productivity, reduced administrative and logistics costs and did not affect quality. Efficiency gains were also made from cutting and constructing on-site or close to the house location.

The original shelter had a single door, but after field visits from the HRCS president and discussions with beneficiaries it was agreed that shelters should have two doors. During that redesign period it was also agreed that shelters should have a roof extension. The French Red Cross programme in Croix des Bouquets included a cement patio below the roof extension. The original wooden doors which could be forced open were replaced with metal doors and metal windows.

The Shelter Programme was flexible in its relations with its PNS partners, adapting to new kit designs, supporting PNS programme shelter construction with IFRC construction teams and even financing PNS shelter programmes.

Despite these evident successes in innovation and flexibility, opportunities were lost. The innovations generally came about in an iterative manner and were not part of a more systematic effort to gather evidence and monitor beneficiary impact. It will be even more important with the INA to take a more structured approach to monitoring than has been witnessed to date. There has been a lot of quite well-judged guesswork in the IFRC response to the earthquake, but a distinct lack of effort to gather *social intelligence*. For example, today in Haiti thousands of families or groups can be seen rebuilding houses. These do not appear to have any relationship or support from the humanitarian sector. So how did this or that family get access to money or credit? Where did they find builders and labourers? How much do they pay them? Where do the materials come from? *How does the private system work?* If the IFRC wants to minimize mistakes in the INA approach to shelter, it would do well to take real efforts to understand how shelter solutions outside the humanitarian sector works.

Recommendations:

1. Learn from best practice in the Haiti shelter operation:
 - ✓ Provide a household grant along with the shelter
 - ✓ Encourage beneficiaries to make alterations to shelters
 - ✓ Offer a choice of paint colour to shelter beneficiaries
 - ✓ Select anti-fungal paint
 - ✓ Include sanitation as part of sheltering
 - ✓ Include water solutions to shelters
 - ✓ Consider per-unit payment for construction teams
 - ✓ Revisit the shelter design and improve during the course of the programme
 - ✓ Recruit labour from within the construction area, especially in insecure areas
2. Include internal and external lighting as part of the shelter construction. This does not require getting involved in the supply of electricity.
3. Ensure households have an appropriate protected area in which to cook.
4. Ensure households have access to clean water.
5. Improve programme monitoring.

4.5 Sustainability

The 24 month programme introduced in the 1st October 2010 Plan of Action was not intended to provide sustainable solutions for Haiti, but was planned to bring people out of emergency conditions after the end of the relief operation. Comments on the lack of permanent shelter solutions have already been presented in the chapter on shelter solutions.

The transitional shelters were originally planned for one or two years which was the period of the land lease. While the plywood walls will probably not last much beyond three years, they can easily be replaced. The core wooden frame could survive many years, though the wooden uprights set in cement may need replacing. Depending on the future strategy for T Shelter beneficiaries, one should consider providing repair kits and extra paint to extend the life of the shelter. Some latrines and showers (see below) could last a number of years.

While there is no definitive time period for the use of ministry land at La Piste, the agreement for the land at Annex de la Marie is for three years.⁵³ It is important to start negotiations with the Marie to determine the future of this camp and identify what role the Haitian Red Cross and IFRC may play when the lease comes to an end. There will need to be a well thought through beneficiary communications plan with the population in Annex de la Marie to ensure whatever the future is, it is clearly understood by the beneficiaries. If the T Shelters were to remain in both Annex de la Marie and La Piste, the IFRC needs to be clear as to its role and responsibilities in regard to camp services or the maintenance of the T Shelters, as over the next twelve months the deterioration of the shelters may become an increasingly pressing issue. This should be done in line with the 'responsible exit' strategy from the *July 2011 – December 2012 Plan of Action*. Noting the expectations from the camp communities on the IFRC and the Haitian Red Cross, the closure of support must be done in such a way as to protect the image of the HRCS. IFRC should explore durable solutions for these camp populations and consider building permanent housing solutions on these sites, the priority being La Piste, while at Annexe de la Marie the threat of flooding needs to be addressed if permanent housing was considered for this site.

The rental support programme supports a family for just one year in order to get them out of poor condition camps and provide a chance to start a livelihood. If the livelihoods grant is used effectively to start a sustainable livelihood, then this would be evidence of sustainability, though this will only be known once analysis is done of those receiving such grants at some time in the future. Likewise the vocational training programme would have sustainable outputs should it be demonstrated that the students have found employment due to the skills they have received.

Wood in such large quantities was never going to be available in Haiti, a country already ravaged by deforestation. The IFRC sourced their supplies from the Dominican Republic and the USA. Despite the suppliers working from the same specifications, there was some variation in quality of the plywood which may explain why some Shelters appear to have deteriorated faster than others. The decision to import wood was appropriate, as Haiti has no sustainable supply of wood products. (see 6.1 for a brief discussion on wood frame solutions compared to cement based shelter solutions).

⁵³ While agreements between the IFRC/HRC and the T Shelter beneficiaries in La Piste and Annex de la Marie are for two years, and there is a general understanding with the Ministry of Interior for La Piste and the Marie for the Annexe de la Marie camp that the lease is for two years, there appears to be no definitive agreement defining the end of lease date and whether the lease period was from the date of site preparation or the date of occupation.

The PPR feedback is worrying in regard to sustainability. Of nineteen families involved in the PPR process that had completed their one year rental contract, only four families had found new rent solutions while four families had negotiated a delay in new rental payments. Ten other families had moved to stay with friends and one family simply didn't have money left to pay for rent. Of all respondents in the PPR process asked how they would manage after the expiration of their lease or rental agreement, 28% of all replies were to trust in God, and 33% of all replies were to rely on the Red Cross.⁵⁴ If one took only the renters the percentage looking to the Red Cross for future support rose to 55%.

Recommendations:

1. Clarify with the authorities and land owners their plans for Annex de la Marie and La Piste after the current lease agreements come to an end, and advocate for IFRC/HRC intentions as required, in line with the July 2011 – December 2012 Plan of Action.
2. Clarify the timeframe for the 'responsible exit from camps' as referred to in the July 2011 – December 2012 Plan of Action and establish a clear beneficiary communications plan.
3. Use the PPR results to inform the 'responsible exit' strategy.
4. Use the *Piloting the Safe Spaces Assessment* recommendations when considering the exit timetable for La Piste and Annexe de la Marie.
5. Review the rental programme in search of more sustainable solutions.
6. Consider providing beneficiaries with repair kits and extra paint to extend the life of the T Shelters.

⁵⁴ This figure does not include specific actions requested of the Red Cross, such as contract extensions.

5. Programmes

5.1 IFRC shelter services to PNS

In the shelter programme National Societies had the option of working independently or working in partnership with the Federation. Partnerships characteristics varied depending on the purpose of the partnership, for example to ensure the timely success of the programme, from being just the provider of materials to fully implementing a T Shelter programme, including financing and construction following a PNS identification of beneficiaries. This report is not intended to review the performance of the partner national societies but to note technical aspects of the PNS programmes and review the quality of services provided by the IFRC Shelter Unit.

The three PNS partners to the Shelter Programme were the Canadian, French and Norwegian Red Cross Societies. The partnerships with these national societies to construct transitional shelters represented nearly 70% of the IFRC Secretariat multilateral target and over 10% of the total Federation-wide construction of transitional shelters. The tables below give the figures from mid December 2011 for the joint programming partnerships:

IFRC Secretariat - Shelter programme - 6 March 2012 update		
Shelter Services to PNS - Transitional shelter		
French Red Cross	Households target	Household supported
Croix-des-Bouquets - Meyer	625	625
Croix-des-Bouquets - Beudet	620	620
Croix-des-Bouquets other locations	200	200
Delmas 9	97	97
Delmas 7	15	15
Delmas 17	121	121
Delmas 30	384	384
Delmas 33 Bloc Béthanie	111	111
Delmas 33 Bloc Commissariat	140	140
Delmas 75	3	3
	2.316	2.316
Norwegian Red Cross		
Petit Goave	700	700
Canadian Red Cross		
Léogane	97	97
Jacmel	68	68
Marigot	30	30
	195	195
Shelter Services to PNS		
Total	3.211	3.211

Direct Implementation		
Transitional shelter	Households target	Household supported
Saint Marc	36	36
La Piste	377	377
Carradeux Decongestion	140	140
Carrefour Feuilles	46	45
INA/Carrefour Feuilles	2	2
INA/Delmas 30	236	55
Annexe de la Mairie (ADM)	321	321
Simon Pele	5	5
Saint Luis de Gonzague Decongestion	24	24
Morancy	121	124
Lilavois	5	5
Divers	26	23
Route des Frères	9	9
Mais Gate 1 Decongestion	13	13
Mais Gate 2 Decongestion	5	5
Annexe de la Mairie (ADM) Decongestion	100	53
Total	1.466	1.237

Alternative Shelter Solutions	Households target	Household supported
Carradeux Settlement Grants	818	543
Carradeux return to province	478	503
Annexe de la Marie settlement grants	435	435
Annexe de la Marie return to province	31	2
St Louis Gonzague Settlement Grants	803	731
St Louis Gonzague return to province	200	196
Simon Pele settlement grants	60	60
Simon Pele return to province	1	1
Carrefour feuille Settlement Grants	11	6
Carrefour feuille return to provinces	1	1
Croix De Bouquet Settlement Grants	82	82
Croix De Bouquet to province	21	21
Lilavois Settlement Grants	19	16

Alternative Shelter Solutions	Households target	Household supported
Lilavois - return to province	2	2
Craph Settlement Grants	114	113
Craph - return to province	6	6
Morancy Settlement Grants	11	8
Delmas 75 Settlement Grants	36	36
Delmas 75 - return to province	2	2
JMV Settlement Grants	10	10
JMV-return to province	93	93
Divers Settlement Grants	3	2
Mais Gate 1 Settlement Grants	1.049	1.027
Mais Gate 1 -return to province	65	65
Mais Gate 2 Settlement Grants	746	746
Mais Gate 2 -return to province	172	172
INA/Carrefour Feuille Settlement Grants	98	44
Citi Militaire Settlement Grants	47	47
Total	5.414	4.970
IFRC Secretariat - Shelter programme	Households target	Household supported
Total	10.091	9.418

The partnerships had different dynamics. For the Canadian Red Cross the IFRC filled a critical pipeline delay and helped the national society become operational with T Shelters earlier than otherwise would have been possible. The Norwegian Red Cross procured all their T Shelter materials from the IFRC thus benefitting from economies of scale and reduced overheads. The French Red Cross had complex agreements and timeframes with donors such as ECHO, as well as a general lack of funding. The IFRC was able to provide financing when and where required as well as provide all shelter materials to multiple construction sites. Impressively, this was done without any MOU, just a shared goal and mutual interest.

Some notes on specific sites:

French Red Cross, T Shelters Delmas 30

The French Red Cross started working with the community in Delmas 30 to identify T Shelter solutions. Delmas 30 is an extraordinary challenge with houses nestled on a steep bank leading down to a ravine. The level of earthquake damage was considerable and access to many parts of Delmas 30 was extremely difficult with narrow alleyways and damaged paths. The French Red Cross identified families that could potentially rebuild on an existing site, or build on a site where they had agreed a rental arrangement. The French Red Cross sought both financial and implementation

assistance from the IFRC, who had available shelter funds and had construction capacity as the construction teams were available from La Piste camp where construction was almost completed. The Delmas 30 project was also a technical challenge, as nearly every house was constructed on a very small site, meaning the T Shelter had to be adapted to the physical reality, sometimes also requiring the building of retaining walls where there was some risk. The entire area will be part of the IFRC INA programme which include an extensive risk reduction programme to manage the ravine dangers. The Delmas 30 project showed the IFRC Shelter Programme as flexible, supportive, imaginative and not averse to taking risks.

French Red Cross, T Shelters Croix des Bouquets

The French Red Cross (FRC) has built standard T Shelters in a number of locations in Croix des Bouquets. The IFRC supplied the materials to the FRC who managed their own construction teams. The beneficiaries are all from the area and most have had a T Shelter built on rented land or



their own land. The contract for rented land is for two years after which the shelter becomes the property of the land owner, who can then charge rent for the beneficiary family to remain in the property.

The programme does not include rain water catchment, latrines or grants, though for part of the programme bio-toilets were provided for collectives of five or six families if they were located together.

In the more rural setting of Croix de Bouquet needs are very different from other areas.

Shelter construction, Croix-des-Bouquets

Shelters are built in previously established hamlets or villages most of which have existing communal water points. Some beneficiaries buy water from the market and some local families have dug their own wells. Beneficiaries negotiated access to latrines from the proprietor, extended family or neighbours.



Land preparation is done by the construction teams, as is painting. The shelters include a patio below the extended roof: the construction teams install a double layered breezeblock surround which the beneficiaries fill with locally available rubble. They are provided with sand and cement to finish off the patio. There appeared to be less shelter modifications than in other programmes, perhaps due to the absence of a grant and the general poverty of the district.

Many shelters have self-made

electricity supply and fittings, most of which presented a risk due to exposed wires, but a few houses visited has installed imaginative external lights for the shelters. FRC had issued leaflets on managing electricity safely. As with other programmes roof nails were not turned to increase roof integrity. There was evidence of some deterioration of plywood, especially those yet to be painted, and there were some minor issues regarding the door-surrounds, especially where metal doors has been used. Construction teams are paid by shelter output, budgeted at \$400 per shelter, which is inspected for quality before payment. FRC construction teams and labour are

T Shelter programme, Petit Goave

insured for accident, medical treatment and loss of earnings through an insurance company based in Port au Prince.

The FRC reported that they had received excellent support and services from the IFRC Shelter Unit.

Norwegian Red Cross, T Shelters, Petit Goave

The Norwegian Red Cross (NRC) decided to construct 700 T Shelters in Petit Goave in three areas identified by the Shelter Cluster in Leogane, which had responsibility for coordination in Petit Goave. The NRC studied the T Shelter models of the IFRC and alternative models of the Canadian, Swiss and Spanish Red Cross Societies. They concluded they would use the IFRC design and request technical support in procuring and delivering the kits for Petit Goave. Financing came from the NRC. The first contract was for 350 units with an option for a further 350 after a mid-term review.

When the IFRC introduced the new design with the roof extension and double door, the NRC adopted the new model for the second phase of the programme and retrofitted for phase one. Additionally the NRC introduced rain harvesting in phase two and retrofitted gutters and provided water butts for phase-one shelters. The NRC did not give household or livelihood grants, but gave household tools and hygiene promotion with the programme. One of the main reasons for this was to avoid increasing the gap between shelter beneficiaries and other vulnerable people in the community that did not receive a shelter. Each shelter included an individual latrine. The IFRC Shelter Programme carpenter provided training for the NRC construction teams, who were all recruited from the region, and provided additional construction capacity to help the NRC meet the planned construction deadline.

As the construction speeded up towards the end of the programme, the unit cost came down, ending up at just \$ 412 per shelter, on top of the price of the kit. The occupancy rate was 99 %.

The shelter beneficiaries had to level the land on which the shelter would be based, dig the latrine well and move the shelter kit from the nearest drop-off point to the shelter location. After the retrofitting of the roof extension many beneficiaries built a concrete terrace.

The financial arrangement between the NRC and IFRC was handled between NRC Oslo and IFRC Panama. The NRC reported they had excellent support from the IFRC and that the IFRC Shelter Unit consistently found ways to overcome obstacles and solve problems.

The Norwegian Red Cross conducted an interim survey with households from the first 310 completed shelters.⁵⁵ Some of the most interesting findings were:

- 82% of households planned to stay in their shelter for five years or more.
- 25% of the beneficiaries previously lived in a tent not in a camp or lived in a destroyed house, as compared to the IFRC programme where 100% of beneficiaries came from organized camps.
- Only 2 out of 232 land tenants experienced any problems with the landowner.

⁵⁵ Interim survey of phase one shelters (draft), Ida Holdhus, Norwegian Red Cross, January 2012.

- Under 17% of householders had modified their shelter, the key modifications being the installation of electricity (60%) and dividing the shelter or adding rooms (32%). A further 36% of beneficiaries planned to make modifications in the future, principally dividing the shelter or adding rooms (53%), installing electricity (47%) and extending the gallery (44%).
- Only two of 25 families that owned a property had the money to repair their house.
- 86% of families that had had a rainwater catchment system installed used the water from the tank. Previously 50% of the families collected water from a pipe in the street; 22% from a public reservoir; 18% from a water source; 14% purchased their water and 3% had piped water to their shelter. 35% of households had to walk more than 30 minutes to get water and nearly 70% had to walk 20 minutes or more.
- 48% of households burnt their garbage; 25% threw garbage in the river; 12% threw garbage behind the house and 6% threw garbage in a ditch or canal.
- 304 out of 307 families said they were happy with the work done by the Norwegian Red Cross.

Canadian Red Cross, T Shelters Leogane and Jacmel

The Canadian Red Cross (CRC) requested supplies from the IFRC to build 195 transitional shelters to be delivered to six different locations in Jacmel and Leogane while they waited for their own kits to be delivered from Canada.

This was not a straightforward operation as the CRC planned to build 18 m² shelters, while the IFRC supplies were for the originally designed Core Shelters of 12 m².⁵⁶ The Core Shelters were part of the original shelter strategy which included both Core and transitional shelters. After ordering the supplies for the Core Shelters, it was subsequently agreed that 12 m² was too small for the purpose and that the standard should be a minimum of 18 m².

To overcome this challenge the IFRC delivered bulk uncut wood which the CRC then cut on-site based on the 18 m² design. There were inevitable errors⁵⁷ in wood quantities delivered by the IFRC due to the differences in the 12 m² and 18m² designs, but early problems were overcome with solutions driven service by the IFRC Shelter Unit. The original design included wooden doors and windows, while a subsequent design upgrade used metal door frames, doors and windows. The CRC decided not to retrofit shelters in line with the new designs, but did retrofit walls which were originally made from tarpaulin, when plywood sheets arrived.

In an innovative partnership, the CRC worked with the Netherlands Red Cross who provided water and sanitation solutions for the CRC transitional shelters, including those provided by the IFRC.

The CRC was appreciative of the support given by the IFRC Shelter Unit and noted in particular the 'problem solving' attitude from the Shelter Unit, which was particularly important with the challenges of supporting projects far from Port au Prince and managing the complexities of converting a 12 m² shelter design into an 18 m² shelter solution.

Managing the Gap

The Federation-wide Strategy introduced a different approach to shelter programming for the Federation, providing more focus on overcoming the shelter problems in Port au Prince in relation to the rural or semi-rural areas and placing more emphasis on a community integrated services approach to shelter and less emphasis on transitional shelters. It should be recalled that at the time

⁵⁶ The procurement order by the IFRC for 12m² kits was completed before the decision by the Haitian Red Cross that kits should be based on a minimum of 18m².

⁵⁷ To convert 12 square metre kits to 18 square metre shelters was a highly complex issue, especially as the large number of components of the kits were not itemized separately on the manifest.

this strategy was introduced, the transitional shelter programme was in its infancy, with only some 4,000 shelters completed by the IFRC.

While the new 'quartier' approach to programming was both challenging and indeed refreshing, the proposal to reduce the transitional shelter programme from a target of 30,000 shelters to 20,000 was not based on any needs analysis, indeed neither was the original IFRC target of 30,000, or the Shelter Cluster target of 130,000. These figures were a representation of interest, commitment and capacity (though capacity estimates were seriously flawed regarding the original planned timeframe), but not of needs based on assessment. The Shelter Cluster statements that there was an oversupply of transitional shelters in Leogane, Petit Goave and Jacmel were based on flawed data and not supported by any field assessments.

The French and Norwegian Red Cross society shelter programmes that are supported by the IFRC are expected to come to an end as the shelter targets have been met. However the overall needs that could be appropriately responded to with transitional shelters have not been met. The French Red Cross could potentially continue in areas such as Croix-des-Bouquets meeting shelter needs if financially supported by the IFRC. The Norwegian Red Cross could do the same in Petit Goave with either their own funds or IFRC funds. The shelter construction capacity within the IFRC, FRC and NRC is currently at its maximum.⁵⁸ If the transitional shelter construction programmes are now stopped, this capacity will be lost, though, of course, some capacity can be transferred to the INA programme. The CRC programme which was partially assisted by the IFRC is also coming to a close. The CRC has recognized there are outstanding shelter needs and is thinking about conducting a gap analysis in their operational areas.

While needs have not been assessed, and potential beneficiary numbers are unknown, it would appear from field visits that some hundreds of families in Croix-des-Bouquets and Petit Goave are still living in poor condition under canvas in locations in which the IFRC and PNS are present. With shelter construction capacity standing at an estimated 100 units per week, and with a slow financial implementation rate and considerable available funds, it would make sense to continue the provision of transitional shelters where the IFRC and its partners have capacity. By the same manner it would be hard to understand any reason to leave these areas because targets have been met, while needs have not been met. Very shortly the construction capacity will be lost, presenting the IFRC with an urgent need to review the current direction on shelter regarding these areas where needs exist and capacity exists.



If outstanding shelter needs were to be considered, this could provide an opportunity for the IFRC and partners to revisit the transitional shelter design and consider progressive shelter that could be seen as a contribution to permanent shelter. If beneficiary numbers were below 1,000 families, it might prove simpler to continue with the IFRC Model two. If FRC and NRC were able to continue to meet needs in their areas the supply chain of materials would have to be investigated. An alternative option would be to upgrade the emergency

⁵⁸ This section was written in December 2011 when capacity was higher, and the Gap Issue was discussed with IFRC management in Port au Prince.

shelters using existing building supplies.

Tent community of IDPs in Croix-des-Bouquets next to T Shelter construction

The Haitian government has requested durable solutions to replace T Shelters, possibly with a focus on urban Port au Prince and the clearance of the major camps. Previous government declarations had had little impact on the IFRC's drive to meet needs and find solutions and should not be considered as important in Croix-des-Bouquets and Petit Goave as the local authorities are likely to be supportive.

Land is plentiful in these semi-rural area and land agreements for T Shelter solutions not, apparently, a problem. The French Red Cross has no problems in finding new beneficiaries for T Shelters. T Shelters are well received and appropriate to the region where small hamlets are made up from a mixture of concrete structures (with many destroyed) and wattle and daub structures. There is also evidence of outstanding needs in Petit Goave.

This scenario presents a question for the future of the IFRC Shelter Programme. ***If there are identifiable shelter needs for very vulnerable populations in districts in which the IFRC and PNS partners work and IFRC has financial and operational capacity with PNS partnerships to respond to those shelter needs, should not IFRC continue a shelter programme in such circumstances?***

This question does, of course, need to be considered in relation to other criteria such as the sustainability of T Shelters, the potential for INA approaches to these 'gap' populations, opportunity costs and local government planning.

In January 2012 the Shelter Cluster held a meeting to discuss the issue of gaps after some encouragement from the IFRC. While solutions have to be found it is at least encouraging to see this issue on the agenda.

Recommendations

1. Carry out a gap analysis regarding outstanding shelter needs in the PNS partnership T Shelter locations and share findings.
2. Discuss the issue between the PNS and IFRC to seek consensus on an appropriate strategy.
3. Seek flexible solutions with PNS partners, but in the context of local authority planning, opportunity costs and the opportunity of INA approaches for these vulnerable populations.

5.2 IFRC camps, La Piste and Annex de la Marie

La Piste

On 15th June 2010 Madame George Salomon, advisor to the President of Haiti wrote to the Haitian Red Cross asking for assistance in the construction of temporary shelters at the location *Site de L'Aviation*, later to become known as La Piste.

The 30 hectare site was owned by the Ministry of the Interior, had been levelled and prepared as a camp by UN OPS including erecting 300 tents in early 2010, but had remained unoccupied, except for 146 families from the Port au Prince deaf community upon advice to the government from the French embassy in Haiti.

There was a rapid follow up to the June 15th letter by the IFRC with specific assistance from the Canadian Red Cross who prepared by June 21st the document: *Planning Parameters and Project Initiation for the La Piste Resettlement Site*.

The original plan anticipated different numbers of houses for different size families, being a mixture of 12m² (originally called Core Shelter) and 18m² houses (T Shelter) and planned for

a plot size of 45m² land for each family member (quoted as the Sphere standard). In fact the houses that were constructed were all of the 18m² model with subsequent retrofitting of a veranda with 90m² of land per family. The site area would allow for 354 houses leaving free some common ground. In fact an additional 14 houses were constructed bring the total occupancy up to 368 families, allowing for an additional 222 families.

The Shelter Programme liaised with the camp committee in the camp La Piste JMV to discuss beneficiary identification. The committee proposed that the additional families are selected from families with a disabled family member. With such a small target and large population at La Piste JMV this decision clearly made beneficiary selection easier. Shelter Programme community workers conducted a detailed assessment of those proposed families. While at the time of assessment the family size was known, subsequently in many cases post-occupation family sizes grew as extended family members were invited by the selected families to share the shelter.

The site was secured by fencing, though this did not prove sufficient to keep intruders out of the camp. A building was erected to house security police, suggested when the IFRC stopped providing security to the camp, but was never occupied. The site was leveled by UN OPS with between 1.5 metres to 2.7 metres of rubble, then covered with gravel, making the site entirely secure from flooding.

The first demonstration model shelter was built on September 10th 2010, using members from the displaced community at La Piste JMV as a construction team. Ten IDPs were trained on how to build the 'La Piste design' T Shelter by an IFRC carpenter: once completed they went on to select other members of the community to fill out their construction teams. This method was repeated to increase the number of teams to the required level.

The site, including the original target of 354 T Shelters was opened on January 9th 2011 with the 146 families from the deaf community already on-site, then groups of 30 families were moved in at a time in line with construction completion. At its maximum 50 construction teams, each comprising 5 builders, were working on La Piste completing up to 50 shelters a week. The final shelter was completed on April 5th 2011. Each shelter had a raised latrine and shower cubicle as separate structures near the house. Families collected water from well-constructed water points. The IFRC initially provided for camp security and site cleaning, slowly withdrawing these services after the camp committee was established and could take over these functions.

After construction was completed the IFRC modified the T Shelter design, providing for two doors and a roof extension. In the La Piste camp the roof extensions were retro-fitted, but the shelters were left with a single door.

Shelter beneficiaries were provided with a household grant of \$150 and a livelihoods grant of \$500, as well as a mosquito net and access to vocational training.

Handicap International advised on ramp access design to shelters used by the disabled.

A year on from the opening of the camp there are a number of issues still to be dealt with. Many beneficiaries comment that the T Shelter roofs leak, that rain gets into the shelters through the eaves and through poorly fitted windows. The removal of human waste remains a problem and requires a solution between the IFRC Wat/San unit, the private sector and the camp community. The same negotiations are required regarding the collection of rubbish, both inside the camp and the removal of rubbish from the camp by either the local authorities or through the private sector.

The IFRC needs to clarify its role and responsibilities regarding the future of the camp and define a coherent exit strategy which will need to be communicated to the camp community.

Observations

Families clearly took pride in their houses with all houses kept tidy both inside and outside. With over 600,000 people still displaced and living under canvas one can question whether each family with ninety square metres space in the camp was appropriate. Regardless of Sphere standards, in the context of the needs in Haiti, this allocated space could have easily been halved allowing for twice the camp population.

The camp has nine large solar-powered lights.⁵⁹ This is possibly insufficient to provide adequate night-time lighting. The areas between the T Shelters and latrines/showers were unlit. Lighting solutions need to be incorporated in these areas.

There are four unmanned entrances into La Piste allowing the camp population from La Piste JMV to enter the La Piste site.

There was no programme for pest control in the camps. PPR feedback indicated problems with rats, mice, ants and mosquitoes.

The latrines were of good emergency quality, but are unlikely to last as long as the shelters, but current waste removal services are possibly inadequate.

Providing one latrine per family was appropriate.

The shower cubicles were appropriate.

Families collected water from water stands, although individual water harvesting for each shelter had originally been planned for. Due to local perceptions about rain water⁶⁰ this was an appropriate solution. The water stands are fed by a gravity flow water supply network installed by the IFRC with a reservoir of 35,000 litres. The IFRC still pays for the water to fill the reservoir.

Some shelters had solar power energy provided by another organization.

Fungus had infected the plywood walls of the T Shelters, despite being painted with anti-fungal paint. This problem will reduce the life expectancy of the shelters.

The main wooden support posts were set directly into concrete without any water resistant protection. This will eventually lead to rotting and reduce the life expectancy of the shelters.

Some roofing sheets were poorly fitted with the nails not always properly flush with the rubber washers, leading to leaks. The same applies to some poorly fitted windows.

Beneficiary families had to find their own cooking solutions. The original design provided for no protected cooking area forcing families to cook inside the shelter when it rained. This problem was mitigated when a roof extension was added.

A number of families built an extension to their shelter to run 'petit commerce' selling basic household goods, food or charcoal, as well as establishing schooling and church areas.

The ramp access for the disabled as designed by Handicap International was excessive and could have been modified with a simpler design.

Advisory posters in the camp on safety and maintenance were useful and appropriate, except for the advice on electrics.

The large majority of shelters had found their own solution for the supply of electricity, despite the risk advisory against this practice. From those interviewed it appeared that families paid an initial 250 gourdes for a supply then a subsequent 50 gourde per month. The legality of the supply was questionable. In all cases observed the electrical fittings were

⁵⁹ Subsequent visits in January 2012 indicated a large solar lighting programme was underway.

⁶⁰ There were unsupported local rumours that washing in rain water turned the skin white.

dangerous. T Shelter design could have included interior and external lighting as part of the basic design.

Conclusions:

The IFRC was fast in accepting the challenge to build a camp in La Piste and bold in undertaking the risk.

The IFRC took appropriate action in site planning, though the number of square metres allocated to each family could be considered as excessive and the lighting possibly inadequate.

Good practice was evident in beneficiary selection and assessment.

The T Shelter design was appropriate for the camp population, though there are a number of maintenance issues to be resolved.

The provision of household grants and livelihood grants were appropriate. Providing access to vocational training was appropriate, though could have been started earlier.

The original water and sanitation solutions in the camp were appropriate, but the transition of camp services such as security, de-sludging, waste removal and the provision of water has led to some problems that need to be resolved.

Pest control could have been considered in the camp design and camp management.

Annexe de la Marie

On March 29th 2010 the Haitian Red Cross Society and IFRC office in Haiti signed an agreement with the local Camp Committee for the start-up of a camp for T Shelters in the area known as Annexe de la Marie in the Commune of Cité Soleil and an agreement was made with the Marie to use the land to construct T Shelters for a period of three years. The land is owned by the Marie, though this was briefly contested by the Radio company that owns the transmitters on the site and also by the Ministry of the Interior. The original agreement was for a camp of 500 families, later reduced to 340 families.

The Mayor of Cité Soleil was involved in site inspections and discussions on beneficiary selection. The agreement with the committee dealt with beneficiary ownership of the T Shelter, roles and responsibilities of the HRCS and the Committee, site preparation, needs assessment, criteria for beneficiary selection, site security, recruitment of security and construction staff, technical assistance and beneficiary involvement in the construction. The committee was apparently appointed by the Marie and was not part of the camp population.

The site contained over 1,200 families living in very poor conditions under canvas. The plan was to decongest the camp and build a T Shelter camp for 340 families, selected from the on-site population. A number of different initiatives were taken to decongest the camp:

- a) Families were offered construction material and tools. Roofing sheets and timber was organized by the Danish Red Cross Relief ERU and distributed on-site to 306 families who then left the camp. It was not clear how these families used the materials and no follow-up assessment was made. Unfortunately the beneficiary families were not properly registered and may even have returned to the camp.
- b) Families that could build on their own land or rent land were provided with a T Shelter package. 48 families took this option.
- c) Rental support package, either in Port au Prince or in the Provinces. 414 families took the standard rental package and two families opted for the Return to Provinces package.
- d) A \$500 housing support package to help families repair their own houses was accepted by five families.

Decongestion was a slow and difficult operation, but eventually 320 beneficiary families were selected for T Shelters on the site at Annexe de la Marie and others took their options from the decongestion alternatives.

The camp lies on low ground and floods regularly after rains. Water run-off from the surrounding terrain enters the site. A lake has been dug to collect flood water, but is insufficient to handle the volume of water. It has not been possible to gain an agreement



from the population across from the bottom of the camp to allow flood water to pass through their neighbourhood to reach a main canal. The flood water is regularly pumped to a canal north of the camp. Shelters have been built directly on the ground and not raised to protect them from flooding. Families have used their own initiative to build protective banks around their houses built from rubble which was provided by the IFRC for this purpose.

Community centre construction, Annexe de la Marie

One latrine and one shower were provided for every two families. Water points were established in the camp by Care International and World Vision and supported by water trucking. In the autumn of 2011 free water was stopped and now families pay for their water, though some have contested the price charged by the Committee and proposed they manage their own water trucking supply.

The original T Shelters in Annexe de la Marie were built on the ground instead of being raised, compounding the problem of flooding. Initially the interior shelter floors were raised with rubble, then covered with sand and a tarpaulin, but water came up through the floor.

Subsequently a raised wooden floor was installed to reduce the incidence of flooding. Later T Shelter designs, for example those built in La Piste were raised off the ground.

Observations

The site is still at risk to flooding, though family level mitigation work continues.

Lighting in the camp was only installed in January 2012 after a long procurement delay, thus leaving the camp dangerous at night for a long period.

The T Shelter design could have included both interior and external lighting to mitigate the lack of camp lighting.

Nearly every family made adaptations to their T Shelter, giving the camp a lot of character.

Beneficiary selection was well managed.

Having a choice of paint colour gives the beneficiary family some sense of identity with their shelter and reduces any appearance of institutionalization.

Latrine and shower provision was adequate.

Water provision was adequate.

Conclusions:

While facing many problems in Annexe de la Marie, it was a correct and bold decision for the IFRC to take on the project that has eventually provided 320 families with adequate shelter in Annexe de la Marie as well as alternative shelter solutions for the rest of the original camp population.

The complex issue of decongestion was successfully managed for a large population with creative sheltering solutions.

The building materials distribution made for 306 families and the five families that took a housing repair grant of \$ 500 could have provided insight into how families use cash or materials for self-sheltering solutions and provided intelligence on whether such a solution could have been included in future shelter options.

The site should have been properly prepared before construction started. To reduce the problem of flooding the camp needed elevation as was done in La Piste. Although the camp was fully populated as a tent city, site preparation could have been done sector by sector in the same way the T Shelter construction was done.

Shelters should have been constructed off the ground.

Lighting should have been installed before the camp was opened.

Internal and external lighting should be considered as part of a shelter design, and a power supply, such as solar power should be investigated as part of a shelter solution.

The camp committee should have been selected from within the camp population.

Recommendations:

1. Conduct mitigation works prior to shelter construction.
2. Install adequate lighting as an essential part of camp infrastructure. Lighting should cover all areas between housing, water supply and sanitation and should be placed in assessed risk areas in the camps.
3. Follow up the five families from Annex de la Marie that received a \$ 500 grant for green house improvements and use that knowledge to advise the INA.

La Piste and Annexe de la Marie : a note on violence in the camps:

During December 2011 and January 2012 assessments were carried in both camps in regard to the problems of violence.⁶¹ Residents in both camps identified violence as a serious problem and through a series of group sessions identified the causes and locations of violence and what coping mechanisms were being, or could be adopted.

Outcomes from the group meetings provide observations related to the shelter programme, in particular the importance of taking into account protection issues when designing the camp and allocating space; the importance of lighting infrastructure in the camp and lighting for the shelters, including identifying and lighting the areas of high risk of sexual and physical violence; the

⁶¹ Piloting the *Safe Spaces* Assessment; Juliet Kerr, Violence Prevention Delegate, IFRC; January 2012

importance of having a second door for each property and the related issue of having a high quality door and lock that cannot be broken into.⁶²

The problem of the theft of cash related to the payments of livelihoods grants is also an important observation that needs to be taken into consideration by the Shelter Unit, though the violence built around informal lending mechanisms⁶³ indicates the importance of the Livelihoods Grants and Household Grant.

Future Options

Depending on the views and plans of the government the IFRC should consider permanent shelter solutions for La Piste and Annex de la Marie, with La Piste more likely to offer durable solutions. Options could include blocks of apartments, twinned houses or individual houses with complete infrastructure, green areas and shops.

A possible mid-term alternative for Annexe de la Marie would be to negotiate with the Marie or higher level government authorities for some form of rental payment from T Shelter occupiers and an extension of the land lease for a further two years.

Recommendations:

1. Refer to the recommendations in the document Piloting the Safe Spaces Assessment.
2. Take learning points from the assessment report into shelter solutions for the INA programme.
3. Consider permanent housing options for La Piste and possibly for Annexe de la Marie.
4. Start negotiations with the authorities to find durable solutions.

5.3 Rental Support and camp decongestion

In July 2010 it was proposed the IFRC could evaluate another potential T Shelter camp in Carradeux, Port au Prince, where there were over 1,400 families under canvas in four camps. UN



OPS conducted a site evaluation and concluded there would have to be extensive site mitigation work done before the locations would be suitable as T Shelter camps. There were also disputes over land ownership regarding these sites. During the evaluation it was found that 75% of the camp population were previously renters, not owners. With this background it was decided to look for alternative shelter solutions for this population, thus, after beneficiary discussions the concept of Alternative

⁶² See also PPR feedback on the importance of a strong door than cannot easily be broken into.

⁶³ Informal lending from loan sharks is available in Haiti, but with very high interest rates. Violence is an inevitable problem when borrowers are unable to make the required repayments on time.

Shelter Solutions was born. IDPs living in the Carradeux camps were to be offered *Annexe de la Marie, Port au Prince*

either T Shelters if they could identify building land, either owned or rented, return to the provinces with rental support, or rental support in the Port au Prince area. Each option would come with a livelihoods grant, access to vocational training, and medical insurance.

This decongestion approach was subsequently used in Annexe de la Marie to make room for transitional shelters.

An NGO working in Carradeux invited the IFRC to look at a problem in Delmas where 1,028 families were camped on a school property and were under threat of eviction; thus gradually the programme grew with local mayors or others asking for IFRC support. Currently the IFRC is involved in 20 sites using the decongestion technique to find shelter solutions for IDPs. To date 6,200 families registered for whom 2,806 have been found shelter solutions.

Decongestion: T Shelters

So far 245 families have opted for the T Shelter solution. The recipient family needed to find a piece of land to rent and sign an agreement with the land owner that allows for a shelter to be built on that land. A standard IFRC T Shelter (model 1, without the roof extension) is built on the plot and a latrine and shower built next to the T Shelter. Beneficiaries received a household grant of \$ 150 to purchase household items or make adjustment to the shelter, such as replacing the wooden floor with a cement floor. Each beneficiary also received a livelihoods grant of \$ 500 and an opportunity to receive vocational training.

Decongestion: Rent support in Port au Prince and the provinces

The decongestion programme started in October 2010. As of December 15th just under 2,000 families had received rental support to live within Port au Prince and 611 families have returned to the provinces. Each beneficiary family received \$500 rental support, anticipated to be sufficient to pay for one year of rent, also \$500 as a semi-conditional livelihoods grant and had access to the vocational training programme.

After registration and an IFRC inspection of the rental property (to ensure the property is safe and has adequate sanitation etc.) their name is sent to the IFRC finance department who forward names to the bank. Within 24 hours⁶⁴ the bank issues a PIN number for each family. The IFRC staff take the beneficiary to the bank to collect their entitlement, then goes with the family to the rental property where they witness the rental payment to the property owner and get a receipt for the payment. The rental beneficiaries are entered into the IFRC Google Earth database and regularly monitored.

In a review of 316 families that went through the decongestion programme, 97% stated that their lives had changed, quoting the main changes as:

- It is less hot than the camp
- It is less dirty
- It is more comfortable
- It is more secure
- Now able to start a small business
- Sleep better at night
- Don't need to pay rent

⁶⁴ Originally this process could take up to two weeks

- It is a better home for the children
- There is access to water
- Now have some cash to meet basic needs
- The overall conditions are better

However, only 25% of respondents said they now felt safer than before. The reasons for this were not explored.

2% of the respondents said their new accommodation still gets flooded and there are a lot of mosquitoes and 1% said the new conditions were worse than before.

85% of respondents said they were either very satisfied (33%) or satisfied (52%) with their new accommodation.

An important change in people's lives were in regard to services, with 93% now able to access a toilet, 83% accessing clean water, 69% having access to a school and 72% having easier access to a clinic or hospital.

Nineteen heads of household involved in the PPR had already passed their one year rental support deadline, and ten of the families stated that they had moved to stay with friends, with only four families re-negotiating a new rental contract with either current landlord or the landlord of a new property. It would be useful to gather more in-depth data on what families do or plan to do when their rental support expires and explore options in an attempt to make the programme more sustainable.

Recommendations:

1. Families opting for T Shelters from the decongestion programme should receive the type II T Shelter with two metal doors and a roof extension.
2. The families referred to above should have their access to water assessed.

5.4 Note on vulnerability, beneficiaries and beneficiary selection

The shelter programme in Haiti was unusual in the context of vulnerability and beneficiary selection. The beneficiary group in La Piste was selected by the camp committee in La Piste JMV. While the handicapped community brought into the La Piste camp were certainly vulnerable, there was no apparent debate in regard to other vulnerable populations in Haiti.

The process in Annexe de la Marie was appropriate in finding the most vulnerable from within the population already resident there at the time. It probably would have been socially and politically impossible to bring in vulnerable families that were not already resident in Annexe de la Marie.

The beneficiaries of the individual T Shelters and rental support were entirely drawn from camps where decongestion was required, either due to planned eviction, or on a request from the local authorities. Excellent approaches were taken, for example is the Mais Gate decongestion, to avoid including 'fake' residents that maintained a tent in a camp but did not actually live there. The IFRC shelter solutions team arrived in the camp at 4.30 in the morning and marked all the uninhabited tents with spray paint indicating them as unoccupied and therefore not eligible for shelter solutions.

With the IFRC shelter beneficiaries all coming from camps there was no analysis of the vulnerabilities and needs of other populations, such as those still resident in red or yellow houses, living under tarpaulin or in tents near their house rubble. If this group from the affected population had been assessed it is possible the IFRC would have identified solutions for such groups, such as household repair grants, the provision of building materials or credit for such materials. Those unable to repair or rebuild due to the concentration of rubble could have been supported by the rubble processing programme. The Shelter Technical Team had started assessments in the neighbourhoods early in the operation, but was advised to discontinue such assessments.

In La Piste the special needs of the disabled were taken into account, and in both T Shelter camps there were adequate areas for children to play, though no specific approach or support to equip safe areas. The T Shelter programme came as a standard package, with no evident special attention paid to the needs of, for example, the elderly, where a wooden or concrete step up to the T Shelter door would have made ingress and egress easier for those with mobility problems.

One could argue that nearly all those affected by the earthquake were vulnerable, thus shelter solutions for any groups were appropriate and consistent with the IFRC Principles and Rules for Disaster Relief, but throughout nearly all the programme and policy documents there is little record of vulnerability being considered or explained in IFRC documentation, though the October 2010 Plan of Action included families from Yellow houses while the main focus was on formal and informal settlements. A hypothetical case could be made that by focusing on owners and renters remaining near or on their damaged or destroyed houses one could have reduced the pull factor into camps where all the services and benefits were being provided, and begin an INA⁶⁵ approach right from the beginning of the operation.

Indirect beneficiaries

Local staff and daily labour can be considered as a large group of indirect beneficiaries. Both groups benefitted from some type of income, but almost all benefitted from an increase in their skills. Some small numbers of daily labour were used to just load or unload trucks, where there was no skills development, but the majority of local staff or daily labour was involved in shelter construction and received technical training before they started working as well as during the programme. The

⁶⁵ Integrated Neighbour Approach

training was mostly in regard to carpentry, but also included joinery and construction, such as fitting metal sheet roofs. There is currently no data on whether daily labour, or others who ended their employment with the IFRC were able to use their newly developed skills to find other employment.

As daily labour from one construction site may have been moved to work on another, the statistics are estimates only, except where detailed records were easily available.

The estimated number of local staff and daily labour were:

La Piste: 786 individuals, the large majority of whom received carpentry and construction training.

Annex de la Marie: approximately 700 individuals, the large majority of whom received carpentry and construction training.

Croix des Bouquets: approximately 550 individuals recruited from the local area who worked with 50 trained construction team leaders from Port au Prince. All these individuals received carpentry and construction training.

Hollywood in Delmas 30: 200 individuals, plus another 300 on the other side of the ravine, the large majority of whom received training in carpentry and construction.



Other projects: approximately 125 individuals, the large majority of whom received training in carpentry and construction or in the planning and implementation of gabion cage risk mitigation projects.

Three staff were also supported by contributions from the IFRC towards the costs of a University education in Santa Domingo.

Collectively one could estimate that approximately 2,700 staff and daily labour were indirect programme beneficiaries, receiving some form of income, though sometimes for only a short period, as well as

Local staff and daily labour also benefitted from the IFRC shelter programme

receiving technical training of some sort. If one also considered the individual's families as indirect beneficiaries, receiving some benefits from the income derived from the employment activities, one could extrapolate a far larger beneficiary group, but data on family size is not available at this time.

6. Technical review

6.1 Transitional Shelters

From a technical point of view this was a successful programme. While shelter is a very personal, sensitive and cultural issue, in the context of the poverty in Haiti one could wonder why it took so long to agree, or disagree, on technical standards for the T Shelters. During February and March 2010 many shelter specialists arrived at the IFRC Base Camp. In a somewhat bizarre architectural competition between national societies and different sections of the IFRC there was no evidence of local architects or IDP camp committee leaders being invited for their views, or attempts to get outside the base camp and view local shelter architecture, though some twenty local staff involved in construction were asked for their opinions. It would appear this was only a problem in regard to a delay in the start of the T Shelter programme, as there were no evident beneficiary objections to the IFRC shelter design. Shelter beneficiaries generally had no comment on the design. This is perhaps not a surprise as the majority of beneficiaries were either renters or previously living in sub-standard rural housing.

The technical comments below need to be taken in relation to the understanding of what a T Shelter was in early 2010. If the T Shelter was understood to be a truly temporary structure to get the displaced population out of emergency shelter and into something more secure in regard to the upcoming rain and hurricane season, and anticipate that there was to be a permanent shelter solution after one or two years, then attention to the quality of the shelter would be less important. If, however, it was understood that the T Shelter was actually to be the *final* level of shelter support from the IFRC Secretariat, then more attention to quality should be anticipated.

The concept of using wood or steel for the T Shelter frame was based on the understanding that for the majority of beneficiaries the T Shelter was constructed on land owned by someone other than the beneficiary and that the shelter needed to be moveable to another site once the land agreement expired. For this reason there was less exploration of stucco type shelters using breeze-blocks or other cement based solutions. One could anticipate that for the INA approach one would not use wooden framed shelters but would resort back to more traditional concrete based structures.

The cost target for each shelter set by the Shelter Cluster was often ignored.⁶⁶ As with the argument above, having a cost-per-shelter limit could make sense if the T Shelter was clearly to be replaced by a permanent shelter, but made little sense if the T Shelter was to be the final level of shelter support. There were some indications that the cost-limit did restrict the IFRC in exploring improved shelter solutions, though no written evidence of this was found.

During the course of this review it would appear that there was a general understanding that in the early months of the shelter operation that the T Shelter option was seen only as a temporary solution. If this was the case, there is a major gap in the shelter strategy to clarify that the IFRC would not move beyond the transitional phase and to fully understand the implications of this decision, especially as the HRCS had promoted permanent shelter solutions from the beginning of the operation. While the IFRC moves into the INA phase in Haiti, it still needs to clarify its strategy in regard to T Shelter and rental agreement beneficiaries whose 'benefit' will expire either due to lapsed rental agreements, lapsed land agreements or the physical deterioration of the T Shelter.

⁶⁶ Shelter agencies and NGOs were advised by the Shelter Cluster not to exceed a specific budget target per shelter.

While problems with T Shelters, such as leaks, poorly fitted doors or windows or other concerns were picked up informally by the Shelter Unit and often acted upon, there was no formalized system allowing for complaints to be made and recorded, the record to indicate if the problem was to be resolved or not, and if to be resolved, how this would be identifiable in the construction teams work-plan.

It was a lost opportunity that after the excellent move from the first design, to Type II with the second door and roof extension, that this type was not used for the decongestion programme, where the old Type I was still used.

Below are some technical comments on the T Shelters based on site visits:⁶⁷

- The decision to use wood rather than steel for the T Shelter frame provided a number of benefits: it allowed for easily managed changes to the design, such as the roof extension and adding a second door; some T Shelters had to be designed to specifically fit a small urban site; it provided for a skills transfer to a large workforce whose experience in carpentry and joinery are probably more useful than learning how to put a steel kit together.
- The potential life-span of a T Shelter is hard to approximate, but the climate in Haiti is harsh on wooden structures. The structures, however, should be reasonably resistant to earthquakes, certainly more so than concrete structures.
- Hurricane straps were evident in all shelters, but occasionally not sufficiently stressed to maximize their purpose.
- In all houses visited the roofing nails penetrated the roofing beams by some one to two centimetres and were left exposed. This presents a risk in hurricane conditions where the roof structure could be a threat to downwind communities. If the exposed part of the roofing nails had been hammered flush with the roof beam this would not only reduce risk from flying debris in a storm, but would also have added considerable structural stability between the roofing sheets and the roofing timbers. Noting that the roofing timbers were secured to the main structure with hurricane straps, this oversight somewhat reduced any potential efficiency of the hurricane straps.⁶⁸
- Nailing corrugated roofing sheets onto a wooden roof structure requires delicacy. Umbrella headed roofing nails were used with rubber washers to avoid leaking from the roof. While all observed nails were correctly positioned in the upper part of the corrugated sheet, as opposed to the lower, there were a number of instances where the under or more often over-zealous hammering of the roofing nails led to a result where the joint between the roof and the nail was not appropriate, leading to leaking from the roof during rain. As this situation has a very direct impact on the living conditions of the beneficiary family, it is an important area than requires special attention during construction training.
- A stronger attention to quality control and monitoring may have picked up quality issues, such as holes in the roofs.
- One of the main causes of leaking roofs was poor alignment between the nail and the roof joist. When a nail was hammered, but missed the roof joist, it of course left a hole,

⁶⁷ These are site visit observations and need to read along with the PPR feedback on T Shelters.

⁶⁸ The roof joists used in La Piste were 1 ½ inches x 2 inches, those in Annexe de la Marie were 4 x 1. With a three inch umbrella nail and 1 inch clearance in the metal sheeting, it was inevitable the nails ends would be exposed. Most shelters built after the La Piste and Annexe de la Marie programme used 50mm x 50mm joists.

or in some cases multiple holes as the roofing team ‘searched’ for the wooden joist by trial and error.⁶⁹

- A number of windows were poorly fitted leading to leaking when it rained.
- Shelters were mostly constructed on main uprights above the ground. Above-ground construction made sense in all areas, noting the potential for flooding and hurricanes. The main upright posts were fixed in cement blocks, hand-poured into hand-dug holes. The cement base was often flush with the ground, and the wooden post set in the cement without protection. This will inevitably lead to water infiltration of the main posts which will need replacing after some 4 – 5 years. To mitigate the potential deterioration of the upright posts one could consider raising the cement base a few inches above the ground level; seal the wood to the cement joint; treat the wood to a level above that inserted into the cement with some form of water resistant coating, such as bitumen, or embed a galvanized steel saddle in the concrete and bolt the post to the above-ground portion of this saddle (this would also make it easier to deconstruct the shelter if it was to be moved).
- Shelter beneficiaries were able to opt for a choice of paint for their shelter. This was an excellent concept and added to beneficiary ownership of their property. Some owners were slow to paint their structures and wood deterioration in such cases was evident. This introduces a difficult balance between shelter efficiency (construction teams paint the house) and participation (owners paint the house). The paint was declared as fungal resistant, but there was clear evidence of fungal decay which will significantly reduce the ‘shelf-life’ of the plywood walls. This may have been more related to delayed painting than to do with the quality of the paint.
- Some early T Shelters used plastic walls, either as a final solution, or as a temporary measure until plywood sheets arrived. This generated (in regard to the entire shelter programme from the humanitarian community) considerable complaints from the local authorities. Perceptions, such as temporary plastic wall sheeting, can be easily misunderstood. It is inadvisable, even in difficult canvas shelter situations, to provide incomplete shelter solutions, as this can lead to confusion and tension.
- Despite some of the evident design flaws noted here, it was remarked upon how efficiently the construction teams worked and were ably led by the team leaders.
- Raised shelters mean the entrance is higher than the ground level. Some observed shelters had wooden steps provided, though most left this as a solution to be resolved by the beneficiary. Most families created their own solutions to this problem, but the issue of house access needed more consideration, especially for the elderly, those with mobility problems or families with young children.
- Safety and care posters for shelter beneficiaries provided unclear messages regarding electricity in the shelters. It was not clear if the message advised not to use electricity at all or when using electricity to use it safely. The large majority of houses had found legal or illegal sources of electricity. Formal and informal payment arrangements were made in a generally underground economic arrangement. Every house using electricity had exposed live electric wires and risky wiring. While no deaths from electrocution had been identified, or fires from self-managed electric installations observed, the inevitable desire for a source of power was not considered in the shelter design. Risks in the area of electric structure could have been easily mitigated by providing a basic internal electrical structure with a fitted internal light as part of the shelter solution. Wiring for an external light would also be recommended, especially to reduce the risk of sexual violence.

⁶⁹ Construction teams were trained to use a string line to identify the location of the wooden joist, but this was not always put into practice.

- No design considerations had been taken for cooking and nutrition. Somewhat surprisingly not a single person responsible for shelter design and construction had considered nutrition as an important aspect of shelter design and had considered the importance of a shelter solution with a cooking area in the design. Some families supported with a household grant erected a basic covered cooking area, usually constructed in a flimsy manner using metal roofing sheets and poorly constructed wooden structures, while others simply could not cook if it was raining as they had no covered area for this. Families receiving the original design IFRC transitional shelter solution, which did not have an extended roof or patio, stated they could not cook if it was raining, as they had no protected area within which to cook.
- The T Shelter windows were considered in regard to air-flow within the shelter, but with no consideration in regard to mosquito transmission of Dengue fever and malaria. If the health unit had been involved in the T Shelter design they may have advised on vector control, such as mosquito screens as part of the window design or the provision of mosquito nets and appropriate roof attachments for mosquito nets.
- Nearly all families receiving T Shelters had improvised a material screen to provide some privacy between the shelter sleeping area and a more active area. This is also important for privacy between men and women in a shelter. The shelter 'kit' could easily have included cup-hooks, a line and screen to recognize the importance of providing some privacy within the shelter.
- Planned T Shelter occupancy was for a family not exceeding seven persons⁷⁰ but there are an unknown number of cases where occupancy numbers are probably higher as extended family members living in poor conditions under canvas join the family with a T Shelter.
- Overall occupancy rates were not investigated as it was evident in all T Shelter programmes⁷¹ that occupancy was at, or close to 100%.
- While the T Shelter camps all had individual or shared latrines and access to water from community stand pipes and renters all had the rental accommodation inspected in regard to latrines and water, those receiving individual T Shelters had a latrine solution, often implemented directly by the shelter unit, but not always a solution for water supply. The T Shelter design in some areas, such as Cité Soleil, built cement stands for large water butts, but beneficiaries put these water butts inside their houses for fear of theft, this problem could have been solved by copying the Norwegian Red Cross solution of setting the water butt in concrete. Water supply, such as guttering for rain collection, was not included in the design. Feedback from the Norwegian T Shelter programme in Petit Goave indicated the success of the water collection approach.⁷² The water harvesting option was considered by the Shelter Unit but rejected by the Wat/San unit, though no alternative solutions were proposed.⁷³ There appeared to be a general attitude that Haitians can always find water therefore the focus should be on sanitation, not water. While in general this may be correct, there were certainly sufficient examples of beneficiaries, particularly in the rural PNS programmes, where water had to be taken more seriously and solutions found.

For more technical notes on T Shelters the reader can find the feedback from the Participatory Project Review in Chapter 7.1. The individual PPR reports can be found in the Annex.

⁷⁰ Families of more than seven persons would be provided with an additional T Shelter.

⁷¹ Norwegian Red Cross reported on 99% occupancy in the programme in Petit Goave.

⁷² The beneficiaries in Petit Goave left the water butts outside the houses as the butts had been firmly set in concrete.

⁷³ It was reported that the Wat/San unit indicated that water harvesting was against IFRC policy, though no policy could be found, and that Haitians can always source water through water distribution services.

6.2 Livelihoods Grants and Vocational Training

Livelihoods Grant

The Livelihood Grant is a grant that allows beneficiaries the opportunity to start a livelihood, or overcome financial constraints that limit the opportunity to start a livelihood. The incorporation of the livelihoods grant into the shelter programme was driven more by an intuitive understanding that providing a T Shelter or rent alone would not be enough to get a household out of a situation of considerable vulnerability, and not initially based on any detailed assessment. Through the course of the programme the beneficiaries were interviewed to provide an understanding of how the livelihoods grants were spent. Noting the responses to these interviews one can conclude with a reasonable level of confidence that the provision of a livelihoods grant was a critical part of the shelter programme and gave beneficiary families an opportunity to find some sort of hope for the future, and not just a physical roof over their heads.

The term Livelihoods Grant is perhaps misleading, as in effect the grant is virtually unconditional, though beneficiaries have to report on how they spent the first grant of \$ 250 before they receive the second grant of a further \$ 250. In a recent study of 316 households that had chosen rental options and were about to receive the second tranche of the Livelihoods Grant, 97% of households invested in '*petit commerce*', of which 77% invested up to a value of \$ 75, with only 5% investing more than \$ 175 in *petit commerce*. 75% of the households spent money on 'family needs' with 21% paying towards school fees, 3% paying for medical costs and 2% paying off debts. When asked how income from *petit commerce* was spent only 40% said they reinvested in their business while 38% spent income on family needs and 63% said they put income aside as savings. More rigorous data on this part of the programme may be useful, as there appears to be some confusion between income and profit, which would explain the unusual results, also some replies (4%) reported investments in *petit commerce* greater than the size of the grant. Depending on how one uses the data from this survey, one could reasonably estimate that about 20% of the total first tranche grants were invested in livelihoods, the balance being spent on other basic needs. Once certain basic needs are met from the first tranche one could anticipate more investments in livelihoods from the second tranche of the grant.

It is clear that while the majority of the initial tranche of the livelihoods grant was not invested in livelihoods, it is also worth noting that nearly every family invested some part of the grant in livelihoods.

Based on camp interviews in both La Piste and Annexe de la Marie, there were reports of thefts of cash linked to the payments of livelihoods grants and some recommendations on how this could be avoided.⁷⁴ This issue was also raised as a security and violence issue by the all-women PPR group.

It should be noted that the data provided in regard to the use of grants by beneficiaries comes from direct beneficiary interviews and is not checked in any meaningful way, even if this were possible, therefore one should note that this data cannot be considered as entirely reliable.

⁷⁴*Piloting the Safe Space Assessment*, Juliet Kerr, Violence Prevention Delegate, IFRC; January 2012.

Vocational Training

All shelter beneficiaries have the opportunity to apply for vocational training in masonry, carpentry, electrics, plumbing, cooking and cosmetics. The training is provided by registered trainers at the Haiti Tec institution and the exam certificates are recognized by the government authorities. By December 15th 82 beneficiaries had completed vocational training with a further 124 currently in training. The course lasts for one month at six hours a day. The Haiti Tec is paid \$600 for each student and provides training with the necessary tools and equipment, training materials and lunch for the students.

It is too early to say what correlation there is between certified training and future employment and the first batch of students have just finished their course and not yet been followed up. The Haiti Tec does provide support for students looking for employment. Apprenticeships are possible in Haiti, but this option has not yet been explored.

There is likely potential to link the vocational training with the future INA, as much construction may be linked to INA outcomes where vocational training students could be employed.

It is suggested that students should receive a tool kit on completion of the course, as employers are more likely to take on daily labourers who are equipped, as well as basic safety equipment such as a protective helmet and gloves. While this adds to the cost of the programme, it almost certainly adds significant impact, as training without an employment outcome could be considered as unproductive. This idea is already under discussion at the IFRC.

Learning from the T Shelter construction team experience, it would be useful to add to the technical training one or two days on basic (non-certificated) finance and administration training, so that those completing vocational training have some potential to manage work crews or manage their own businesses. The Haiti Tec provides training in commerce, administration, finance and computing, so it should be difficult to organize this approach.

Student follow up should be a rigorous part of the programme to identify the impact of the training regarding student formal or informal employment; the appropriateness of the tool kits, and maintaining a data-base that could later be relevant to the INA programme. This could be done through the Shelter GIS programme.

Recommendations:

1. Rename the Livelihoods Grant to Support Grant.
2. Consolidate all livelihoods expenses data onto a single report, separating use of first and second tranche.
3. Add admin/finance to the technical vocational training.
4. Provide a tool kit at the completion of vocational training.
5. Track vocational training students to monitor impact.
6. Try to integrate trained students back into the programme or into work.

6.3 Rubble solutions

It is estimated that over 10 million metres c3 of rubble was created by the January 12th 2010 earthquake. Rubble was seen as a constraint to rebuilding, especially in the most congested areas of Port au Prince, and not seen as a potentially valuable asset for house owners when converted into construction materials.

The IFRC has been experimenting with rubble from the earthquake. Unfortunately the project is taking off at a time when approximately half the rubble has already been cleared, but nevertheless the rubble project provides some useful ideas for future programmes.



IFRC paving slabs made from reprocessed rubble

The IFRC is about to begin constructing gabion baskets which are used regularly in Haiti for flood and landslide mitigation projects. There is currently a monopoly on gabion supply, pushing prices well beyond reasonable cost. It is a surprise that gabions were not



Aggregate produced from earthquake rubble

used much earlier in the overall humanitarian response in Haiti, where rubble filled gabions could have been used to protect roads, houses and infrastructure from landslides and flooding, while at the same time finding a 'home' for the millions of tons of rubble.

Rubble has also been converted into building materials by the IFRC. Rubble is cleaned of rebar and other contaminants then crushed in simple rock crushers. The output is graded into different building products such as gravel and aggregate which then form the base of

making breeze-blocks, precast drains and paving slabs. Rubble has also been used to fill gabion cages in risk mitigation projects and used to increase the land height in camps susceptible to flooding, as well as having been used to build five demonstration shelters.

Production levels are currently quite small, working in part of the Woodstock warehouse complex, though the project will expand as the T Shelter construction area at Woodstock is reduced as the programme comes to an end. Until INA assessment results become clearer, it is unclear what level of rubble conversion may be required for the future and whether economies of scale in the production will be economically competitive with the commercial sector, though it is bizarre to note that in the reconstruction programme rubble for dumping is subsidized to the tune of \$10 to \$20⁷⁵ per cubic metre and for every cubic metre dumped a further cubic metre is mined and trucked into Port au Prince for construction, thus greater investments in on-site rubble conversion would certainly have made economic sense during this programme.

There would appear to be opportunities to make closer links between this programme and the vocational training programme at Haiti Tech.

While it is currently too early to provide any level of valuable analysis of the IFRC rubble project in Haiti, it could certainly be seen as a relevant approach for future urban earthquake disasters where the pre-earthquake construction material was concrete or stone.

Recommendations:

1. Keep a detailed record and technical details of the Haiti rubble project to inform future urban shelter disasters where masonry construction is used.
2. Develop a business plan for this part of the shelter programme.

⁷⁵ The subsidy depends on the distance the rubble is transported.

6.4 Water and Sanitation

Water and sanitation solutions were found for the two T Shelter camps as described in section 5.2 on La Piste and Annexe de la Marie.

In the decongestion programme those taking rental solutions had to allow for a site inspection to determine that the rented accommodation has appropriate water and sanitation facilities before a rental agreement could be reached. In the PPR feedback from renters only three out of forty complained about sanitation while one respondent commented that they now had to purchase water.



The largest apparent problem, however, was the failure to assess and resolve water access for the decongestion beneficiaries taking the T Shelter option. While these T Shelters are erected in the Port au Prince region, this does not mean they necessarily have easy access to water. There were assumptions made both by the Water/Sanitation Unit and the Shelter Unit that in the Haitian context people could always find a solution to water. While people do indeed find solutions to water, one needs to consider at what cost, and whether or not

T Shelter with good quality shower and latrine

water access should have been properly assessed and solutions found. In the context of Petit Goave it was already noted that nearly 70% of beneficiaries had to walk twenty minutes or more to collect water and 35% had to walk more than 30 minutes. What came as something of a surprise from the PPR feedback from independent T Shelter plot respondents was that 40% had to walk at least 500 metres to find water, usually a stand pipe in the street, with 70% having to walk 200 metres or more. While the SPHERE Standards state the maximum distance to access water should be no more than 500 metres and that the maximum time to access water should not exceed 30 minutes, one could also note that these maximum standards should not inhibit easier access to water, especially where it can be done so cheaply and simply.

With less than satisfactory communications between the IFRC Shelter Unit and the IFRC Wat/San Unit, by the time the decongestion programme started the Shelter Unit was managing its own Wat/San support to individual T Shelters. Some excellent durable latrines and showers were erected on raised concrete bases, and a concrete base for a water butt was built and butts provided. The problem of access to water, whether with water harvesting or water delivery, was left to the individual household. Judging from the technical discussions held in Petit Goave by the Norwegian Red Cross, it is extremely unlikely that T Shelter beneficiaries would have had any idea, let alone appropriate supplies or tools, to erect their own guttering and down-pipes. The issue of the potential theft of water butts could have been overcome with a little more effort.

Unfortunately water and sanitation are always referred together, thus when latrines are built the IFRC Operations Reports refer to Wat/San solutions. Such statements are not accurate in regard to the individual plot T Shelter beneficiaries, where one should only refer to sanitation solutions.

It is possible this problem could have been identified and resolved if two other recommendations had been implemented: firstly by placing a dedicated Wat/San unit into the Shelter Unit, thus making the Shelter Unit *responsible* for water *and* sanitation solutions and secondly to have initiated a more structured monitoring process from the beginning of the programme. Additionally the question of water would have been a suitable topic for the Shelter Technical Committee where best practice from among the PNS could have been explored, or NGO best practice explored through the Shelter Cluster Technical Working Group.

In line with the discussion on T Shelter quality being determined by the understanding of what a T Shelter was, and the understanding of transition, the latrine solutions for the camps at Annexe de la Marie and La Piste were appropriate for short term solutions, and constructed accordingly. If the T Shelters are not replaced by permanent sheltering solutions shortly, the temporary latrine structures in the camps will probably need to be replaced as they were not designed to last in this environment for more than a couple of years.

Recommendations:

1. Assess the access to water as part of shelter assessments and record the distance from a shelter to a water access point.
2. Monitor water and sanitation needs and use throughout the programme.
3. Integrate water and sanitation human resources into shelter operations in large shelter programmes.
4. Be prepared to replace latrine structures in the two major T Shelter camps.
5. Include water and sanitation issues related to shelter in technical working groups such as the Shelter Technical Committee and the Shelter Cluster Technical Working Group.

7. Participatory Project Review, Beneficiary Communications

7.1 Participatory Project Review

PPR process⁷⁶

A critical part of the review was to engage programme beneficiaries in the review of the programme and gain an understanding of how the shelter programme had directly or indirectly affected people's lives.

Ten staff from the IFRC Shelter Solutions Team were selected for training in how to conduct a Participatory Project Review (PPR) and participated in preparing the supplementary questions and methodology to be used. Five beneficiary types and nine groups were identified for the PPR which took place over a two week period during January and February 2012. At least one group from each type was selected with no group exceeding 20 participants. A total of 179 beneficiaries went through the PPR exercise, representing 1.9% of the total beneficiary population of the shelter programme.⁷⁷ Women represented 53% of participants, with 47% men.

The selected groups were:

1. Shelter solution team local staff (ten male, ten female)
2. Beneficiaries from the La Piste camp (ten male, ten female including 5 handicapped)
3. Beneficiaries from the Annex de la Marie camp (ten male, ten female)
4. A group of rent beneficiaries that had received their first livelihoods grant (10 M, 10 F)
5. A group of rent beneficiaries that had received their second livelihoods grant (7M, 12 F)
6. A group of beneficiaries from the decongestion programmes that opted for a T Shelter (10 M, 10 F)
7. A group from the French Red Cross T Shelter beneficiaries in Croix des Bouquets⁷⁸ (0)
8. A group from the IFRC T Shelter construction teams (20 male)
9. A women's group including renters and T Shelter beneficiaries (20 female)
10. Renters in the Provinces(13 female, 7 male)

The selection of these groups was done to ensure indirect beneficiaries, such as local staff, were included; that a comparison between T Shelter owners who received grants and did not receive grants (Croix des Bouquets) would be possible; that a comparison could be made between those having received their first and second livelihoods grant; that a comparison could be made between renters in Port au Prince and renters in the provinces, and that women's issues could be better understood.

Due to the limited timeframe of the review the renters in the provinces were contacted by phone. The beneficiary selection was done by the manager best aware of the group make-up under the direction to seek gender balance and select as diversified a group as possible. The PPR meetings were directly managed by the trained teams from the Shelter Solutions Team and took place at the Red Cross base camp in Port au Prince.

⁷⁶ It was originally planned to include an IVR beneficiary survey in the review, but the IVR technology was not in place at the time the review was conducted.

⁷⁷ For the purpose of this exercise local staff are considered as beneficiaries.

⁷⁸ It was not possible to run the PPR with the group from Croix des Bouquets due to a conflict of schedules, but the Interim Survey of Phase One Shelters undertaken by the Norwegian Red Cross provided a number of the answers sought in the planned Croix des Bouquets PPR.

Questions were asked using a variety of methodologies to help understand the overall satisfaction level of the shelter solutions provided by the IFRC; to understand the problems faced by beneficiaries in both T Shelter and rented accommodation; to understand the level of individual adaptation to houses and how the \$ 150 Household Grant had contributed to this and to better understand other issues such as cooking facilities, access to electricity and distance to water sources. An important but challenging part of the review was also to help the IFRC better understand the intentions of beneficiaries when their T Shelter land agreement expired or their rental support ended. The local staff was asked how the IFRC could improve its programmes. The Shelter Solutions team provided individual support for the illiterate and blind participants.

The core of the classic PPR design is built around *significant changes* after an intervention and *future plans*. In this Haiti PPR the question of significant change was not included, but instead more pointed questions were asked. In retrospect this was a good decision as the very open-ended questions led to very open-ended and not entirely useful answers.

The PPR questions can be found in annex 10.8, the PPR timetable can be found in annex 10.7 and then individual reports can be found in annex 10.6.⁷⁹ The reports are written in French.



While the PPR process itself can give the participants some feeling of empowerment and ownership it is a loose science at the best, and results have to be treated cautiously. It can however provide some general understanding on the future, while also exposing some explicit issues in regard to specific questions on, for example, cooking areas, electricity supply and housing problems.

Summary of PPR findings

1. Satisfaction level of accommodation

All T Shelter beneficiaries, including those in the La Piste and Annexe de la Marie camps and those that had taken rental support were asked to rank their level of satisfaction with the shelter from 1 to 5 between 'highly satisfied' to 'highly un-satisfied'.

All figures in total number of respondents

	Annex de la Marie	La Piste	Renters	Individual plots TS	Provinces renters	Total	%
Highly satisfied	6	9	11	7	4	37	31
Satisfied	12	3	16	4	14	49	41
Neither one or other	0	8	4	7	2	21	18
Dissatisfied	1	0	5	1	0	7	6
Highly dissatisfied	1	0	3	1	0	5	4
Total	20	20	39	20	20	119	100

⁷⁹ Only the first three original reports are available. Later reports were compromised by a virus. Originals are available from the Technical Movement Cooperation office, Red Cross Base Camp, Port au Prince.

In Port au Prince T Shelter residents and renters were generally satisfied with their accommodation with only 5% highly dissatisfied; there was little difference in attitudes between T Shelter residents and renters, though renters in Port au Prince were less satisfied than those in the provinces, where 90% were either satisfied or very satisfied with their accommodation.

These figures are quite encouraging, especially considering the lack of assessment and the quality problems of T Shelters, particularly in La Piste.

The total figure of 72% of all beneficiaries from the PPR process⁸⁰ being either satisfied or very satisfied compared to 10% being dissatisfied or very dissatisfied is good with 76% of renters being either satisfied or very satisfied compared to 68% for T Shelter beneficiaries. 66% of all dissatisfied or very dissatisfied came from just one beneficiary type, namely renters in Port au Prince. There was no specific evidence that any one problem area was the cause of this dissatisfaction.

2. Problems with accommodation

All T Shelter beneficiaries and renters were asked to list the main areas of concern and problems they had with their accommodation.

Renters had far fewer problems with their accommodation than T Shelter occupiers, with 56 % of renters saying they had no problems with their rented accommodation. The few problems that were mentioned were: having to purchase water (10%), sanitation problems (7.5%) and roof problems (5%). The key problems of the camp respondents were the same, namely problems with leaks (from the roofs, windows or eaves) when it rained (32%) and not having safe doors (either door or lock quality) (26%). This comment on doors is important in regard to how it relates to the violence survey and the overriding opinion that the safest place to be was in one's house. Animal and insect pests were cited as a problem for 7.6% and the quality of the plywood floors a problem for 11%. Six of the seven reports on plywood floors came from La Piste, the other from Annexe de la Marie where 38% of residents interviewed had replaced the wooden floor with a concrete base.

Similar to renters in Port au Prince, provincial renters had fewer problems than those living in T Shelters, with 60% stating they had no problem. The only problem was the distance to access drinking water.

A more structured monitoring and complaints process could have captured some of the problem areas much earlier and been fed back to the Shelter Unit to subsequently look at re-training (e.g. the way the roofing sheets were attached) or design (e.g. metal doors for La Piste).

3. Durability of T Shelters

T Shelter beneficiaries from La Piste and Annexe de la Marie⁸¹ were asked to estimate the durability of their shelters in regards to the number of years they thought the shelter would remain habitable if no maintenance work was carried out and additionally if beneficiaries carried out their own repairs.

There were surprising differences of opinion on this question between the two T Shelter camps with residents from La Piste anticipating a T Shelter lifespan of 2.3 years (without

⁸⁰ Not including local staff.

⁸¹ Individual plot T Shelter beneficiaries were not asked this question, as after the two year lease programme the T Shelter becomes the property of the landowner.

structural repairs) and a period of 4 years from those in Annexe de la Marie. If structural repairs were included, the responses were respectively 5 years and 8 ½ years. It is worth noting the response from the Norwegian Red Cross survey that 82% of T Shelter beneficiaries expected to stay in their houses for at least 5 years.

4. Installation of electricity

All T Shelter beneficiaries were asked if they had installed electricity in their shelter. It was not always easy to get honest answers to this question as most electricity supply was illegal and was not part of the IFRC programme, therefore respondents were generally reluctant to answer honestly. For example one group initially indicated only two out of twenty had an electricity supply, but finally agreed nine out of twenty had a supply. The real figure was probably higher.

Respondents from the two camps said that 45% had installed electricity, and three renters indicated they had also installed electricity.⁸² It is assumed from observations that electricity was used inside the house mostly for lighting, while very few houses had installed external lighting. This high level of electrical installation shows that T Shelter occupiers saw this as a priority though the purpose for installing electricity (such as for security) was not pursued in the PPR meetings. Only 20% of the renters in the provinces had installed electricity. The reasons for this were unclear, but it is possible a source of electricity was harder to find in the provinces than in Port au Prince.

In a context such as Haiti, power and lighting should have been considered as part of a shelter solution, and in particular it should have been included to improve family security and reduce sexual and physical violence, as well as reduce the incidence of house break-ins.

5. Cooking

As the T Shelter design had not taken cooking into account, participants from La Piste and one group of renters were asked to explain where they cooked when it rained.

Residents from La Piste said no covered cooking area had been built and nine out of twenty families cooked *inside* their accommodation when it rained, while only three of the renters did not have a covered cooking area. Cooking was never considered as part of a shelter solution and to some degree only came about by chance with the proposal of a roof extension, under which families could cook in a covered but safe area.

6. Access to water

T Shelter beneficiaries on individual plots were asked about their access to water to help identify if water solutions should have been included in the original shelter design.

Four respondents were within 50 meters of water⁸³, one within 100 meters, two within 200 meters, four within 250 meters, and 8 within 500 meters.⁸⁴ It is clear from this analysis that much more should have been done to assess and understand water access for individual plot T Shelter beneficiaries.

One elderly woman from the women's PPR Group reported that she had to walk at least 700 metres to get water.

Unlike the renters in Port au Prince, there were no house inspections in the provinces in regards to the provision of water and latrines. 40% had to walk 500 metres or more to access water, with only 15% having water available within 50 metres. Access to water was

⁸² Renters were not directly asked if they had installed electricity. This response came from those answering what house improvements they had made.

⁸³ Respondents were not asked what source of water they accessed.

⁸⁴ Obviously these figures are not cumulative.

the only problem referred to by the renters⁸⁵ representing 40% of all provincial renters and 100% of all problems.

7. Shelter improvements

Participants were asked what improvements they had made to their accommodation to garner some idea about the sense of pride and ownership of the accommodation. Some groups had received a Household Grant to help them make improvements.

42% of renters in Port au Prince had not made any changes to their accommodation, compared to only 20% of the renters in the provinces and 17% of T Shelter residents. It is interesting to compare this figure with the T Shelter owners in the Norwegian Red Cross Petit Goave programme who did not receive a Household Grant or a Livelihoods Grant where 83% had made no changes to the shelter, although 36% of beneficiaries had plans to do so.⁸⁶

The main alterations made by renters were to paint their accommodation (25%), make repairs (12.5%), change the door (5%), and set up a separation/divider⁸⁷ within the accommodation (5%), while for T Shelter residents the key changes were to put up a separation/divider (45%), replace the plywood floor with a cement base (32.5%), enclose or protect the front porch (25%) or create a garden (25%). A larger percentage of the renters in the provinces had invested in house improvements, perhaps indicating a more stable rental plan for the future, with 65% investing in repairs and painting and 15% accessing an electricity supply.

8. Use of the Household and Livelihoods Grants

No research had previously been conducted to understand the impact of the Household Grant, while research and data was available for the Livelihoods Grant. However, it was not always easy to clearly separate the use of the Household Grant and the use of the Livelihoods Grant for those participants that had received both grants, so for this exercise the two grants are reported on together.⁸⁸ One group (renters # 2) reported back on the use of the first and second tranches of the Livelihoods Grant separately. It was not clear if the replies indicated one family used funds for petit commerce from each tranche or whether the figure represented two different families.⁸⁹ The amount invested in any particular area was not requested, thus the figures only indicate that a topic such as school fees was invested in, but not by how much. There is some inconsistency in responses on the use of the Household Grant and the house improvements, as respondents indicate the main use of Household Grants as investments in petit commerce and school fees, yet a large percentage from all groups had made improvements to their accommodation. For the use of the Household Grant it is therefore advised to look more closely at the responses to the house improvements question rather than the direct response to the use of the Household Grants, which appears to be more closely related to the use of the Livelihoods Grant.

Very consistent with the study of 316 families taking a Livelihoods Grant (chapter 6.2) 82.5% of respondents from camps and renters used funds for petit commerce, while 67.5% used the funds to pay for school fees. 27.5% of respondents used the grant for basic needs, such as food with 17.5% purchasing furniture for the accommodation. Six families (15%) paid for medical fees and five families (12.5%) paid back debts. Other responses (one family out of

⁸⁵ Other than one problem of inheritance.

⁸⁶ It has not been possible to crosscheck the questions asked, thus this comparison should be taken cautiously.

⁸⁷ A separation or divider is any form of hanging or structure that gives privacy between two parts of the accommodation.

⁸⁸ There were no major differences in replies to the use of either grant.

⁸⁹ As a best attempt to protect statistical integrity, it has been assumed one family used the grant for any activity twice, rather than the figure representing a new family.

forty) included putting money aside for savings; paying funeral costs; paying towards a new rental contract and doing nothing.

85% of renters in the provinces had used the grants for commerce, 25% used the grants for school fees and 10% for house repairs, but when asked if they had made changes to their houses, 65% had made repairs or painted their accommodation, 15% had installed electricity with only 20% not making any improvements.

9. Local staff ideas for programme improvement

Local programme staff can often be key informants as they understand the programme, the cultural context and the beneficiaries. Groups from the Shelter Solutions teams and the T Shelter construction teams were asked how they would improve the programme in general, in regards to efficiency and in regards to quality.

The key recommendations in regard to the shelter strategy from the Shelter Solutions team were (in order of importance)

- Encourage the government to identify land and construct permanent housing.
- Assist beneficiaries with school fees.
- Improve collaboration with community representatives.
- Construct latrines at the same time as the T Shelter.
- Make co-operatives.
- Provide psycho-social support.

Other ideas included conducting re-registration; providing training to beneficiaries; giving a single \$ 500 grant instead of in two tranches; building a marketplace; not a giving a second livelihoods tranche for those not investing any of the first tranche in some form of commerce.

The key recommendations on programme improvements were:

- Ensure you recruit qualified personnel.
- Work closer with the local authorities to ensure that those receiving rental support actually leave the camp.
- Work with the most vulnerable.

Other ideas included monthly staff meetings; training recipients of livelihoods grants; removing the requirement for a third meeting with rental beneficiaries; clearer separation of staff duties; ensuring only the head of household is the recipient of cash; fight fraud; record mistakes made in the programme and monitor the programme.

When asked what they would have done if in charge of the shelter programme, eleven out of nineteen from the construction team said they would have built semi-permanent housing instead of transitional shelters. What was meant by semi-permanent shelter was not discussed, but this was an interesting observation.

The construction team felt the life of a T Shelter was 3.8 years without maintenance.

10. My future

To help the IFRC plan exit strategies or programmes for the future it was considered important to gain some insight about beneficiaries' own plans for the future, especially as rental support was for only one year and T Shelter agreements with individual land owners or camp owners were for only two or three years. Participants were asked what they planned to do when their current lease or rental agreement expired. PPR groups wrote individual replies then grouped the replies into common statements. Each individual was then given a number of 'votes' that could be assigned to any of the common statements, and could either spread out their votes or use all their votes on a single topic.

As some renters had already finished their rental contract they were asked separately what they had actually done since the end of the rent. These figures are shown separately. To help with the analysis these response have been separated by group type, with some collective analysis, as there were significantly different attitudes by group type.⁹⁰

Of nineteen renter families that already passed their one year rent support period⁹¹ ten families (53%) said they moved into a friend's accommodation; four families (21%) had moved to another house (where it was presumed they were paying rent), four families (21%) had negotiated a rental extension,⁹² while one family simply stated they had no money to pay rent and did not explain what they had done.

Many of the 'future plans' summarized statements were rather esoteric while others were more practical:

The T Shelter residents in camps need to be broken down by camp as the answers were very different.

The group from La Piste had a total of 181 votes recorded against six future outcomes. In order of voting their responses were as follows:

1. Trust in God (49%)
2. Keep my T Shelter (28%)⁹³
3. Negotiate a new contract (13%)
4. Look for work⁹⁴ (4%)
5. Be moved to permanent shelter (4%)
6. Rely on the Red Cross (1%)

The group from Annexe de la Marie had a total of 137 votes for five answers:

1. Negotiate a new contract (48%)
2. Look to the Red Cross for support (25%)
3. Expect the government to take its responsibilities (12%)
4. My situation is hopeless for the future (10%)
5. Keep my T Shelter (5%)

Individual plot T Shelter respondents gave four answers:

1. Trust in God (45)
2. Rely on the Red Cross (28%)
3. Move to friends (17%)
4. Find new land (7%)

The two groups of renters came up with 12 responses which could subsequently be grouped into 8 responses as four were close enough to be similar.

1. Look for work or be assisted in finding work (36%)
2. Rely on the Red Cross(26%)
3. Depend on God (22%)

⁹⁰ A problem with the PPR voting system can be the influence played by early voters and subsequent voters following the opinion of the first voters, or voting for something it would be seen as hard to vote against, for example 'support from God' or 'thank you Red Cross',

⁹¹ One needs to note that each family was provided with \$ 500 for one year of rent, regardless of the actual amount of rent paid which was generally thought to be less than \$ 500.

⁹² It was not clear if this was a paid rental extension or an agreement to delay the rent for a period of time.

⁹³ It was not clear if this meant physically taking the T Shelter to a new location or if it was in effect the same response as (3): negotiate a new contract.

⁹⁴ Look for work or the Red Cross will help me find work.

4. Negotiate a new contract (7%)
5. Rely on petit commerce (4%)
6. My situation is hopeless (2%)
7. Live with a friend (1%)
8. Seek a permanent house (1%)

The renters in the provinces had more sustainable plans for the future:

1. Increase my business and live off the profits (50%)
2. Trust in the Red Cross (20%)
3. Trust in God (15%)
4. Looking for work (10%)
5. Already put money aside for the next rent (5%)

These results should be of concern, with so little apparent action to resolve life problems and find solutions. The fatalism of the respondents makes sustainability difficult in any case, but the reliance, particularly from renters, on the Red Cross is of real concern. As the IFRC plans to withdraw from the camps, and currently has no plans for further support to the renters there may be the risk of a negative image of the IFRC and the HRC in the future.

Recommendations:

1. The Shelter Unit management should review all recommendations from the local staff PPR exercise and discuss, resolve and adapt accordingly.
2. As part of the *responsible exit strategy* for La Piste and Annex de la Marie, negotiate to extend the land lease on both sites and clarify the rights or future dues, such as rent, of the current residents in T Shelters.
3. Prepare a communication strategy for the two camps explaining plans for the future, including the lease of the land, and new rental agreements, and the transfer of the provision of services.
4. Conduct a more in-depth survey of households that have gone past their one year rental support to determine what impact the one year of support had, and what adaptations could be made to make the rental support programme more sustainable.
5. As part of a monitoring process, have a complaints system whereby beneficiaries can feed back to the programme on issues that can alert the IFRC to potential problem areas.
6. Continually review construction quality and provide re-training of staff as required.
7. Cooking behaviour and space need to be included in shelter assessments and shelter design.
8. Power and electricity should have been considered as basic household needs when designing sheltering solutions. This does not require becoming involved in the supply of electricity, but requires putting into a shelter a basic electrical network for interior and exterior lighting.
9. Access to water needs to be included in shelter assessments and shelter solutions.

7.2 Beneficiary Communications

The shelter programme was highly dependent upon effective beneficiary communications. Providing high value entitlements such as a T Shelter or rental support in an impoverished population can easily lead to enmity and requires delicate handling in regard to communicating clear and understandable information with the affected population regarding the role and purpose of the IFRC/HRCS programme, the values of the Movement, the criteria by which beneficiaries will be selected and the alternative options, in the case of the decongestion programme that will be available to those not selected for a camp based T Shelter.

Additionally it was important to communicate to shelter beneficiaries about protecting and cleaning the T Shelter, avoiding risky practices such as cooking in the shelter and the installation of electricity in the shelter and knowing how to seek advice or complain about the programme.

The beneficiary communications unit used a variety of media to get key messages across: posters were put up in camps; leaflets were distributed; sound trucks with recordings went around selected camps; messages were sent by SMS; there were radio call-in programmes and a call-centre to receive calls or complaints. There was perhaps a lost opportunity not to use the feedback from beneficiaries to implement a more structured complaints procedure, whereby complaints can be stated, recorded and responded to.

The leaflets were designed to explain how the T Shelter programme worked, with the associated household grant, livelihoods grant and access to vocational training. The leaflets for the decongestions programme explained the shelter options available, including the rental programme and another leaflet showed how families could look after their shelters.

There can be little doubt that the beneficiary communications support to the shelter programme added real value and reduced tensions in what could, potentially have been a controversial programme promoting jealousy and unrest.

Recommendations:

1. Learn from best practice of the Haiti programme:
 - ✓ Communicate to communities where programming will take place explaining the programme, beneficiary selection process and alternative shelter options.
 - ✓ Provide technical advice on shelter maintenance.
 - ✓ Let beneficiaries communicate back to the programme
2. Introduce a more structured complaints procedure for programme beneficiaries.

8 Recommendations

The recommendations below provide an accumulated report from the recommendations cited in separate chapters of the review. There are also a number of observations within some chapters that are not repeated as recommendations. Recommendations can be taken as either a recommendation in regard to the future of the current programme or as a recommendation that could be used for future shelter operations in a similar urban and cultural environment. In a number of cases the recommendations capture 'best practice' that could be replicated in future shelter programmes.

Extracted from the executive summary:

The recommendations apply to the continuation of the programme in Haiti as well as to future international shelter interventions. In regard to **the current programme** the key recommendations are to review the future of the camp populations in La Piste and Annexe de la Marie and consider permanent shelter solutions for these beneficiaries and to review the impact of the rental programme and make adjustments as required. The vocational training programme needs to be more closely aligned to employment outcomes. The INA programme could learn from the review in regard to the importance of taking an integrated multi-sectoral approach to assessment and programme implementation.

In regard to **future shelter programming** it is recommended to be clearer regarding the overall strategy for shelter, especially if not working in permanent shelter and have a clear record of decision making in this regard, while leaving space for adaptation and flexibility throughout the programme that should be informed through a continuous monitoring process. Emergency shelter is part of a shelter strategy and needs to be included in the conceptual framework of the initial emergency response. The concept of sheltering needs to be understood in its broadest context and assessment and programming needs to take into account aspects such as cooking and nutrition, power and lighting, health and protection and water and sanitation. The organizational structure needs to support this more integrated approach to shelter. While shelter targets are usually based on budget allocations, there needs to be a clearer strategic understanding of beneficiary needs and operational capacity based on field assessments. Time should be spent on reviewing how support services such as human resources, finance and procurement can be better aligned to support large-scale shelter operations.

Future shelter programmes can benefit from some of the **best practices** identified in the Haiti early recovery shelter programme, including the provision of household and livelihoods grants which allowed shelter beneficiaries to make personal adaptations and improvements to their shelter. The creative partnerships between the IFRC and PNS partners in the Haiti operation maximized the capacity of the International Federation to provide shelter solutions to beneficiaries and provided useful models for future consideration. The Haiti shelter rental programme provided an interesting approach to shelter solutions and should be fully documented for future learning as should the approach to post-earthquake rubble and the conversion of rubble into building materials. The approaches to beneficiary communications in the Haiti shelter programme provided a number of unique experiences that significantly contributed to the success of the shelter programme: these approaches to beneficiary communications need to be well documented for future learning.

Specific recommendations

Document management:

1. Document *and explain* the decision making process throughout the course of a programme in either internal or external documents. A separate management file should be held for this. An e mail trail is not sufficient.
2. Use the planning and reporting tools to clearly explain when plans or targets are changed. If specific plans are dropped these should be reported on and explained.
3. Use the words *plans* and *commitments* carefully to ensure the reader is clear on the status of the document.
4. Changes in direction, projects or budgets should be reflected through the standard IFRC Appeals and Reports procedures.
5. Date documents and clearly indicate their status.

Integrated Planning

1. When assessing sheltering needs, include water, sanitation, health, nutrition and protection, using NGO or PNS partnerships in areas where the IFRC may lack experience.
2. Design sheltering solutions, including the design of a shelter, taking into account water, sanitation, health, protection and nutrition.
3. Conduct beneficiary interviews as part of a structured monitoring process early in the programme to see if the chosen solutions are appropriate.
4. Emergency shelter and relief need to be integrated.

Organisational Structure

1. Ensure the construction staff is insured against accident and injury including medical treatment and loss of earnings.
2. Review authorization levels of finance and procurement for large budget operations.
3. Ensure high quality information management systems with large shelter programmes.
4. Integrate key functions such as Wat/San into shelter, or ensure a cross-departmental management approach to ensure shelter decisions are advised by, e.g., health, Wat/San, relief, protection, beneficiary communications.
5. In large programmes separate shelter field programme management from Movement coordination, as was done in this operation.

Innovation: Shelter design:

1. Learn from best practice in the Haiti operation:
 - ✓ Provide a household grant along with the shelter
 - ✓ Encourage beneficiaries to make alterations to shelters
 - ✓ Offer a choice of paint colour to shelter beneficiaries
 - ✓ Select anti-fungal paint
 - ✓ Include sanitation as part of sheltering
 - ✓ Include water solutions to shelters (rain catchment and water tanks)
 - ✓ Revisit the shelter design and continually improve during the course of the programme
 - ✓ Recruit labour from within the construction area, especially in insecure areas
2. Include internal and external lighting as part of the shelter construction. This does not necessarily require getting involved in the supply of electricity.
3. Ensure households have an appropriate and protected area in which to cook.
4. Ensure households have access to clean water.
5. Improve programme monitoring.

PNS Partnerships and services

1. Carry out a gap analysis regarding outstanding shelter needs in the PNS partnership T Shelter locations and share findings.
2. Discuss the issue between the PNS and IFRC to seek consensus on an appropriate strategy to manage the gap between needs and construction targets.
3. Seek flexible partnership solutions with PNS partners.

T Shelter project:

1. Include Wat/San staff in large shelter programmes
2. Always include wat/san solutions with shelter structures, this includes water, not just a latrine.
3. Carry out a gap analysis regarding outstanding shelter needs in the PNS partnership T Shelter locations and share findings.
4. Discuss the issue between the PNS and IFRC to seek consensus on an appropriate strategy.
5. Include information data base software as a standard component of large scale shelter programmes.⁹⁵

Camp design:

1. Conduct mitigation works prior to shelter construction.
2. Install adequate lighting as an essential part of camp infrastructure. Lighting should cover all areas between housing, water supply and sanitation.
3. Follow up the five families from Annex de la Marie that received a \$ 500 grant for green house improvements and use that knowledge to advise the INA.
4. Refer to the recommendations in the document *Piloting the Safe Spaces Assessment*.
5. Take learning points from the *Piloting the Safe Spaces Assessment* into shelter solutions for the INA programme.

Future of La Piste and Annexe de la Marie

1. Refer to the recommendations in the document *Piloting the Safe Spaces Assessment*.
2. Take learning points from the assessment report into shelter solutions for the INA programme.
3. Consider permanent housing options for La Piste and possibly for Annexe de la Marie.
4. Start negotiations with the authorities to find durable solutions.

Sustainability:

1. Clarify with the authorities and land owners their plans for Annex de la Marie and La Piste after the current lease agreements come to an end, and advocate for IFRC/HRC intentions as required, in line with the July 2011 – December 2012 Plan of Action.
2. Clarify the timeframe for the 'responsible exit from camps' as referred to in the July 2011 – December 2012 Plan of Action and establish a clear beneficiary communications plan.
3. Use the PPR results to inform the 'responsible exit' strategy.
4. Use the *Piloting the Safe Spaces Assessment* recommendations when considering the exit timetable for La Piste and Annexe de la Marie.
5. Review the rental programme in the search of sustainable solutions.
6. Consider providing beneficiaries with repair kits and extra paint to extend the life of the T Shelters.

⁹⁵ While essential for a large shelter programme, an information data base should be used for all beneficiary programmes.

Livelihoods and vocational training

1. Follow up the PPR results to better understand the impact of livelihoods grants on family resilience for the future
2. Add admin/finance to the technical training
3. Provide a tool kit at the completion of training
4. Track students to monitor impact
5. Try to integrate trained students back into the programme or into work

Decongestion

1. Families opting for T Shelters from the decongestion programme should receive the type II T Shelter with two metal doors and a roof extension.
2. The families referred to above should have their access to water assessed.

Rubble

1. Keep a detailed record of the Haiti rubble project to inform future urban shelter disasters where masonry construction is used.
2. Develop a business plan for this part of the shelter programme.

Water and Sanitation

1. Assess the access to water as part of shelter assessments and record the distance from a shelter to a water access point.
2. Monitor water and sanitation needs and use throughout the programme.
3. Integrate water and sanitation human resources into shelter operations in large shelter programmes.
4. Be prepared to replace latrine structures in the two major T Shelter camps.
5. Include water and sanitation issues related to shelter in technical working groups such as the Shelter Technical Committee and the Shelter Cluster Technical Working Group.

Beneficiary communications

1. Learn from best practice of the Haiti programme:
 - ✓ Communicate to communities where programming will take place explaining the programme, beneficiary selection and options.
 - ✓ Provide technical advice on shelter maintenance.
 - ✓ Let beneficiaries communicate back to the programme
2. Introduce a more structured complaints procedure for programme beneficiaries.

Participatory Project Review

1. The Shelter Unit management should review all recommendations from the local staff PPR exercise and discuss, resolve and adapt accordingly.
2. As part of the *responsible exit strategy* for La Piste and Annex de la Marie, negotiate to extend the land lease on both sites and clarify the rights or future dues, such as rent, of the current residents in T Shelters.
3. Prepare a communication strategy for the two camps explaining plans for the future, including the lease of the land, and new rental agreements, and the transfer of the provision of services.
4. Conduct a more in-depth survey of households that have gone past their one year rental support to determine what impact the one year of support had, and what adaptations could be made to make the rental support programme more sustainable.

5. As part of a monitoring process, have a complaints system whereby beneficiaries can feed back to the programme on issues that can alert the IFRC to potential problem areas.
6. Continually review construction quality and provide re-training of staff as required.
7. Cooking behaviour and space need to be included in shelter assessments and shelter design.
8. Power and electricity should have been considered as basic household needs when designing sheltering solutions. This does not require becoming involved in the supply of electricity, but requires putting into a shelter a basic electrical network for interior and exterior lighting.
9. Access to water needs to be included in shelter assessments and shelter solutions.

9 Conclusions

The over-riding conclusion of this review is that the IFRC took courageous, effective and technically efficient solutions to the challenge of providing a realistic response in the shelter sector, while being driven by statistical, logistical and structural requirements that did not adequately respond to more complex and thoughtful approaches to beneficiary needs.

The reasons for an IFRC production driven response, as opposed to a beneficiary driven response are, however, entirely understandable. There was enormous pressure placed on the IFRC to get shelter results; the IFRC was expected to find technical solutions as well as complicated logistical and procurement solutions. No-one at the early stage of the programme was thinking of the more subtle issues of shelter and health, protection and nutrition: the programme was mostly concerned with delivering shelters in numbers and was less focused on sheltering in its more complex dimensions.

The development of the *alternative shelter solutions* approach provided innovative solutions to shelter that broadened the effective, but limited T Shelter programme. This demonstrated a flexible and innovative attitude that was apparent throughout the shelter programme and was a critical factor in the programme success. The ability of the IFRC to adapt the programme over time also showed an ability to listen to the beneficiary community and make programme adjustments, such as the continuous redesign of the T Shelters.

Flexible shelter partnerships were also creative and beneficial to all parties demonstrating some best practice as to how the IFRC can manage the relationship between being a programme implementer as well as a service provider to its membership.

While there are a number of recommendations for future improvements, it is important to highlight some of the **key success areas** that are probably relevant to all shelter programmes:

- Include beneficiary communications as a core component to shelter programming.
- Include a household grant to allow shelter beneficiaries to make changes to the structure and personalize it, turning a shelter structure into a family home.
- Include a livelihoods grant that takes the shelter beneficiary into a better future.
- Allow for personal adaptation of the shelter solution, such as providing a choice of paint.
- Create a flexible programme environment that promotes creativity and innovation.
- Be creative with PNS partnerships to maximize IFRC impact.
- Be brave, task risks and be ready to adapt to new challenges.
- Encourage the right type of delegate that supports and promotes the success areas.

While many lessons were learnt during the course of the programme, there are a number of fundamental issues that need to be considered for the future of the programme, or that could be educational for future shelter programmes in a similar environment.

Some of the **key opportunities** are:

- Consider shelter design and shelter programming in the context of broader beneficiary needs, such as nutrition, water, health and protection.
- Look for horizontal approaches to shelter assessment, monitoring and evaluation.
- Have a planned monitoring process at both the strategic and project level.

In the *immediate future* the IFRC needs to look at the La Piste and Annex de la Marie land lease agreements and negotiate for extensions of the agreements, even if this may require T Shelter residents to start paying some form of rent. The site at La Piste should be considered for permanent housing solutions. A careful beneficiary communications plan will be required, allowing the residents to negotiate on their own behalf and to express their plans for the future. Careful communications will also be required in regard to the removal of IFRC services in the camps in order to avoid the potential of reputational damage for the IFRC and Haitian Red Cross Society.

More research is required to see how the beneficiaries of the rent support programme manage when the rent support expires, as early indications from a very small sample raise questions about the impact and sustainability of the programme.

To conclude, despite enormous constraints the IFRC can take considerable pride in an effective shelter programme that provided suitable shelter solutions for over 8,400 vulnerable families, but could also learn from some of the issues identified in the Haiti shelter programme for both the current INA programme and for future urban shelter programmes.

Peter Rees-Gildea
March 2012

10 Annex

10.1 Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference (TOR)	
Enhancing IFRC sheltering solutions: review of the Haiti programme	
1.	<p>Summary</p> <p>The IFRC Shelter team in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, is planning a review of the programme from its inception in May 2010 to end October 2011. To support this plan, the IFRC’s Earthquake Recovery Operation in Haiti is seeking the expertise of experienced programme reviewers, specialised in shelter and watsan programming and participatory project review (PPR) methodology to lead this internal review.</p> <p>The aim of the review is to assess the methodology adopted by the IFRC Shelter programme, the quality of the construction works implemented, and gauge the progress to date of beneficiaries involved in the shelter programme. The review will assess all facets of the Shelter programme including the t-shelter project, the self-sheltering solutions project, and the supporting inputs of re-settlement grants, livelihoods interventions, rubble reprocessing, social infrastructure and mitigation works.</p> <p>It is intended that the review will provide the IFRC’s Earthquake Recovery Operation in Haiti with insight into the effectiveness and appropriateness of the programme approaches, the quality of technical deliverables, eg construction of shelters and water and sanitation facilities, as well as the community engagement strategy. The review team will also report upon shelter occupancy rates, the degree of satisfaction beneficiaries express about their shelter solution and their interaction with IFRC (and partners), and advice on improvements or adaptations to strengthen the programme.</p> <p>IFRC in Haiti expects to receive a report that informs the reader of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the IFRC’s Shelter programme in Haiti, identifying programme strengths, areas in which improvements can be made and direction on what changes can be made and how they should be implemented to enhance programme quality. The report should also provide information and recommendations related to lessons to be learned that will inform planning for the shelter programme in Haiti to end 2012.</p>
1.1	<p>Purpose</p> <p>The purpose of the review is to assess the extent to which the IFRC Shelter programme in Haiti is meeting the recovery needs of participating beneficiaries.</p> <p>The appropriateness of the methodology adopted by the IFRC Shelter team in Haiti will be assessed along with the quality and effectiveness of the shelter solutions delivered – both technically and according to beneficiary experiences, and the review report will provide guidance and recommendations to enhance programme effectiveness.</p>
1.2	<p>Audience</p>

	<p>The primary audience for the review report is the IFRC Earthquake Recovery Operation in Haiti, specifically the Shelter team. It is expected that the review team will report on the effectiveness and appropriateness of the methodology/ies adopted in the Shelter programme in Haiti, technical assessment of shelter outputs, and the extent of beneficiary satisfaction. The IFRC Shelter department in Geneva and in Panama will be included in the review and is a key recipient of the report. The review is also expected to be of interest to planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting (PMER) offices in Panama and Geneva.</p> <p>The review report will be presented to Haitian Red Cross, and to partners to the IFRC Shelter programme, i.e. French Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross and Canadian Red Cross.</p> <p>Results and conclusions drawn from the review will be communicated to participating beneficiaries and communities via a context appropriate communications strategy.</p> <p>The review report will be made available to the wider Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement via reporting of findings to the Shelter Technical Committee, the Movement Operations Committee (MOC) in Haiti, and as appropriate to other international IFRC shelter programmes.</p>
<p>1.3</p> <p>1.4</p> <p>1.5</p> <p>1.6</p> <p>1.7</p>	<p>Commissioners</p> <p>The IFRC Shelter programme in Haiti is the commissioner and funder of this review.</p> <p>Reports</p> <p>The review team will report to James Bellamy, the IFRC’s Shelter Coordinator in Haiti and manager to this review.</p> <p>Duration</p> <p>The review is for 20 workings days, of which at least 17 will be spent in Haiti. The review report can be concluded remotely.</p> <p>Timeframe</p> <p>The preferred commencement date for the review is 31 October 2011.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Haiti: desk review, tool development, and data gathering x 17 days • Preliminary findings presented to the IFRC Earthquake Recovery Operation on 17 November 2011 • Report finalisation: x 3 days • Final report due to IFRC: 30 November 2011 <p>Location</p> <p>The review team will be required to spend up to 17 working days in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Visits to shelter solution sites and localities will be undertaken in Port-au-Prince and to regional locations, and will be conducted in accordance with security conditions and guidance provided by the IFRC security coordinator in Port-au-Prince.</p>
<p>2.</p>	<p>Background</p> <p>On 12 January 2010 an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter Scale struck Haiti. The earthquake’s</p>

epicentre was some 15 km south-west of the country's capital Port-au-Prince close to the city of Léogane. According to statistics from the Government of Haiti, over 200,000 people died, 300,000 people reported injuries, and 1.5 million people were displaced by the earthquake and the subsequent aftershocks that occurred during the weeks that followed.

The earthquake caused significant damage to housing and public infrastructure, with the resulting need for shelter solutions and longer-term reconstruction. In summary:

- Shelter affected population estimated at 1.5 million
- Total number of buildings and houses to be rebuilt in the disaster affected areas estimated at 250,000

Under the 2010 IFRC plan of action, a target was set for the IFRC secretariat to provide shelter solutions for 7,500 households within 24 months. This target comprised two major outputs:

Output 2.1: 1,000 households will have received assistance with improving their shelter

Output 2.2: 6,500 families will have received a timber or steel frame transitional shelter

As the programme has evolved, the targets have been adapted to incorporate self-sheltering solutions programming and as a consequence, the target for t-shelter construction has decreased to 5,000 households. This covers households who have received an IFRC shelter, directly, ie IFRC supplied and constructed, or indirectly, ie IFRC provides materials and assistance and project management is led by a Red Cross partner. Targets for partner implementation of IFRC-supplied t-shelters are: French Red Cross x 2,500, Norwegian Red Cross x 700, and Canadian Red Cross x 195.

IFRC has directly implemented t-shelter projects in four sites: Annexe de la Mairie (on land provided by the local mairie), La Piste (on land provided by the national government), and is assisting decongestion of camps at Carradeux, St Louis Gonzague, Annexe de la Mairie, Delmas 75, Simon Pele, Croix de Bouquets and Lilavoi.

Of the IFRC's target of 7,500 shelter solutions, the following results have been achieved as at 31 August 2011:

- | | |
|--|-------|
| • T-shelters supplied and constructed by IFRC | 943 |
| • T-shelters supplied by IFRC and constructed by French Red Cross | 1,816 |
| • T-shelters supplied by IFRC and constructed by Norwegian Red Cross | 418 |
| • T-shelters supplied by IFRC and constructed by Canadian Red Cross | 195 |
| • IFRC facilitated self-sheltering solutions (<i>Port-au-Prince and regions</i>) | 1,831 |
| <i>Total</i> | 5,203 |

All IFRC shelter solutions include water and sanitation components and, depending on the beneficiary's circumstances, a settlement grant of USD500, and livelihoods interventions.

[Self Sheltering Solutions project](#) for internally displaced persons living in Port-au-Prince:

The *settlement approach* offers a framework of support to communities and infrastructure, integrating other sectors such as water, sanitation and education, and often described through economic and social 'livelihoods'. This widens the understanding of shelter to include support to all of the settlement options

	<p>chosen by affected populations, including host families, rental accommodation and, where necessary, camps. In choosing between options, families and groups can make best use of their coping strategies for livelihoods, community development and security. In supporting only shelter and housing, both governments and the international community respond to only a small proportion of the reconstruction priorities of affected populations, in terms of how disasters impact their communities and livelihoods.</p> <p>In the self sheltering solutions project a series of packages has been developed from which the family can choose depending on what will best enable them to return to a semblance of normal life in other parts of the city, or in towns outside the capital. The livelihoods grant is given in two instalments with the person involved in attending monthly meetings with staff to monitor their progress⁹⁶.</p> <p>The t-shelter project is scheduled for completion by 31 December 2011; the self-sheltering solutions project will continue through 2012.</p> <p>Note: The review will not address emergency shelter or permanent shelter.</p>
<p>3.</p>	<p>Review Purpose and Scope</p> <p>The purpose of the review is to assess the appropriateness of the methodology adopted by the IFRC Shelter team in Haiti, assess the quality and effectiveness of the shelter solutions delivered – both technically and according to beneficiary experiences, and provide guidance and recommendations to enhance programme effectiveness.</p>
<p>3.1</p>	<p>Purpose/overall objective</p> <p>The review will assess the two major components of the IFRC’s Shelter programme in Haiti:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The T-shelter project: this project is ahead of its scheduled 31 December 2011 completion date. The review shall provide information to the IFRC shelter team on the degree of beneficiary satisfaction with their t-shelter, highlight any issues that can be resolved prior to project completion, and reinforce and influence the t-shelter project exit strategy (as necessary). • The Self Sheltering Solutions project: commenced in September 2010 and will continue through 2012. The review will assist in the formation of the next phase of the project.
<p>3.2</p>	<p>Scope</p> <p>The review will assess the overall approach and effectiveness of the Shelter programme, looking particularly at the t-shelter and self-sheltering solutions projects. Supporting inputs of re-settlement grants, livelihoods interventions, rubble reprocessing, social infrastructure and mitigation works are to be assessed as part of the shelter packages offered and are not subject to specific project review under this mid-term review.</p> <p>It is envisaged that the review team members will visit IFRC t-shelter locations in Port-au-Prince, ie Annexe de la Mairie, La Piste, Carradeaux, and St Louis Gonzague, and locations inside and outside of Port-au-Prince in which self-sheltering solutions such as rental accommodation has been adopted. The small IFRC t-shelter project in St Marc (three hours from Port-au-Prince by road) may be visited if time permits. It is further envisaged that team members shall visit t-shelter sites where IFRC has supplied materials and</p>

⁹⁶Refer Attachment A for more information about the settlement approach and details of self sheltering solution options.

	<p>assistance to the t-shelter projects implemented by French Red Cross and Norwegian Red Cross.</p> <p>In order to accurately assess the occupancy rates and beneficiary satisfaction levels it is envisaged that the review team will interact with the widest cross-section of the beneficiary community as possible, and will include engagement with people with disabilities, female-headed householders, and especially vulnerable groups such as the elderly.</p>
<p>4.</p> <p>4.1</p>	<p>Evaluation Objectives and Criteria</p> <p>Objectives</p> <p><i>Overall objective:</i> to assess the appropriateness, effectiveness and quality of the IFRC’s Shelter programme in Haiti according to the opinions and experiences of beneficiary households and communities, as well as review of the programme’s methodology and technical outputs.</p> <p><i>Specific objectives:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the shelter programme process/es and advice and guidance into how the process can be further strengthened; • The extent of beneficiary satisfaction and ownership, considering factors of appropriateness, relevance and implementation. • Major landmarks in the programme timeline, including key achievements, challenges, constraints, gaps and resources and capacities. • Quality and sustainability of the technical aspects of the shelter programme, including t-shelters and self-sheltering solutions (where relevant). • Profile of best examples of modifications made to t-shelters by beneficiaries, including extensions, second door, electricity etc.) • Cost efficiency and cost analysis of different shelter solutions with analysis of what has been the most appropriate use of resources. <p>The results of the review will inform future shelter programme planning including exit planning.</p>
<p>4.2</p>	<p>Evaluation criteria</p> <p>It is anticipated that the review will provide insight into the extent to which the programme is addressing the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Where to build <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Land and property rights:</i> what are the challenges and are they being appropriately addressed? 2. <i>Site selection for building upon or for relocation:</i> are the sites appropriate for the construction activities undertaken, or for relocation as appropriate? 3. <i>Site preparation and mitigation works, e.g. gabion walls:</i> how appropriate and effective are these works? 4. <i>Watsan:</i> were factors such as water availability, space considerations for latrines, depth to groundwater appropriately considered in site selection? • Planning <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. <i>T-shelter sites:</i> were the t-shelter sites, e.g. La Piste and Annexe de la Mairie, appropriately planned and configured for the Haitian context?

	<p>6. <i>Comprehensiveness</i>: to what extent were concerns including children, gender, people with disabilities, vulnerability, and poverty implications taken into account in programme design and implementation?</p> <p>7. <i>Consultation</i>: how effectively were shelter plans communicated with key departments, i.e. logistics, water and sanitation, and beneficiary communications?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Beneficiaries criteria <p>8. <i>Displaced and non-displaced</i>: was the criteria fair and balanced?</p> • Participation <p>9. <i>Beneficiaries</i>: how are beneficiary communities engaged in the shelter programme activities? Is the engagement appropriate and can it be improved?</p> <p>10. <i>Local governments</i>: are local authorities appropriately consulted in shelter programme activities?</p> <p>11. <i>Other actors</i>: is the involvement of other actors in key activities, e.g. outsourcing watsan activities, appropriate? Were roles and responsibilities clearly articulated and agreed?</p> • Project Implementation Methodology <p>12. <i>Support services</i>: how timely and efficient are the key support services, i.e. logistics and finance to the shelter programme?</p> <p>13. <i>Monitoring</i>: are monitoring mechanisms appropriate to the projects, i.e. t-shelter and self-sheltering solutions? Is the data reliable and verifiable? Are challenges and obstacles appropriately recorded and reported? What beneficiary feedback processes are utilised and how is the team responding to feedback received? What improvements could be made to enhance monitoring activities?</p> • Technical characteristics of designs <p>14. Have the following characteristics been appropriately addressed in construction activities?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Standards reached (surface, ventilation, etc.) ▪ Climate conditions, including disaster resistance considerations ▪ Priorities taken to define the design and evolution of design ▪ Local materials, imported materials, appropriateness ▪ Other local materials, tools or resources (eg. pre-assembly factory established to be handover to people) • Supervision of the construction process <p>15. <i>Site supervision</i>: are site supervisors adequately identifying and resolving issues arising and maintaining quality controls at construction sites?</p> <p>16. <i>Technical capacities/skills transferred</i>: how has the Shelter programme developed the skills and capacities of national staff and local communities? How useful and effective has the training been, and are there opportunities for further training development?</p> • Sustainability <p>17. How has sustainability been considered in the programme? What are the sustainability issues to be addressed?</p>
5.	<p>Review methodology</p> <p>It is intended that data gathering will be drawn from two review styles:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Participatory Project Review (PPR), and 2. Technical assessment of the shelter solutions process and outputs <p>Expected activities will include (though not limited to):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review of documentation held by the IFRC Shelter team in Haiti

- Beneficiary surveying (via the IVR)
- Household surveys
- Beneficiary focus groups via PPR (see below)
- Stakeholder interviews: Haitian Red Cross, Partner National Societies, IFRC Shelter Movement Coordinator, IFRC Watsan, Haven (supporting latrine construction), CHF, external stakeholders, such as the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC)

Technical review methodology will be developed in consultation with technical reviewers.

One reviewer will be dedicated to the PPR process and will work closely with the Haiti Shelter team to facilitate this process.

Participatory Programme Review (PPR) is a form of internal evaluation utilising a combination of participatory methodologies that should be tailored towards specific project evaluation needs. The methodology draws heavily from that of Empowerment Evaluation, as developed by David M. Fetterman,⁹⁷ as well as the Most Significant Change (MSC) technique as developed by Rick Davies and Jessica Dart.⁹⁸ The PPR approach seeks to help programmes/projects use a form of self-evaluation and reflection where, “program participants – including clients – conduct their own evaluations; an outside evaluator often serves as a coach or additional facilitator depending on internal program capabilities...The group thus can serve as a check on its own members, moderating the various biases and agendas of individual participants. The evaluator is a co-equal in this endeavor, not a superior and not a servant; as a critical friend, the evaluator can question shared biases or *group think*” (Fetterman 2001).

The PPR component of the review will be led by IFRC staff with direct experience in programme formulation and evaluations in reconstruction programmes, community development and volunteering in different country contexts in the Americas. Given the community based approach of the programme it is necessary that the person be able to easily communicate in spoken and written French and be familiar with the local context.

The PPR will be facilitated by a French/Creole speaking person who has conducted such evaluations before. It will first be conducted with the programme team, during which several members will be identified to be trained as trainers. Multiple PPRs can then be facilitated to include a convenience sample from the target communities according to the time and capacity of the project team. Information can then be analysed by PPR participants to create a larger picture of the project for review and evaluation.

PPRs will be undertaken with the following groups:

- 3 groups of families that have resettled in Port-au-Prince in the last nine months and have received the livelihoods grant
- 1 group of families that have returned to the provinces and have received the livelihoods grants
- 3 groups of families that have had a t-shelter built on private land and received a livelihoods grant
- 2 groups of families that have received a t-shelter in a planned camp and have received a livelihoods grant within the last six months.

To assist in reaching as broadly across the beneficiary community as possible, IFRC intends making use of the soon-to-be-installed Interactive Voice Response (IVR) hub at Haitian Red Cross Base Camp in Port-au-

⁹⁷Fetterman, D. M. 2001. Foundations of Empowerment Evaluation. Sage Publications. Thousand Oaks, London, New Deli.

⁹⁸Davies, Rick and Jess Dart. 2005. “The ‘Most Significant Chang’ (MSC) Technique.” Freely available at www.mande.co.uk/docs/MSCGuide.htm and www.clearhorizon.com.au

	<p>Prince. The IVR will make possible the use of a simple survey that can be sent to all shelter programme beneficiaries via mobile phone. It is anticipated that should the IVR be installed in time, the shelter survey will be conducted and the results available to the review team for inclusion in the shelter review report.</p>
<p>6.</p>	<p>Deliverables/outputs</p> <p>It is expected that the review team will produce a report that addresses the objectives of the evaluation, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The appropriateness and effectiveness of the approach and processes adopted by the IFRC Shelter team in Haiti. • Concise written reports of each PPR, with a synthesis of the PPR learnings to be featured in the review report. • Percentage of occupied/unoccupied shelters, occupied shelters to be disaggregated by original/new occupants and by type of shelter solution provided. • Case studies representing the experiences of a diverse selection of beneficiaries • Recommendations to inform future shelter programming in Haiti, and more broadly and if relevant, to direct adjustments and improvement to be made before the end of the projects. • Review exit strategies and make recommendations for managing the impact of the exit process. <p>The report should follow the following headings:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Executive summary 2. Abbreviations/acronyms 3. Introduction 4. Literature review 5. Review aims and objectives 6. Methodology 7. Findings 8. Recommendations 9. Conclusion 10. Appendices
<p>7.</p>	<p>Proposed Timeline/Schedule</p> <p>The proposed schedule for the evaluation is as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Haiti: desk review, survey tool development, and data gathering x 17 days (preferably commencing in Haiti on 31 October 2011) • Presentation of preliminary findings in Haiti (mid November) • Final report due to IFRC: 30 November 2011
<p>8.</p>	<p>Evaluation Quality & Ethical Standards</p> <p>The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of people and the communities of which they are members, and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate, reliable, and legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organisational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and specific, applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Evaluation Framework accompanying the TOR.</p>

	<p>The IFRC Evaluation Standards are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Utility: Evaluations must be useful and used. 2. Feasibility: Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost effective manner. 3. Ethics & Legality: Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation. 4. Impartiality & Independence: Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders. 5. Transparency: Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency. 6. Accuracy: Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined. 7. Participation: Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate. 8. Collaboration: Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation. <p>It is also expected that the review will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5) voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about these principles at: www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp</p>
9.	<p>Review Team & Qualifications</p> <p>IFRC is seeking to form a team of up to three (3) professionals to undertake this review. It is anticipated that the following skills and experience will be represented in the review team:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring and evaluation: with practical experience in Participatory Project Review (PPR) methodology; able to lead the PPR exercise in Haiti. • Shelter programming: experienced in programme design and implementation as well as monitoring, assessing, and evaluating shelter projects • Water and sanitation: experienced in designing and implementing water and sanitation as part of shelter programming; experience preferred in monitoring and evaluation of shelter/watsan projects. • Risk Mitigation: experience is assessing risk in urban shelter programming. <p>All team members will have the following qualifications and competencies:</p> <p>Essential:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tertiary qualifications in relevant technical discipline • Excellent writing and presentation skills in English • Experience in survey design and sampling • Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings • Experience in participatory approaches to evaluations <p>Preferred:</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ability to converse comfortably in French and/or Creole. <p>Note: the final report will be made available to the readership in both English and French languages. IFRC in Haiti can assist with translation services.</p>
<p>10.</p>	<p>Application Procedures</p> <p>Applications are to be submitted by 19 October 2011 to Paula Fitzgerald, Technical Adviser – Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, IFRC Haiti paula.fitzgerald@ifrc.org, and must include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • curriculum vitae (CV) • references x 3 • daily rate • 3-page sample of writing that the applicant has solely authored.
<p>11.</p>	<p>Appendices</p> <p>A Self-sheltering solutions brief</p>

Appendix A: Participatory project review of the self sheltering solutions project for internally displaced persons living in Port-au-Prince

The '*settlement approach*' offers a framework of support to communities and infrastructure, integrating other sectors such as water and education, and often described through economic and social '*livelihoods*'. This widens the understanding of shelter to include support to all of the settlement options chosen by affected populations, including host families, rental accommodation and, where necessary, camps. In choosing between options, families and groups can make best use of their coping strategies for livelihoods, community development, and security. In supporting only shelter and housing, both governments and the international community respond to only a small proportion of the reconstruction priorities of affected populations, in terms of how disasters impact their communities and livelihoods. www.aidworkers.net/files/Shelter%20Centre%20Summary.doc

Core shelters offer an opportunity for implementing a more integrated service delivery programme to provide for the range of needs required by those affected by the earthquake. To facilitate this, the project was set up to address housing, water and sanitation, as well as livelihoods issues. An integrated team in the field identifies a target population in one of the selected geographic areas. One of the key motivations for this is to test out transitional shelter processes to ensure appropriateness. This includes assessing design, site selection and preparation, community involvement, timing for the process, and staff and volunteer requirements. The results can then be analysed, adjustments made and then replicated in other areas. It also allows for joint planning, implementation and monitoring mechanisms to be developed and refined before being applied on a larger scale.

The intervention planned is based on the assessments where families identify three areas that would help them to move forwards: an improved shelter solution, support for livelihoods to allow them to place regular food on the table and plan for the future, and an option to help their children to return to school. Towards this end the planned intervention is described below.

In the case of the Port au Prince internally displaced camps where the IFRC is working, there is not enough land available on the site for the numbers of families who stated they would remain on the site and build transitional shelters. It was estimated that at least two thirds of families would have to move to alternative shelter solutions for the transitional shelters to be built on the site. Innovative approaches are the key to moving the population forwards to safer shelter solutions and transitional shelters on other sites. The information gathered led the team to propose a multipronged approach that served to improve the shelter environment of the families currently in the camp by providing them with a transitional shelter.

Haiti suffers from chronic under and unemployment issues and an unconditional grant would be the opportunity for many families to re establish themselves as part of the workforce, be it in small business ventures, skilled labourers with tools, independent tradespersons or finance other aspects of their lives that need support such as payment of school fees or outstanding debts that they may have incurred.

In the self sheltering solutions project a series of packages has been developed from which the family can choose depending on what would best enable them to return to a semblance of normal life in other parts of the city, or in towns and also help them establish themselves once again. The livelihoods grant is given in two instalments with the person involved attending monthly meetings with staff to monitor how they are managing to get back aspects of their lives.

Families who own houses or land where they can build a transitional shelter: Though the numbers of persons who state that they were property owners in the past or have a house are limited there are some and they could be offered options to move back to where their house was or to a piece of land that they can show ownership of. In this case cash for work (CFW) involving people residing in the camp could be undertaken to either clear the land of debris or organic matter if it is the case of an empty block of land. These people would then have access to a transitional shelter and a small unconditional grant to help them to re-enter the employment market.

Families who have the opportunity to move to a plot of land:

There are people who are living in the camps and have gotten to know their neighbours and now have an opportunity to help them, or people who know someone who has a plot of land and have said that they would be able to reside on the plot for two years. With these people they would need to produce a document signed by their neighbour/friend that states that they can live on the land for two years and a copy of the ownership documents of the owner and their identification to have access to option 3, a number of people have come forwards to state that this would be possible for them to move from the camps.

Families who have green houses that require simple work to make them habitable:

There are persons who have houses that have been classified green and would like to return to their homes if they had the resources to repair minor aspects of their dwelling. These persons would be offered a cash or voucher system whereby they could go and access the materials they needed to improve their home and also an unconditional grant that would allow them to either buy tools and set up a business or use towards aspects of their activities. A training on earthquake resistant construction will be offered to enable them to take the learning's into consideration for future construction that they may be involved in. This training will be compulsory for all those that are involved in the voucher option.

Families who can move to a host family:

Some families have stated that they would like to return to the provinces where they came if they were able to receive a shelter and some support to enable to re-enter the employment market. This group could be assessed to see if they can be supported with a transitional shelter (especially in the case where a number of families are moving to the same area) and an economic package. It could be possible to coordinate with other PNS if people are planning to move to areas where they are engaged in transitional shelter construction. There are families who know of alternative accommodation that they could utilise with some financial support they would receive a conditional grant that would allow them to move to the alternative accommodation.

Families with no option but to stay in the camps:

There are families that will have no option but to remain on the site and as long as there is enough land transitional shelters will be built on the site to accommodate them. It is important that the most vulnerable that have no other option are identified for building on the current site. For these families there is also the struggle to find employment opportunities and so an unconditional grant will be given to them so that they buy what they require to re-enter the workforce.

Cash interventions can be used to meet any need for which there is a private market. The cash transfers described in this project are intended to enable recipients to obtain goods and services directly from local traders and service providers. The International Federation is not directly involved in the procurement, transportation, or provision of goods and services. Cash transfers often therefore meet people's needs more quickly than commodity distribution, because they reduce the logistics involved. At the same time, they stimulate the local economy. Moreover, cash transfers are more dignified than in-kind distributions (of items such as food aid, jerry cans, cooking stoves, seeds, and tools), because they give disaster-affected populations the option of prioritizing their needs and spending on what they need first to help them move on.

Many of the households were involved in small business or found work by being able to present to a site with their own equipment/tools, much of this was lost in the earthquake. Initially a small group of women will be asked to present a small business idea, and also give details of how they made their living prior to the earthquake. These business ideas and plans will be seen by the team discussed with the women individually to see how in fact they would put the action into place. Once they have been given a grant this will be followed up by monthly meetings to see how families are getting on and also to see how the shelter solution that they have opted for is allowing them to regain some of the way of life that they had before the earthquake. This would allow the International Federation to see how the support given them has impacted upon their lives.

The project considers, in the area of inclusion that the effort to overcome poverty and social exclusion must be kept and must be extended to improve the situation of the people exposed to the highest risk to remain in poverty and in exclusion, such as occasional workers, the unemployed, single headed households (mostly by women), older persons living by themselves, families responsible for several persons, vulnerable children, as well as ethnic minorities, the sick, disabled or homeless people. These people have all been included in the project.

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Emergency Transitional Shelter in Haiti, IFRC

Le kit Abris de la Federation, IFRC, 2010

Timber Estimate for Frame

Core Shelter/Transitional Shelter

T Shelter Agreements Table

IFRC Haiti Emergency and Transitional Shelter Options

Fiche d'identification des beneficiares

Core Wooden Frame Shelter 12 SQm

Core Wooden Frame Section, 12 SQm

10.3 People Interviewed

Norbert Allale	Head of Operations, Canadian Red Cross
Aaron Andersen	Shelter Programme, IFRC Haiti
Christoph Arnold	Shelter Programme, French Red Cross
Shir Shah Ayobi	Shelter Programme, Norwegian Red Cross, Petit Goave
Robert Barlin	Logistics, IFRC Haiti
James Bellamy	Shelter Programme, IFRC Haiti
Jenny Bistoyong	Livelihoods, IFRC Haiti
Didier Boissavi	Watsan Movement Coordinator, IFRC Haiti
Hugh Brennan	Shelter Programme, IFRC Haiti
Charity Dube	Human Resource Coordinator, IFRC Haiti
John Flemming	Health Coordinator, IFRC Haiti
Elony Flory	Shelter Programme, French Red Cross
Marcel Fortier	IFRC Haiti country representative
Karine Fournier	Shelter, Canadian Red Cross
Brigitte Gaillis	MOC Coordinator, IFRC Haiti
Xavier Genot	Shelter Movement Coordinator, IFRC Haiti
Dr Michaèle Gideon	President HRCS
Chris Howe	Rubble project, IFRC Haiti
Chris Jackson	Head of Operations, IFRC Haiti
Vyaskamlesh	Livelihoods Coordinator, IFRC Haiti
Franco Kabuela	Head of Finance, IFRC Haiti
Juliet Kerr	Violence Prevention Delegate, IFRC Haiti
Luis Luna	Humanitarian Diplomacy, IFRC Haiti
Steve McAndrew	Head of IFRC Haiti Operations
Janet Porter	Transition Coordinator, Canadian Red Cross
Regan Potangaroa	Shelter consultant, IFRF Haiti
Sharon Reader	Beneficiary Communications, IFRC Haiti
Graham Saunders	Head Shelter Department, IFRC Geneva
Matthew Schraeder	Cholera Operation, IFRC Haiti
Corrine Treherne	IFRC Shelter department, Geneva
Eduard Tschan	IFRC Representative, IFRC Haiti
Lorenzo Violante	Haiti Support Team Coordinator, IFRC Panama
KamleshVyas	Livelihoods Movement Coordinator, IFRC Haiti

Many other delegates and local staff contributed to the review and the development of ideas, but were not formally interviewed

Participatory Project Team from the Shelter Unit:

Joane Danger	Carli Jean-Baptiste
Islande Pierre	Adee Lindor
Johnny Florestal	PresumaLuscon
MacklayLafortune	Darismond Roberson
Jenny Timothee	DuquelRebert

10.4 Statistics

No	Work Description	Unit	Project Target	Actual Progress Volume	shelters received by H.H. that have left IDP camp	Remark
A. Shelters Delivered						
1	Canadian Red Cross	item	195	195	195	Completed
2	Norwegian Red Cross	item	700	601	482	
2	French Red Cross	item	1800	1816	1816	Completed
3	German Red Cross - Shelter upgrade	item	1000	0	0	Still to be confirmed
4	French Red Cross 2	item	400	80	0	
TOTAL			4095	2612	2493	
B.						
1	Prototype and community buildings	Shelter	38	38	0	Completed
2	St Marc	Shelter	36	36	36	Completed
3	Annexe de la Marie - camp settlement	Shelter	340	340	313	Completed
4	Annexe de la Marie - decongesting camp	Shelter	100	47	47	
5	La Piste	Shelter	372	368	373	Completed
6	Carraduex - decongestion	Shelter	200	152	127	
7	Carrafourfielle	Shelter	53	60	45	Completed
8	Saint Loius	Shelter	50	21	19	
9	Simon Pele	Shelter	5	7	5	Completed
10	Route Frere	Shelter	9	9	9	Completed
11	Lilovois	Shelter	6	6	5	Completed
12	Morancy	Shelter	69	69	49	Completed
13	Haitian Red Cross Benef.	Shelter	25	0	0	Completed
TOTAL			1303	1153	1028	
C.						
1	Carraduex Settlement Grants	item	500	380	380	These beneficiaries will be monitored and supported with livelihood grants over the following 12
2	Carraduex return to province	item	500	365	365	
3	Annexe de la Marie settlement grants	item	400	396	396	
4	Annexe de la Marie return to province	item	100	2	2	
5	St Louis Gonzag	item	778	591	591	
6	St Louis Gonzag return to province	item	200	195	195	

7	Simon Pele settlement grants	item	60	60	60	months. This will allow the shelter and settlement program to assess if these households are able to remain out of the camps for a period of 12 months +	
8	Simon Pele return to province	item	1	1	1		
9	Carrefour feille	item	6	6	6		
10	Carrefour feille return to province	item	1	1	1		
11	Croix De Bouquet	item	82	82	82		
12	Croix De Bouquet to province	item	21	21	21		
13	Lilovois	item	24	16	16		
14	Lilovois - return to province	item	2	2	2		
15	Craph	item	114	113	113		
16	Craph - return to province	item	6	6	6		
17	Delmas 75	item	36	36	36		
18	Delmas 75 - return to province	item	2	2	2		
19	Morancy	item	90	4	4		
20	JMV-return to province	item	15	22	13		
21	Haitian Red Cross Benef.	item	2	2	2		
22	Citi Militaire	item	47	47	47		
TOTAL			2987	2350	2341		
GRAND TOTAL			8385	6115	5862		


10.5 PPR Reports

10.5.1 Local staff from the Shelter Solutions Team. 10 male, 10 female.

PARTICIPATORY PROGRAMME REVIEW

- ✓ Vous etes le chef du solution shelter de logement que feriez vous differemment?
- DIFFERENTES IDEES NOMBRES DE VOTES

- 1) Disposition de terrain par le Gouvernement pour la construction des abris permanent . (72)
- 2) Aider les beneficiaires aux frais d'ecolage. (37)
- 3) Bonne collaboration entre les agents communautaire. (30)
- 4) La construction des latrines et des Shelters doivent se faire simultanement. (22)
- 5) Faisons la cooperative. (20)
- 6) Support Psychologique. (18)
- 7) Amelioration et Le suivi du ressensement. (16)
- 7) Differentes formations aux beneficiaires . (16)
- 8) Donner l'argent de livelihoods en un seul versement. (15)
- 9) La construction d'un marche aux beneficiaires. (14)
- 10) Creation d'emploi a la place du commerce . (13)
- 11) pas de 2^{eme} tranche pour ceux qui n'ont pas mis sur pied le petit commerce. (12)
- 12) Augmentation d'une piece quand il ya 10 personnes dans une famille. (0)



✓ Si vous étiez le responsable du programme Shelter solution que feriez vous pour aboutir à un meilleur résultat ?

❖ DIFFERENTES IDEES.

NOMBRES DE VOTES

- 1) Recruter des personnes formées, capable de réaliser le travail. (42)
- 2) Il faut l'inclusion de l'état pour efforcer les bénéficiaires à quitter le camp après avoir reçu l'argent. (36)
- 3) Servir les gens les plus vulnérables. (31)
- 4) Faisons une rencontre mensuelle aux différents responsables des activités. (20)
- 5) Sensibilisation et formation des bénéficiaires. (15)
- 5) Il ne faut plus faire la 3^{ème} réunion. (15)
- 6) Répartition des tâches. (13)
- 7) Assurer que le chef de famille reçoit l'argent. (8)
- 7) Vérifier et sanctionner les bénéficiaires fautifs. (8)
- 8) Dresser un rapport sur les erreurs trouvées dans le programme. (7)
- 9) Faisons le suivi du programme. (2)
- 10) Éliminer la visite des maisons afin de faciliter le travail. (0)



Chef de l'équipe: Danger Joane

Lindor Adee, Presuma Lucson, Lafortune Mackenson

10.5.2 La Piste camp. 10 male, 10 female including 5 handicapped.

PARTICIPATORY PROGRAMME REVIEW

❖ Etes vous satisfaits de votre T-Shelter?

Différentes idées		Nombre de voix
Tres Satisfait		(9)
Satisfait		(3)
Un Peu Satisfait		(8)
Pas Satisfait		(0)
Vraiment Pas Satisfait		(0)

❖ Faites une liste des problemes que vous avez eu avec votre T-Shelter

Plywood Usé	(6)
Maison avec toiture endommagée	(6)
Probleme des bestioles nuisibles	(4)
Les portes des maisons sont de mauvaises qualities	(10)
Les fenentres sont en mauvaises etats	(2)
Les galleries n'ont pas assez d'espace	(1)
Betonner les galleries	(2)
Les T- Shelter sont places au meme endroit que les latrines	(2)
Ils n'aiment pas les latrines	(1)
Probleme d'insecurite	(1)
Peindre les T-Shelter	(2)
Nettoyer les latrines	(2)

- **Avez-vous ameliore votre T-Shelter**
- La separation de mon T-Shelter en deux parties (13)
- J'ai un jardin derriere la maison (4)
- Je n'ai porte aucun changement (4)
- J'ai plafonner la maison (2)
- J'ai un espace ou je garde les bêtes (1)
- Cloture la maison (2)
- Fermer la galerie avec des tapis (5)
- Placer les mosaïques sur le plancher (2)

➤ **En quoi avez vous utilisez les \$150?**

- Il y a eu un beneficiaire qui n'a pas eu les \$ 150 (1)
- J'ai renbourse mes dettes (2)
- J'ai acquitte les frais d'ecolage (1)
- J'ai approvisionne ma maison (5)
- J'ai meuble ma maison (2)
- J'ai Cree mon petit commerce (6)

Avez vous installer l'electricite?

- Oui (9)
- Non (11)

Avez vous une zone de caisson couverte (Cuisine)?

- Oui (0)
- Non (20)



Period the T Shelter will remain habitable

	Without repairs	With repairs
Un an sans aide	(5)	(0)
Deux ans sans aide	(6)	(1)
Trois ans Sans aide	(6)	(3)
Quatre ans sans aide	(1)	(1)
Cinq ans sans aide	(2)	(6)
Six ans sans aide	(0)	(5)
Sept ans sans aide	(0)	(0)
Huit ans sans aide	(0)	(0)
Neuf ans sans aide	(0)	(0)
Dix ans sans aide	(0)	(4)
Plus que dix ans	(0)	(0)

Quand la pluie tombe comment faites vous pour cuisiner ?

A l'intérieur de la maison	(9)
Sur la galerie	(11)

Que feriez vous après que le contrat de deux ans prendra fin ?

Après deux ans je vais rester sans rien faire	(0)
Plus d'espoir	(0)
Je chercherai du travail	(8)
Espoir en Dieu	(89)
Je serai très inquiet	(0)
Espoir en Croix Rouge	(2)
On sollicite des abris définitifs	(51)
Espoir d'avoir ma propre maison	(7)
Renouveler le contrat	(24)

Chef d'équipe : TIMOTHE Jenny
DUQUEL Rebert
DANGER Joane
FLORESTAL Jhonny

10.5.3 Annex de la Marie camp. 10 male, 10 female.

RAPPORT

Le 25-01-2012

PARTICIPATORY PROGRAMME REVIEW

Etes vous satisfait de votre T-Shelter?

Très satisfait	(6)
Satisfait	(12)
Un p'tit peu satisfait	(0)
Insatisfait	(1)
Vraiment pas satisfait	(1)

2) Faites une liste des problèmes que vous avez eu avec votre T-Shelter

1) Les portes ont des Problèmes de serrures	(7)
2) Les toitures sont endommagées	(5)
3) Quand il pleut l'eau pénètre dans le Shelter	(4)
4) Les fenêtres ont des problèmes serrures	(3)
5) Problème sanitaire	(2)
5) Mon Shelter est en bon état	(2)
5) L'absence du drainage causant trop de boue dans le shelter.	(2)
6) En cueillant les mangues les pierres tombent sur le shelter.	(1)
6) Problème de rat qui fait rage dans le shelter.	(1)
6) La déformation des plywoods	(1)
6) Les galeries sont inachevées	(1)
6) Leshelter ont des problèmes de pignon.	(1)
6) Les douches ont de problèmes	(1)

3) Avez-vous amélioré votre T-Shelter(Clotures , coin cuisine, etc.patio)?

What alterations did you make to your house ?

- | | |
|------------------------------------|------|
| 1) Nous avons cimenté nos shelters | (11) |
| 2) On a fait de jardins | (6) |
| 3) On a séparé nos shelters | (5) |
| 4) Je n'ai rien encore fait | (3) |
| 4) On a fermé la galerie | (3) |
| 5) On a fait la galerie | (2) |
| 6) J'ai aménagé mon Shelter | (1) |



4) En quoi avez vous utilisé les \$150 (Household Grant)?

Différentes idées

Nombre de voix

- | | |
|--|-----|
| 1) On a utilisé pour les frais d'écolage | (8) |
| 2) On a mis sur pied un petit commerce | (4) |
| 2) L'argent a été utilisé pour la nourriture | (4) |
| 3) L'argent a été utilisé pour la maladie | (2) |
| 3) J'ai remboursé mes dettes | (2) |
| 4) J'ai utilisé l'argent pour aménager mon shelter | (1) |
| 4) J'ai escompté l'argent | (1) |

5) Avez vous installé l'électricité?

Oui

Non

9

11



6) Avez-vous une zone de cuisson couverte ?

Oui	Non
10	10

7) Lorsque la pluie tombe, comment faites-vous pour cuisiner ?

Différentes idées	Nombre de voix
a) A l'intérieur du Shelter	(2)
b) Sur la galerie	(5)
c) Il ne cuisine pas sur le camp	(3)

8) Combien d'années pensez-vous que votre shelter vous durera ?

Différentes idées	Sans aide	Avec aide
	Nombre de voix	Nombre de voix
1 an	2 personnes	0 personnes
2 ans	3	1
3 ans	4	0
4 ans	2	1
5 ans	2	2
6 ans	2	1
7 ans	2	0
8 ans	1	1
9 ans	0	0
10 ans et plus	2	14

9) Que feriez vous après que le contrat de deux ans prendra fin ?

Différentes idées voix	Nombre de
1) Que la Croix-Rouge renouele le contrat.	(66)
2) On remerciera la Croix-Rouge	(19)
3) Que l'état prenne sa responsabilité envers-nous.	(16)
4) Notre espoir sur la Croix-Rouge.	(15)
5) On a pas d'autre endroit pour aller.	(14)
6) Sollicite un autre terrain pour déposer le shelter.	(7)
7) Je chercherai un autre shelter.	(0)

Chef d'équipe :LafortuneMackenson

CarlieJnbaptiste

JhonnyFlorestal

Islande Pierre



10.5.4 Renters having received 1st Livelihoods Grant
Twenty participants: 10 male, 10 female

Original document available from Technical Coordination Unit, IFRC Port au Prince

10.5.5 Renters having received 2nd Livelihoods Grant
Nineteen participants, 12 female, 7 male

Original document available from Technical Coordination Unit, IFRC Port au Prince

10.5.6 T Shelter occupiers on individual plots
Twenty participants, 10 male, ten female

Original document available from Technical Coordination Unit, IFRC Port au Prince

10.5.7 T Shelter occupiers, French Red Cross, Croix des Bouquets
Cancelled

10.5.8 Women from T Shelters in camps, rentals and individual T Shelter plots
Twenty participants, female

Original document available from Technical Coordination Unit, IFRC Port au Prince

10.5.9 IFRC Construction teams local staff
Twenty participants, all male

Original document available from Technical Coordination Unit, IFRC Port au Prince

10.5.10 Renters in the provinces
Twenty participants, 13 female, 7 male

Original document available from Technical Coordination Unit, IFRC Port au Prince

10.6 PPR Timeframe

1. CALENDAR

DATE	ACTIVITY	Sub-group	LOCATION	RESPONSIBLE
Thursday 19 th Jan	Plan questions		n/a	Peter
Friday 20 th Jan	Planning and PPR ToT		Meeting room HQ	Ascension
Saturday 21 st Jan	Plan PPR visits		Shelter	PPR Team
Sunday 22 nd Jan	Report writing		n/a	Peter
Monday 23 rd Jan	PPR Shelter solutions team		Training room	PPRT
Tuesday 24 th Jan	PPR La Piste		Training room	PPRT
Wednesday 25 th Jan	PPR Annex la Marie		Training room	PPRT
Thursday 26 th Jan	Renters # 1	1 st L Grant	Training Room	PPRT
Friday 27 th Jan	Renters # 2	2 nd L Grant		PPRT
Saturday 28 th Jan	PPR Team review		Shelter	Peter
Sunday 29 th Jan	Report writing		n/a	Peter
Monday 30 th Jan	Ind T Shelters Phone provinces		Training room	PPRT
Tuesday 31 st Jan	Croix des Bouquets Phone provinces		Croix Bouquets	PPRT/FRC
Wednesday 1 st Feb	Construction team	IFRC staff	Training room	PPRT
Thursday 2 nd Feb	Women	Mixed sols	Training room	PPRT
Friday 3 rd Feb	Feedback session Report writing	10.00 am		Paula
Saturday 4 th Feb	Report writing			

10.7 PPR Questions

QUESTIONS

Additional to standard PPR methodology dealing with the 'most significant change' and 'the future'

1. IFRC T Shelters - camps

- a) Are you happy with your house? 1-5
- b) List any problems with your house. List
- c) Did you improve your shelter (eg fencing, cooking area, patio, etc) ? List
- d) What did you use your \$ 150 Household Grant on? List
- e) Did you install electricity? Yes/No
- f) Do you have a covered cooking area? Yes/No
- g) How many years do you think your shelter will last? Post it
- h) What will you do after the two year agreement ends? Post it

2. French Red Cross T Shelters

- a) Are you happy with your house? 1-5
- b) List any problems with your house. List
- c) Did you improve your shelter (eg fencing, cooking area, patio, etc) ? List
- d) Did you install electricity? Yes/No
- e) Do you have a covered cooking area? Yes/No
- f) If you had a Household Grant of \$ 150, what would you spend it on to improve your house, either contents or structure? List
- g) How far do you walk to get water? (time spent to walk to water). Post it
- h) How many years do you think your shelter will last? Post it
- i) What will you do after the two year agreement ends? Post it

3. T Shelters individual plots

- a) Are you happy with your house? 1-5
- b) List any problems with your house. List
- c) Did you improve your shelter (eg fencing, cooking area, patio, etc) ? List
- d) Did you install electricity? Yes/No
- e) Do you have a covered cooking area? Yes/No
- f) What did you use your \$ 150 Household grant on? List
- g) How far do you walk to get water? (time spent to walk to water)

4. Renters Port au Prince

- a) Are you happy with your house? 1-5
- b) What problems did you have with your accommodation
- c) Did you make improvements to your house? List
- d) Do you have a covered cooking area? Yes/No
- e) What will you do/did you do after the 12 months rent supports ends/ended? Discuss

5. Shelter solutions teams

- a) You are Head of Shelter Solutions. What would you do differently? Post it
- b) How could we make the programme more efficient? Post it.

6. Construction teams

- a) You are Head of the T Shelter programme. What would you do differently? Post it
- b) How could we improve construction quality? Post it
- c) How could we include construction efficiency? Post it
- d) How many years do you think the T Shelters will last? Post it

7. Women

- a) What was the best thing about your shelter solution? Post it
- b) How could we make the shelter programme better for women/elderly? Post it (prompt ref cooking area, lighting, steps, etc).
- c) Do you feel safer since your shelter solution? Yes/No

8. Renters in the provinces: telephone interviews

- a) How satisfied are you with your rental solution? 1-5
- b) What problems have you faced in your accommodation? List
- c) Have you made any physical improvements to your accommodation? List
- d) What do you plan to do when your rent support ends? Record



Strategy 2020 voices the collective determination of the IFRC to move forward in tackling the major challenges that confront humanity in the next decade. Informed by the needs and vulnerabilities of the diverse communities with whom we work, as well as the basic rights and freedoms to which all are entitled, this strategy seeks to benefit all who look to Red Cross Red Crescent to help to build a more humane, dignified, and peaceful world.

Over the next ten years, the collective focus of the IFRC will be on achieving the following strategic aims:

1. Save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disasters and crises
 2. Enable healthy and safe living
 3. Promote social inclusion and a culture of non-violence and peace
-